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The research on which this thesis is based investigated the significance of gender in the 
agrarian reform and farrn restructuring process which has been conducted in Kazakhstan 
since 1991. Through detailed ethnographic study of rural communities, it explored how the 
macro level framing of rural development policy as privatisation was impacting on gender 
relations at micro level and how gender was interwoven with the emerging patterns of social 
and economic stratification. 
The thesis argues that farm privatisation has been a gendered process. On one level, taking 
'privatisation' in a primary sense, as a planned programme of structural change, the 
redistribution of land and assets is having specific consequences for women in terms of 
entitlement and property rights. On another level, privatisation can also be understood in a 
second, broader, sense, as a shift in the balance between public (state) and private (domestic) 
spheres. From this perspective, the corollary of the withdrawal of the state as a provider of 
employment and services in rural areas is that households are increasingly reliant for survival 
on the 'private' resources of family, kin and social networks of various kinds. Local ideas 
about gender roles, that I term the 'rural gender contract', have been instrumental in shaping 
how women and men have been affected by and reacted to these changes. At the same time, 
the 'rural gender contract' itself has been challenged by them. 
The thesis thereby contributes to the emerging anthropological literature on postsocialist 
societies, which explores how communities and individuals are experiencing radical 
transformation and how their reactions are shaping local strategies and economies in ways 
often unforeseen by policy makers. 
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Note on Terminology and Transliteration 
My transliteration of Russian and Kazak words into English follows the US Library of 
Congress system. Contemporary Kazak uses a modified form of the cyrillic alphabet adopted 
in 1940. For the Kazak letters that do not appear in the Russian cyrillic alphabet, I have used 
the transliteration system in Edward Allworth, ed. Nationalities of the Soviet East. 
Publications and Writing Systems. (NY and London: Columbia University Press, 1971: 332). 
The official international latinised name of the country is now Kazakstan and I have 
followed this spelling rather than the more usual Kazakhstan or Kazakh. However, since I 
am not a Kazak linguist and since most of the local sources cited are in Russian, I have used 
the conventional Russian spellings for some place names and terms - for example, 
Karaganda instead of Qarag-andy. Lastly, for some recurring terms, such as oblast'. I have 
removed the final soft sign ('). 
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aul* Kazak settlement, referr ing both to a herding encampment and a 
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babushka grandmother, old lady. 
bai* In pre-soviet Kazak society, aul or clan leader; now used to refer to 
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baibishe* Senior wife 
bardak* Collapse and chaos 
baursaq Kazak bread 
besbarmak* Traditional dish of horsemeat or mutton and pasta, served during 
feasts 
blat The use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods 
and services in short supply and to find a way around formal 
procedures 
chastniki Local word for private farmers 
chelnoki 'Shuttle-traders': (mainly) women, who travel to larger towns or 
abroad to buy cheap goods to resell at higher prices. 
chernaya kassa work-collective-based women's credit groups 
dedushka (ded) grandfather, old man 
enshi* Share in inheritance of household property and livestock 
fenna outlying section of a state farm 
glasnost' policy of openness launched in the USSR in the 1980s 
Goskomzem State Committee for Land Relations and Land Management 
Gosudarsvennyi 
Akt na Zemlyu official land certificate 
viii 
gulyanka office party 
imushchestvennyi pai share of assets 
kalym* bride wealth 
khozyain owner, head of household, husband 
khozyaika owner, mistress of the house, wife 
kokteu* Spring pasture 
kolkhoz collective farm 
kollektiv Russian term for a work collective, used to refer to both the entire 
workforce of an enterprise, such as a state farm, and to its individual 
subdivisions 
kommertsanty traders 
kontora state farm office 
krestyanskoe 
khozyaistvo independent, private (peasant) farm 
kulak a prosperous Russian peasant 
kupi-prodazh buying cheap to sell dear 
kuzin* Autumn pasture 
liman hayland 
nachalstvo Senior officials, may refer to national government, farm 
management or local officials 
oblast! an administrative region or province 
ogorod vegetable plot 
otdeleniye Former section of a state farm, combining production and 
settlement; in some cases these corresponded to villages or Kazak 
settlements (auls) that existed prior to collectivisation. 
pai share (of land or assets) 
parandja* Heavy horsehair veil worn in Central Asia that covered women from 
head to foot 
perestroika Policy of restructuring launched in the USSR in the 1980s 
Pervyi Zvonok Celebration of the first day of the new school year 
pominki Commemoration of forty days and a year after a death 
ix 
rod clan 
qistau Winter pasture 
rayon An administrative district 
sarai Part of domestic smallholding, including bam or animal shed and 
hayloft 
sauyn* Arrangement whereby poorer households herded livestock for richer 
ones, in return for milk, fleece or a share of the young animals. 
sel'sovet Village council (Soviet era) now akimiat. 
shanyrak* Sacred smoke-hole wheel at the centre of the yurt frame. 
snokha daughter-in-law 
sovkhoz state farm 
sviditel'stvo share certificate 
tenge* Kazakhstan's national currency, introduced in November 1993.1 
tenge: 100 tyn. 
tetya auntie 
toikhana* Equivalent of a village hall, where parties and feasts could be held. 
Tselina Virgin Lands Campaign, launched by Krushchev 
uru* Kazakh lineage 
vyzhivanie survival 
yurt A circular, collapsible felt tent, with wooden frame, used by Central 
Asian nomads 
zemel'nyi pai share of land 
zhasau* dowry 
zhataki* Members of a Kazak aul community with no land or livestock of 
their own. 
zhaylau * Summer pasture 
zhuz* Large territorial and tribal division of Kazaks, of which there are 
three 
zimovka Winter quarters for herders; semi-subterranean dwelling. 
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ACDINOCA A US-based private non-profit development organization formed in 
1997 from the merger of two companies, Agricultural Cooperative 
Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative 
Assistance. 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
A. 0. Aktsionnernoye obshchestvo, joint stock company 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EU TACIS European Union programme of Technical Assistance to the 
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INTRODUCTION 
Origins and background to the research 
Kazakstan, like the other new states which emerged from the break-up of the former Soviet 
Union, is undergoing a period of rapid change and transformation. On the one hand, at a 
macro level, the government is implementing a programme of economic and political reform, 
alongside the processes of state-building and renegotiation of a place on the world stage. On 
the other hand, at a micro-level, people are experiencing change in terms of the 
disappearance of familiar structures and the emergence of - or opportunity to create - new 
ones, the transfortnation of social and economic relations and the disruption of work, 
education, leisure and other patterns of daily life. Change can therefore be conceptualised 
both as a programme of rapid and radical social, economic and political transformation, 
planned from above, and as responses to this from below. 
Seventy years before, the region had experienced a period of equally radical change, fuelled 
by different ideologies, as the Bolshevik regime sought to 'modernise' or 'develop' the 
indigenous, largely pastoral and transhumant Kazak society, and incorporate it into the 
Soviet state. One of the central planks of Bolshevik ideology and practice in Kazakstan, as 
elsewhere in Central Asia, was the will to change traditional gender relations, specifically to 
emancipate women from oppression within the family in order to participate fully in public 
life. 
What had been the results of this policy, from the perspective of seventy years on? And 
what would be the impact of the new development model on gender relations at micro level? 
These were two of the questions that brought me to Kazakstan for my first field visit in early 
1996 with the aim of scouting out the territory and assessing whether the country would be a 
suitable focus for my research. 
Before describing this and the other field visits in more detail, I would like to back track a 
little to the genesis of the project as a whole. My doctoral thesis was to be part of a wider 
university-funded research project initiated in 1995 and aimed at filling an increasingly 
evident gap in gender analysis in rural areas in Eastern Europe and/or the Former Soviet 
Union. By 1995, it was clear that privatisation in the agricultural sector was presenting 
enormous problems, political, cultural and social. Whilst international organisations were 
intervening more and more, they tended to address the problem at local government, 
institutional or macro-economic level. One of the obstacles to further action by development 
agencies was the lack of locally-based knowledge and research. A key premise of the project 
was that, although the demand for technical and farming expertise could be met without it, an 
effective attempt to intervene on the economic and social levels required such deep local 
knowledge. The aim of the project was therefore to start constructing this pool of resources 
and analytical tools as a basis for policies on the restructuring of economic and social 
relations and, in particular, for targeted policies on women. 
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With regard to gender relations and women in particular, initial research suggested that a pre- 
existing imbalance based on women's lower skills and lesser agricultural and technological 
know-how, coupled with a very traditional and patriarchal culture and the break-down in 
welfare systems and social safety nets would result in women being the most fragile link in 
the process of economic reform. In response, according to the original project proposal, 'by 
investigating issues such as gender divisions of labour in household and farming, access to 
social services and healthcare and participation in different forms of local civil society, there 
should emerge a map of inequalities, deficiencies and systemic cultural barriers and also a 
theoretical framework for development and training stemming from knowledge of local and 
specific gender issues. 
My own doctoral research was to fit within this framework and was to be based on 
qualitative social and gender analysis at grass-roots level, conducted either in one single 
country or in a comparative perspective, examining several East European countries or 
Former Soviet Republics. 
My interest in the issue of gender and rural development in post-socialist countries and the 
specific choice of Kazakstan as a possible research site stemmed from a combination of 
academic and personal interests and happenstance. 
In the course of reading for my undergraduate and master's degrees, I had developed an 
interest in gender issues and feminist theory, first in the context of literary theory and later in 
the wider context of the position of women under socialism. My Master's dissertation had 
focused on the participation of women in the perestroika policy initiated in the USSR in the 
1980s, specifically its gendered consequences in terms of limitations of women's citizenship 
and participation in public life and the opportunities glasnost was giving women to organise 
and define their own agendasTrom below'. 
In more personal terms, the experience of living and studying in the USSR for a year in the 
mid-1980s, as part of my undergraduate degree, was pivotal in stimulating my interest in life 
- and particularly women's lives - under socialism. Many evenings were spent in the student 
hostel discussing, or more usually arguing heatedly, over the 'propee roles of men and 
women, and what had struck me most forcibly then were the contradictions between official 
ideology on equality of the sexes and people's perceptions of gender roles. In addition, 
Voronezh University had a broad student body, drawn from all over the Soviet Union and the 
possibility to talk with students from outside Russia itself, as well as several trips to the 
Caucasus, also roused my interest in the very different life modes in what I at first assumed 
to be a 'monolithic' state. 
However, two experiences had been missing during this year. First, despite several attempts, 
the authorities were unwilling to let us, as Western students, move beyond the 9km visa limit 
which confined us to the city. Our sole experience of the Russian countryside was therefore 
a tightly controlled day trip to a 'model' collective farm in the Voronezh region and a brief 
unauthorised visit to another, rather more run-down village, just outside the city. Second, we 
had also been unable to get the necessary visas to travel to Central Asia, which therefore 
stayed in my mind as a forbidden, but exotic destination. My interest in this particular region 
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was subsequently heightened by work and travel elsewhere in Asia and particularly a month 
spent working in Mongolia in 1993, interviewing nomadic herders for a preventive health 
project. What was particularly fascinating to me about this visit, was the resistance of the 
traditional Mongolian way of life, based on transhumant pastoralism, to Soviet-style 
modernisation. 
So, when I discovered that the university was building links with a counterpart in Kazakstan 
and that funding would be available to make a pilot visit, I jumped at the chance. One of the 
most striking discoveries to emerge from this initial ten day visit to the then capital, Almaty, 
in 1996, was the sheer number and variety of international and donor organisations active in 
the country, ranging from 'major players' such as UN bodies, the World Bank, USAID and 
EU TACIS, to smaller non-profit organisations and consultancies, often implementing 
programmes on behalf of the former. I was interested in discovering what their role was in 
the planning and implementation of change in rural areas and how they were incorporating 
gender issues into their programmes. What I initially hoped to find were specific projects, 
incorporating Women in Development or Gender and Development concerns, that would 
enable me to explore the interface between Western development agencies and local actors 
from a gender perspective: what strategies had been adopted and how did they mesh with 
local perceptions of gender elations and change? I thought the focus of my research might 
be a kind of anthropology of development, which would try to assess how WID/GAD models 
used elsewhere were being applied in the former Soviet Union and how they contrasted with 
the Soviet development model applied in Central Asia, which had made the emancipation of 
women a central concern. 
However, it soon became apparent that I was not going to find exactly what I was looking 
for. Not only were comparatively few organisations working in rural areas, social issues, let 
alone gender issues were not seen as within the remit for action. This was initially very 
disappointing - but it did set me thinking about the ways in which rural change was being 
framed at the top and what the gender implications of this framing might be. If such projects 
did not exist, why was this the case? 
It was also during this visit that I first met a woman who was to have a considerable 
influence on the shaping of my research. Had I met the 'sugar beet ladyT, one of the EU 
TACIS project managers asked me. Intrigued, I said no, but I would be very interested in 
meeting her. Who was she exactly? He explained that she was a private farmer in one of the 
former state farms receiving TACIS project support. There were a number of women private 
farmers in this community, he said, but she was the most important, and indeed one of the 
very first people to have set up a farm at all. From what I gathered, she was an extremely 
forceful personality, a community leader, who also headed a local farmers' association, a 
machinery station and a credit group. By a fortunate coincidence, she was to attend a TACIS 
project seminar in Almaty the following day. I didn't hesitate. In contradiction to what I had 
been hearing about the lack of women in private farming, here, it seemed, was a powerful 
woman, managing a private farm in a community where other women had also become 
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private farmers. The following day, I introduced myself to Dina' in a break between 
sessions. After talking for a while about women's traditional involvement in sugar beet 
production in the Almaty region and about how she and other women in their community had 
come to set up private farms, she invited me to come and visit. For some reason, a number 
of foreign women had been interested in interviewing her, she said, and some had even come 
to live on her farm for a while. She herself had a higher scientific degree from Moscow. She 
was interested in my research and would be willing to help me. 
After this meeting, I did some more research into the former state farm (sovkhoz) where she 
lived. It seemed that former sovkhoz Druzhba had been one of the first farms in the 
Almatinskii district (rayon) to opt for 'radical restructurine. Privatisation had already 
advanced through several stages. The first wave of private farmers had appeared in 1989 
when it became possible to lease land. In 1991, new legislation on land reform had enabled 
them to register their farms as private enterprises. Restructuring of the state farm itself had 
begun in 1994, when the sovkhoz had been split into 'cooperatives' based on the former 
sections (otdeleniye). By 1996 all but one of these cooperatives had been further restructured 
into several hundred independent private farms. The state farm itself had employed 1,110 
people, divided between a central village and four nearby otdeleniye, but was part of a much 
larger rural settlement of 14,000 people, based around a railway depot, 50 kin North of the 
former capital, Almaty. The railway and the local animal feed plant had provided alternative 
employment. The community had good transport connections to the city as well as to the 
rayon centre, and a number of people had also commuted there to work. In terms of farming 
system, the sovkhoz was situated in the fertile belt of land near the Zailiskiy Alatau 
mountains, which provided considerable opportunities for irrigation. With the exception of a 
few areas of pasture, mainly in the mountains, all the land had been cultivated and the state 
farm had a mixed profile, including dairy farming, horticulture and wheat and sugar beet 
cultivation. In 1991,600 of the farms 1,100 employees were women, but they were not 
evenly distributed across the workforce. Some branches, particularly horticulture and dairy 
work, were dominated by women, whereas cereal cultivation was dominated by men. There 
were a number of women team leaders, particularly in sugar beet production, but no women 
brigade leaders and the farm's senior management and specialists were all men. In terms of 
ethnic composition, the community was very mixed, with the central village forinerly 
dominated by Russians and Germans and the otdeleniye by Kazaks, Turks and Uighurs. The 
community had now been targeted for technical assistance and aid by a number of Western 
organisations, including EU TACIS and the smaller US organisation, Mercy Corps. The two 
had been working in tandem to set up credit lines for private farmers and to foster farmers' 
associations. 
This was therefore a fateful meeting. Here was a community in which women were 
seemingly becoming private farmers, a phenomenon which flew in the face of the 
widespread attitude amongst Western and urban Kazak experts that I would find no women 
private farmers in Kazakstan. It was also a community that had been integrated into the 
Soviet development programme and seemed to be integrated into the current one also. 
' All the personal names used in this thesis and some place names have been changed to protect the 
privacy of respondents. 
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Given the lack of specific gender and development projects in rural Kazakstan, I reasoned 
that the best approach would be to focus my research on the gender aspects of the 
government programme of state and collective farm privatisation and land reform. From 
what I had learned, the farm restructuring process had followed a range of different models 
in different regions and communities. In addition, Western development agencies were 
implementing projects in some rural areas. An interesting approach might therefore be to 
contrast two rural communities with different profiles in terms of privatisation strategy and 
Western involvement. What impact were different models of farm privatisation having on 
women's entitlement and property rights? What were women's roles in the new private 
farms and were Western rural development initiatives facilitating women's entrepreneurship? 
I had one possible fieldwork site. I needed another one. 
Finding it was the primary objective of my next fieldwork visit, from October to December 
that same year and it proved to be a more difficult task than I expected. For several fruitless 
weeks I tried to counter the partner university's unexpected reluctance to make good on its 
offer to get me to the countryside. It was too cold already, the rector solicitously infon-ned 
me. There were power cuts, no electricity, no gas, no telephones and no running water. The 
university was responsible for me and couldn't possibly let me go. It was much too risky. I 
should come back in the Spring. Mystified and frustrated, I began to put out feelers in other 
directions, and, in the meantime, focused on conducting in-depth interviews with the 
international development community and local NGOs, and accompanying Western experts 
on short visits to former collectives and state farms in the vicinity, including Dina's. 
Finally, it was through social networking that I found a possible second fieldwork site. The 
husband of a Turkish anthropologist working on gender issues had an employee, a German 
woman teaching in Karaganda, who had married a Kazak - he came from the countryside 
and had relatives in an isolated rural area North of the city. Perhaps they could help me. 
And so it was that I arrived in Karaganda and was passed along the network of Bogembai's 
relatives, first to a sister in a small country town, then to the eldest brother who had 
'connections' with the local state farm directors and finally, as a result of his negotiations, to 
an actual sovkhoz, selected, he said, because it was 'the most isolated, the most traditional 
and Kazak state farm in the area' and would therefore be the most interesting for me to study. 
There were Russians and Germans living in the central village, but the outlying villages were 
entirely Kazak. At 8am, on a cold November morning, I found myself on former sovkhoz 
Lenin, waiting in an antechamber, with a crowd of mostly elderly women, for an audience 
with the farm director. Very soon I had been billeted on a Kazak woman of about my age, 
the head accountant, who often hosted visitors to the farm, 'adopted' by the kollekliv of 
women working in the administration building and whisked off on a tour of the state farm, 
including the outlying villages. 
Here, indeed, was a community with a very different profile. The central village itself was 
50km from the nearest town, much of this on untarmacked single-track road across the 
steppe, which seemed to stretch, endless and empty, into the far distance, broken only by the 
occasional line of small hills. The sovkhoz had four outlying villages, the nearest five 
kilometres from the centre and the furthest 20 km away across the steppe. As we bumped 
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along in a dilapidated sovkhoz lorry towards one of these, the head agronomist explained that 
these outlying villages were where much of the agricultural work took place, but that there 
were also even more distant summer and winter herding encampments where some of the 
stock was pastured. The state farm had once concentrated entirely on such semi-transhumant, 
extensive livestock farming, but had diversified over the past ten years or so and now 
specialised in more intensive fattening of cattle brought in from neighbouring farms and 
some wheat production. However, the farm's economic situation was now extremely poor. 
The price of beef had dropped, the supply of cattle for fattening had practically dried up as 
the other local farms got into difficulties and started to their use stock for barter and in-kind 
wages. They had decided to focus on wheat production, but the prospects were uncertain. 
Money wages had not been paid for several years. There were rumours that the power supply 
was to be cut off for the winter since the farm had been unable to pay its debts to the 
electricity company. As for the government farm privatisation and restructuring programme, 
this did not seem to be a burning issue. The sovkhoz had become ajoint stock company', so 
for the moment they were still together. Nobody bad yet taken the option to take land and 
assets and start farming independently. There had certainly been no interventions from 
Western or international development agencies on this farm. 
The next few days provided an intensive introduction to the sovkhoz. What particularly 
struck me was the vibrancy of community life, not just in the farm office, which always 
seemed to be a hub of activity, but also in terms of feasts and gatherings in people's homes. 
On the one hand as I was a guest, some feasts were held 'in my honoue but in addition, the 
excuse of showing me the farm enabled my host and other farm specialists to visit kin in the 
outlying villages and I also attended some occasions as a temporary member of my host's 
household. I was dimly aware that my own research agenda was being swallowed up in 
complicated strategies I didn't understand. Had my hosts brought together a group of 
women on the second otdeleniye so that I could talk to them about their lives, so that the 
women could be given the latest information about pension arrears or so that Mainur could 
have lunch with her second cousin and talk about the cow the latter was raising for her? 
Much of this was way above my head, but I also intuited that it was a key part of the way in 
which 'public' life on the sovkhoz was articulated with kin and other solidarities. In itself, the 
way I had gained access to the community suggested the strength and importance of social 
networks, in this case between kin in the city, town and countryside. In addition, not only 
did the community seem to accept my presence and even welcome the opportunity to tell 
their story, I had begun to form a real friendship with my host. At the end of this visit, she 
invited me to come back and stay with her the following year, for as long as I wanted. 
I still had some reservations about both communities. In particular, my objective had been to 
find two state or collective farms which had adopted contrasting approaches to privatisation 
and where I would be able to spend a number of months studying the process at close hand. 
Yet, the second community seemed to be privatising in name only, and there therefore 
seemed to be no redistribution process and no private farms to investigate at all. Moreover, 
both here, and in the other community, where farm restructuring seemed to be actually going 
ahead, even the new private farmers seemed distinctly uninterested in talking about the 
privatisation process itself. For most people, privatisation, in the sense of the government 
programme of restructuring, was not an issue. Nobody, even the farm officials responsible 
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for implementing it, seemed to have a clear grasp of the process or the options available and 
their implications. Instead, people were interpreting their experience in terms of bardak-2 
(collapse and chaos) and of vyzhivanie (survival), both of the community and of the 
individual household, and the topics of concern were how and especially from whom, the 
inputs necessary to household subsistence were to be obtained. After several weeks, I could 
talk fairly knowledgeably about the relative merits of keeping pigs or cows in the domestic 
smallholding, about the types of tomatoes best for pickling, and who could provide coal or 
fodder for the Winter, but this seemed a long way from the kind of information I originally 
hoped to obtain. Did this mean that these were unsuitable fieldwork communities or was 
there a problem with the framing of my research question itself ? 
On reflection, I realised that what had seemed like a frustrating obstacle was actually an 
important research topic in its own right. On the one hand, the literature on farm 
restructuring and my impressions from farm visits and interviews suggested that the 
privatisation policy was not in fact leading to the expected results. In actual fact, its 
implementation was being mediated by power relations on the ground and the process could 
often be described in terms of resistance rather than inclusion and empowerment. On the 
other hand, the farm privatisation process itself seemed to be embedded in wider processes of 
change, which were of more immediate concern to people at the grassroots in rural 
communities. In particular, there seemed to be a radical change in the nature of the 
relationship between the household and the sovkhoz, marked by decreasing outside support 
(for example, in terms of regular salary and provision of public services) and a corresponding 
increasing reliance for survival on the domestic economy, family, kin and neighbourhood 
ties. Farm privatisation therefore needed to be addressed in a much broader sense, not just as 
a government-sponsored and donor-assisted programme of farm restructuring and agrarian 
reform but also in terrns of a shift in the boundaries between the public and domestic spheres. 
Given men and women's different loci in these two domains, this was also likely to be a 
gendered process. 
This reconceptualisation of the research question opened up new avenues for exploration. 
Framing the issues in terms of the relationship between public and private domains would 
provide a means to investigate the shifting boundaries between the household, the state and 
the emerging new 'private' sphere of the market, both in ideology and policy and in people's 
daily lives. In addition, since perceptions of gender roles were also closely bound up with 
conceptual isations of public and private domains, an exploration of the boundaries between 
them would permit an analysis of the ways gender relations were changing or shaping 
change. 
During the following year, I spent nine months in Kazakstan, divided between fieldwork in 
these two rural communities and data collection in Almaty, with two weeks investigating the 
framing of development and private farms in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. The following year I 
conducted a further four months fieldwork in Kazakstan, including a short fieldwork 
expedition to four sheep-breeding farms in the Zhana-Arkinskii and Ulu-tauskii rayons south 
2 Bardak is the subject of Nazpary's recent study post-Soviet Chaos: Violence and Dispossession in 
Kazakhstan. Pluto Press, 200 1. 
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of Karaganda. Two days were spent in each community, followed by two weeks further 
research on one of the four farms, Sarybulak. Although I spent considerably less time here 
than in my main research communities, the greater mobility which came from being part of a 
motorised team enabled me to cover a far wider area and also to visit the outlying parts of the 
farming communities, including the herders out on the zhaylau (summer pasture). This 
research therefore gained in breadth what it lost in depth and, coming as it did when I was 
already familiar with other examples of farm privatisation, it helped to crystallise a number 
of ideas on how different farming systems and models of restructuring had affected the 
gender outcome of reform. 
Methodological considerations 
The aim of the research was therefore to explore how the new ideologies and practices of 
rural development determined at macro level were impacting on gender relations in rural 
communities and households. Although I did investigate the framing of macro-level policy 
on development and agrarian reform, the main focus was not on the nitty-gritty of the policy- 
making process itself, nor the ways in which the various actors at this level managed their 
relationships and conflicts over the goals and meanings of development. Similarly, although 
I investigated the re-allocation of land and assets during de-collectivisation, the production of 
statistics on the holdings of men and women or particular types of farms was not the primary 
goal of the research. 
In fact, one of the outcomes of my research was to reveal the complexity of quantitative or 
statistical analysis in current conditions. In 1991, a specific body was given the task of 
formulating and managing land reform. This agency, the State Committee for Land Relations 
and Land Management (Goskomzem) has its headquarters in Almaty and regional and 
district offices throughout the country. These offices were one of the principle sites of my 
data collection. The cadastre officials, who made visits to all former state farms to inventory 
land and mark out individual plots, were a good source of information on the situation in 
different communities, particularly on the initial farm privatisation process and subsequent 
changes in the numbers and structures of agricultural enterprises. They generally had maps 
illustrating the various stages of this process, as well as lists of the individuals granted land 
shares and the size of their shares. These proved very useful in conducting gender analysis. 
Moreover, as outsiders, these officials were often more willing to comment than villagers 
themselves on any conflicts surrounding privatisation. The registry also held records on all 
krestyanskie khozyaistva (private 'peasant' farms), which often included the names of all 
those who had contributed shares to the enterprise or who were officially listed as members. 
As an important site for farmers wishing to officially register their land, it was also a good 
vantage point for participant observation and for making contacts with local farmers. 
However, official records on the number of rural enterprises of different types excluded a 
number of locally salient factors. For example, figures on the number of private farms were 
generally based on the number of official land certificates (Gosudarsvennyi At na Zemlyu) 
which had been issued. However, it soon became apparent that many farmers had never 
gone through the expensive process of obtaining a certificate. Others had acquired one, then 
sold or leased the land to another, generally wealthier farmer, for whom they then worked. 
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Particularly in communities such as Druzhba, which had undergone radical restructuring, 
figures on the number of private farms, associations and cooperatives fluctuated 
considerably, reflecting conflicting processes of amalgamation and disintegration. The 
archival records could give only an indicative picture of the kinds of processes by which land 
and assets were changing hands and farms being created, merged or split. It is these 
processes, which were closely intertwined with kinship and other social relations, which are 
examined most closely in the discussion on farm restructuring 3. 
Moreover, as anthropologist Judith Okely puts it, 'numerical material may give a clue to 
systematic patterns, but people's beliefs, values and actions are not necessarily revealed by 
( ... ) counting; instead these crucial revelations are much more likely to emerge from chance 
incidents, extended comments and both informal and ceremonial gatherings' (1994: 25). 
Accordingly, I chose to use qualitative research methodologies, which imply 'a direct 
concern with experience as it is 'lived' or 'felt' or 'undergone" and have the aim of 
'understanding experience as nearly as possible as its participants feel it or live it' (Sherman 
and Webb, 19884, cited Ely et al 199 1: 5). 
During the first two short visits to Kazakstan, I experimented with various field methods, 
including participant observation, semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Having 
received some basic training, I also considered using participatory rural appraisal as a means 
of involving people in the communities more actively in my research. However, the 
combination of working alone and the increasing pressures and erosion of trust experienced 
by villagers made the latter two options impractical. Ultimately, I found that participant 
observation and semi-structured interviews were the methods best adapted to the situation. 
The actual strategies and practicalities of selecting and making contact with informants were 
determined by the topography of the different communities and my own position within 
them. On the one hand, I sought key informants, such as the farm director, senior 
management and local officials most involved in implementing farm privatisation, the staff 
of village councils, local schools and hospitals, court officials and managers of local markets, 
who were knowledgeable about specific subjects and local patterns. Often I found that my 
identity as a relatively 'unimportant' young, female researcher was an advantage in 
persuading officials to share sensitive information about the conflictual redistribution 
process. On the other hand, on the Lenin and Druzhba state farms, I lived for extended 
periods of time with host families and both they and their networks of kin, neighbours and 
work colleagues provided immediate 'core clusters' of individuals and households that I 
could approach. My position as a 'surrogate family member' gave me an important kind of 
social and networking capital that was important in building relationships of trust and these 
initial core clusters snowballed outwards to others in widening circles. On Lenin, for 
example, membership of my host family opened connections to relatives of different ages, 
generations, occupations and ethnicities, as well as to their neighbours and colleagues. 
Household membership also opened access to other settings, including work collectives and 
3 For parallel discussions on problems with statistical data and techniques for collecting it in rural 
Central Asia see, for example, Werner (I 997a) and Kandiyoti (1999). 
4 Qualitative Research in Education: Focus and Methods. London: Falmer Press, p. 7. 
10 
ceremonial occasions. Working in this way heightened my understanding of the importance 
of social networks in people's daily lives. 
However, balancing rapport with the initial core clusters with meeting new families or 
individuals was a concern in both communities. This was particularly so on Druzhba, where I 
lived with one of the most powerful private farmers, who aroused particularly strong and 
often negative emotions in the community. As fieldwork progressed, my association with her 
household raised a number of ethical and practical problems. I found that I myself had 
ambivalent feelings about Dina's position in the community and that I felt caught between 
my personal sympathy for her and my growing knowledge of her position in conflicts over 
land and assets. Moving between conversations about her life, as she played with her 
grandchildren or helped prepare for a feast, and conversations with families who felt she had 
unfairly 'grabbed' assets that belonged to them, or employees she housed in appalling 
conditions, felt like crossing, uncomfortably, between hostile zones. In addition, I realised 
that, unlike with male 'winners' from the privatisation process, I had hopes or even 
expectations of her not only being an entrepreneur, but also a 'politically correct' one, who 
would show extra consideration for the social implications of rural privatisation. As well as 
highlighting some of my own expectations around gender roles, these feelings shed light on 
the complex interactions between gender and inequality. From this perspective, my close 
association with her household risked distancing me from other groups - particularly those 
who felt that they had been disadvantaged by privatisation - and I found that it was 
important to move outside her circle to get a better understanding of the community. That I 
was able to do so was due to its size and diversity and particularly the existence of public 
settings, such as the local shops and market, the nearby land office and the donor project, 
which made it possible to meet other informants relatively easily. By 1998,1 appeared to 
have developed my own separate identity in the village, as people I didn't know would often 
approach me to ask if I would like to interview them or even for information about 
privatisation. The research process on Druzhba was therefore one of moving outwards from 
the small circle provided by an initial, powerful, gatekeeper, whilst maintaining links with 
original informants. 
Conversely, the research process on Lenin began with a relatively wide circle and focused 
inwards, as relationships with people I knew became closer and it became increasingly 
difficult to make contact with others. After my first visit, my most substantial research did 
not involve trying to approach new people for interviews, but participant observation with 
my Kazak 'relatives' or associated households I already knew5. The collapse of the sovkhoz 
public sphere and the growing sense of mistrust in the community as a whole also had an 
impact on people's perceptions of me and my research. As I have described, during my first 
visit, people were keen to tell their stories, sometimes because they saw my work as a kind of 
journalism, which might lead to action from the authorities. By my last visit, when there was 
no longer any hope in redress from above, people I didn't yet know wondered if I was 
perhaps a Western spy or a potential buyer of the sovkhoz. This casting of me as western 
5 See also Werner, (1997a), who encountered similar difficulties in approaching 'strangers' for 
interviews in a rural community in southern Kazakstan and focused her research primarily on twelve 
kin-related households. 
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exploiter or rescuer raised uncomfortable issues about my own part in the meeting of East 
and West. In addition, in the context of the radical upheaval in people's lives, questions about 
the balance between taking and giving were especially acute. Leaving aside the question of 
the academic contribution of the research, what contribution could it possibly make to 
people's lives that would be a fair return for the time, energy and support I was given? As a 
full participant, my skills in milking cows, making manty (ravioli), plucking chickens or 
lighting the stove remained basic, at best. Adopted as a 'sister' or 'one of us' (nasha), I was 
not only a researcher but part of a social network based on reciprocal exchange, with moral 
obligations to play a role in it. Living in a community experiencing growing poverty and 
hardship, I was a potential advocate without financial or other back-up from an organisation 
that could provide any direct help. Difficulties in negotiating these boundaries are certainly 
an integral part of anthropological fieldwork in many settings, but I found them to be 
particularly important in these post-socialist communities undergoing rapid change and 
encountering an outsider from the west, sometimes for the first time6. These questions about 
the unequal power relations remained a problem throughout and beyond the fieldwork 
period. 
A consolation was sometimes to feel that my own personal and research difficulties around 
trust, relationship and inequality mirrored the problems being encountered by the people 
around me, and that this brought us together in the search to map and find a more secure 
footing in a reality that often felt like shifting sands. Everyday conversations and informal 
interviews gave my informants a space to discuss issues that affected them in their daily 
lives. Often, it seemed that having a space to share and reflect on what was happening was 
rare and important. At their most fruitful, these conversations felt like part of an ongoing 
learning process, as my questions met and were informed by, those of my informants, who 
were able to voice their own concerns. As they continued, I collected information on a broad 
range of subjects, including the process of privatisation and attitudes to it, previous and 
current occupations of family members, feelings about work for the state farm, private 
enterprises and/or unemployment, the division of labour in the home and feelings about work 
for the home and family, economic and emotional coping strategies, changing relationships 
with kin and colleagues, marriage, sex and childbirth. 
From the perspective of the inclusiveness or representativeness of the data I collected, there 
is no doubt that my identity as a young, female, mainly Russian-speaking researcher, 
affected the rapport I established with different people, the kinds of conversations I had and 
the kinds of data I collected. As a feminist researcher, I was particularly interested in giving 
a voice to women, who had not (yet? ) been heard by development agencies. In addition, as a 
woman, I found it easier to be included in women's activities and to reach a level of trust 
with women where personal stories and feelings could be expressed. Rapport with male 
informants was more difficult to establish. Although men and women were not segregated, it 
was clear that there were strong local ideas about their social behaviour and the boundaries 
between them. On Lenin, living with the head accountant, a single Kazak woman very 
6 The particular issues and problems connected with doing anthropological research in postsocialist 
societies have been addressed recently in De Soto, H. and Dudwick, N. (cds. ) (2000) Fieldwork 
Dilemmas: Anthropologists in Postsocialist States. 
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conscious of needing to protect her reputation, I also identified with her concerns. On 
Druzhba, Dina's relatively powerful status gave both her - and myself - more freedom from 
these restrictions. I also found that being part of a mixed-gender team during the expedition 
opened spaces to talk with men that were not so easily available when I was working on my 
own. On the other hand, men tended to prefer to talk in sweeping terms about political 
history rather than their own family or personal stories. Although I did explicitly set out to 
look at 'gendeerather than 'women, this combination of factors created a gender bias in the 
data, with most of the detailed 'life histories' in particular, coming from women. I also found 
that the older generation of Kazak women were often unwilling to talk about the past. Pahl 
and Thompson (1994) have suggested that specific methodological problems are connected 
with the 'dangeeof remembering in Soviet society. From this perspective, it was interesting 
that amongst the older generation, Slav respondents in general were far happier to talk about 
the past than their Kazak counterparts, for whom the years of collectivisation and famine had 
been and remained taboo subjects even within their own families. Another issue was 
certainly language, as the older generation of Kazaks, women in particular, were less 
comfortable speaking in Russian. More widely, in-depth knowledge of Kazak might well 
have shed further light on the nuances of relationship between Kazak and Russian categories 
and ways of seeing and describing the world. 
From the point of view of balancing breadth and depth, another issue concerns the decision 
to work in several communities, rather than focusing on a single state farm. A more orthodox 
practice in anthropological fieldwork, particularly for 'novice' researchers, is to focus on 
understanding one setting in a very detailed way. Both during and after the actual fieldwork, 
as the material amassed and points of divergence and similarity spaghettied into increasingly 
complex patterns, I often wondered whether I had made a wise decision. However, research 
such as Pine's (1994,1995) in two areas of rural Poland and Shankland's (1993) on Alevi 
and Sunni villages in Anatolia, highlighted the potential benefits of using comparative 
settings to investigate the relationship between culture and economic change. 
The result of my fieldwork was therefore to catch a series of points in a process of rapid, 
profound and ongoing transformation in several rural communities in Kazakstan and to set 
this analysis in the macro-level context of how rural development was being framed. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured around 8 chapters: 
Chapter I lays out the main theoretical approach for the study, looking at how existing 
approaches to 'development! and 'transition, ' and particularly theories of public and private 
domains, obscure or shed light on the gender issues it addresses. It poses a bundle of 
questions pertaining to gender, the relationship between macro and micro levels, new 
regimes of inclusion and exclusion and the way ideologies shape socio-economic relations in 
different political economies. 
Chapter 2 places the current reform in the perspective of the past, looking at the 
accommodation between the indigenous Kazak economy and the ideology and practice of 
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Soviet development and specifically, how the Soviet model sought to change gender 
relations and how local communities variously resisted, subverted or adapted to the changes 
imposed by the state. Drawing on ethnographic studies and life history material from my 
fieldwork communities, it explores how theories of public and private domains can be 
applied to indigenous and socialist society and investigates the extent to which gender 
domains were stable categories and the extent to which they were destabilised by the new 
political and economic regime. I argue that Soviet development practice led to an 
accommodation between indigenous and socialist metaphors for gender domains, which 
varied both between and within the different communities. 
Chapter 3 turns to the current macro-level framing of development policy, exploring how (if 
at all) it is taking account of gender. The first, general, section looks at the different 
representations and ideologies of gender being expressed and transmitted in the process of 
state and nation building. The second, more detailed, section looks at the various actors, 
ideologies and aims driving (economic) development policies and introduces my argument 
about the 'invisibility' of gender in the current framing of development. 
Chapter 4 looks more specifically at how the macro level development model was being 
translated into rural development policy, programmes and projects in Kazakstan. I argue that 
the invisibility of gender in the overarching development model was carried through into 
these policies, with the result that the gendered aspects of agrarian reform were not taken 
into account. Drawing on research on gender and agrarian refon-n elsewhere, the chapter then 
lays out the issues addressed in the case studies of rural reform, which form the backbone of 
the following three chapters. 
Chapter 5 takes a narrow definition of privatisation as the policy of redistribution of the land 
and assets of state farms. Using material from my fieldwork communities, it explores the 
significance of gender in this process, looking at: 1) the extent to which existing gender 
disparities within communities affected the shaping and outcome of redistribution and 
enterprise formation; 2) the extent to which the privatisation reform itself was producing new 
gender disparities and 3) how the different examples of redistribution and reorganisation 
compared in this regard. I argue that the outcome of reform was to create or consolidate 
divergences in land and property ownership within communities by creating categories of 
large and small landowners and landless people. Although both women and men were 
eligible to obtain individual title to land and assets, gender entered into processes of 
cumulative advantage and disadvantage and the extent to which women were able to 
concretise their shares was influenced by their position in the socialist-era gender division of 
labour and power, their position in local farming systems and local models of gender roles 
and the associated division of labour and authority. 
Chapter 6, argues that the 'narrow' privatisation framework was not sufficient to encompass 
or explain the changes taking place in people's lives and communities. In particular, this 
model failed to capture the specific ways in which the introduction of the market was 
intertwined with public (state) and private (domestic) spheres. The first section draws on a 
detailed ethnographic study of one private farm to illustrate how the macro-level model of 
entrepreurship obscured the way enterprises actually operated and made women's 
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contribution to their establishment and survival invisible. Setting the new private enterprises 
in the context of the wider community, the second section argues that reform was primarily 
being experienced by rural households in terms of exclusion from the new market domain, 
the collapse of the public domain and increased reliance on household production, informal 
trade and complicated kin and social networks of exchange. Referring back to the material 
presented in Chapter 2,1 argue that this shift was creating new patterns of inequality and 
that the strategies in the state farm communities were influenced by their previous attitudes 
to and patterns of reliance on the state, informal and domestic economies. 
Using a focus on changing forms and meanings of labour and social networks, Chapter 7 
looks more specifically at the gender dimensions of the shifting relationship between public 
(state, market) and domestic domains. By exploring the interface and interaction between the 
new development ideology described in Chapter 3 and local ideologies of gender, it 
considers how the reconfiguration of public and private spheres was restructuring gender 
roles and conversely how local gender ideologies and metaphors were shaping change. 
The thesis concludes by evaluating the findings of the field research in connection with its 
contribution to theory and generating further questions. 
is 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Objectives and Method in Context 
When the USSR collapsed in 1991 Kazakstan emerged geographically as the largest Central 
Asian republic with an area of some 2,717 thousand square kilometres but a relatively small 
population of some 16-17 million. Ostensibly it had a GNP per head of some 71% of the 
average level for the USSR but, as with the other less developed fragments of the former 
Soviet Union, the transition would not be kind to pretensions of high levels of development. 
Nevertheless Kazakstan was fortunate to possess one important resource of considerable 
value in terms of oil. Since the dissolution of the USSR, Kazakstan has implemented a 
radical shift from the 'Soviet development model' to an identification of development with 
Western models of capitalism and the market. This planned economic change and systemic 
transformation is closely bound up with changes in the relationship between public and 
private domains. Privatisation has been one of the central pillars of the development 
programme implemented by the Kazakstani government, with the support of international 
agencies. The reduction of state control and introduction of private ownership has been seen 
as one of the key ways of producing a more efficient, 'modem' market economy and 
stimulating growth, as well as providing economic and social benefits to individuals and 
communities. In the rural sector, this has entailed major structural transformation, with 
moves to eliminate all collective and state farms by encouraging the formation of new 
agricultural enterprises based on private ownership of land and assets. 
The research on which this thesis is based aimed to explore these processes of planned 
change in rural areas of Kazakstan from a specifically gendered perspective. It poses two 
main questions. First, what are the implications of this current framing of rural development 
at macro level for gender relations at micro level? Second, are current rural development 
ideologies and policies leading to new regimes or inequality and exclusion, and if so, what is 
the place of gender? 
Why look specifically at gender in this context? Setting my own research in the context of 
the existing literature, this first chapter explores the reasons why this is an important area for 
analysis and the extent to which the current literature can elucidate the issues involved as 
well as defining in more detail the research question I am taking forward and the parameters 
of my analytical framework. 
Gender analysis as a research tool 
By drawing a distinction between 'sex' - the anatomical and biological characteristics of 
female and male bodies - and 'gendee - the culturally specific articulation of these 
differences, the feminist scholarship of the late 1970s and 1980s created an analytical tool for 
exploring expressions of sexual difference and inequality between women and men both in 
different societies and systems and dynamically, over time and through economic and 
cultural transformation. As Borocz and Verdery (1994: 223) put it: 
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'the notion of gender, like that of class as conceptualised by Marx, focuses attention 
on a fundamental social relationship, the relationship between 'masculine' and 
'feminine'. Work on gender investigates the place of that relationship in social life, 
in power and social inequality, in forms of symbolic representation, and in the 
reproduction of society. The study of gender is not about women : it is about women 
and men in relation to each other, and it is about one of the most basic organizing 
principles in human societies, past and present! 
Taking up the idea of gender as a basic organizing principle, the premise of this thesis is that 
it is vital to analyse gender relations in order to fully understand the process of social and 
economic transformation in rural Kazakstan, both in terms of systemic change and the way it 
is experienced and shaped by individuals and communities. It also aims to engage with the 
debates through which gender analysis has evolved, particularly since the late 1980s, notably 
around the adequacy of Western models of sexual difference and the gender relations 
inscribed on them, to explore meanings in other cultures, and around the interrelation 
between gender and other systems, such as class, generation and ethnicity. 
Gender analysis in the context ofpost-socialist reform in rural Kazakstan 
One of the major reasons for conducting research on gender and rural change in a post- 
socialist context is the lack of fit between the existing literature and the research question, 
which occupies a blind spot at the conjunction of a number of different disciplines. 
On the one hand, research on agricultural sector reform in Kazakstan and other post socialist 
countries takes a predominantly technical and economic approach, excluding the social and 
cultural context of transformation. In particular, despite the body of knowledge on the gender 
impact of capitalist development and agrarian reform in other parts of the world, little 
consideration, either direct or oblique, has been given to the possible differential impact of 
decollectivisation on women and men. Neither has attention been paid to the influence of 
local constructions of gender in shaping responses to reform. 
On the other hand, since the 1970s, a considerable body of work has been built up on gender 
and rural development in the Third World, looking at issues such as women's contribution to 
farming systems and the impact of capitalist expansion, development projects and agrarian 
reform on women. However, this research cannot simply be transposed to a Kazakstani 
context. Its relevance to the particular situation in post-socialist countries has not been 
established and is, indeed, one of the major issues facing development agencies operating in 
the region. 
One particularity of the situation in post-socialist states is that communism itself was a 
political system explicitly based on ideas of modernisation and development. The current 
capitalist development project is not starting from scratch, but overlays and must interrelate 
7 Some notable exceptions are Sue Bridger's (1992,1997) and Myriarn Hivon's (I 995a) work on 
- women and agrarian reform in Russia. This literature will be examined in more detail in Chapter 4 in 
connection with the discussion on the framing of post-Soviet rural development. Gender issues have 
not been specifically addressed in the technical literature on agricultural sector reform in Kazakstan, 
although some findings are presented in the UNDP's annual development reports and in a study 
commissioned by the Asian Deveopment Bank (Bauer et al, 1997). 
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with existing socialist development categories, that were themselves intertwined in particular 
ways with the identities and structures of pre-Soviet society. As Olivier Roy (1999: 110) 
puts it, despite the mistaken perception shared by the IMF and some NGOs, the Kazakh 
Plains are not the Middle West of the nineteenth century. Far from being a blank slate on 
which Western development discourses and practices can simply be inscribed, Kazakstani 
society therefore has a complex existing social fabric, which has already resisted or 
influenced the outcome of a previous modernisation/development project in particular ways. 
What makes the Kazakstani situation particularly interesting from the point of view of 
gender and development is the uniqueness of its starting point to capitalist transformation. 
As in the other Central Asian Republics, the transformation of gender relations was a key 
part of the modernisation policies applied during the Soviet period. From the outset, the 
Bolshevik regime promoted emancipation of indigenous women, with attacks on practices 
such as veiling and attempts to bring women into the labour force and political life (Massell, 
1974; Tabyshalieva, 1995; Warshofsky Lapidus, 1978). Throughout the Soviet period, 
accounts of rural development used indicators of women's education levels and employment 
as evidence of successful modernization and progress (Korbe, 1950; Vasil'eva, 1975). Huge 
steps were indeed made in these areas (UNDP, 1995). However, critiques of Soviet 
development point to its uneven success in changing the position of women, evoking the 
perpetuation or even reinforcement of gender inequality under the Soviet regime, especially 
in rural areas (Akiner, 1997; Bridger, 1987; Brill Olcott, 1991; Harris, 1996a and b; Lubin, 
1984; Poliakov, 1989; Tabyshalieva, 1995; Tett, 1994). The history of Soviet intervention in 
Kazakstan therefore raises questions about gender and inequality and the ways that local 
identities and practices may serve as obstacles to engineered change or may shape it in 
particular ways, that are equally salient in relation to the current development project. 
The now considerable literature on the gender aspects of postsocialism provides some 
responses to these problems. In particular, one of the strengths of this literature is its 
historical and contextual grounding in analysis of gender relations under socialism. 
However, there are a number of limitations with this literature in relation to the present 
research question. Firstly, the 'women and transition' literature has mainly tended to talk 
about women as an undifferentiated category. As Bruno argues, thisignores the complexities 
of gender stratification' and other factors cutting across it, such as generation, ethnicity, 
social and economic stratification, the urban-rural divide and geographical location all shift 
the boundaries of a uniform gender analysis and call for ethnographic grass-root studies of 
the realities of different groups of women' (1995b: 73-4) Recent work, such as Ashwin's 
(1999) on women m ine-workers' changing attitudes to collectives and Kaneff s (2002) on the 
attitudes of two generations of rural women to market activity, have demonstrated the 
fruitfulness of this approach. Secondly, although the literature often refers to gender, its 
predominant focus is on women, either as victims or agents of change, rather than on gender 
relations as such. Changing masculinities have, as yet, been given little attention'. The 
8 One of the early exceptions to this is Hilary Pilkington's (1992) article, which shows that the civil 
society and public/private concepts can also be used to investigate the shifts in men's, as well as 
women's roles and how they are interrelated. The second part of her article, based on fieldwork in 
urban Russia, explores the renegotiation of both male and female identities in informal youth groups, 
one of the forms of the newly emerging civil society. More recently, the construction of masculinities 
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reasons for the tendency to focus on women rather than gender are manifold, including the 
previous framing of analysis in terms of the 'woman question' i. e. how far socialism had 
brought about equality for women, and the emphasis in feminist research on empowering 
women or 'giving women a voice'. Thirdly, there is still a lack of the micro-level studies of 
change in post-socialist countries, particularly in rural areas, that would situate gender issues 
against the background of other factors of stratification. 
What follows is therefore a cross-disciplinary exploration of the relevant literature, which 
interweaves debates around the particular post-socialist 'transition' to market economy and 
democracy in Kazakstan with debates in the literature on development, focusing on 
inequality, inclusion/exclusion, the ferninisation of subsistence and shifting boundaries 
between the state, individual and household in different political economies. 
Examining the 'transitional economy'model ofchange 
One of the ongoing concerns of development theorists is to investigate the links between 
'paradigms' in development thought, the practice of the agencies which implement them and 
the societies they seek to develop (Hewitt, 2000; Kohler, 1995; Thomas, 2000). The 1980s 
and 1990s were spanned by two such 'paradigms: on the one hand, the neo-liberal paradigm 
which emerged in the wake of the debt crisis in the 1970s and advocated economic 
liberalisation and structural adjustment policies as the foundation for development; and on 
the other hand, the more nuanced New Policy Agenda, which still advocated markets as the 
most efficient mechanism for economic growth, but also had the broader remit of 
encouraging democratisation by encouraging good governance, building the capacity of 
institutions and strengthening 'civil society' (Hewitt, 2000; Kohler, 1995). In addition, the 4h 
World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1994 and the World Summit for Social 
Development, held in Copenhagen in 1995 also signalled a growing sensitisation to the 
gender, social and 'human' aspects of development. These paradigms, which are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Three, form the backdrop to the particular development paradigm of 
'transition' or 'transitional economy' being applied to Kazakstan and other post-socialist 
societies, both in academic theory and policy recommendations. 
As Burawoy and Verdery (1999: 4-6) describe, diagnoses and policy prescriptions vary 
across the various models of 'transition' elaborated by economists, historians, political 
scientists and sociologists. However, all share a number of assumptions about the 
relationship between systemic transformation, modernisation and increased benefits to the 
population, and between economic and social change. First, transition is conceptualised as an 
inevitable, linear process of change from one state (socialism) towards the type of social, 
economic and political system which has developed in Western Europe and North America 
(market economy). Second, it is regarded predominantly as a matter of economic growth, 
attainable through the espousal of Western models of economy and a range of social and 
cultural changes which can be facilitated through 'outside' help. Third, these macro-level 
policies are assumed to produce micro-level benefits for the population as a whole, in terms 
of increased living standards and greater individual opportunity and autonomy. This 
in general, and in post-socialist society in particular, has become an increasingly researched topic. See 
for example Ashwin, S. and Lytkina, T. (2004) 
19 
'transition' paradigm bears striking similarities to the 'modernisation' paradigm of 
development which emerged during the 1950s9 and the arguments developed in critiques of 
this paradigm are also relevant to transition. 
The relationship between capitalist modernisation, economic growth and universal benefit 
The considerable body of critical literature on development theories, programmes and 
specific projects built up in the fields of development studies and anthropology since the 
1950s, when many former Western colonies gained their independence and 'development' as 
a theory and practice explicitly entered onto the global scene, suggest that the relationship 
between capitalist modernisation, economic growth and universal benefit is far from linear. 
One of the fundamental contributions of this literature, particularly since the 1970s, has been 
to problematise development by illuminating and critiquing the premises on which it is 
implicitly based, questioning its success in terms of its own paradigm, and showing how it is 
embedded in particular global and societal power relationslo. These critiques provide 
interesting angles from which to consider the current transition to market economy in 
Kazakstan and the possible micro-level impacts of the country's inclusion into the global 
capitalist system. 
Relying mainly on structuralist analysis at a macro level, dependency theory argues that the 
benefits of capitalist integration and economic growth are unevenly spread, and may create 
new groups of losers as well as winners on both global and national levels. Since capitalism 
itself is inherently inegalitarian and embedded in political and other power relations, some 
parts of the world and some social groups are not only not fully incorporated into the 
development process but are actively underdeveloped by it, whereas others develop at the 
cost of the former (Frank, 1967). Using a conceptual model of centre and periphery, 
Wallerstein (1974) extends this model to explore the ways in which this pattern of 
exploitation is reproduced at sub-national level, suggesting that just as the 'peripheral' 
economies are exploited by the 'core' economies, rural economies are exploited by 
metropolitan areas". 
Investigations by anthropologists and sociologists into the effects of economic change and 
development projects also problematise the assumption that the rewards of economic growth 
will eventually be reaped by all, as well as some of the more sweeping aspects of 
dependency theory itself. They have demonstrated that, even in regions of substantial 
economic growth, poverty levels often remain the same or deteriorate further (Mosley, 1985: 
155; Pearse, 1980). Taking a micro-level perspective, they illustrate that the communities at 
the receiving end of development are composed of a mixture of people, all with different 
amounts of power, access to resources and interests, which mediate the effects of 
transformation (Hill, 1986: 16-19). Critiques of the 'modemisation paradigm' therefore 
9 Gardner and Lewis (1996: 7) argue that, after the debt crises of the 1980s and subsequent structural 
adjustment programmes, there was a general re-emphasis in organisations such as the World Bank on 
important elements of the modernisation paradigm, particularly economic reform and growth. 
10 For a historical review and critique of development paradigms see Webster (1990), Kohler (1995), 
Gardner and Lewis (1996), Hewitt (2000) and Thomas (2000). 
11 Both Frank and Wallerstein are cited in Gardner and Lewis (1996: 16-17). 
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suggest that capitalist transformation is likely to be uneven, both at international level and 
within countries themselves. One of the reasons for this is that the process is inherently 
political and embedded in power relations, whether at global, national or local levels and 
these need to be taken into account in any analysis of development. 
Turning to the situation in Kazakstan, it might be supposed that although 'transition' may 
lead to the country's inclusion in the global capitalist economy and create affluence and new 
opportunities for some, for others, it may bring poverty, marginality and exclusion from 
modem means of existence. Indeed, the Kazakstani economy is being integrated into global 
capitalism in specificways and the agficulture sector is tak7ing on a particular role within the 
overall economy and significance to the state. 
The Central Asian Republics - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan - were amongst the least developed in the Soviet Union and the least well known 
in the West before its break-up. Covering a territory roughly equivalent to that of the 
European Union, the Republic of Kazakstan is the largest of the five, but its vast and and 
semi-arid regions also make it the most sparsely populated. At 6.2 persons per square 
kilometre, its population density is among the lowest in the world (UNDP, 1995: 10). 
Kazakstan is also one of the most richly endowed republics in terms of natural resources, and 
today, as in the Soviet period, this resource wealth has helped to define its development 
trajectory. 
Within the Soviet Union, the Republic of Kazakhstan's enormous natural resources, 
including confirmed holdings of 2.8 billion tons of oil and 2 trillion cubic meters of natural 
gas, together with immense reserves of coal, iron ore, nonferrous metals and gold, meant that 
its main orientation was production of raw materials for the wider USSR economy. Although 
the emphasis was on export, the Soviet period also saw considerable industrial development, 
boosted by the evacuation of many industries to the region during World War 11. The share 
of the urban population grew rapidly, climbing from 10% in 1913 to 58% in 1989 (UNDP, 
1995: 12). At the same time, agriculture was a major contributor to the Republic's economy. 
On the eve of independence, the sector produced over one-third of the national income in the 
Republic (34%, as compared to industry's 37%) (Esentugelov, 1996: 198-9). Similarly, the 
Republic of Kazakhstan was a major exporter of agricultural produce within the Union 
economy, supplying 27% of Soviet wheat, 23% of wool and 7% of meat (Kaser, 1997). 
Around 42% of the population lived in rural areas (UNDP, 1995) and agriculture employed 
nearly a quarter of the labour-force, as compared to 14% in Russia (Esentugelov, 1996: 198; 
Craumer, 1995: 1)12 . This combined industrial/agricultural profile distinguished the Republic 
of Kazakhstan from its more agricultural Central Asian neighbours, such as Uzbekistan, 
where exports were dominated by cotton, over half the population (59%) lived in rural areas 
(Kaser, 1997: 23) and agriculture, forestry and fishing accounted for 43.5% of the workforce 
(Craumer, 1995: 1). It has also been a key factor in shaping the Kazakstani political economy 
and its integration into the global economy since independence. 
12 It should be noted that the percentage of the population living in urban and rural areas varied 
considerably between regions (oblasts): in Karaganda oblast 75% of the population lived in developed 
urban areas, whereas over half the population lived in rural areas in Southern Kazakstan, Northern 
Kazakstan and Taldykorgan oblasts (UNDP, 1995.24). 
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The international agencies which began operating in Kazakstan after independence saw the 
country's agricultural sector both in terms of a promise and a challenge for the future. On the 
one hand, they argued that agriculture could play an important role in the future growth and 
development of the economy. With abundant and diverse agricultural resources and a well- 
trained agricultural labour force, agriculture could remain a major supplier of raw materials 
for domestic use and an important source of export revenues (ADB 1996b; World Bank, 
1994). Moreover, a reorientation of agriculture towards more sustainable farming systems 
could both ensure food self-sufficiency for the country and benefit the environment (World 
Bank, cited Kaser, 1997). On the other hand, for donor agencies, the challenge was to 
transform the agricultural sector to a market-based system, which would involve a number of 
interconnected areas, including land reform and farm restructuring; restructuring of supply, 
processing, marketing and distribution systems; restructuring of rural financial institutions; 
and restructuring of public administration in agriculture. Moreover, these reforms would 
have to be conducted in a situation of economic instability and decline, where old trading 
relations within the Soviet Union had been disrupted and new ones had yet to be established 
in global world markets. In addition, there were likely to be tensions between the economic 
imperatives of market reform of the agricultural sector and the social imperatives of 
maintaining living standards and social protection for rural populations, as well as political 
divergences over the goals and methods of the reform process (ADB 1996b; World Bank, 
1994). 
Between 1991 and the end of my fieldwork in 1998, the challenges facing Kazakstan's 
agriculture sector were considerably more apparent than the promises. Setting agriculture in 
the wider context of overall economic development, the immediate post-independence years 
saw a precipitous fall in production, disruption of the monetary system and a sharp decline in 
the population's standard of living. Between 1991 and 1993, the national income decreased 
by 38.2%, dropping back to the level of 1976. The GDP fell by 15% in 1992 and 17.1% in 
1993. Virtually all sectors of the economy were in very difficult straits. Simultaneously, the 
economy suffered from runaway inflation, which reached around 3,000% during the first 
year of reforms in 1992 and peaked at a monthly rate of 55% in November 1993. Industrial 
production was badly hit, sinking by 14.8% in 1992 and 16.1 % in 1993 (Esentugelov, 1995). 
However although all sectors suffered, the costs of transition to market e6onomy fell 
particularly heavily on agriculture and the rural sector. Output declined to less than half 
former levels, with grain production falling from 30 million tons in 1992 to 6.5 million in 
1998 and cattle stock from 9 million in 1992 to 3.9 million in 1998 (World Bank, 2003: 4). 
The contribution of the agriculture sector to the total economy also fell from an average of 
25% of GDP during 1986-1990 to an estimated 14% in 1995 (ADB, 1996b: 10). Conversely, 
over 2 million rural households remained dependent upon agriculture for their survival. In 
fact, during the initial post-independence period, agriculture was the only sector to have 
recorded slight employment increases, as it absorbed workers displaced from other sectors 
(World Bank, 1994). 
The particularly severe contraction in agriculture can partly be explained in relation to 
internal factors, including the need to adjust to rapid institutional changes, removal of state 
subsidies and part ic Li larby adverse weather conditions, and external factors such as the loss of 
the Soviet market, the regional financial crisis and low International prices (World Bank. 
2003). However, the particular model of economic development espoused by the Kazakstani 
government also had a direct bearing oil the position of' the agriculture sector. as %Nell as on 
elite consolidation strategies and land reform and enterprise restructuring policies. With its 
vast reserves of raw materials for which there were ready world markets. Kazakstan could 
afford to rely much less on its agricultural sector than other neNN independent Central Asian 
states Such as Uzbekistan. The government saw the oil, gas and mineral extraction industries 
as the key sectors that Could bring rapid returns. stabilise the state budget and dri% e economic 
growth. 
Oil, iron and non-ferrous metals accounted for 80 percent ofexports, drcý% tile lion's share of 
foreign investment and were the main drivers of GDP growth (\k'tjrzcl, 1998: 20) 
Conversely, investment in agriculture and rural development represented only a small 
proportion of government expenditure. It was not until 1998 that the Kazak authorities 
began to realise the need to strengthen the process of agricultural development (\Vorld Bank, 
2003). 
The result was to create highly uneven economic structures. Oil the one liand. tile Kazakstani 
econorny was integrated in the global economy primarily as an exporter of' raNý material". 
On the other, as Clover and Corzine ( 1998: 1, cited Nazpary, 2002: 11 ) describe: 'Economic 
reforms also created two distinct economies. One is export-oriented, and includes priNatised 
oil companies and metal plants, and the banks that finance them. Flush %vith cash, they are 
bus issuing ADRs and corporate Eurobonds. In the other economy wages are paid in 
vegetable oil, vehicles tyres and loaves of bread, if at all'. 
As I investigated my research communities, I found that the relationship between capitalist 
niodernisation, economic growth and universal benefit indeed seenled far from 
stra igh t forward. In rural areas, rather than bringing growth, the reforms appeared to be 
causing stagnation or retraction to a subsistence economy, creating or wicIcning inequalities 
between town and countryside and between various groups within rural C0111111 Lill ities 
themselves. 
13 Cited Nazpary, 2002, p. 10. 
14 This dependency was attested by the dramatic drop in GDP in 1998 following tile fall in raw 
material prices and the subsequent government budget cuts. 
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Table 1.1 Key Agricullural Indicalors 
1985-1990 1991 1992 1993 1999* 
Contribution to Net Material Product (NMP) 35.6 34.2 30.4 31.4 
Growth in Output -24.7 0.5 -15.0 
Contribution to Filiployment 22.8 23.4 24.4 N. A. 21.9 
NUUM-h: UUS KUM SIAI and World Bank I, stimate(World Bank, 1994: 1) 
* 1999 figures from I MF 
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A similar divide ran across the political landscape. In the conditions of what Nazpary (2002) 
terms 'post-Soviet chaos' or, to use the local expression, bardak following the dissolution of 
the soviet state, a minority elite stratum grasped economic opportunity and formed networks 
of power within the emerging market economy and post-Soviet polity. These networks are 
comprised of the 'tiny but very powerful, rival networks of the Kazak elite who formed the 
higher echelons of the former communist party [and] who have expanded their old power 
base by converting to the new market orthodoxy and by restructuring the old state apparatus' 
(Nazpary, ibid: 152). Despite the constitution and elections, this process of restructuring 
happened through the deals between these networks not through a democratic process 
(Masanov, 1996) and the new state also has strong authoritarian tendencies (Bremmer and 
Welt, 1996; Brill Olcott, 1997). What emerged was a 'kleptocratic state', whose 
administrative and coercive powers were monopolised by members of insider networks for 
their own interests, where welfare provision or redistribution of wealth was minimal and the 
majority of the population were 'dispossessed' of their means of security and participation 
(Nazpary, 2002). In the rural communities where I conducted my field research, this 
translated into a widespread feeling that, far from giving any sense of democratic 
participation or empowerment, post-Soviet reform had created conditions of extreme 
contingency, where wealth and power was held by a minority, corruption was rife, the 
authorities could not be held accountable and as one local saying had it, 'the most we can 
hope for is that the same pigs will stay at the trough; at least this lot have had their fill; bring 
in a new bunch and they will start guzzling all over again'. 
The relationship between economic and social change 
The critique of orthodox models of development has been an important theme in 
anthropological literature, from the earlier work of Polanyi (1957) to more recent attacks on 
the international development industry such as those found in Chambers (1983,1993) and 
Hobart (1993), which have focused on the links between economic change and cultural 
practice and particularly the interaction between development plans and local communities 
themselves. 
The crux of these critiques is that, contrary to the plans of policy makers which cast solutions 
to economic problems in economic terms alone, the economy is always embedded in a 
variety of non-economic practices. This approach opens the possibility of exploring the 
ways in which people at the 'receiving end' of development may accept, resist and in other 
ways shape change. Whereas modernisation theory presents people predominantly as an 
'obstacle' to change and dependency theory as 'victims' of change, recent research points to 
the importance of looking to micro level in order to understand the dynamics of economic 
and social transformation. Long, for example, uses the concept of 'human agency, the 
recognition that people actively engage in shaping their own worlds, rather than their actions 
being wholly pre-ordained by capital or the intervention of the state (Long and Long, 1992: 
33). His case studies show that the organization and activities of local people are not simply 
responses to externally initiated change, but contribute to and modify the pattern of regional 
and even national development (Long and Roberts, 1978). Two key questions are: how are 
people combining new and old ways of doing things in devising strategies to sustain or 
enhance their livelihoods? And, what do 'ordinary' people thinkdevelopment' is and how do 
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they conceive of their own lifestyle and life-chances in relation to apparent 'development 
opportunities'? (Webster, 1990: 10). 
From this perspective, markets and new private property regimes in rural areas in Kazakstan 
may also be shaped by the ways in which local people and communities absorb, manipulate 
or resist the new parameters of action. From this perspective, the normative view of 
transition, as wielded by economists and Western multilateral agencies, has also been 
criticised for relying on an under-theorized understanding of changes in society and economy 
(Anderson and Pine, 1995; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Mandel and Humphrey, 2002; 
Hann, 2002). Transition theory projects 'scientific' regularities irrespective of particular 
contexts, neglecting histories and geographies and questions of scale (Cartier, 1999: 3). By 
positing the idea of a natural market as an a priori phenomenon that can be liberated, it 
obscures the ways in which markets are socially constructed and underpinned by institutions, 
culture, traditions and relationships between people and processes that stretch across space, 
especially changing class, gender and ethnic relations. A number of researchers, particularly 
anthropologists, have pointed to this impoverished understanding of social and cultural 
relationships and stressed the need to investigate how individuals and communities are 
shaping the new system and sometimes sending it into uncharted directions (Anderson and 
Pine, 1995; Hann and Dunn, 1996; Werner 1997a, b; Bridger and Pine, 1998; Humphrey, 
1998; Kandiyoti and Mandel, 1998; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Roy, 1999, Mandel and 
Humphrey, 2002; Hann, 2002). 
Drawing on these critiques, this thesis explores the link between marketisation and the 
economic and social benefits this process is assumed to provide to individuals and 
communities in rural Kazakstan, and to examine the relationship between economic and 
cultural change, 'the extent to which the market has an intrinsic power to revolutionise 
culture and social relations and the degree to which individuals are responsible for the 
(re)production of the cultural meanings and practices which engender the market' (Bruno, 
1996b). It does so through the specific lens of gender analysis. 
Capitalist transformation and gender 
Proponents of the current 'transition and economic growth' model argue that higher levels of 
income and economic development are associated not only with improvements in measures 
of well-being, such as education, longevity, rights and opportunities, but also with greater 
gender equality (World Bank, 2000). On the other hand, opponents suggest that 'there is no 
automatic link between economic growth and the advancement of women, even in a limited 
material sense' (Pietila and Vickers, 1990: 40). On the contrary, critiques developed in the 
context of the structural adjustment policies imposed in the Third World and based on this 
neo-liberal discourse have show that macro-economic policy objectives and instruments have 
tended to be gender-biased in their effects and do not take account of gender inequalities at 
micro and meso levels, which have macroeconomic implications and can impede or distort 
the outcome of reform (Sen and Grown, 1987; Cagatay, 1998). 
One gendered critique of the marketisation and economic growth paradigm relates to the 
discipline of economics as a whole and the gender blindness of the models it employs. 
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According to this argument, economics has been the discipline least permeable to feminist 
analyses and thinking, and this is reflected in the continued use of frameworks and models 
that fail to take account of women and men's separate loci in economic, social and political 
life and particularly the gender assymetries that may be aggravated by economic 
restructuring or systemic change. One indication is that neoclassical economics takes a 
standard, apparently 'gender neutral' individual as its basic category of analysis. It is 
assumed that human beings throughout history and across cultures pursue their self interest 
in a rational manner and that this actor 'homo economicus' can be used to chart a 
transhistorical and transcultural model of human behaviour. However, as Qagatay (1998: 4) 
argues, this model lacks the capacity to take account of the way economic behaviour is 
shaped by social identities such as gender and ethnicity. Conversely, in practice, the 
individual at the foundation of economic theory is constructed as a male subject and 
economic models are constructed around androcentric norms. As Chris Beasley (1994) 
describes, economic models are grounded in a series of 'sexual ecomyths', that is, implicit or 
explicit principles or assumptions that systematically marginalize or exclude women. These 
might include ideas such as, 'women do not work!, 'women are unproductive' or 'women are 
absent from or unimportant in the economy'. As a result, these models fail to take account of 
the actual structure of society, particularly the embeddcdness of productive activities 
(income-generating, generally linked to the market) in reproductive activities (unpaid care 
and development of people in the domestic sphere). Classical macroeconomic models are 
therefore not so much gender neutral as gender blind, failing to take account of the different 
ways in which men and women combine work in the 'formal' economy with 'unproductive' 
labour in the domestic sphere and particularly women's greater role in reproductive labour, 
together with gender biases and inequalities in the labour market, access to credit, 
distribution of wealth and income and decision-making, which restrict and shape the 
economic activity of women. 
The gendered effects of capitalist modernisation have also been explored in the development 
studies and anthropology literature, which now constitutes a specific and considerable, body 
of work. It shows that, just as economic change has differential social effects hetween 
households, it may also have unequal effects within households, whose various members 
have different access to and control over resources and different cultural repertoires of 
responses and opportunities open to them (Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 62; Ostergaard, 1992; 
Rogers, 1980; Whitehead, 1981). The pioneering work in this area was Boserup's (1970) 
cross-cultural study The Role of Women in Economic Development, which, by investigating 
changing production relations in connection with the sexual division of labour and marriage 
and inheritance systems, traced the specific impact of capitalist development on women. A 
number of the questions it raises are still very much topical. Of particular concern to this 
thesis is the argument surrounding the 'feminisation of subsistence'. According to this 
paradigm, as economies have become more technologically developed and integrated into 
the capitalist system, women have been increasingly withdrawn from production or forced 
into the subsistence sector, while men have taken centre stage in the production of cash 
crops. On the one hand, women's reproductive duties (feeding, clothing and caring for their 
families) and their role in producing the subsistence foods on which their households depend, 
have made them less free than men to experiment with new technologies and production for 
exchange. On the other, male labour migration has often left women behind to carry the 
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burden of supporting the subsistence sector. However, Boserup also argues that these 
changes have not been automatic, but have been influenced by bias in the framing of 
development policies and practices. Her critique shows how ethnocentric colonial policies, 
which assumed that women were not involved in agricultural production, meant that 
women's actual work in the spheres of subsistence agriculture and domestic labour went 
largely unrecognised and women farmers were bypassed in favour of men. 
Previous gender inequalities and/or 'gender blindness' or patriarchal attitudes on the part of 
those planning and implementing development programmes, may therefore lead to women 
being marginalized in the process of capitalist development. The many recent examples of 
this suggest that this might be a useful framework for the analysis of decollectivisation in 
rural Kazaktsan'5. However, for a number of reasons, the relevance of the ferninisation of 
subsistence paradigm cannot be assumed. 
First, recent work has cautioned against making a simplistic equation between the 
introduction of market economy in rural areas and the marginalisation of women, or between 
men as 1winners' and women as 'losers. Drawing on a range of anthropological studies, 
Moore (1998: 79-80) shows how a portrayal of this kind may distort the actual complexity of 
gender relations and obscure key dimensions of analysis. To adopt the framework of women 
as'losers' being pushed back into subsistence agriculture may mean that insufficient attention 
is given to the ways in which women actively struggle against the situation they find 
themselves in. In addition, any simple characterisation of women as disadvantaged tends to 
reinforce the treatment of women as a homogenous category and obscure the ways that class 
and ethnicity, for example, may heighten inequalities between different groups of women as 
well as between women and men. Using these dimensions of analysis, other studies have 
shown how overall effect of the penetration of capitalism into traditional rural production 
systems has frequently been the impoverishment of the peasant agricultural sector as a 
whole, rather than a simple gain for men (Deere and Leon de Leal, 1981, cited Moore: 77). 
Economic change may not exacerbate differences between women and men within the 
household, but instead increase differentiation between households and therefore between 
individual women (Stoler, 1977, cited Moore: 82). In some instances, women's roles in 
alternative, informal income generating activities may put them in a better position than men 
to seize new opportunities outside subsistence production (ibid). 
Second, as noted above, theories elaborated in the context of capitalist transformation of 
subsistence agriculture are not necessarily transposable to the situation in post-socialist 
countries, where land reform is a unique, historically novel process of transition from 
centrally planned to market economy and from one socio-political system to another 
15 For a specific case study, see for example Dey's work on rice development projects in Gambia. Her 
account shows that by assuming that men controlled land, labour and income, the projects failed to 
increase national rice production and increased women's dependency on men. Women's traditional 
economic rights were systematically undermined - only men were given rights to irrigated land, 
whereas under the previous Mandinka fanning system, both men and women were allocated separate 
land for cultivation in return for labour for collective household consumption. The projects failed to 
recognise the central role of female producers. By ignoring the complexities of the fanning system 
and concentrating on male farmers, they not only disadvantaged women, but lost out on their valuable 
expertise (Dey, 198 1, discussed in Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 65). 
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(Gleason, 1993). In so far as indigenous subsistence-based farming systems in Kazakstan 
had already been changed by Soviet development policies, the existence or nature of a 
'subsistence' domain cannot be assumed. Further, if it exists - or is being 'reinvented' in 
relation to the market - neither can its meaning nor the value ascribed to it by local people. 
This caveat connects with a further set of critiques of the way in which feminist analysis 
itself has imposed Western categories and assumptions of meaning and value. Whereas an 
important current in feminist analysis used dichotomies of public/domestic (Rosaldo, 1974), 
nature/culture (Ortner, 1974; MacCormack and Strathern, 1980) and production/reproduction 
(Edholm et al, 1977) to explain what was seen as universal subordination of women, more 
recent research suggests that it is important not to take for granted categories which need to 
be explained, but to analyse if and how they are constructed in different societies and 
different groups within them (Fishburne Collier and Yanagisako, 1987: 20)16 . In Boserup's 
work, for instance, it is assumed that the public sphere encompasses the domestic sphere and 
is culturally accorded higher value. As a result, the importance of the domestic sphere is 
dismissed or undervalued, and the opportunity for examining the nuances of how these 
domains are constituted and interrelated is lost. 
Reform and the shifting boundaries between public and private domains in post-socialist 
societies 
As I pointed out in the opening to this chapter, in Kazakstan, as in other post-socialist 
societies, the redefinition of public and private domains is central to the new macro-level 
paradigm of development being imposed on local populations and espoused by local elites. 
Policies have been premised on a particular understanding of the way state and private 
sectors of the economy and different associative spheres are constituted in modem 
democracy, how they were constituted and interrelated under socialist regimes and how this 
relationship should change in order for these societies to'develop, normally'. 
This understanding is clearly expressed in a communiqu6 by the Kazakstani President on the 
nation's development strategy, which makes an explicit link between withdrawal of the state, 
the growth of individual economic and political freedom and development (Nazarbaev, 
1998). The, communiqu6 states that, despite its achievements, the old system was not 
economically competitive and, in comparison with market democracies, failed to provide 
citizens with an adequate standard of living. Consequently, the state must now withdraw 
from many of the functions it performed under the command economy, which are not under 
state control in 'normal developed countries' and 'create conditions in which free citizens and 
the private sector can take effective steps for themselves and their families'. Although much 
remains to be done, already, as a result of wide-ranging social, economic and political 
reform, and specifically the shift from a 'state-collective vision to a private-individual one', it 
is asserted that 'people have become free. 
The restructuring process initiated by perestroika and accelerated since the dissolution of the 
USSR is therefore presented as the forging of a new social contract, by which the state will 
16 For a more detailed exposition of the domestic/public dichotomy in feminist theory see Rosaldo, 
1974 and Ortner and Whitehead (198 1) and for later critiques of the model as a universal opposition, 
see Rosaldo, 1980; and Fishbume Collier and Yanagisako, 1987). 
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wit raw, liberating individual motivation and participation and increasing efficiency. One 
aspect of this vision of change is economic: it is argued that in the state-socialist command 
economy, the public/state sector swallowed up the private/market sector, leading to 
economic stagnation and underdevelopment. Accordingly, one focus of reform efforts has 
been privatisation and the creation of functioning markets. Another aspect is political: it is 
argued that the socialist state also encroached too far into the sphere of 'private' associative 
life, leading to political repression and lack of individual freedom. Another focus has 
therefore been to encourage democratic reform by fostering 'good governance' and the 
emergence of citizens'groups and organisations. 
In the post-socialist context, a spatial metaphor is commonly used to describe this changing 
relationship between the individual and the state: with the withdrawal of the socialist state, 
an area is revealed where private institutions, voluntary organisations, free markets, free 
expression of ideas and free exercise of religion can be imagined or realised. This space is 
often referred to ascivil society', a concept that will be explored below. As a critique of this 
position, various alternative arguments concerning the changing nature of public and private 
domains and the shifts in the boundaries between them, have been developed in the post- 
socialist context. These have pertained particularly to 1) gender issues, specifically women 
and 2) the construction of 'civil society' and the exclusion of various groups from full 
citizenship. These critiques suggest that shifts in the boundaries between the state and the 
economy and between the state, civil society and households are creating new forms of 
inclusion and exclusion and, particularly, that the process is not a gender neutral one. 
Post-socialism and the construction of civil society 
The concept of civil society has had a long career in European political thought, but has 
experienced an enormous theoretical rebirth in recent years and was taken up as a rallying 
call by the international donor community and many post-socialist governments in the 
1990S17 . The concept 
has been used in different ways. Most expansively, in the post-socialist 
context, the entire space between the individual and the state, including private enterprises 
and the institutions of the market economy, is sometimes termed 'civil society'. More 
narrowly and more frequently, the term is used to refer to a sphere of un-coerced collective 
action between the state and the market where social movements become organised, and 
comprising organisations such as voluntary associations, trade unions, non-govemmental 
organisations, community groups, business associations and advocacy groups (UNDP, 1993: 
1). As Wedel (1994: 323, cited Hann, 1996: 1) describes, the absence of a space for 
individuals and groups to organise independently of the state is generally taken to be one of 
the defining features of the communist system and international donors working in post- 
socialist countries have therefore seen the creation of 'civil society' as an intrinsically 
positive objective. It is not only in post-socialist countries that civil society in this sense has 
gained currency. In the Western democracies too, neo-liberal policies promoting the retreat 
of the state have also highlighted new roles for civil society organisations in providing a 
17 For detailed analyses of the history and uses of the concept of civil society, see for example, the 
introduction to Cohen J. L. and Arato, A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, Gellner, E. 'Civil society in a historical context', International Social Science Journal, 129, 
1991 and Keane, J. (1998) Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso. 
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range of different services. Civil society is also seen by some as playing a growing 
'watchdoý role in reigning in the power of the state and ensuring the democratic 
I accountability of governments at national and even international levels. 
In Kazakstan, one of the foci of Western development agencies has been the (re)creation or 
seeding of civil society. A multitude of projects have sought ways of bringing non-state, non- 
market groups such as farmers' associations, community groups and womeWs organisations 
into being and helping them to organise effectively. However, the extent to which the 
Kazakstani goverrmment is actually encouraging political, as opposed to economic freedom, 
is a moot point18. Whilst economic liberalisation and privatisation have proceeded apace, 
democratic reform has lagged far behind. As the previous extract from President Nazarbaev's 
communiqu6 illustrates, local elites have effectively hijacked civil society discourse, 
conflating it with the idea of imposing the market and particularly private property rights, as 
a way to teach people 'civilisation' and help them unlearn the 'corrupted ways of socialism'. 
Kalb (2002: 319) argues that civil society in Central Asia has 'become an item for luxury 
consumption' which has enabled local networks of well-educated citizens in the main urban 
centres to form NGOs and do 'good work', but has delivered far less than promised to the 
rural population, small town industrial workers, the less educated, women and children. On 
the contrary, in these populations'it has consciously taken away some of the tools and public 
goods previously taken for granted, as the basis for life projects. It has also done much less 
than governing elites and global institutions have been willing to concede: while the 
powerful were gathering for a celebratory banquet, the civil society programmes have stolen 
the weapons of the weak! (Kalb, 2002: 319). 
Across Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, anthropological accounts of 
post-socialist reform have investigated power and social relationships and the redistribution 
of risks, resources and opportunities". They challenge the claim that the withdrawal of the 
state and the shift towards individual rights, notably the right to own property, necessarily 
enhances the rights of all citizens in any substantive way. On the contrary, the shift towards 
formal-legal notions of universal rights in post-socialist societies may be matched by the loss 
of the entitlements to which citizens had become accustomed under socialism. Many of the 
Soviet Union's ethnic groups benefited from policies that, while significantly restricting 
individual freedoms, also constituted positive discrimination that provided security, social 
services and well-being to remote communities (Anderson, 1996; Konstantinov and 
Vladimirova, 2002). The shift to a model that emphasises juridically equal individuals, 
linked to the imposition of a market economy, is also leading to impoverishment and 
insecurity, in short to the breakdown of trust that is supposed to be a hallmark of civil 
society. Thus, far from being pitted against the state and benefiting from its withdrawal, 
some ethnic groups and communities may have relied on the state to provide the conditions 
for their sustainability and development. It is suggested that this was particularly the case for 
See for example Evgeny Zhovtis' discussion on freedom of association in Kazakstan in Holt Ruffin 
and Waugh (eds) (1999) Civil Society in Central Asia. Seattle and London, Center for Civil Society 
International and University of Washington Press: 57-70. 
19 The premises of this critique were set out clearly in the introduction to Hann and Dunn (eds. ), Civil 
'Society: Challenging Western Models (1996) and are explored through the anthropological accounts 
written by the various contributors to the volume. See also the later volume Hann (ed. ) (2002), 
Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia. 
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rural communities, where civil society has been utterly unable to substitute for tile 
destruction of social networks, social capital and hope among village inhabitants after 
liberalisation and privatisation (Hann, 1996: 8; Kalb, 2002: 320). This may also be 
particularly pertinent to the situation of women, as I shall explore below. 
In addition, these critiques raise the issue of how relevant the western concept of 'civil 
society' is to the post-socialist societies and highlight the importance of examining the 
'invisible' practices which fall altogether outside the framework of the civil society model. 
One of the main tenets of the mainstream civil society literature is that, due to their pre- 
Soviet feudal political culture and Soviet colonisation, Central Asian societies have an 
'undeveloped' civil society, or a 'lack of social capital'. Accordingly, the debate revolves 
around how - and whether - civil society can be brought into being through external 
intervention and aid. In these terms, 'progress' is measured in terins of the growth of formal 
institutions such as NGOs and associations. In contrast, anthropological critiques suggest that 
society, whether 'civil' according to this definition or not, does exist and can be an actor in 
the reform process. In his analysis of kolkhoz and civil society in Central Asia's independent 
states, Roy (1999) argues that it is a mistake to see Central Asian societies as deprived of any 
social fabric. Although existing forms of trust, solidarity and moral community in post- 
socialist society, including networks based on extended families, neighbourhoods and 
collective farms, have largely been ignored by development agencies, they may be central to 
survival and entrepreneurial strategies (Hann and Dunn, 1996; Roy, 1999). Conversely, this 
social fabric may be structured by power relations and inequalities - including gender-related 
imbalances - which are now interrelating with the economic and social thresholds of 
exclusion and inclusion being introduced by the market. 
Gender and the shifting boundaries between public and domestic domains 
The espousal of a western, liberal model based on the withdrawal of the state and the 
(re)emergence of the market and civil society may well not benefit women and men equally 
as citizens and individuals or may actually restrict women's citizenship (Rai et al, 1992; 
Einhorn, 1993). Feminist analysis highlights that liberal Western political theory obfuscates 
or ignores the domestic sphere of family and kinship relations. It is argued that Western 
democracies have been built on a gendered association of men/public/production and 
women/domestic/reproduction, which has led to the marginalisation of women in both state 
and market spheres and their exclusion from full citizenship (Pateman, 1989). 
The extent to which this Western feminist theory is applicable to the changes taking place in 
post-socialist societies has been broadly debated in the literature on gender (or generally 
women) and transition. Analysis has focused around several issues: the role of the socialist 
state in guaranteeing, or failing to guarantee quality and full citizenship for women; the 
ways in market and democratic reforms change this gender regime, either by increasing 
gender discrimination or opening new opportunities; and the specific configuration and 
interrelationship between public and domestic spheres in state socialist societies, as 
compared with Western democracies, and the implications of this for attempts to analyse the 
current transformation using Western models and analytical tools. 
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One strand of analysis suggests that Pateman's framework is particularly apposite in post- 
socialist societies, where the state played a proactive role as a guarantor of women's right to 
participate in public life (Rai et al, 1992; Verdery, 1994). In effect, the socialist state altered 
the relation between gendered domestic and public spheres familiar from nineteenth century 
capitalism, socialising significant elements of reproduction and drawing women into the 
labour force (Verdery, 1994: 232). It is argued that the substantive entitlements to education, 
paid employment, maternity leave and childcare which underpinned women's participation in 
the public sphere may well be placed at risk by the rolling back of the state and the 
introduction of the market economy. As Verdery puts it: 
The end of socialism means the end of a state that assumed significant costs of 
biological and social reproduction, instead of assigning most of these costs to 
individual households, as capitalist systems have done. If, as some scholars argue, 
the gender organization of the capitalist household cheapens the cost of labour for 
capital by defining certain necessary tasks - 'housework! - as non-work (and 
therefore not remunerating them), then the economies of post-socialist Eastern 
Europe will be viable only with a comparable cheapening. Thus the end of socialism 
necessarily means making once again invisible, by ferninising them and reinserting 
them into households, those tasks that become too costly when rendered visible and 
assumed by the state! (Verdery, 1994: 253-4). 
A further argument for the ambiguity of the rolling back of the state for women in post- 
socialist countries is the gender assymetries and inequalities left in place or created under the 
socialist system. Both ideology' and practice continued to emphasise women's primary 
rI esponsibilities in the domestic sphere, imposing a'double burden' of paid employment and 
unpaid domestic labour that was not shared by men (Fong, 1993). Further, the Soviet labour 
mar ket continued to be highly stratified by gender. Although better educated than men, 
women were concentrated at the low-paid, unskilled and semi-skilled end of the labour 
market and were also absent from the top layers of the political and economic hierarchy 
(Bruno, 1995b; 'Warshofsky Lapidus, 1978; Buckley, 1989). The space revealed by the 
withdrawal of the state was therefore not an 'even playing field' but a landscape shaped by 
gender stratification and inequality. As Bruno (1995b: 74) describes, 'the categorywomen' 
was a highly discriminated one which had been distanced and had partly distanced itself 
from the dominant loci of Soviet public and political life and sources of powee. In addition, 
the logk of reform itself was not necessarily gender neutral. Already, in the mid-1980s, the 
discourse of perestroika (restructuring) creating a universal public realm of civil society had 
been undercut by a specific gendered discourse of citizenship3o. The renegotiation of the 
relationship between the state and the individual in the perestroika period was accompanied 
by calls for the relocation of women from the public to the domestic sphere, justified by the 
notion that women's emancipation, or 'over-emancipation' was a distortion of socialism 
which the new political leadership must overcome. The 'rights' of women were redefined as 
20 Here civil society is to be understood in the broader sense. Funk and Mueller (1993) make the point 
that in Central and Eastern Europe also, stress on women's domestic roles was already been evident in 
official discourse before the 'watershed' date of 1989, often taken as the start point of transformation. 
In the Soviet Union, the re-emphasis on women's domestic role should be seen in the context of an 
existing shift in emphasis related to fears about a demographic crisis. For a discussion of this, see for 
example Lapidus (1978) and Buckley (1989). 
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the opportunity to return to their 'truly womanly mission' in the home (Pilkington, 1992: 
108). 
Women as 'victims'of change 
Women and men are therefore likely to stand in different positions in relation to the 
retraction of the state and market reform. Since the perestroika period, this framework has 
been used to shed light on the gendered aspects of 'transition' ideology and policy, suggesting 
that women were likely to be particular losers, with the ideology of state-building and 
nationalism and market reform forcing them out of the labour market and into the domestic 
domain (Fong, 1993; Rai, et al, 1992; Bridger et al, 1996). 
The early negative prognoses have been borne out in the wealth of mainly macro-level, 
quantitative, research conducted over the past decade, which has demonstrated that, 
throughout Central and Eastern Europe, women have been hit disproportionately hard by 
both falling living standards and unemployment during the initial phase of the 'transition' 
(Einhorn, 1993; Funk and Mueller, 1993). Economic restructuring and privatisation have 
resulted in proportionally higher female unemployment and increasing pay differentials, with 
women poorly represented in the better paid private sector workforce (Bridger, et al.: 1996). 
This process has been matched by an erosion of social, including reproductive rights, fuelled 
by a backlash against socialist ideology on equality and a resurgence of 'traditional' ideas on 
1women9s place'. Similarly, democratisation has paradoxically led to a dramatic decline in 
women's representation in formal politics throughout the former socialist bloc. So., although 
the negative impact of reform has been felt by these societies as a whole, women have paid a 
greater price than men. 
Compared to the wealth of research on the impact of transition policy on women in Central 
and Eastern Europe, including Russia, research in the newly independent Central Asian 
states was relatively late to appear and is far less extensive. However, the analyses which 
have been produced, largely for international organisations uch as the UNDP and the Asian 
Development Bank, paint a similar picture (Bauer et al, 1997; Bruno, 1997; Kuehnast, 1996; 
Mendikulova, 1996; Tlenchieva, 1996; UNDP, 1995,1996,1997a, 1998; Usacheva, 1997). 
According to a study conducted in Kazakstan in 1997 for the Asian Development Bank, the 
social and economic costs of transition (falling incomes, increasing unemployment, eroding 
social services and weakening social assistance support) are affecting both sexes but are 
falling disproportionately on women (Bauer et al: 26)21 . The study concluded that 
restructuring was leading to strain on the family system and change in family and gender 
roles, amid the emergence of serious social problems. It also suggested that restructuring 
was impacting differently on urban and rural populations, with rural women particularly 
disadvantaged because isolation compounded the breakdown in employment structures and 
21A comparison of gender disaggregated employment data for 1990-94 showed that job reduction 
over this period impacted on women more than men in most major sectors. In total, the number of 
jobs occupied by women decreased between 1990 and 1994 by 22.7%, whereas the number ofjobs 
held by men shrank by only 10.2%. In 1993, more than two thirds of those officially registered 
unemployed were women, and in rural areas the percentage exceeded 80%. Although evidence was 
patchy, women were also over-represented in hidden unemployment. 
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limited alternative opportunities. On the other hand, one of its interesting insights was that 
women tended to be more active and flexible than men in looking for new employment, 
particularly in the informal sector of shuttle trade, and in many cases were taking on the role 
of family breadwinner. 
Women as 'agents of change' 
This insight, although not fully explored in the report, points to the second, emerging strand 
in the literature on women and the transition in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
which speaks to the, theoretical developments described above in connection with the 
concepts of human agency and feminisation of subsistence. This research suggests that, as 
well as investigating ways in which re-structuring may be having a negative impact on 
women in areas such as employment, it is important to look at how different groups of 
women are acting as 'agents of change'. Research on urban women in Russia has argued that 
women may have developed proto-entrepreneurial behaviours under the Soviet system in 
order to cope with breakdowns and gaps in Soviet provisioning, and that these may serve as a 
basis for entrepreneurship in the new conditions (Bruno, 1996b; Pahl and Thompson, 1994). 
Similarly, field-based research being conducted in rural areas of other post-socialist countries 
at the same time as my own was beginning to suggest hat women were playing a key role in 
trading and household based agricultural production (Dumitrescu, 1999; Momsen and 
Kukorelli, 1999). However, it was also highlighting the complexity of local impacts and 
responses. Although there did seem to be an emerging trend towards male domination of the 
emerging private farm sector and female domination of the subsistence sector, not only was 
there a wide variety of patterns, but their meaning, for men and women, both in relation to 
each other and within each group, could not be taken as read, not least because of the values 
attached in different contexts to the state, the household or the new market domain. 
Cultural meanings ofpublic and domestic domains 
One of the things that many Western feminist commentators have found most challenging in 
relation to the 'relocation' of women to the home is the reaction of many Central and East 
European women themselves, who have seen it not in terms of a loss of rights, but as a 
potentially positive development (Funk and Mueller, 1993; Bruno, 1995b). This has raised 
debate as to whether Western feminist diagnoses of the relationship between public and 
domestic in terms of subordination were applicable to the culturally specific situation in the 
Soviet Union. 
One argument is' 
, 
that women's desire to return to the home, or at least have the choice to do 
so, could be explained by their actual experience of participation in social production, which, 
far from being liberating had been experienced in terms of drudgery and exploitation. The 
gendered structure of the state socialist labour market, which had positioned women in low- 
prestige and low-pay sectors of the economy, had given women 'negative images of 
themselves as workers and associated the private sphere, the home and the role of mother 
rather than worker, as the sphere in which self-expression might be achieved' (Pilkington, 
1992: 111). 
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Another argument is that socialism itself generated a specific demarcation and relationship of 
public and domestic spheres, which needs to be taken into account in order to understand 
how people are shaping and reacting to current changes (Hann, 1993; Einhorn, 1993; Funk 
and Mueller, 1993; Verdery, 1994). According to this thesis, contrary to ideology, the 'non- 
state' domain was actually more significant than the domain dominated by the socialist state. 
It is posited that the operative dichotomy in state socialism was not that of public/domestic 
but of state/family, in which the family itself was an ersatz public sphere or a'surrogate civil 
society' (Einhorn, 1993: 129; Funk and Mueller, 1993: 5). Citizens created their own 
networks and engaged in family-based income-generating activities, not merely to help them 
cope with economic shortage, but also to provide them with positive values and identities 
lacking in socialism. In terms of gender relations and gender inequalities, it is argued that, 
although the family was actually characterised by gender inequity, with women responsible 
for the vast majority of domestic labour in addition to their full-time jobs outside the home, 
women were also fiercely defensive of the family as a haven from an intrusive state and 
over-politicised public domain and drew enormous strength from the key role they played 
within it and that this is a key factor in women's current responses to change (Einhom, 1993). 
Clearly, if state socialism generated a specific relationship between public and domestic 
domains, then it is likely, to be affected by the creation of a market sector. Here, the 
'mainstream' women and transition literature has tended to argue that the domestic sphere has 
lost the significance it inadvertently gained as a substitute civil society and that, in this new 
constellation, the values attributed to the state and family spheres in state socialism have 
simply been reversed. Whilst, previously, unofficial networks depended on the family and 
women's role in it, but this was not recognised in official discourse, now public discourse 
glorifies the family and women's place in it, whereas in practice, it is the public sphere of the 
market place and mainstream political institutions that are the important arenas (Einhom, 
1993: 129). However, this macro-level argument again leaves open the question: important 
for whom and in which settings? Recent, more micro-level research, such as Pine's (1994, 
1995) analysis of two contrasting areas of rural Poland, suggests that the actual value and 
meaning of state, market and family or kinship domains need to be investigated in local 
contexts. In her example, the degree to which local communities, and the individual men 
and women comprising them, were integrated - or not - into the socialist state., was a key 
determinant of their current perceptions and trajectories. 
The existing gendered critiques of 'development' in general and post-socialist 'transition' in 
parrticular, therefore provide useful frameworks for analysis. The literature on capitalist 
modernisation suggests that macro-level rural development policies can lead to new regimes 
of inequality and exclusion at micro level. As far as gender is concerned, policies may either 
intend to affect gender relations or may have unintended effects because gender issues are 
not taken into account at the planning or implementation stages. Whilst women may be 
particularly vulnerable with respect to capitalist development models, this cannot be 
assumed. Gender relations need to be investigated in local contexts, with analysis of the 
sexual division of labour, access to power and resources and cultural norms, and models. In 
particular, they suggest that the question of gender issues in the transformation of rural areas 
in Kazakstan can usefully be addressed through the prism of the debates around the changing 
relationships between the state and private sectors and between the associative spheres of the 
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state, civil society and households. Critiques of the mainstream liberal model being applied 
in post-socialist societies 
-suggest 
that the creation of new boundaries between these domains 
create new forms of inclusion and exclusion and, given men and women's different social 
loci, that the process is not a gender neutral one. On the other hand, from the point of view of 
continuity, the experience of the Soviet modernisation/development project suggests that 
ways in which different groups conceptualise these domains and the relating gender roles and 
identities may be resistant to change and may shape responses to programmes imposed from 
outside in particular ways. In particular, in the context of rural Kazakstan, a salient question 
is, to what extent is reform leading to the marginalisation of women from the public sphere 
and their relegation to a subsistence or domestic sphere? And further, are these meaningful 
categories and 
, 
if so, how are they constituted or interrelated in particular communities and 
groups and how are, these relationships shifting? 
The research on which this thesis is based therefore aimed to explore how public and 
domestic domains were constituted in the research communities and whether and how the 
boundaries between them were shifting as a result of the present transformation in rural 
areas, looking at four main issues: 1) How public and domestic domains were constituted and 
differentiated, if they were in fact differentiated a) in pre-Soviet b) in Soviet Kazakstan; 2) 
Whether the relationship between public and domestic domains is currently shifting and if so 
how; 3) To what extent these domains were stable categories and to what extent they were 
destabilised by different political/economic regimes; 4) What, if anything was the relevance 
, 
of civil society (i. e. to local, rural communities, as opposed to the urban intelligentsia and 
Western agencies?, - 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Accommodation of Soviet Development and Indigenous Society 
'The imprint of the past is reflected in deeplypsychological ways, which 
greatly affect behaviour in the economic realm and modernisation as a whole' 
(Lubin, 1984: 207). 
At first sight, there is little to distinguish former sovkhoz Lenin or Druzbba either from each 
other, or from any other former collective or state farm community throughout the former 
Soviet Union : the same standard model of straight, dirt roads lined with whitewashed, one- 
storey houses, with their vegetable plots out front and farmyards out back; the same public 
buildings - school, kindergarten and culture club, hospital, post-office and farm 
administration, where the formerly ubiquitous statue of the Soviet founder still stands, 
pointing the way to the glorious communist future. 
That vision of the future is now changing, and with it the shape of the community over which 
Lenin, for the time being, continues to preside. However, before investigating this 
transformation, and particularly its gender implications, it is important to set it in the context 
of the earlier socialist vision and the interaction of the latter with local traditions and 
identities. 
As I suggested in Chapter One, the current capitalist development project in Kazakstan is not 
starting from a 'tabula rasa! but from an existing social fabric, shaped by the meeting of a 
nomadic, pastoralist society and socialist development policies and infrastructures. In this 
context, Caroline Humphrey (1995) has pointed out that there were important local variations 
in the frameworks of the state or collective farms that were 'on paper, the same everywhere'. 
Not only did the ideological blueprint not always correspond to the reality of 'actually 
existing socialism', but local concepts of community, kinship, economy and autonomy 
variously shaped responses to the Soviet modemisation process in ways unforeseen by the 
State (Pine, 1995). Like all large, abstract, development plans, Soviet modemisation was 
pursued by ordinary men and women in small, concrete worlds of human relations in 
households, villages and peer groups, and it was on these microcosms that its outcome 
ultimately depended (Massell, 1974). The same is now true for the current capitalist 
ty development project, which, like its predecessor, aims to act upon existing socie . Both 
raise the question of how far revolutionary transformation is possible and, conversely, how 
and to what extent local structures and lifestyles may serve as obstacles to engineered change 
or may shape it in particular ways. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to explore the landscape inherited by the current 
capitalist development project in Kazakstan, with particular reference to my own research 
communities. Given the particular history of the region, which has experienced extremely 
rapid modernisation, it is important to look, not only at the recent Soviet past, but also at the 
pre-Soviet period and the interaction between the Soviet state and the traditional, indigenous 
society it sought to transfonn. How did the Soviet state seek to disrupt or change the 
indigenous model of the economy and society? How successful was it, in its own terms, in 
bhl 
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doing so? Were local models resistant to change and if so, how was this resistance structured 
and manifested? And, with specific reference to gender, what was the place of gender in the 
indigenous model, the Soviet modernisation project and local responses to it? 
1. The Indigenous Kazak Economy 
Limitations of the literature on the indigenous model of the economy and gender relations 
While conducting my fieldwork, I found that the distant past was often evoked in terms of 
the position of women and, conversely, that projects for 'propeegender relations in the 
present often drew on images of the past. What was particularly striking was the contrasting 
perceptions of the pre-Soviet past described by my informants. Whilst some stressed the life 
I of drudgery and suffering led by women and the progress which had been made under the 
Soviet regime, others would affinn that Kazak women were always more liberated than 
others in Central Asia, pointing to the fact that they were never secluded and never wore the 
parandja 22 , but rode on 
horseback alongside their men and that their skills and courage were 
praised in Kazak folklore and ballads. Still others affinmed that'in the past, Kazak women 
always sat at home' and that this was a proper expression of women's place in indigenous 
and/or Islamic culture. This contested picture is indicative of individual informants' own 
relationship to the Soviet past and post-Soviet present, and of the way in which gender 
identity, cast in terms of 'the woman question' was central to Soviet modernisation policies 
and is now a key idiom in the 'renaissance' of the indigenous past. 
The existence of such diverse representations is also connected with the contradictory picture 
of gender relations painted in the ethnographic literature. Although there is a considerable 
body of ethnographic work dating from the Tsarist Russian expansion into Central Asia in 
the late I 9th century a nd from extensive surveys conducted in the early post-Soviet period, it 
is marked by various gender, ethnocentric and political biases that make it difficult to draw a 
balanced picture of social relations. Virtually all contemporary accounts were written by 
non-Kazak outsiders, who were engaged in various ways in the European/Sovict'civilising' 
project, which saw the Kazak nomadic way of life in terms of its inferior position in a linear 
march of progress and developmen t23. Moreover, both during the Tsarist and Soviet periods, 
ethnographic accounts were written within the highly politicised context of the expansion of 
24 the Russian, then Soviet state into Central Asia . What is missing from these accounts is a 
detailed study of Kazak social structure, and particularly of the perceptions and 
understandings of Kazak men and women themselves with relation to their lived experience. 
With respect to gender analysis in particular, the scarcity of detailed ethnographic 
description, especially from the perspective of indigenous women, has meant that gender 
relations have, at various times, become part of different, and often contradictory, 
22 The heavy horsehair veil that covered women from head to foot. 
23 One notable exception is the Kazak scholar, Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, who compiled more 
insightful information than his contemporaries on Kazak cultural history and ethnography, but was 
also Russian educated and served as an officer in the Tsarist military. 
24 See Kandiyoti (1996) on the specific relationship between Soviet ethnographers and the state, 
which distinguishes their role from that of anthropologists in colonial encounters of the West. 
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'mythologising projects' to depict the past in the interests of present concerns (Akiner, 1997). 
Both pre-Soviet and Soviet research tended to use the'position of women' instrumentally as a 
way of pointing to the relative backwardness of traditional Kazak society and the need for 
'civilisation' to be imported from the outside. This is particularly true of material from the 
Soviet period, which used the 'oppression of women' as a cipher for the exploitative 
'patriarchal-feudal ism' of Kazak society. In contrast, in the current period other versions of 
an idealised indigenous past, uncorrupted by Russian or Soviet elements, are being 
'rediscovered' or reinvented by the state to serve as an inspiration for nation building and 
future development. I will return to this in Chapter 3. 
One way of circumventing these problems would be to turn to oral life histories as a means 
of reconstructing a 'more accurate' picture of the past. However, this presents a number of 
difficulties. In practical terrns, few of the generation who experienced the pre-Soviet way of 
life are still alive. Yet, interestingly, even the authors of one of the few in-depth ethnographic 
studies of collective farm communities in Kazakstan, conducted in the 1960s, comment on 
the problems they experienced in using oral histories to draw a historical topography of the 
pre- and immediate post-revolutionary period (Margulan, 1967). Over time, people develop 
myths and prejudices about the past, meaning that the picture drawn seventy years later will 
differ from the picture that would have been drawn contemporaneous to events (Roberts, 
1973)25. Moreover, as Caroline Humphrey (1992) has pointed out with relation to Mongolia, 
the profound rupture resulting from Stalinist transformation makes taking oral histories an 
even more problematic proposition. The total displacement of society and culture brought 
about by Stalinism means that the past is viewed across a chasm. The time before the 
socialist period becomes another world, a 'deep past' whose detail is obliterated and whose 
memory, even for those who lived through it, is distorted. On the other hand, as suggested 
above, these very myths and distortions tell a story of their own. What people hold on to in 
their current reconstructions of the past speaks to how they interpret and structure their lives 
in the present and how they imagine the future. It also speaks to the ways in which personal 
memory is shaped by wider narratives of national history and culture. My argument here is 
that the past, like the present, is a contested space, where identities are continually 
negotiated 26 . 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the available material, the following section sketches a 
putative gendered model of the indigenous social economy in pre-Soviet Kazakstan. As well 
as referring to the existing literature, it sheds oblique light on social and gender relations 
through examining the structure of the indigenous economy as a whole, specifically in terms 
25 Referring to oral histories of the Edwardian period, Roberts notes that 'Some professional inquirers 
into the past have persuaded the elderly both to reminisce and to complete lengthy questionnaires 
covering aspects of their lives in youth. This can of course yield valuable information, social and 
historical. But a certain caution is needed. During the '30s and '40s I often talked with people who 
were already mature by 1914. They criticized the then fairly recent past, faculties alert, with what 
seemed some objectivity. But by the '60s myths had developed, prejudices about the present had been 
set hard; these same critics, in ripe old age, now saw the Edwardian era through a golden haze! ' (1973: 
25) 
26 For an example of the use of oral testimonies in a post-Soviet context, see Skultans (1998) study 
which explores and theorises the relationship between the Soviet and pre-Soviet past and between 
personal and social narratives of the past in contemporary Latvia. 
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of sources of value and the constitution of public and domestic domains, which were 
radically altered during the Soviet period2l. 
The landscape of the Kazak indigenous economy 
Who were the Kazaks and what was the topography of the Kazak indigenous economy? The 
territory of vast open steppe and mountains which now comprises the state of Kazakhstan 
has been settled by successive waves of peoples. One of these was the Kazaks, pastoral tribes 
of mixed Turkic and Mongolian origin, which united in confederations in the 15'h and 16 Ih 
centuries. 
Like other nomadic groups of Central Eurasia, the Kazaks' social organization was based on 
patrilineal descent groups. At the lowest level, the basic social and economic unit in Kazak 
society was the family, which owned the livestock that was central to nomadic life. In turn, 
families were united in lineages, small groups of close patrilineal kin, known as uru, whose 
genealogy could generally be traced back to a founding ancesto? 8. Each uru formed an 
encampment, known as an aul, which might also comprise other more distant kin or non-kin. 
, 4uls varied in size, comprising anywhere 
from three to fifteen or more households with 
4,000-5,000 sheep, 300-800 horses, 80-100 cattle and 60-200 camels (Benson and Svanberg, 
1998)29 . The size and composition of the aul 
fluctuated over time, as descendants of the 
leader branched off to form their own auls, typically when the father passed to each son his 
'share' (enshi) in inheritance of household property and livestock or when the land it 
occupied could no longer ensure effective grazing (Martin, 2001: 22). Each encampment 
was a socio-economic unit in its own right, but was also identified with a wider clan, with 
which it united in times of danger or during certain stages of transhumance. In turn, these 
large patriline groups came together to form larger entities, on the same principle. Thus, at 
the highest level, ý the Kazaks were divided into three 'hordes' (zhuz), the Great or Large 
Horde (VU Zhuz), the Middle or Central Horde (Orta Zhuz) and the Lesser or Small Horde 
(Kishi Zhuz). Each zhuz was an independent political entity, headed by a khan or sultan from 
the "ak-suiek" (white bone) dynastic caste, descendants of Chingis Khan 30 . 
27 1 do not intend to suggest that indigenous Kazak society was a static entity to be broken open and 
changed by Soviet - 
interventionist policies. My analysis aims to break down this essentialist 
conception of 'traditional' society and to highlight that the encounter between Tsarist, then Soviet 
colonial power and indigenous society was one between two, changing and dynamic entities. 
28 There was (and remains) a good deal of confusion regarding divisions and subdivisions of lineages 
and the use of particular terms (Hudson 1938: 17-19; Benson and Svanberg, 1998; Martin, 2001: 22). 
Using extensive ethnographic survey material gathered at the turn of the 19'h century, Rumyantsev 
(1913: 119-121) suggests that one issue may be the disappearance of more subtle lineage 
differentiation under changing economic conditions, particularly the penetration of agriculture. He 
also points to several examples of groups which presented themselves as genealogically related 
(descendants of one individual) actually having a much more complex form. He himself witnessed the 
'creation' of a lineage in Lepsinskii oblast when a group of different ethnicities (descendants of Sarts 
and Kyrgyý) invented a founding ancestor and the genealogy linking them to him. He concludes that, 
to some extent, the notion of uru was therefore a fiction, but a necessary one in the social structure. 
29 Hudson (193 8: 24) draws a distinction between the yj (family or house) group of five or ten yurts 
and the bigger aul, comprising many such groups. 
- 
30 The power of the khans and sultans is disputed. Whilst mainstream Soviet ethnographers; ubscribed 
to the 'feudal' categorisation of Kazak society comprising a ruling stratum and a servile one, others 
have argued that the majority of society was composed of free tribesmen. For further details of the 
opposing analyses of power relations in Kazak society see Gellner, (1988): 92-114. 
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Two points are worth highlighting here : first, that the whole social body was conceptualised 
in terms of extensions of kinship, more specifically agnatic affiliation, with all Kazaks 
situated in branches of a universal genealogy; and, second, that power was not concentrated 
in a centralised state, but highly decentralised, with local entities having control over both 
social matters and economic resources (Bouchet, 1991). In effect, the nomadic pastoral 
economy was structured around agnatic kinship groups, which were at once political, 
economic and social units. 
The mainstay of the Kazak economy and the lynchpin around which the entire cultural 
system was structured, was the herding and management of livestock. In Central Asia herds 
consisted, 'as the Mongols say, of the five animals: sheep, goats horses, cattle, and camels. 
Of these, sheep and horses (were) the most important, but the ideal (was) to have all the 
animals necessary for both subsistence and transportation so that a family or tribe (could) 
approach self-suff iciency in pastoral production' (Barfield, 1993: 13 7). The I ivestock owned 
as family property were not only a source of food, clothing and transport, but also the main 
criterion of wealth, social status and position, measured primarily according to the size of the 
family, aul and clan herd. 
Land was not owned as private property by the khans or other individuals, but held in 
31 
common by the clan, which migrated seasonally to its different pasture grounds . 
Migrations followed a yearly cycle, and were either vertical or horizontal, according to 
climate and geographical location. In the South, near the Alatau mountain range, flocks were 
wintered in the valleys and moved up into the mountains in spring and summer. In the 
central steppe lands, where former sovkhoz Lenin is situated, migration routes tended to be 
longer, sometimes covering many hundreds of kilometreS32 . The aul would leave the winter 
pasture (qistau) in March or April for the spring pasture (kokteu), for lambing, commonly a 
fixed place used by the same group over a period of years. In May or June the group would 
move to the summer pasture, (zhaylau), where animals were milked and a range of dairy 
products produced. Then, at the end of summer, came the move to the autumn pasture 
(kuzin), where sheep were sheared. Once back in winter pasture, some animals would be 
sold and others slaughtered for the aul's own consumption. 
Before turning to what the available sources can tell us about gender relations, it is worth 
placing them in the context of the wider arguments around the relative egalitarianism or 
exploitation in indigenous Kazak society, which has been a particularly contentious issue. As 
Gellner (1988: 96) points out, whilst Soviet scholars tended to stress the inequalities of 
power within this social system, Western scholars were often struck by the relative 
31 For a detailed ethnographic account of Kazak systems of land claims and land use see for example 
Rumyantsev (1913: 90-119). Unfortunately, his account does not include detailed gender analysis of 
these systems. 
32 According to BaJirov (1992) in the second half of the 18'h century, over 80% of Kazak families 
migrated over distances varying from 300 to 1,000 kilometres, from south to north and the same 
amount again on the return journey. 
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egalitarianism of nomadic societies like the Kazakh, particularly in comparison with Asiatic 
sedentary cultures 33 . 
One argument is that, although there was a degree of social differentiation, it was mitigated 
by a system of patronage and dependency, based on concrete and specific traditions. Bajirov 
(1992) states that the economic stability of the aul depended on the ability of all its members 
to conduct transhumance and on their having the means (particularly transport) to do so. The 
kinship-based division of labour meant that large and powerful households were bound in a 
relationship of interdependence with middle-sized and small households with fewer 
livestock. Whilst the former required the labour of poorer kinsmen and women, the latter, 
who did not control sufficient herds to ensure survival, were ensured subsistence through 
providing their labour according to a series of contractual arrangements. These included 
poorer households offering the labour of their sons to larger herd owners, or sauyn by which 
the latter gave livestock into the care of the poorer households, which cared for them in 
return for a proportion of the young or for produce, such as milk or fleece. Rather than being 
seen as a wealthy exploiting class (Abramzon, 1973: 237) the larger households could 
therefore also be seen as a kind of 'protective umbrella' for the poorer ones within the aul 
(Sagadiev and Bekturganova, 1998). Indeed, Humphrey suggests that this giving out of 
livestock for herding in exchange for use of the milk and wool and perhaps some of the 
young was 'so general, among all the pastoralist peoples of Central Asia at all periods, that it 
should not be seen as 'exploitation' but simply as the fundamental mechanism by which 
labour was adapted to the existing herds' (Humphrey, 1998 [1983]: 281). As Black points 
I oUt'in his study of the Lur-s in Western Iran, this type of system contains both elements of 
egalitarianism and elements of inequality of resources and control over them. Insiders and 
outsiders may evaluate the balance between them very differently. In addition, whilst the 
system may remain 'the same' the balance can alter significantly in different circumstances 
(Black, 1972, cited Eikelman, 1998). In the case of Central Asia in general and Kazakstan in 
particular, it has been suggested that, by the time of the Soviet domination, erosion of the 
pastoral economy due to Slav settlement and the introduction of market relations had made 
sufficient inroads in some areas to alter the balance towards capitalist forms of stratification 
and inequality (Massell, 1974: 16-17; Sagadiev and Bekturganova, 1998). 
The kinship-based division of labour can also be seen in the context of a wider system of 
what Sahlins terms 'generalized reciprocity' linking households within the aul and wider clan 
community'4 . What 
I mean by this is that individual households were bound into a web of 
exchanges of livestock, labour and other services, some of which took place on an informal 
level and some of which were 'institutionalised' in ritual practice and custom, particularly 
For a recent analysis of the relationship between egalitarian aspects and inequality in pastoralist 
society, see Galaty, J. 'Justice among equals: Disdain, inequality and stratification among egalitarian 
pastoralists in East Africa', paper presented to the WAS XVth Congress, Florence, 7-8 July 2003. 
Available at: h! M: //users. ox. ac. uk/'cpnc/CollectedAbstracts. 12df Last Access 9.4.2004. 
34 In Sahlin's definition, generalized reciprocity occurs where goods and services are not consumed by 
or retained by individual households, where individuals or households who perform labour for others 
do so in an altruistic fashion, the material side of the transaction is repressed by the social, the counter 
obligation is not stipulated by time, quantity, or quality or the expectation of reciprocity is indefinite 
(Sahlins, 1972: 194, cited Netting, 1993: 169). 
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feastingý5. Community life was therefore governed by a kind of 'moral econoMY, 36 based on 
the sharing and redistribution of resources, which both provided a safety net to insure against 
subsistence failure and conferred status and reputation. 
A similar refocusing on mutuality and interdependence can also be applied to the analysis of 
gender relations in pre-Soviet Kazak society, generally also described in terms of the 
exploitation and subordination of women. 
Women as chattels or women as resource persons?: re-examining the position ofwomen and 
gender relations in Kazak society 
As Hudson (1967) describes in his study on the Kazak social structure, there is no consensus 
on the position of women in the Kazak family (1938: 40-41). On the one hand, both Radlov 
(1893) and Levshin (1840), the two classic Tsarist era ethnographic accounts on which much 
subsequent work was based, see women as, at best, subordinate and, at worse, as slaves. 
Radlov considered Kazak women to be worse off than among the Kalmuck and saw the 
kalym (bride wealth) as evidence that men treated their wives as property (Radlov, cited 
Hudson, 1967: 40), whilst Levshin states that a woman's sole recompense for her toil was to 
be treated as a slave by her arrogant and severe master. On the other hand, Levshin also 
recognised that, even when the husband had no particular affection for the senior wife 
(baibishe), he was obliged to respect her and to compel the other wives to do so also 
(Levshin, cited Hudson: 40). This point is reiterated by Lansdell (1885) and made even more 
forcefully by Karutz (1911) who specifically denied that the relationship between husband 
and wife was that of master and slave, stating that the household was harmonious and that 
the wife held a respected position (cited Hudson, ibid: 41). Although inconclusive, at the 
very least, this literature suggests that age, as well as gender, hierarchies played a significant 
part in Kazak society and that their interrelationship needs to be investigated, particularly in 
so far as it gave women avenues for power in accordance with increasing seniority. i 
However, the subsequent Soviet literature is framed almost entirely in terms of the 
oppression of women in the traditional family and wider society" . The majority of Soviet 
analysts paint a powerfully emotive and overwhelmingly bleak picture of Kazak women's 
lives, stressing their lack of formal rights, their exclusion from public life and positions of 
authority and the unremitting drudgery and abuse to which they were submitted within the 
family'8. Abrarnzon, (1973: 238) for example, states that the strictly patriarchal structure of 
35 In her recent study of law and custom in the Middle Horde, Martin (2001: 22-23) lists a number of 
other clan-based forms of mutual aid, including zhurtshiliq, aid for the purpose of paying a debt, zhilu, 
aid in case of natural disaster, qizilkoteru, giving of lambs in equal portions from each clan herd to the 
member groups that had suffered loss of sheep, and tasimal, rich helping poor during migration. 
36 This term was coined by EP Thompson, who used it to refer specifically to the moral obligation 
between the state and workers. It was then picked up by James Scott (1985), who used it to distinguish 
between the sense of local community, responsibility and entitlement and the market and state 
political economy. It has subsequently been used in this sense by anthropologists working in rural 
areas, including, in the postsocialist arena. 
37 See Section III of this chapter. 
38 This literature is explored in detail in Gregory Massell's extremely comprehensive study on women 
in Soviet Central Asia (1974) and is also surnmarised in Janice Baker's study on the position of 
women in Kazakstan in the Interwar years (1985). One interesting exception is the detailed four-year 
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Kazak and Kyrgyz society made it'one, of the most backward in the Russian empire' in which 
all power lay with the senior male and women 'merely had a few rights in the domestic 
sphere'. 
This last comment, in particular, points to the assumptions concerning the subordination of 
women and the existence of - and hierarchical relationship between - public and domestic 
domains, which underlie the majority of both Tsarist and Soviet analyses. By engaging new 
theoretical approaches with the available ethnographic material, it is possible to outline an 
alternative perspective. These raise three questions that push forward the analysis of social 
and gender relations. How did gender hierarchies interrelate with different forms of authority 
and hierarchy? Were there other, informal avenues of power open to women that were not 
foregrounded in contemporary and Soviet analyses? And is the analytical framework of 
public/private domains appropriate for understanding gender and wider socio-economic 
relations in indigenous Kazak society? 
Drawing on historical sources and current research on semi-nomadic tribal communities 
which function outside state structures and traditions, Turkish historian Isenbike Togan 
(1999) concludes that age, rather than gender, was the most important dimension of 
hierarchy in Central Asian nomadic societies. Age sets, inequalities, interdependence and 
subordination to the elders shaped the lives of men, as well as women 39 . Conversely, 
everyone could be acknowledged as senior, irrespective of gender. Both men and women 
were therefore bound'up in age hierarchies, which determined their status and carried 
particular obligations, responsibilities and privileges. Applying this framework to the 
patrilineal structure of Central Asian nomadic society, she suggests that women accrued 
more authority from the lineage than has so far been acknowledged. She notes that although 
the system was one of patrilineal descent, within it, social status was determined by the 
mother's status. (Togan, 1999: 182). Martin expands on this by giving the concrete example 
of the Argin clan, which was divided into a number of sublineages of different statuses 
(2001: 22-3). As the son of Argin's senior wife (baibishe), the lineage of Meyrarn and his 
offspring occupied the highest status in the kinship hierarchy, followed by the sublineages of 
the seven sons by his second wife, with the lineages of the offspring of Argin and his 
youngest wife at the bottom of the hierarchy. She points out that this hierarchical status 
helped organise land usage, redistribution customs and political leadership at all kinship 
levels. 
It is therefore likely that gender interrelated systemically with seniority and wealth in 
constituting authority and property regimes. One issue of particular interest is women's 
access or control over the key resources of land and livestock. Soviet sources often cite adat 
and shariat (customary and islamic law) as elements of Kazak society that demonstrate the 
subordination of women. They argue that women 'belonged' to the clan and had no property 
or individual rights of their own, as demonstrated through patrilocal residence on marriage, 
bride wealth, and the fact that a mother had no rights to her children in the event of her 
ethnographic s tudy of the Kazak'kolkhoz auf conducted in the 1960s by the Kazak Republic Academy 
of Sciences (Margulan, et al, 1967). This more nuanced account draws explicitly on oral histories. '9 For a detailed investigation of homosocial hierarchies in a neighbouring Central Asian nomadic 
group, the Turkmen tekes, see Bouchet (199 1). 
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husband's death (Baker: 1985). However, the more nuanced ethnographic literature suggests 
that the actual situation was more complex. 
First, marriage was essentially a moral, legal and economic union between clans rather than 
an individual matter, meaning that neither men nor women had individual rights as such. 
Both sons and daughters were subject to their father's or lineage's authority in terms of 
choice of marriage partner and divisions of family property (Akpaev, 1907)40. Another 
source states that, in the poorest families with no livestock of their own, who lived with 
wealthy relatives, it was not the father, but the head of the clan (bal) who decided on 
marriage partners (Margulan, 1967: 174-5). 
Second, the usual Soviet interpretation of bride wealth as trading women for cattle and 
housing also needs to be reassessed in connection with the available ethnographic evidence 
and current debates on bride wealth and dowry systems. Margulan's study asserts that the 
bride wealth (kalym) for sons was matched by the zhasau (dowry) for daughters 'so that they 
would be valued and respected in the husband's family' adding that sometimes, especially in 
wealthy families, it exceeded the bride wealth many times over. It is now argued that neither 
bride wealth nor dowry can simply be read as signifiers of women's status or lack of it in a 
given society (Moore, 1998: 64-72; Comaroff, 1980, Watson, 1991). Bride wealth may 
actually be an acknowledgement of women's value or serve as protection for women against 
divorce (Eikelman, 1998: 166). Conversely, dowry does not necessarily give women greater 
economic security, status and independence within marriage (Sharma, 1980: 48, cit. Moore 
1988: 70). Sharma! s analytical distinction between the kinds of property received by sons and 
daughters may be applicable to Kazakstan, where sons' property share (enshi) comprised a 
yurt and livestock, the elements necessary for independent subsistence, whereas daughters' 
dowry mainly comprised jewellery and other moveable goods. Dowry may therefore have 
been a mechanism for maintaining sons' rights in property rather than a recognition of 
daughters'right to share in patrimony. However, the fundamental issue of how much control 
women could exert over their own dowry, before and after marriage, and how this affected 
wives' power and authority, is now difficult to resolve. 
More broadly, the assumption that women were excluded from the 'formal' legal sphere is 
also challenged by recent research, which suggests that the recording of customary and 
islamic law distorted their practice, particularly the shifting, informal relations which 
underpinned them. Both Massell (1974: 123) and more recently, Martin (2001: 4) argue that 
the relationship between the written record and actual practice of adat and shariat in local 
contexts is not clear. Martin, in particular, points to the way in which, by codifying oral 
Kazak customary law, Russian written sources 'froze' practices that were actually flexible 
and continually evolving in relationship to changing local economic and social 
circumstances. By doing so, they also imposed an artificial dichotomy between a formal, 
jural, and an informal, community sphere that were actually intricately connected. Martin 
40 Akpaevs ethnographic study of marriage law notes that reciprocal rights and duties between the two 
kin groups were embodied in both ritual and law. The name of the written act, the khoirykh-baur 
(khoirykh - fatty part of sheep; baur - liver), refers to the food eaten at the occasion, the liver 
symbolising the spiritual link between the relatives of the bride and groom, who are to become one, 
like the two parts of the liver (1907). 
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does not explore this process from a gender perspective. However, if, as she states, the 
'patriarchal legal arena ... was almost solely a mate world' (ibid: 170) this may 
have been 
because a gender-blind Tsarist colonialism artificially constructed it as such. As she states, 
Russian scholars and officials drew on the knowledge of male (sic) nomadic judges, kinship 
group leaders, political elites and Islamic scholars. If women's voices were not heard in this 
process, this may have reflected their actual exclusion or marginal isation, but codification 
may also have obscured the ways in which women could use customary law to uphold their 
interests. Tantalisingly, in later chapters, Martin explicitly draws on material from court 
records which suggests that some women at least used extremely sophisticated strategies for 
pursuing their own property and inheritance claims through the customary and Tsarist courts 
(ibid: 100-103). My own research suggested that, in some areas, women's claims to land 
were, at least, informally recognised4l. 
Might Kazak women have had many more avenues of informal power available to them than 
have appeared in contemporary accounts? In her study of female forms of power in peasant 
society, (Rogers, 1975) argues that the apparent hierarchy of dominant male/subordinate 
female, reflected in the formal, jural, sphere and local ideologies, may mask actual relations 
of interdependence and obscure how women wield power in 'informal' or 'coverf, and 
therefore invisible, ways. She also raises the question of where the locus of power and value 
is situated. If, as in hermodel, the domestic unit was central to social, political and economic 
life, women may have been able to control a major proportion of important resources and 
decisions42. Pre-socialist Kazak society has not been analysed through this framework, but, 
again, Togan's work suggests that it may be a useful one. According t her argument, a more 
nuanced reading of power structures shows that women accrued more authority from the 
decentralisation of power than has so far been suggested: 
In this system, where the authority of the state was absent, women's position was 
determined by the structure of the microcosms in which they lived. Because these 
microcosms were semi-independent units there was more emphasis on the 
reproduction of hierarchy within these units. As women did not pose a threat to the 
non-centralized state authority they were able to acquire greater authority in their 
microcosms in comparison with women in centralized state structures. Women of 
these societies appear in their microcosms as more powerful matriarchs who 
organised the lives of not only their immediate, but also their extended, families. ( ... ) Nomadic women enjoyed more political authority than sedentary women, and took 
part in public decisions to a much greater extent han the latter. (Togan, 1999: 172ý 3 
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,. 
On sovkhoz Lenin, none of my Kazak informants seemed to have detailed knowledge about their 
families' former territory, or how it had been allocated. However, on Druzhba and particularly 
Sarybulak, several people knew (or claimed to know) where their uru's land was. On another former 
sovkhoz in the mountains south-east of Almaty inforinants also told me that many of these territories 
had women's names (Fieldnotes, 6/12/96) 
42 It has been assessed in connection with Russian peasant society. Glickman, for example, argues 
that it cannot be applied to Russian peasant women, although she also stresses that the lack of data 
makes it difficult to speculate on informal arrangements or women's own perceptions of their situation 
(1990). 
" The question of the relative oppression or freedom of women in state and nomadic societies is 
contested. See, for example, Watson's exploration of how the state in Imperial China variously 
challenged or strengthened women's rights during different periods (1994: 347-368). 
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Togan goes on to introduce the serious caveat that women's authority was 'in general social 
and not backed by control over economic resources ( ... ) which remained in the hands of the 
microcosms, the lineage and extended family'. Similarly, the above-mentioned study of the 
Kazak kolkhoz aul (Margulan, 1967) makes the same proviso that, although in many families 
the wife had influence over her husband and respect from children and clan members, the 
father was head of the family and controlled family property. However, the study also notes 
that in the domestic economy, the wife had wide powers and her husband as a rule did not 
interfere in her domain. 
Women's major role in the domestic economy is acknowledged in the Soviet literature, but 
interpreted as further evidence of their slave status. Surveys conducted in 1929 on the 
division of work in Kazakh households assert that Kazakh women performed over 62% of 
the labour and concluded that a woman's activities were of far greater significance to 
maintaining the family economy than a man's, since she performed 80% of all chores and 
activities that were necessary to the life of the family and its place in the community. In 
1929, women apparently erected the yurt, did all work concerning cattle, the household and 
care of children and sewed all items of clothing. The men only played with the children 
(Baker, 1985: 86)44. Was Kazak women's considerable work in the domestic economy 
further evidence of their exclusion from the 'real' power process and low social status? If 
this picture is accurate, a rather different interpretation is possible - i. e. that women had 
significant and substantial power that has not been highlighted in contemporary accounts. 
One of the assumptions which may have led to this being overlooked is the distinction 
between valued public and undervalued domestic spheres, which may be totally 
inappropriate in the Kazak contexe5. The association of the domestic with the demeaning or 
" One interesting eyewitness account of aul life at the turn of the 19th century comes from Lady 
Macartney, the wife of the British Representative in Kashgar from 1890 to 1918, whose account of 
gender relations is quoted in full below ([1931] 1985: 146-7). 
1 The women, although they are Mohammedans, are very free and go about unveiled. Their 
dress is much like the dress of the ordinary women of the plains. But their headdress is a marvellous 
arrangement of white muslin, wound round and round many times till it looks like an enormous 
cocoon. Sometimes it is pure white, with silver ornaments and fringed embroidery hanging down over 
the cars and shoulders, and sometimes the muslin is of a pale colour, with an embroidered edge. The 
shape and colour of the cocoon varies according to the tribe of the Kirghiz. For full dress, or when 
they travel to a new encampment, the women put on all their finery and are loaded with necklaces of 
coral and silver, heavy silver ornaments finish their plaits of hair, and silver rings cover their fingers. 
Of course, living this outdoor life makes it impossible for them to be secluded and consequently they 
are independent and self-possessed. The men are often away looking after the animals, which wander 
great distances up the hillsides, or are working in the fields; and the whole encampment is left to the 
womenfolk, who do all the work at home of milking, rearing young animals, bringing up their children 
and making the family's clothes. It is also their work to put up and take down the Ak-ois, when they 
move, and the men stand by and watch them do it. They also make the felts and all the embroideries, 
and fancy cords and straps for the adornment of their tents. They do not seem to have large families 
generally speaking, and the infant mortality is very high, due to the hard Winters in the mountains and 
the prevailing ignorance of sick nursing: so the strongest survive and grow up into very hardy men and 
women. The women are almost as much at home on horseback and camelback as the men, and we 
used to see them riding over the roughest and steepest of roads, carrying a baby and with one or two 
children riding behind. ' 
45 For example, Soviet analyst, S. M. Abramzon sees the fact that women lived in separate quarters 
with the domestic utensils as evidence of their being treated like slaves or domestic animals (S. M. 
Abramzon 'Reflection of the Process of the Coming Together of Nations in the Family Life and Daily 
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less than social is not a universal feature of thought. As Leacock suggests, the key issue is 
not whether labour is domestic or public but whether individuals or categories of person 
control access to resources, the conditions of their work and the distribution of the products 
of their labour. Her analysis of Iroquois society is apposite here. As she writes : 
Iroquois matrons preserved, stored and dispensed the com, meat, fish, berries, 
squashes and fats that were buried in special pits or kept in the long house... 
women's control over the dispensation of the foods they produced, and meat as well, 
gave them de facto power to veto declarations of war and to intervene to bring about 
peace. Women also guarded the 'tribal public treasure' kept in the longhouse, the 
wampum, quill and feather work and furs... The point to be stressed is that this was 
'household management' of an altogether different order from management of the 
nuclear or extended family in patriarchal societies. In the latter, women may cajole, 
manipulate or browbeat men, but always behind the public fagade; in the former 
case, 'household management' was itself the management of the 'public' economy 
(Leacock, 1978: 253; cited, Moore, 1988: 32). 
As in this example, the indigenous Kazak economy does not fit comfortably into the Western 
analytical framework of 'public' and 'domestic' spheres at all. On the one hand, there was no 
'public' sphere in the sense of the development of a centralised state or of an 'economy' as 
such. As stated above, society was highly decentralised, with political, economic and social 
power concentrated in small-scale communities where power and authority were inextricably 
bound up with kinship relations. Similarly, the extended family was both a unit of 
consumption and production, an independent world or microcosm unto itself. Given that 
household production and management were simultaneously 'public' economic and political 
life, a separation between 'domestic' and 'public' spheres is meaningless. Although gender 
and age were two fundamental structuring principles of Kazak society, it therefore makes 
little sense to analyse gender relations using this framework. 
Another approach is suggested by work such as that of Ardener et al (1993) on the way in 
which the ordering of society is expressed in spatial terms, particularly the ways in which 
space operates as, a metaphor for critical aspects of identity, including gender. The 
importance of the spatial dimension in the cosmology and world view of the Kazaks has been 
underlined (Timoshinov, 1997: 46). It is suggested that the oppositions between above and 
below, inside and outside, were central to the conception of the human person and the 
relationship between people, landscape and cosmos. These were not necessarily hierarchical 
oppositions, but complementary ones, stressing the importance of maintaining hannony 
(ibid). This question has recently been re-examined in Anne-Marie Vuillemenot's (1996) 
doctoral research on body and space in Kazak society. She sees this principle embodied in 
the yurt itself, where female and male spaces are demarcated under the encompassing circle 
of the shanyrak (the smoke-hole wheel and lynchpin of the entire structure), which 
symbolises han-nony. Moral values and ideas about proper social relationships between men 
and women, elders and juniors were therefore inscribed in spatial patterns. In this sense, the 
difference between men and women's labour can also be seen in terms of an inside/outside 
division. Men performed the 'outside' labour of herding, hunting and conducting trade and 
Habits of the Peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan' in Soviet Sociology, Vol., no 2, Fall 1962, p. 48 
translated from Sovetskaya Etnograjtya no. 3,1962, cited Baker, 1985). 
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exchange beyond the aul, whilst women performed the 'inside' labour around the camp and 
in the yUrt46. 
Soviet accounts, based on assumptions about the value and importance of public and 
domestic suggest that the relationship between these domains was one of domination and 
subordination. However, their interrelatedness is equally striking - it may not be the case 
that the male domain encompassed or dominated the female domain, but that male and 
female were demarcated but equal and interdependent parts of a whole. On the other hand, 
the relationship between these spatial domains is not necessarily fixed but may be construed 
differently at various times (Togan, 1999). In opposition to past analyses which have 
presented 'traditional' society as a static entity, Togan examines the way in which gender 
hierarchies changed over time, in relation to a number of different factors, such as 
central isation/tribal isation and islamicisation. She concludes that in different periods these 
forces brought out different types of hierarchy and authority and shaped different cultural 
conceptions of women's roles. One explanation for the controversy surrounding the position 
of women in Kazak society may be that processes such as islamicization and Tsarist 
colonisation themselves led to gender hierarchy being imposed on earlier, more egalitarian 
male/female relationships based on shamanistic cosmology, thereby producing a syncretic 
combination of old and new elements (Hudson, 1938; Willemenot, 1996). 
Economic and cultural change prior to Sovietisation 
The annexation of Kazakstan by the Soviet state was the culmination of a long process of 
Tsarist expansion, marked by the imposition of Russian administration and increasing 
settlement of Russian peasants on the Kazaks' pasture lands. By the beginning of the 20'h 
century, the latter process, in particular, was eroding the sustainability of the indigenous 
pastoral economy, particularly in the densely settled South, and capitalist market relations 
were beginning to impinge on the indigenous economy and social structure in some regions 
(Akiner, 1995, Brill Olcott, 1987). Contemporary accounts point to the divergence between 
central Kazakstan and Semi'rechie, the areas where the fon-ner Lenin and Druzhba state 
farms, respectively, are now situated (Rumyantsev, 1896). Whilst in the first, transhumant 
herding continued to be practised, in the second, where fertile land was at a premium, 
herding had to coexist with different forms of land use and was maintained only in areas 
where settled agriculture was not possible 47 . Semi'rechie as a whole was 
distinguished by its 
mixed herd ing/agricultural economy, with the majority of Kazaks cultivating some crops, 
including millet, barley and wheat (Rumyantsev, 1896; Argynbaev, 1973ý8 . The Verny (now 
Almaty) region was also the most highly developed from the point of view of development 
of trade and industry. Rumyantsev's (1896) ethnographic study of the region traces the 
46 Vuillemenot suggests that the boundary between the outside, or 'wild' and the inside, of 'family' was 
the post to which horses were tied. 
47 This is not to say that the indigenous socio-economy remained unchanged here. See, for example, 
Virginia Martin's (2001) account of law and custom in the Middle Horde for a sensitive exploration of 
the interraction between local society and the Tsarist colonial apparatus and settlers over this period. 
48 it is estimated that only one fifth of the Kazakh population in this area sowed no crops 
(Rumyantsev, 1896). Although most pastoral societies also cultivate some crops (Eickelman, 1998: 
72), this represented a change in traditional practice. For a fuller description of Kazakh involvement in 
cultivation see also Bajirov (1992), and Rumyantsev, (1896). 
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impact of these changes on kinship, custom and social structure. His account suggests that 
the introduction of agriculture was linked with a changing relationship to land, marked by the 
demarcation and private ownership of both pasture and arable land. It was also linked with a 
weakening of the clan structure and growing social differentiation. Although wealthy 
families continued to engage in transhumant herding, the poorer ones remained in their 
winter quarters and the zhataki, those with no land or livestock of their own, were 
increasingly drawn into trade, transport and other forms of employment. He notes that a 
considerably higher proportion of men than women engaged in such labour, with women 
mostly trading for wealthy relatives or working in textiles and weaving. Explaining that the 
practice of women working outside their own domestic economy was strictly condemned by 
the Kazak population and was a rare exception, he comments that, 'it will be some time 
before, under the influence of civilisation, Kazak women will cease being an object of sale 
and exchange and themselves begin to sell their labour powee. His comment presages an 
important part of the Soviet development project, which will be explored in the next section 
of this chapter. 
11. The Soviet model of development 
Soviet power was established in Kazakstan after the October Revolution of 1917. In 1920 
Kazakstan became an autonomous republic of the USSR, and then in 1936 a union republic. 
Whereas the Tsarist state was largely content to administer its new territories without 
attempting to alter existing social. and economic relations, the Soviet development project 
aimed to radically transform existing indigenous society (Patnaik, 1996). Three aspects of 
Soviet ideology and practice had a major effect on people's life worlds: ideas about labour 
and value, gender ideology and, underpinning both, an evolutionary model of development, 
drawn from the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, that placed nomads at the beginning of 
the evolutionary process. The following section examines how these ideas were played out 
in terms of economic structure and social relations, particularly the changes brought about in 
the articulation of public- and domestic spheres and thereby in gender domains. 
Underpinning the Soviet development model was the idea that all societies evolve through 
particular stages - primitive, com ' 
munal, slaveholding, feudal, capitalist and socialist - each 
characterised by particular productive and social relations (Anderson, 1995: 37). Each stage 
was seen as an advance over earlier ones, with the transformation of the means of production 
fuelling changes in social relations, and culture. The question of where the indigenous 
societies annexed by the Soviet state were located in this framework became crucial to the 
development policies applied there. As Tolstov put it in 1934 
This problem is by no means'merely of academic significance .... its solution enables 
lus 
to sharpen our weapon of a correct Marxist understanding ... 
it is relevant to the 
immediate practice of class war both in the Soviet East and abroad, in the colonial 
Orient... the correctness of the practical work of the socialist reconstruction of the 
nomadic and semi-nomadic aul of the Soviet East depends on the correct theoretical 
solution of this problem (cited Gellner, 1988: 99). 
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Classification of nomadic society, proved to be a major headache for state ethnographers, 
9 
and debate over appropriate responses continued until the late 1920s (Gellner, 1988: 97ý 
The issue was ultimately resolved under Stalin on primarily political and economic grounds. 
Those who believed that socialism could be built on a surviving kin community were 
labelled as 'right and left-wing deviants'. The orthodox view became that genuine kin 
communities had been replaced by feudal relations using 'kin camouflage', and it was 
therefore necessary to use class struggle to wage an outright assault on social relations 
(Tolstov, 1934, cited Gellner: 100)50. This coincided with a shift from a gradualist to a more 
proactive approach to economic change and the inauguration of mass mobilisation of the 
population for rapid industrial development. The modernisation project undertaken by the 
Soviet state therefore came to be premised on a radical break with the past. 'Modem' ideas 
and institutions were to be imposed on pastoral or peasant rural populations, and this 
involved both building new structures and attacking existing ones, including the family, 
which were perceived as constraints on social, political and economic change. Two of the 
key loci of change were labour and value and gender relations. 
Sedentarisation and collectivisation: changing loci of labour and value 
In the Kazak pastoral economy, although the family, aul or clan had an interest in increasing 
the size of its herds, it did not aim to convert the surplus into money wealth, but to 
symbolically mark its power and status. At the same time, growth was limited by a range of 
factors, including the size of the kinship-based labour-force, ecological conditions and the 
principles of reciprocity which bound the community. Conversely, both Marxist and liberal 
economic thought subscribed to a same shift from this type of economy and view of the 
world to a 'modem' industrial one (Jacob, 1994). Whereas the aim of peasant economy is 
subsistence, the aim of industrial development, whether capitalist or socialist, is growth and 
maximisation of production5l. 
In Soviet ideology the relationship between the two forms of economy was seen as 
evolutionary. Large-scale factory production, then characteristic of capitalism, was regarded 
as being capable of fulfilling a higher level of human needs than artisan labour (Lane, 1986). 
It was concluded that the pastoral and peasant economy of Central Asia needed to be 
2 
restructured for higher productivityý . This would not only provide food for the newly 
49 However, see Gellner's account of the problems faced by Soviet ethnographers in adequately 
categorising nomad society (1988). The Marxist framework failed to account for the stability and self- 
perpetuation of nomadic society, or for the combination of collective and egalitarian traits and private 
ownership. 
50 As we have seen, this may have been true in some regions, but in any case, in rural parts of the 
former Russian empire, Soviet reforms became contingent on identifying local economies as 
following the cultural logic of capitalism together with exploiting and exploited classes (Ssorin- 
Chaikov, 2000: 13). 
Gudeman and Rivera's (1990) distinction between the house and the corporation could also be 
applied here. According to their definition, the project of the house is to maintain itself, meet 
necessities and increase its holdings by keeping its remainders as a reserve. Conversely, the project of 
the corporation is to make a profit, invest and increase it. 
5' Since the time of Stolypin in the first decade of the 20th century, a stream of agronomists had 
advocated cultivation of cereal crops on the steppe pasture lands of Kazakstan and southern Siberia. 
bký 
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established industrial cenires, but would also open the possibility of using the labour of the 
peasant and indigenous population in'socialist construction'. 
The first plank in this policy was sedentarisation. Overturning the ethnography of the 1920s, 
which had suggested that this would be undesirable or even harmful, it was decided under 
Stalin that the Kazaks 'had to be sedentarised and introduced to agriculture' (Margulan, 1967: 
3). The overt justification for this was philanthropic. The Soviet 'enlighteners! presented 
nomadic life as one of constant hardship, with little security of shelter and food, poor 
hygiene and total isolation from the benefits of twentieth century urban culture, such as 
medical care and education (Forsyth, 1992). However, this philanthropy hid a further 
subtext connected with the 'evolutionary' model of development, which attached specific 
moral and value judgements to nomadism versus settlement, pastoralism versus agriculture. 
Drawing a comparison with Annie Jacob's work on the meeting of 'civilised man' and 
'savage' in the New World, the Soviet attitude can be seen in the context of the shift in value 
which began with the enlightenment and the birth of economics, and was articulated around 
changing ideas and representations of work and the relationship to the natural world: 
Economics ( ... 
) relies heavily on an evolutionist vision of the world in which 
Western society is considered to be superior, 'civilised' whilst the savage is perceived 
as a past Self, relegated to our past and destined to become like us, provided he 
submits to our beliefs and our rules of economy oriented towards the search for 
growth. He must agree to work according to our criteria, and the history of 
colonisation demonstrates that 'putting the savage to work' was the issue which 
recurred the most frequently and was the most difficult to resolve. The point of 
radical rupture is the relationship to the earth, particularly the relationship to 
agriculture, which most fundamentally transforms the function of work and 'civilises' 
mankind. (Jacob, 1994: 246)53. 
To achieve modemisation, the 'lazy savage', who doesn't maximise either his production or 
his needs, and is therefore contrary to the objectives of economic society and civilisation, has 
to be transformed into a 'workee, who must produce, then develop needs to increase 
consumption. In both liberal economic (Adam Smith) and Marxist thought, work therefore 
becomes a central social value and a primary source of social legitimacy. 
For the Soviet state, the indigenous populations of Central Asia stood in a marginal position 
to this model of productive labour. Transhumant livestock herding, in particular, was not 
perceived as productive work, but something else, often defined in terms of 'backwardness', 
or'laziness'. Part of the'mission'of Soviet society was therefore to'civilize the nomads', and 
a major part of this was 'teaching them how to work'. In the 1950s propagandising novel, 
Ochevidels (Eye-witness), by the Kazak writer, Gabiden Mustafin, which I came upon by 
chance in the school I ibrary on Lenin sovkhoz, I read, 'The Kazaks are poor because they are 
lazy. If they learned to work from the Russians, life would get bettee. 
A link was therefore drawn between evolution, progress and ethnicity. As elder brothers', 
the role of the more 'civilised Slavs'within the new state was to educate and 'develop' their 
ethnic 'younger brothers'. However, more generally, a line was also drawn between urban 
" My own translation from original French text. 
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and rural populations throughout the Soviet Union. Not only the Kazaks and other socially 
and economically 'backward' ethnic groups, but also the peasants of the Russian heartland 
itself had to be imbued with 'progressive' attitudes to work and the peasant economy as a 
whole radically changed. Again, debate over how the restructuring of the rural sector could 
best be achieved raged throughout the 1920s. Although a few thinkers, such as Chayanov, 
were convinced that peasant family farms were viable and could compete successfully with 
large-scale capitalist or collective farms, the orthodox view was that 'agriculture based on 
family farms (was) transitory and obsolete' (February 1919 Regulations Concerning Land 
Administration, cited Shanin (1990): 303). As Lenin himself put it, the 'waste of human 
power and labour as is involved in small peasant economy cannot go on any longer. The 
productivity of labour and the economy of effort would be doubled and trebled in agriculture, 
if, from the present disjoined individual system, we could pass to one of collective tillage 
(Maynard, 1942: 359, cited Netting, 1993: 295). After the Revolution, attempts were made to 
move towards state-managed family farming and communal organisation. However, the 
reformers met widespread peasant resistance to state-control and the idea of large farms, and 
attempts were largely curtailed with the move to the free-market under NEp 54 . It was not 
until 1929, with Stalin's rise to power and the'turn to the left! that radical transfonnation took 
place, in the form of the rapid and dramatic mass collectivisation campaign". 
Collectivisation became the second plank in Soviet rural development policy. Throughout 
the Soviet Union, it was as much politically as economically motivated, as the Stalinist state 
sought to crush opposition and dissent. This was particularly marked in Kazakstan, where 
Stalin's determination to root out the nomadic economy and so end the political authority of 
the old social order meant that collectivisation went hand in hand with forced 
sedentarisation. 
Settlement is collectivisation. Settlement is the liquidation of the bai semifeudals. 
Settlement is the destruction of tribal attitudes... Settlement is simultaneously the 
question of socialist construction and the approach of socialism, of the socialist 
reconstruction of the Kazakh mass without divisions by nationality under the 
leadership of the vanguard of the proletariat and the Communist Party. (F. 1. 
Goloshchekin, First Secretary of the Kazakh CP, cited Brill Olcott, 1987: 183). 
By late 1936, only 150,000 Kazakh nomadic households remained in the republic, most in 
the deserts of Central Kazakstan. Nearly 70% of the Kazak population had been settled in 
grain producing areas. However, the cost of this attempt to convert millions of nomads and 
semi-nomads into sedentary farmers and industrial workers was catastrophic. In protest 
against the enforced collectivisation of their livestock, households began to slaughter their 
animals. The massive reduction in the overall livestock numbers resulted in severe famine. 
One estimation is that over one and a half million Kazaks - about 25% of the entire Kazak 
population - died as a result of violence and starvation during the 1930s and loss of human 
life was proportionately greater in Kazakstan than anywhere else in the Soviet Union. 
54 For a more detailed account of changes in rural policy in this period, see for example, Shanin (1990: 
313-318). 
15 Brill Olcott's account of the period suggests that Kazaks had had little exposure to collectivisation 
principles before 1929. In January that year, 99.1 % of all livestock in the republic were still privately 
held and 92.7 percent of cultivated land was still privately owned (1987: 177). 
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(Akiner, 1995: 63; Brill Olcott, 1987: 184-187; UNDP, 1995)56 . During the 
'Great Terror, '
Slav peasant farmers in Kazakstan were also repressed and Tulaks' from elsewhere in the 
Soviet Union forced into exile there, mostly in labour camp settlements 57. Moreover, 
collectivisation came after the violence of the 1918-21 civil war and the serious famine 
which followed the extreme winter of 1920-21 and preceded the upheaval and hardship of 
the Second World War. 
The landscape of my research communities and the histories of the older generation of 
informants were strongly marked by these experiences. Even now, the trauma of this period 
is such that it is largely surrounded by silence, particularly for Kazak villagers. Akiner 
(1995: 63) notes that, unlike the Holocaust or the Armenian genocide, collectivisation and 
sedentarisation 'as yet remain uninterpreted and in a way non-existent periods in the national 
experience'58. She found that although Kazaks often acknowledge its traumatic impact, they 
'do so with a curious sense of detachment, as though it were not located in actual, recorded, 
time, but rather in some abstract past! and hypothesises that this may be because 'there were 
few family survivors to keep alive memories of the dead, that subsequent Soviet propaganda 
described the period in glowing and optimistic terms, because the modern way of life was 
created in the vacuum left by the destruction of the old or because of the scale of the disaster 
was so great that it could not be consciously comprehended and was therefore blocked out! 
(ibid). On Lenin, none of my Kazak respondents spoke in detail about what had happened to 
them or their families". However, I did learn that the origins of former Lenin sovkhoz lay in 
the destruction of the area's peasant farms (khutory) and the forced settlement of auls from 
the Satylgany and the Kozgany, two lineages of the Kazak middle horde. The whole region 
was also scattered with labour camps for Slav, Greek, Chechen and German deportees, many 
of which later became collective then state farms in their own right. The detailed individual 
or family histories I did hear were recounted by Slavs, who told of being forcibly removed 
from their smallholdings or coming to Kazakstan in the aftermath of famine or the upheavals 
of world war two. Their stories bore witness both to the pain of the violent rupture people 
experienced during the Stalinist era and the ways they then managed to reconcile or even 
identify themselves with Soviet values and institutions'o. This ambivalence was reflected in 
the way that stories were told. Memories about life before collectivisation veered from 
nostalgia and loss to evocations of poverty and disease, and memories of the horror of 
collectivisation into stories about the benefits of life on the sovkhoz. In men's stories, 
collectivisation. often segued into memories of their service experience in the 'great patriotic 
" According to Brill Olcott (1987), herd size did not return to pre-collectivisation dimensions until the 
1960s. 
17 This was one of several waves of deportations to Kazakstan. Between 1935-1940 there were 
repeated deportations of Poles from western parts of Ukraine, Belorussia nd Lithuania. During the 
1941-1945 war Germans from the Volga region of Russia, as well as Chechens and Ingushes from the 
Caucasus and others, were also forcibly resettled in Kazakstan. 
" This traumatic period is now beginning to be explored more openly. In 2004, a Museum of 
Repression was opened in the former NKVD (secret police) headquarters inAlmaty. 
" The same was true of sovkhoz Druzbha. However, on Sarybulak, people were more willing to talk 
about this period, although mostly in terms of the livestock their family or clan had possessed prior to 
collectivisation and where their grazing territory had been. 
"' See the appendix on life histories for illustrative examples. Other poignant sources on this period 
include the memoirs of Berta Bachmann (1983), a Volga German, Dombrovsky's semi- 
autobiographical novel 'The Keeper of Antiquities' and Chingiz Aitmatov's novel, 'The Day Lasts 
More than a Century'. 
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war' and their honoured status as veterans. Many women stressed that they had been left 
alone to cope with hardship as their husbands and male relatives had either been repressed or 
sent away to fight. In their stories, memories of 'before' the sovkhoz were often bitter ones of 
poverty or abandonment by family, whilst memories of the sovkhoz itself focused on the 
growing stability and standard of living it had brought and their pride in their own work. 
As one Kazak man described: 'Then they couldn't get people to come together. Now they 
can't get people to split aparV61. Stories from the sovkhoz illustrated that collectivisation, war 
and modernisation in general brought radical changes both to people's daily lives and to the 
structures and value systems in which they were played out. Over a very short period, the 
focus of Kazakstan's economy changed from agrarian, to agro-industrial (1932), to 
industrial-agrarian (1938). By 1941 the volume of industrial production had grown eight 
times compared to 1913. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, Kazakstan was transformed from a 
land of pastoral nomadism into one with large-scale and diverse industry, intensive crop- 
growing and animal husbandry (UNDP, 1995). Ownership and control over land and 
livestock had been removed from households or kin groups and placed under state ownership 
in collective farms. The role of the aul as a decision-making group had also been transferred 
to the state and communist party structures. In theory, at least, the organisational structure of 
the collective farm was based on labour specialisation rather than kinship, and did not reflect 
traditional age and gender hierarchies. As Humphrey describes, 'there (were) no economic- 
political functions for kin groups wider than the family in official Soviet society' (1998: 
267). 
Collective farms also redrew indigenous domains, delineating boundaries between domestic 
and public spheres, production and reproduction. Whereas, in the nomadic pastoral world, 
family and work had been integrated for both men and women, collectivisation created a 
separation between a 'public' world of labour and collective production and a 'domestic' 
world of the family. Soviet ideology held up work for the collective as the principle source 
of value and identity for both men and women. Public labour was not only a contribution to 
development and progress, it was also a moral duty and obligation which was to take 
precedence over other family obligations, for women as well as men. Indeed, one of the 
specific features of the Soviet development concept was this emphasis on women's 
participation in the public sphere. 
The place ofgender relations in the Soviet development project 
Uniquely for the period, the Soviet state explicitly recognised the pivotal importance of 
women's roles to modernisation. The resulting deliberate and long-term efforts to draw 
women into political and economic life in large numbers, to alter family roles and 
demographic patterns and to inculcate new cultural norms in support of these expressed an 
innovative attempt by the state to incorporate the mobilization of women into a larger 
strategy of development (Lapidus, 1978: 11). 
1 Fieldnotes, 6/12/1996. 
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Soviet policy on the 'woman question' explicitly linked female emancipation with bringing 
women out of the household and into socialised tabour. To cite Alexandra Kollontai, (1984 
[ 192 1 ])'without the participation of women workers and peasants, victory on the tabour front 
is impossible; on the other hand ( ... ) the complete and actual emancipation of the 
70 million 
women of the working republic is equally impossible without the introduction and 
implementation of the principles of the communist economic system. ' Family-based 
production and consumption were not only seen as backward or traditional but also as, 'the 
basis upon which rested the former enslavement and dependence of women'; conversely, it 
was thought that socialist collective production and consumption would remove women's 
'former dependence on the capitalist boss and husband cum bread-winner (Kollontai, ibid). ' 
Socialist development would therefore enable women to participate in the public sphere, 
which would, in turn, enable them to break free from oppression. However, by so doing, it 
would also ensure that women's potential could be mobilised and harnessed for the goals of 
the state. The motivations behind state gender policy were therefore complex and 
contradictory, marked by tension between a genuine commitment to improving the position 
of women and a more instrumental attempt to mobilise the population as a whole for 
productive tabour and political support for the regime'. 
Theory and policy on gender relations also reflected the class and ethnic aspects of the 
evolutionary model of development described above. A distinction was drawn between the 
vanguard of urban women workers who were already 'conscious of their rights' and had 
'bound their future to the future of communism' and the 'peasant woman, as yet only timidly 
following in their wake' (Kollontai, ibid). Lower still, as outlined in the opening section of 
this chapter, the 'woman of the East, awakening from age-old slavery' was seen by Soviet 
theorists and activists as suffering from particular oppression. Ideologically, it was argued 
that, since these 'patriarchal-feudal' societies had not yet passed through the capitalist stage, 
the objective conditions for solving the woman question did not exist. Women in these 
societies had endured a triple oppression of class, nationality and family. First, they had 
suffered, like men, from class oppression before Bolshevik rule. Second, years of oppression 
as members of various nationalities reduced their self-detennination, even after revolution. 
Third, in family life, women were subject to feudal-patriarchal relations which meant that 
they lacked rights to a much greater degree than Slav women (Buckley, 1989: 82-3). In view 
of this, it was decided that particular measures would be necessary to challenge gender 
discrimination and draw women into public life. 
The campaign for the emancipation of Central Asian women therefore grew out of the theory 
and practice of Russian Marxist feminism, drawing inspiration and moral support from 
leading activists such as Nadezhda Krupskaya, Klara Zetkin, Inessa Armand and Alexandra 
Kollontai (sometimes credited as being instigator of the movement in Central Asia) (Stites, 
1978: 332)63 As a strategic priority, the project was organised and monitored by the central 
organs of the Communist Party in Moscow. Initially, action took the form of changes in 
legislation. Between 1918 and 1926, the Soviet government focused on creating a legal 
62 For a more detailed historical perspective on the evolution of Soviet ideology and practice on the 
'woman question', see for example, Warshofsky Lapidus (1978) and Buckley (1989). 
63 flowever, see Azade-Rorlich (1996) for a discussion on jadidism and the indigenous women's 
movement which predated Soviet power. 
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framework codifying women's rights and an organisational infrastructure to enforce them. 
Although shariat and adat courts continued to function alongside Soviet courts until 1928, 
their powers were circumscribed and some areas of family law ceased to have jurisdiction in 
the early 1920s. From 1918 women could have recourse to the Soviet instead of tile sharial 
divorce law and between 1921-23, legislation was passed outlawing practices such as kalyin, 
polygamy, child marriage and forced abduction with strict penalties for infringement. In 
1925-9, land and water reforms gave women an independent entitlement to a share of these 
resources, emphasising their equality and autonomy in law and in society (Akiner, 1997). 
However, it was acknowledged that legal instruments alone would not be sufficient to bring 
about change in attitudes and practices, which were deeply ingrained and sanctioned by 
religion. Accordingly, in the mid-20s, a more proactive approach was adopted. Central 
Asian branches of the Zhenotdel (the women's section of the Party) began to conduct 
agitprop work to help indigenous women to take the initial step into social production and 
political participation. Different forms of activism were designed to reach different groups 
of women and take account of the specific characteristics and customs of different 
nationalities. For nomadic peoples, agitprop took the form of mobile clubs known as 'red 
tents', which stayed with an aul for two or three months before moving on to another. Tile 
first of these was set up in Kazakhstan in 1926. Their brief was to combat illiteracy, to 
provide medical, cultural and political education, as well information on the new civil and 
property rights, and to offer training and support to help women enter production and Party 
work (Buckley, 1989: 89-90). 
In Central Asia, the latter took on particular resonance. There is little doubt that many 
activists were committed and sincere in their desire to liberate Muslim women (Buckley, 
ibid.: 86). However, Soviet ideology and policy on gender relations in Central Asia must 
also be seen in the light of wider objectives. Although women's liberation was a primary 
issue, more so than in European Russia, this was largely for political and economic reasons. 
The regime's failure to penetrate or destroy traditional associational networks through direct 
assaults on local elites led to a new strategy, in which sex replaced social class as tile 
decisive lever for effecting social change (Warshofsky Lapidus, 1978: 66). The new civil 
and property rights granted to women and enforced through the Soviet legal system were 
used to undermine traditional Muslim law and legal institutions and break their hold over 
local life. Women came to be viewed, in Massell's (1974) evocative term, as a 'surrogate 
proletariat'. Class relations had not developed sufficiently to provide a proletariat which 
could be mobilised to effect change, but women could be identified as the most exploited 
stratum of Muslim society. By mobilising women through the Zhenoldel, the Party could use 
them to gain access to the Muslim community, crystallise their discontent and channel it in 
new social and political directions. In this context, in Central Asia, the transformation of 
gender elations became the main catalyst for wider social change. 
This instrumental use of women's emancipation entered a new and more aggressive phase in 
1927, with thekhudzhum', an all-out attack on the old way of life, centred on mass unveiling 
of indigenous women. For the Russian development activists, the parandzha (veil) was a 
symbol of the oppression, ignorance and degradation in Central Asian societies which the 
Soviet state had pledged to eradicate. Unveiling was presented as an ideological victory and, 
for women and society as a whole, a rite of passage into a new era of progress and 
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enlightenment. Traditionally, Kazak women were not veiled, and the mass unveilings took 
place largely in Uzbekistan, where the custom was most entrenched. However, the 
principles of khudzhum were also relevant in Kazakstan. Here, as elsewhere in Central Asia, 
stepping up the destruction of traditional family structures through the mass mobilisation of 
women came to be seen as the key to undermining the traditional social order. 
The effects of the khudzhum are described fully in Massell's account of the period. The 
aspect I wish to underline here is the contradictory results of this onslaught on traditional 
gender norms. On the one hand, the Soviet campaign for women's emancipation raised the 
position of women in society as an issue, challenged existing structures and stereotypes and 
opened spaces for women's participation in the new economic and political structures, which 
were certainly taken up by some women. However, the policy of making women a 
'surrogate proletariat! misfired badly. As Akiner (1997) argues, since the Kazak economy, 
culture and social relations revolved around the kinship ideal, gender policies which 
attempted to cut across family solidarities were seen as an attack on every aspect of Kazak 
life. One direct result was that many Russian activists and indigenous women who had 
broken taboos were violently attacked or even murdered. Another was that gender elations 
and the private sphere of the family became a site of resistance to change imposed from the 
outside. In the face of the accelerated pace of Soviet modemisation, Central Asian women 
and men reacted by selectively accommodating to and resisting change, most significantly in 
the domestic sphere, where men and women colluded in holding on to the familiar order, 
incl 
, 
uding the disposition of gender roles. It is the process and results of this selective 
accommodation that I shall turn to in the next section. 
The outcome of Soviet modernisation: stratirication, selective accommodation 
and resistance to change. 
To what extent were Soviet policies successful in transforming the traditional cultural and 
economic landscape in Kazakstan and what kind of social and economic stratification did 
they create? In particular, how were gender domains and the boundaries between public and 
domestic spheres changed by the Soviet development project? 
By the 1970s, it was asserted that the peoples of Central Asia had 'successfully completed the 
non-capitalist road to delvelopment'(Margulan, 1967). The past 50 years were presented as a 
period of economic and social achievement and the popular image of Kazakstan, put forward 
in the didactic-propaganda material of the time, was that of 'A Storehouse of Natural 
Riches..; of Great Transformations... A Republic of Major Industries... of Collective Farms 
and State Farms.. -. - A, Land with a Great Future' (Yanios and Dvoskin, 1957)64. It was 
asserted that,, in the Kazak countryside, 'new, all-Soviet and international features of daily 
life and culture' had 'emerged and developed under the leadership of Russian culture and in 
connection with the cultures of other peoples of the USSR! (Margulan, 1967: 7). The 
improved status of women in Central Asian societies, particularly in rural areas, was also 
presented as a mark, er of the overall progress achieved under the Soviet system. Quantitative 
64 Yanios N. and Dvoski, n, B Besedy o Kazakhstane, Alma-Ata, Kazgosizdat, cited in Akiner (1995): 
51. 
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indicators showed that the position of women in the Kazak labour force had risen from IS% 
in 1922 to 47% in 1970, and that women made up 46% of all kolkhoz workers. It was 
asserted that, in the countryside, women now occupied leading and specialist positions on 
collective farms. They were using new technology alongside men. Bakeries, running water, 
electric irons and canteens had freed them from the burdensome tasks connected with the 
previous way of life and women's new economic independence had changed patriarchal and 
hierarchical relations within the family (Vasil'eva, 1975). 
However, the picture painted in these ideologically inspired celebrations of Soviet-style 
modernization was not complete. Although presented as egalitarian, Soviet development was 
marked by disparities at all levels. At the macro level, at the beginning of the 1990s, various 
researchers concluded that Central Asia and Kazakstan represented a specific Soviet case of 
underdevelopment - in effect, the region's economies had remained at the periphery, almost 
completely outside the sphere of industrialisation in the union economy (Alexandrov, 1993; 
Patnaik, 1996). Soviet development policies had led to similar disparities between and 
within regions, particularly between urban and rural areas. By the Brezhnev era, a stable 
standard of living, grounded in state employment and welfare provision was a reality in rural 
as well as urban communities. However, in Kazakstan as elsewhere in the USSR, 
development indicators such as income levels and provision of health care and education 
were lower in rural areas (Patnaik, ibid: 74; UNDP, 1995: 3). Further, these disparities were 
linked to ethnicity, with the indigenous population overly represented in rural areas and 
Slavs concentrated in the cities. Through controlling the division of labour and the allocation 
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of reward, the state also created its own forms of differentiation and social stratification . In 
the countryside, waged labour for the state farm was a key determinant of access to resources 
and therefore of social stratification. Despite the ideological commitment to incorporating 
the indigenous population, particularly women, into public labour, both groups continued to 
be relatively marginalized and disadvantaged, occupying the least skilled and least 
remunerated positions in the rural workforce and formal hierarchy (Bridger, 1987; Lubin, 
1984). 
Similarly, state accounts of the outcome of modernisation glossed over the underside to 
official practice and ideology. As Ledeneva (1998) has argued in her study of Russia's 
'economy of favours, ' and as Cynthia Werner (1997(a)(b), 1998) has shown for Kazakstan in 
particular, the formal state system of public labour and distribution of resources was also 
intertwined with informal practices. The second economy and personal networks based on 
colleagues, friends and kin provided alternative forms of access to resources, values and 
identities. In effect, 'a large social network ( ... ) could serve as a 
form of wealth or as a 
resource-base in itself (Ledeneva, 1998: 113). In some instances, formal position in the 
occupational hierarchy corresponded with this informal 'wealth'. This was the case for the 
Soviet elite of party cadres and state officials, who had considerable access to and control 
over state property, which enabled them to build large social networks. However, other 
relatively lowly positions in the formal hierarchy were also valued highly in the informal 
'economy of favours'. From the perspective of ethnicity, parts of the informal economy 
65 For a detailed discussion on social stratification in Soviet society, see for example, Zaslavsky's 
'From Redistribution to Marketization: Social and Attitudinal Change in Post-Soviet Russia' in 
Warshofsky Lapidus (ed. ) (1995) The New Russia: Troubled Transformation. 
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'found a safe and comfortable niche in traditional networks of reciprocity ( ... ) constituting a 
'native regime of consumption' characteristic only for the local population' (Korotyeva and 
Makarova, 1997: 581). From a gender perspective, 'male' and 'female' occupations both 
provided diverse opportunities to engage in informal networking and exchanges. For 
instance, although they were low-paid, traditionally 'female' areas of employment, such as 
retail and services were particularly valuable arenas for social networking and bla? 6. 
Similarly, women's household responsibilities obliged them to develop the skills needed to 
create and maintain complex networks and systems for bartering goods, favours and 
information, in order to compensate for the constant difficulties in consumption and daily 
life. During at least the last decade of the Soviet regime, more and more citizens were 
turning to these private networks of advantage and survival to compensate for the 
inefficiencies and shortcomings of the public sector, shaping other aspects of social 
stratification in the process (Bruno, 1996: 60). 
How were these patterns of stratification to be explained? To some extent, the problem of 
uneven development was recognised during the Soviet period. As Kandiyoti (1996) 
describes, the discourse on the achievements of Soviet-style modernization was undercut by 
a parallel and contradictory discourse, which stressed the immutability of Muslim cultures 
and the persistence of local patterns of social organisation that the Soviet state had been 
unable to penetrate and transform. The problems of development in Central Asia were 
singled out as illustrative of a particularly large 'attitudinal lag' between rates of technical 
progress and attitudinal change: 
If this (lack of correspondence) is characteristic for our society in general, then it is 
all the more noticeable in the republics of Central Asia, which in an economic sense 
in a relatively short historical period completed a leap unparalleled in scope... In the 
consciousness and behaviour of some parts of the population, traditions and survivals 
continue to be preserved which, by their character and content, are not compatible 
with the socio-economic level of the development of society. (M. F. Soldatov, 
Trudovoe vospitanie mass, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 1972: 97-8, cited Lubin, 1984: 
204). 
Soviet ethnographers, now echoed by many of their post-Soviet colleagues, both from Russia 
and Central Asia, continued to point to manifold 'survivals' of the past, particularly in rural 
areas. They argued that, despite Soviet modernisation, the 'essence' of traditional culture had 
been retained unscathed and reproduced in an unbroken chain throughout the Soviet period. 
On the other hand, many Western researchers have pointed to the need for a less essentialist 
approach, which take 
,s 
account of the actual dynamics of change, accommodation and 
resistance in Central Asia. According to this argument, which is convincingly summarised by 
Kandiyoti (1996), what appears to some commentators as 'traditionalism' was as much a 
response to and creation of the system itself as an unchanging feature of local communities. 
Drawing on anthropological work carried out in the late Soviet period, such as Humphrey's 
(1998 [1983]) study of Karl Marx Collective in Siberia, Dragadze's (1988) work on rural 
families in Georgia and Bouchet's (1991) study of tribalism in the Central Asian kolkhoz, she 
explores the ways in which the social, cultural and economic landscape of Soviet Central 
66 In her in-depth study, Ledenova defines blat as: 'the use of personal networks and infonnal contacts 
to obtain goods and services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures'. 
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Asia was created through the interplay of local strategies and identities and the state-imposed 
development concept. Her discussion and my own reading of these and other critiques 
informs the final section of this chapter on the topography of my research communities at the 
beginning of the current reforms. 
IV. Profiles of the research communities 
On one level, the Lenin, Druzhba and Sarybulak communities typified the history and 
structure of state farms in Kazakstan 67 . They were all sited on former Kazak pasture lands 
and established as state farms from the amalgamation or re-demarcation of earlier collective 
farms, in 1946,1961 and 1960, respectively. 
As will be further explored in Chapter 4, they were all incorporated in the Union-wide state. 
controlled input, production, distribution and marketing chains. At the top, the all-union 
body, the Gosagroprom SSSR took strategic decisions on the development of agriculture and 
the agricultural processing industries. At the Republic and Oblast levels, Ministries and 
Committees were responsible for ensuring that agricultural production met plan targets and 
coordinating processing and storage. At Rayon level, the RAPO (rayonnoe 
agropromyshlenoe obedinenie) was the first link in the management system of individual 
enterprises, providing data for planning and organising processing and storage 68. This highly 
centralised system curtailed the freedom of individual farms and farm managers to deten-nine 
agricultural production. What was grown, how much was produced and where it was 
processed or sold was determined at the centre rather than at the micro level. For example, 
on the Lenin state farm, an order of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Kazak SSR, issued in 
19 84, stipulated that the enterprise would specialise in meat production, with a subsidiary 
focus on cereals. In application of this order, a long-term Production Plan was drawn up by 
the oblast administration in 1986 69 . This assessed the 
farm's current situation and potential 
production up to 1992, based on factors such climate and soil conditions, the available 
workforce and projected developments in the use of technology, and set precise targets for 
increases in production, together with developments in infrastructure and services. 
As well as being situated within the same vertical system of planning and production, all 
three state farms had a similar hierarchical internal structure, which was expressed in the 
" The fact that I investigated privatisation on two former sovkhozy rather than kolkhozy needs to be 
flagged. State farms were statistically more representative of the situation in Kazakstan as a whole 
and were the focus of the privatisation progrýmme. it appeared that there was little to distinguish the 
two in terms of organisation, management and marketing arrangements (Coulter, 1996). However, in 
terms of social structure and cultural continuities, a number of informants suggested that kolkhozy had 
been based on Kazak lineages or auls and tended to be far more homogeneous in terms of ethnicity 
and kinship. My own comparison between the relatively ethnically homogeneous Sarybulak 
community and the other two state farms suggests that this may well have impacted on the 
Frivatisation process and the question merits further attention. 
8 For a detailed description of the functioning of the Agriculture Sector see for exarnple, Khozraschet 
i samoupravlenie v trudovykh kollekivakh kolkhozov i sovkhozov. Uchebnik posobie dlya 
kolkhoznikov i pabochikh sovkhozov. Prof izdat. Moskva, 1988. 
69 Proekt vnutrikhozyaistvennogo zemleustroistva sovkhoza Lenina Molodezhnogo Rayona 
Karagandinskoi oblasti, 1986, Gosudarstvennyi Agropromyshlennyi Komitet Kazakhskoi SSR, 
Karagandinskiifilialproektnogo instituta 'Kazgiprozemý Document held in the oblast records. 
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organisation of decision-making and production. The top level of this 'three-tier' system was 
the farm's central administration (tsentral'noye upravleniye), which was located in the central 
or biggest population centre. The next level comprised the various production departments 
(otdeleniye), structured around smaller population centres, where work was organised in 
particular branches of agricultural production. On the Lenin state farm, there were four such 
oldeleniye, two focusing primarily on livestock production and two on arable production. 
The lowest tier of the administration and production comprised the individual 'brigades' or 
'production units', which actually performed the agricultural work. Again, these were usually 
structured around particular locations, such as areas of agricultural or pasture land or 
buildings, such as the dairy, bakery or mechanical repairs workshop and focused on specific 
tasks. For example, on sovkhoz Lenin's fourth Weleniye, one brigade focused on 
preparation of feed for livestock, another on actual feeding of livestock and a third on 
milking.. On Lenin and Sarybulak, some of these brigades, notably those focusing on sheep 
herding, were based in outlyingfermy, far from the sovkhoz centre (see figure 2.1, facing 
page). 
Within this structure, individual jobs were also incorporated in the vertical hierarchy. On 
Lenin, respondents tended to distinguish between four different categories: 1) the farm 
director; 2) the chief specialists, (such as the head economist, head accountant and livestock 
specialist); 3) the 'white-collar workers' (sluzhashchie) (including the heads of the individual 
oldeleniye, brigadiers, farm office administrators and managers of units such as the dairy or 
grain store); and 4) ordinary 'blue-collar workers', further subdivided into skilled and general 
workers and permanent, seasonal or day-hire workers. 
The most powerful figure was the farm director, whose job was concerned with both 
production and administration". As Humphrey (1998: 122) describes, 'he (sicýl [was] 
responsible for work discipline, issuing pen-nits for travel, sick-leave, insurance and 
pensions, taking on and dismissing workers, and the honesty and quality of their work, as 
well as the directly productive activities of allotting products and money to different funds, 
obtaining inputs, fulfilling the plan of deliveries to the state, allocating machinery and 
workers to the brigades and so on'. A state farm director therefore had very extensive 
powers in relation to ordinary members of the enterprise. However, all three of the fieldwork 
communities bore witness to the changes which had taken place since the Stalinist period, 
when these powers could in some instances be almost unlimited and used in an arbitrary and 
unaccountable way (Humphrey, 1998: 123). In the formal decision-making structure of state 
farms, the highest authority was not the Director but the general meeting of the sovkhoz 
members (Obshchee sobranie trudovogo kollektiva). 
It should also be pointed out that during the Soviet period, the sovkhoz proper was also articulated 
with the local organ of the Communist Party (Partorg), headed by a Party Secretary and the Rural 
Soviet (Sel'sovet) headed by a Chairman. For a detailed exploration of the relationship between these 
three organs ee, for example, Humphrey's analysis of the Selenga collective farm (1998: Chapter 3). " None of the three former state farms had ever had a woman director. More widely, there was one 
well-known woman state farm director in the Lenin region at the time of privatisation, but she was 
seen as an unusual exception. The discussion in Chapter 5 examines the issue of gender and 
managerial authority in more detail. 
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Figure 2.1: Administrative and Production Structure of Sovkhoz Lenin during the late Soviet 
Period 
Central Village 
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This meeting met at least four times a year and elected a governing committee (Sovet 
trudovogo kollektiva) which had authority when the general meeting was not in session. 
Formally, then, the State Farm Director was the third authority after the general meeting and 
the governing committee. This whole structure i. e. 1) meeting; 2) committee and 3) leader 
was theoretically repeated at the lower levels of otdeleniye and brigades. However, as 
Humphrey (ibid: 105) points out, in practice this principle of 'worker democracy' was in 
contradiction with the principle of 'single leadee (yedinonachanfiye), whereby the decisions 
of individual officials along the chain of command took precedence. As in her examples 
from Siberia, I found that the meetings and committees operated only infrequently, if at all, 
at lower levels. On Lenin, for instance, the brigade committees met only at key times for 
production, such as sowing and pre- and post-harvest. In the final instance, then, the actual 
powers of state farm workers to decide important matters were limited. Nonetheless, looking 
back to the late-Soviet period in contrast to the present, respondents often referred to their 
sense that there were channels for expressing complaints about unfair treatment by the 
Director or other farm officials, both within the farm, notably through the trade union 
representative, or beyond it, for example through higher echelons of the Party apparatus or 
the press, and their confidence that there would be some form of redress. 
Below the 
, 
farm director, responsibility for organising the practicalities of agricultural 
pr 
, 
oduction fell to'the chief specialists and heads of otdeleniye. Since the 1970s, agricultural 
production had been structured into specific sectors, headed by chief specialists. On Lenin, 
for 
, 
example, the livestock sector was headed by a chief 'zootechnik' (livestock specialist) and 
chief veterinarian, the arable sector by a chief economist and head engineer and the planning 
and accounting sector by a chief economist and head accountant. The relationship between 
the specialists from the farm centre and the heads of the otdeleniye appeared to be a complex 
one in terms of power and influence over decision-making. In theory, the heads of the 
otdeleniye were subordinate to the chief specialists. In practice, the heads of the otdeleniye 
-tended to be local people, often older than the specialists who were 'outsiders' appointed by 
the state and this appeared to have had an influence on their relative positions. For ordinary 
workers, it was the head of the otdeleniye who was responsible for deciding key issues, such 
as which workers would join which brigade and what their annual production plan would be. 
For ordinary workers, jobs were divided into different specialisations (combine operator, 
shepherd, milk-maid, field-worker, accountant), which, as will be discussed further below, 
required different kinds of training and had different pay, ideologies, statuses and political 
opportunities associated with them. Within this centralised and hierarchical system, 
individual farm workers had little opportunity to change or control the conditions in which 
they worked. From the 1980s, there were moves to change this situation. Faced with the 
failure to meet growth potential in agriculture and a series of environmental problems, the 
government saw a need to stimulate economic activism and the independence and 
creativity of work collectives and encouraged a transition from the extremely centralised, 
command system of management to a democratic system, prioritising the economic, with an 
optimum balance of centralism and self-governance 72 . Two major changes were 1) wider 
introduction of khozraschet (self-accounting), whereby rather than simply fulfilling 
72 From Khozraschet i s'amoupravleniye, Profizdat, Moscow 1985, p. 4. 
65 
production plans, farms and the smaller units within them were to aim to ensure a profit 
balance and 2) the decision to move towards greater independence for smaller units, 
including the creation of family brigades (semeinyipodrad). This was one important area of 
contrast between the three research communities. In particular, the family brigade system 
had made far greater inroads on Sarybulak and on Druzhba than on Lenin, where no brigades 
had gone over to this system. 
At another level, the communities had significantly different profiles, in terms of their 
farming systems and incorporation into the Soviet development project. These emerged as 
important points of comparison in analysing the gender outcome of the current reform, as did 
the demographic composition of the communities, which is also described in this section 73. 
Changing patterns of migration are mentioned specifically as a background to the analysis in 
chapters 5,6 and 7. 
Farming systems 
one significant factor in shaping the post-privatisation landscape was the different fanning 
systems that existed prior to restructuring, each of which had a different gender distribution 
of labour. The Lenin and Sarybulak state farms were both situated in relatively isolated and 
uninhabited areas of un-irrigated steppe most suitable for livestock production. Historically, 
both had concentrated on extensive, semi-transhumant pastoralism. However, the 
communities' fanning systems had diverged sharply since collectivisation. Sarybulak was 
located in a particularly and region known as the 'hungry steppe' and had not been the target 
of specific Soviet rural development or industrial isation drives or the accompanying in- 
migration of Slavs or other nationalities. The community had remained relatively 
demographically and economically homogeneous, essentially comprising Kazaks from a 
restricted number of lineages and concentrating on semi-transhumant herding. The system 
described by the older generation of informants who had worked on sovkhoz Lenin before 
the 1950s seemed very similar to that still practised on Sarybulak. Herding brigades were 
often based on family units and their work followed a pattern of seasonal migration, often 
taking place in isolated encampments far from the centre. In this system, both men and 
women were employed as shepherds or herders, usually as senior and assistant, respectively. 
In the community as a whole, shepherds and their work were highly regarded, both for their 
knowledge of land and animals and their self-reliance and autonomy. 
Unlike the 'hungry steppe', the area around sovkhoz Lenin had been the target of both rural 
development and industrialisation drives. From the Tsarist period, industrialists had begun to 
exploit the region's rich coal resources and Slav settlers had been attracted by the 
possibilities for settled agriculture. Both trends had developed further during the Soviet 
period. On sovkhoz Lenin, the farming system and demography had undergone considerable 
changes since the Virgin Lands campaign in the 1950s, which had seen a mass influx of 
Slavs and the development of more intensive agriculture 
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- By the 1990s, only a minority of 
11 Statistics on the communities' demographic profiles are set out in Appendix 1. 
74 'in the 1950s and 1960s, more than one million Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians came to 
Kazakstan as pioneers in the development of the Virgin Lands. The proportion of Kazaks, which in 
1926 was 57.1% of the total population of Kazakstan, fell to 38% in 1939; and by 1959 was less than 
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workers from the Kazak-dominated otdeleniye continued to take livestock out to the seasonal 
pastures and a handful of families lived year-round on the distant fermy. Stock rearing had 
become increasingly specialised and intensive, with a shift from sheep and horses to cattle 
and a focus on dairy production and fattening young animals from other fartris. In addition, 
under the Virgin Lands campaign, the farm had developed a second line of production in 
cereal cultivation. This shift was accompanied by a profound change in work relations, 
including the gender division of agricultural labour. Although women still worked with 
livestock, particularly with the calves and in the dairy, transhumant herding was increasingly 
conducted by men alone. In addition, although many Slav women had come to the 
community in the 1950s specifically to work as tractor drivers and machine operators, by the 
1990s, this branch of mechanised production was almost entirely conducted by men. This 
reflected a generational shift in aspirations, with younger women tending to seek more 
specialised education and employment in the service sector as nurses, teachers or 
administrators. In 1994,113 of the farm's 583 workers were women, but only 15 worked in 
cereal production, against 60 in livestock production, with the remainder in administration. 
On the other hand, women predominated in the service sector, in the kindergarten, school, 
hospital, shops, post office and hotel. In terms of vertical stratification, the Director, seven of 
the eight chief specialists and the four heads of the otdelenie were men, along with eleven of 
the next level of white-collar employees (sluzhashchie). It seemed that the farm director had 
traditionally been Kazak, but that, before the outmigration of many ethnic Germans and 
Russians began in 1991, the latter had dominated the specialist and managerial posts in the 
sovkhoz centre. 
The situation of sovkhoz Druzhba was somewhat different. Although it too had been sited on 
traditional Kazak grazing lands and originally focused on livestock production, its situation 
in the lee of the Zailiiskiy Alatau mountain range provided considerable possibilities for 
irrigated cultivation. The region had already been in the forefront of the Tsarist colonial 
expansion, which had led to significant in-migration of Slav peasant settlers and disruption 
of the indigenous economy. During the Soviet era, the community's location near Almaty 
also led to increasing diversification, both in terms of heterogeneity of population and 
economic activity, with the state farm existing alongside the railway, rural manufacturing 
and agro-industry. Sixteen large firms were located in the community, together with the 
largest animal feed (kombikorm) plant in the Republic, which employed around 600 people. 
By the early 1990s, much of the original pasture land was under cultivation and the farm had 
come to specialise in dairy production, cereals and horticulture. All three branches were 
represented in each of the outlying villages, apart from one which specialised exclusively in 
the cultivation of fruit and potatoes. Frustratingly, the official statistics on women's and 
men's participation in agricultural production prior to privatisation had disappeared along 
with the sovkhoz itself before I started my fieldwork. According to the administrator 
responsible for keeping the books on human resources, in 1991,600 of the 1,100 workers 
had been women and in 1985 women had comprised 60% of workers. She also indicated that 
30%. Only in the mid-1960s, due to a high level of natural growth of the Kazak population, as well as 
to an increase since the mid-1980s in the level of emigration of the non-Kazak population, has there 
been a gradual increase in the proportion of Kazaks in the overall population of the Republic. 
According to the 1989 census it had reached 41%'(UNDP, 1995). 
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women dominated particular branches, particularly sheep, dairy, livestock and horticulture 
F and that 
in these branches many team leaders were women. On the other hand, very few 
women worked at the higher levels as brigade leaders and none in the highest echelons of the 
administration in specialist and managerial posts. Although these figures may not be entirely 
accurate, my respondents' work histories demonstrated that women had been heavily 
involved in all branches of agriculture, except for mechanised cereal production, which, as 
on Lenin, was dominated by men. The farm's workforce had also been stratified by ethnicity, 
with the various otdeleniye and the associated specialisations dominated by particular ethnic 
for example, Kazaks predominantly in livestock production and Turks in groups 
I horticulture. This group was commonly perceived to be particularly 'marginal'. In particular, 
women's work in horticulture was seasonal, and it was common for this group to be heavily 
engaged in household production of produce for sale at the local markets. In general, many 
households sold produce at the market and second-economy activity was highly developed. 
It should be flagged that on Lenin and Druzhba, changing patterns of in- and out-migration 
were particularly significant factors not only historically, but also in connection with the 
current reforms. On the one hand, throughout the early and mid-1990s, both communities 
experienced significant out-migration of ethnic Russians and Germans, often the most 
skilled, white-collar workers, who took up new opportunities to emigrate to Russia or 
Germany. On the other hand, there was a counter-trend towards in-migration of ethnic 
Kazaks from the diaspora. On Lenin, this comprised 10 Kazak households from Mongolia, 
who were resettled in one of the Weleniye. On Druzhba, far larger numbers were involved. 
Between 1991 and 1997,197 Kazak families, mainly from Karakalpakistan, were resettled 
across the community. In addition, the community also absorbed considerable numbers of 
Kazak in-migrants from the ecologically devastated areas of Semipalatinsk and Kyzyl Orda 
within Kazakstan itself. On Druzhba the trend towards in-migration seemed set to continue. 
According to statistics from the local 4kimiat, a further 103 households, comprising 353 
Kazaks, 21 Russians, 7 Germans and 14 other in-migrants from other ethnic groups, 
including Uighurs, Turks, Azeris and Estonians, arrived between January and September 
1998, when I left the field 75 . In both communities, the new arrivals were a focus for often 
heated debates around opportunity, entitlement and distribution of scarce resources as well as 
around 'tradition' and identity. Gender and notably the 'proper' roles for women in work and 
family, how they had been changed by Soviet policy and how they should now evolve, was a 
key issue in these debates. 
Incorporation into the Soviet development project 
The three communities, as well as different social categories within them, therefore occupied 
different niches in the Soviet economy. One way of conceptualising this interrelationship is 
75 Detailed statistical tables showing in and out-migration on Druzhba are set out in Appendix 1. 
These three different trends in migration: emigration of non-Kazaks, immigration of Kazaks and 
refugees and internal migration, were marked across the country as a whole. In 1994 alone, about 
480,839 people left the country, around 70,000 migrated into the country and 330,000 migrated inside 
the country. 283,000 Russians, 92,000 Germans, 37,000 Ukrainian and others left. Around 3 10,000 
(93.7%) of migrants inside the country were Kazaks who moved mainly from rural auls to the cities 
(Nazpary, 2002: 3 1, citing Masanov, 1996, Ethnopoliticheskii Monitoring v Kazakitane, Almaty: 
Tsentr Monitoringa Mezhnoetnicheskikh otnoshenii v Kazakstan, p. 2). 
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to say that some communities and social categories were more 'state-dependent' han others, 
which, either because of their relative power, or paradoxically because of their 
marginal isation, had developed a range of other niches and strategies within the socialist 
economy (Zaslavsky, 1995). From this perspective, the Lenin community was the most'state 
dependent' of the three, with Druzhba's relative incorporation into the Soviet modernisation. 
project and Sarybulak! s relative marginalisation from it, opening alternative possibilities: 
&abulak 
" isolated and relatively marginalisedfrom Soviet modernisation project; 
" value ascribed to self-provisioning and autonomy; 
" pastoralistfarming system maintained and highly valued across the community; 
9 relative ethnic and economic homogeneity,, 
kin-basedforms of labour, social organisation and ritual important in both public andprivate 
spheres; 
Lenin 
0 relatively integrated into the Soviet modernisation project; 
0 reliance on the statefor services and standard of living, 
uneasy balance or symbiosis between indigenous and state identities, forms of social and 
work organisation and ritual. 
strong inter-ethnic community identity; 
interdependence of households and the state farm (i. e. symbiotic relationship between 
subsidiary and statefarming; 
value ofautonomy and self-provisioning, second economy activity not very developed. 
Druzhba 
0 most integrated into Soviet modernisation project, 
0 ethnically and economically very heterogeneous; 
0 relatively weak community-wide identity, strong identity of sub-communities, i. e. Welenie, 
brigades, social networks; 
0 highly developed second economy. 
Figure 2.2: Key characteristics of the Sarybulak, Lenin and Druzhba state farms 
Looking in detail at the Lenin state farm, I argue that gender and ethnicity were key factors 
around which communities' relationship to the state development project was articulated. 
Revisiting sovkhoz Lenin 
If we returned to sovkhoz Lenin, it would not take us very long to understand that its 
seemingly uniform Soviet topography hid alternative community topographies, shaped by the 
encounter and accommodation between Soviet development policy and the pastoral culture 
and economy it aimed to transform - and between incoming Slav settlers and the indigenous 
Kazak population. We would also see how these topographies were informed by ethnicity, 
generation and gender. If we stood at the entrance to the main village at sunset, when the 
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sheep and cattle are driven from pasture, and asked each of the waiting villagers for a map to 
guide us through the community, we would receive many different configurations of the 
same physical and social landscape, which would differ both from the 'official' map and from 
each other. 
If we spoke first to a Kazak villager, he or she would probably begin by telling us that we 
were in a'Kazak'sovkhoz, unlike the neighbouring community, which was'Russian', and that 
this was important. It meant that Kazak and Muslim traditions and customs were respected. 
That livestock were central to both sovkhoz and household production and, so long as they 
were plentiful, the community would survive. That it was important to help kin and 
clansmen, to stick together in times of trouble. That everyone in the sovkhoz was related. 
And that younger members of the family should respect their elders and wives their 
husbands, as the khozyain (master) of the household. If we took up the villagees certain 
invitation to stop by and 'drink tea- since hospitality is a central part of Kazak identity and 
tradition - we would be shown through to the back room of the house, the 'best' room, with 
its displays of good china, felt rugs and photographs of relatives and invited to sit down, 
cross-legged on the floor, at a low round table. The woman of the house, or her daughter-in- 
law, would pour numerous cups of milky tea and serve copious amounts of food, especially 
meat. Perhaps one of the household's private flock of sheep would be slaughtered in our 
honour, and prepared as'hesharmak, with parts of the head distributed, according to age and 
gender, to the invited guests, the foreign researchers, but also nearby kin, perhaps neighbours 
and work colleagues too. They would tell us that community life was punctuated by 'feasts' 
of this kind, sometimes mall, sometimes larger events to which the 'whole neighbourhood' 
or 'whole sovkhoz' would be invited. We might discover that the household comprised an 
elderly couple and the family of their youngest son, and that the other sons lived separately, 
but nearby. The old people, now retired, would talk about their work and lives as herders, out 
on the steppe encampments; the younger generation about their further education and work 
in mechanised agriculture, the hospital or school. The daughter-in-law might take us to one 
side and recount how she had had to leave herjob in the city when she got married, to come 
and live with her husband's famili 6. It was traditional, but hard; she was expected to be 
demure and modest, and to obey her in-laws and husband. But then, if the husband was the 
head, the wife was the neck, and when the neck turned the head must too. And now she had 
had a child, she had gone back to work, as an accountant, in a'women's collective' where she 
could relax and let her hair down. The family photograph albums would be produced and we 
would learn, not only about an extended network of kin, in the sovkhoz centre and outlying 
settlements, in the rayon centre and perhaps as far away as Almaty, but also about the clan or 
lineage, which can be traced back seven generations, and its close relationship to this land, 
which their ancestors had known and migrated across for generations. However, whilst our 
hosts might stress their ancestry, they would also show pride in 'theie sovkhoz and the 
improvements it had brought - the school, hospital, kindergarten and cultural centre - and the 
distance they had travelled from the 'primitive' nomadic way of life. 
76 Despite the prohibition of this custom under Soviet law, it was not uncommon, particularly in the 
older generations, to find that women had been 'stolen' 
into marriage against their will. See Werner 
(2004) for a recent study of non-consensual bride-kidnapping in Kazakstan. 
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If we then fell in with a Russian villager, and made the same request we would be given a 
rather different map of the community. He or she might say that, although the outlying 
settlements were Kazak, the central village was dominated by Russians and Germans. It was 
they, the specialists and administrators, who had been the driving force behind the building 
of the sovkhoz. With pride, he or she might tell us that many Russians had come as 
volunteers, during the Virgin Lands Campaign in the 1950s, to bring civilisation to the empty 
steppe. Both men and women had worked as tractor and combine operators; they had worked 
hard to create 'something out of nothing', had built all this, with their own hands. The 
Kazaks, on the other hand, were lazy and did not know how to work. You could tell by 
looking at the houses - that one, on the left, was a Russian house - look at its neat and well- 
tended vegetable plot; but that one, next door, was a Kazak house - lots of livestock, and the 
garden in a mess. And Kazak women had never worked - they had been listed as assistant 
shepherds, but they just had children. How could you work when you had a family of ten to 
take care of? However, we would also find that, like the members of the Kazak household, 
the Russians would point with pride to their own domestic smallholding, especially the 
vegetable plot and the latest litter of pigs, and tell us that the latter had been sold to buy the 
new television which had pride of place in the living room. If we accepted the invitation to 
'drink tea!, we would be served copious amounts of vodka and either salads fresh from the 
garden or home-made pickles. As in the Kazak household, the family photograph albums 
would be produced. Unlike it, many family members would live far away, perhaps in 
Siberia, where the wages were good, or in Russia or the Ukraine, but like it, our hosts would 
stress the closeness of their relations with neighbours and work colleagues. 
What can these maps tell us about the landscape of sovkhoz Lenin? In terms of 
(dis)continuities and the maintenance of past (local) practices, two things are particularly 
striking: first, the extent to which actual economic and social practice deviated from the 
official Soviet model; and, second, the extent to which it continued to be influenced by 
culture and ethnicity. As described above, one of the aims of Soviet modernisation was to 
rearticulate the relationship between public and domestic life. The state farm had created a 
division between public and private domains, work and family, splitting indigenous kin- 
based structures where life, work and economy were one. Value officially came from 
membership in the public domain, from labour in the socialised economy and one's 
contribution to the collective. However, these maps reveal that local life also continued to be 
centred on the private sphere of kinship and the home, coming of age through marriage, 
founding a family, running a household and building solid networks of reciprocity. The 
domestic sphere therefore played a vital part in people's lives, both as a site of alternative 
identities and solidarities and, to varying degrees, of alternative income-generating activities. 
In fact, throughout the Soviet period, the majority of households in all my fieldwork 
communities kept a domestic smallholding (pod'sobnoye khozyaistvo), which produced food 
both for domestic consumption and for sale and exchange. The continued existence of this 
form of household production can be read in various ways. By the end of the Soviet period, 
when rural salaries were stable and regular, maintaining a smallholding was a potentially 
lucrative activity, which could produce a surplus for sale and conversion into luxury goods 
such as a television or washing machine. As such, it was part of the 'shadow' or 'second 
economy' which came into being alongside the official economy and compensated for or 
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took advantage of its shortcomings (Humphrey, 1995). On the one hand, then, the 
smallholding can be read in terms of a more generalised 'privatisation' of labour, as 
households drew their energies away from work for the collective to a more individualistic or 
'capitalisf logic of utility and economic rationality (Lampland, 1995). In this sense, as Pine 
(1999) argues, the socialist state unintentionally reinforced the economic role of tile 
household as the centre of the second economy. However, the precise relationship between 
state, household and second economy varied. On Lenin, most private livestock was sold 
through the state farm rather than directly on local markets. Respondents would contrast this 
with the 'uncivilised' or 'backward' (dikh) practices of 'othee communities in 'the South', 
where people had sold excess produce for money. In contrast, although there was similar 
disdain for certain ethnic groups, particularly the Turks and Uighurs, who were perceived to 
focus overly on second economy production, in practice many households sold home 
produce on the weekly market. 
However, this economic rationale is not an adequate reading of the meaning of domestic 
production in any of my research communities. Equally striking was the way in which 
maintaining a smallholding was perceived as a key part of one's cultural and ethnic identity 
and the role it played in underpinning indigenous forms of community and solidarity. For my 
Kazak respondents, keeping livestock was presented as an integral part of 'being a Kazak', 
whilst for Russian respondents, a thriving and tidy vegetable plot was morally symbolic of 
effort and hard work. In addition, home-produced produce and livestock were one of the vital 
components, along with exchanges of labour and services, in maintaining the social networks 
in which households were embedded. These networks served a threefold purpose: to access 
scarce goods and services, to provide an alternative source of 'belonging' and status to 
membership of the sovkhoz and to provide a kind of 'safety nef in times of trouble. As 
Cynthia Werner describes in her study of household network strategies in a village in 
Southern Kazakstan, through the reciprocal exchange of gifts, favours and hospitality with 
kin, neighbours, schoolmates, work colleagues, friends, and also, in the Kazak case, clan 
members, households entered a web of reciprocal exchange and 'mutual indebtednesso which 
provided a form of insurance, both for individuals and households (1998: 60 1). 
For Kazak households, in particular, the livestock kept in the domestic smallholding was 
central to the traditional hospitality and elaborate system of feasts that were the basis for 
other forms of reciprocal exchange. Not only weddings, but also other life cycle events, such 
as a circumcision, death and the commemoration of forty days and a year after a death 
(pominki) involved huge feasts, to which hundreds of people might be invited, and a series of 
other occasions, such as the Winter slaughter of a horse (sogym) and a child's first day at 
school, were also marked by smaller feasts and exchanges of gifts. All these occasions 
involved a huge investment of time and labour and considerable expense. As Cynthia 
Werner points out, behind the seeming economic irrationality of this behaviour, by providing 
opportunities to exchange food, labour, gifts and toasts, the feasts were the principle social 
institution through which Kazak households maintained and extended their social networks, 
which were manipulated daily for various economic and political purposes' (1997: 5). 
Feasting and gift exchange were, according to her argument, the particular 'Central Asian' 
form of the Soviet-era practice of using personal connections (blat) in a variety of contexts, 
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such as to obtain consumer goods, housing, a job, career advancement, university entrance 
and quality health care. 
In this sense, again, indigenous practices grounded in understandings of kinship and 
community had fused with Soviet practices in particular ways. Werrier describes feasting 
primarily with relation to Kazak households. What was particularly striking about former 
sovkhoz Lenin, and what distinguished it from the neighbouring communities and from 
Druzhba, was that the 'whole sovkhoz, Russian as well as Kazak households, was often 
included in feasts. In effect, on Lenin, feasts were a visible sign of the community wide, 
interethnic identity based on an interweaving of membership of the sovkhoz and the ritual 
economy. In this sense,. Soviet structures were, in some circumstances, conceptualised 
through local models, in this case a kinship-based model of 'everybody being related' or 
'being one sovkhoz or one alJ77 
At the same time, there were divisions, tensions and obvious or latent inequalities both 
within and between Soviet and local models of the community. In particular, within this 
accommodation, ethnicity and gender were important markers of identity and arenas of 
negotiation and contestation. The different ways in which various groups were incorporated 
in the sovkhoz and moral economies had a socio-spatial expression. The sovkhoz bore little 
resemblance either to a farm or a village as this might be understood in the West. In fact, it 
comprised a, number of different sub-communities. The central village Qsentral'naya 
usad'ba), the focus of the administrative, social and cultural infrastructure and of the Slav 
population, was often contrasted with the outlying settlements and herding encampments 
(otdeleniye and otara), overwhelmingly populated by Kazaks. These physical spaces were 
conceptualised as the lodestones of the Soviet and indigenous discourses and practice. In the 
Soviet discourse, the central village was presented as the vanguard of progress and 
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modernity, with the otdeleniye and otara seen as increasingly 'traditional' and 'backward . 
However, in the alternative local Kazak discourse, value was reversed, with the aul seen as 
the positive centre of Kazak tradition and solidarity. 
V. The Rural Gender Contract 
In demarcating public and private domains, Soviet development also changed the contexts 
and meanings of women and men's labour. The Kazak way of life in general and women's 
tasks in particular, were classed as reproductive rather than productive and of less value. 
However, seen from the inside, the private sphere and women's identity as keepers of the 
hearth flame, with its associations of warmth, nurturing and hospitality, were construed as 
the heart of the moral order and Kazak identity. The underlying tensions within and between 
these two codes were largely mediated, often uneasily, by individuals, who combined these 
different regimes of value, using different idioms at different times and in different settings. 
Spatially, central Kazakstan was juxtaposed to southern Kazakstan, rural communities to 
urban ones, the sovkhoz centre to its outlying villages and public space to private space. 
77 Caroline Humphrey (1998) describes a similar interrelationship between local models and Soviet 
structures in rural Buyatiya. 
78 In this discourse, the term sovkhoz was often used to refer to the central village and the term aul to 
the outlying ones. 
73 
Relationally, different stages of the life cycle, with the opportunities and responsibilities 
attendant on age and seniority, also brought different emphases. Both for Kazaks and for 
women generally, access to the public sector was problematic. For Kazak women, in 
particular, participation in public labour, valued in the Soviet code but suspect in the local 
one, had to be continually renegotiated, particularly at key points in the lifecycle, such as 
marriage and childbearing. Conversely, the value of their role in the family and domestic 
sphere had continually to be defended against its marginalisation or denigration in the 
official model. 
Leo Howe (1998) evokes the mechanism by which subordinate groups relocate negative 
representations onto others in order to justify their own situation. In this sense, Russian 
women, also confronted with the ambiguities of the double or triple burden that was the lot 
of all rural women under socialism, could point to their Kazak counterparts, who 'didn't 
work' to bolster their own position within the official hierarchy of value. In turn, Kazak 
women often pointed to women from other groups as being less incorporated than 
themselves. At the time of my fieldwork the 'otheegroup so named was the incoming Kazak 
migrants from Mongolia, who were criticised as 'backward' because they lived in yurts and 
did not know how do housework. Kazak women also commonly pointed to Russian women's 
behaviour (drinking, smoking, sex) as a sign that they were morally beyond the pale. 
Out of the combination of these two different codes came a shared consensus on the 'ideal' 
gender roles within rural households and the 'ideal' balance of work in public and domestic 
domains. Respondents were emphatic that this balance of work and roles was specific to the 
countryside, where households required the labour of both men and women to survive and 
prosper and that the balance would not necessarily be the same in the town or city, where 
tasks and responsibilities were different. I have therefore chosen to term this consensus, the 
'rural gender contract'. I should clarify that, by using the term 'contract' I do not mean to 
suggest a codified and immutable agreement, but a relationship closer to Kandiyoti's (1998) 
concept of the local 'rules of the game' in gender relations, which may be subject to change 
and redefinition through a process of bargaining, but are a relatively enduring framework for 
human transactions. 
According to this local narrative, a husband's role was to be 'glava sem'j, (head of the 
family), to 'obespechit' (provide), to Wormit'semyu' (feed the family), to Idostal' (obtain 
goods), and to Vogovorit" (do deals in pursuit of the latter); a wife's role, on the other hand 
was to Wontrolirovat'sebe' (be self-control led) and to 'byt' zhenshchinoi' (be a woman) 
which entailed being the 'guardian of the hearth', managing the domestic sphere of childcare, 
cooking, cleaning, gardening and looking after some aspects of the smallholding (milking, 
caring for young animals and poultry, feeding the livestock) as well as managing the 'public' 
face of the household. A key contrast here is the difference between the male role of 'feeding 
the family', in the sense of materially and financially providing for the family's needs, and 
the female role of 'feeding the family' in the sense of growing food, raising livestock and 
producing meals. Although this was presented as a partnership - running the household was 
conceived as a common enterprise, with separate, but complementary roles for husband and 
wife and different roles for children according to age - the 'mainstay' of the household was 
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managing relationships and ritual obligations with kin, neighbourhood and community. To 
draw a parallel with the situation described by Ingrid Rudie (1994: 151), women's as well as 
men's activities were also considered as managing the 'public' face of the household. 
Marriage turned a woman into adult and wife and gave her a role in local ceremonial life, the 
'arena where women cooperate, exchange services, create and maintain local network ties' 
which was 'a substantial portion of women's public space! Just as 'inside' work, was not 
solely construed in terms of domestic labour, motherhood or caring for a family, 'outside' 
work was not solely constructed in terms of bringing in a wage12 . In this cohort, both men 
and women therefore continued to perform tasks according to the traditional gender division 
of labour within the Soviet system. However, the value of these activities did not remain 
unchanged. In particular, for Kazaks, women's 'inside' locus became laden with symbolic 
associations with maintaining tradition and ethnic identity as the home became a haven from 
the Soviet state. Conversely, men's 'outside' locus became laden with associations with 
material and financial security and status in official society. This shift applied to all ethnic 
groups across the community. 
The next cohort of informants, now parents and heads of households in their own right, were 
born between 1945 and 1965 and came of age during the late socialist period, which saw 
further shifts in official and folk models of labour and value and in gender domains. For this 
generation of Kazaks, encouraged both by the Soviet system and often by their parents, there 
were now in effect two possible courses into adult and public life for both men and women: 
marriage and further education and employment. This had a significant impact on the 'rural 
gender contract' as espoused by their parents' generation. In particular, increasing numbers 
of Kazak women were drawn into further education and into the workforce. Unlike in the 
previous generation, it was common for girls to leave home to study in local institutes or 
farther afield in Karaganda or Almaty, most often in administration, teaching or medicine, 
and to then be assigned work, sometimes far from their communities. Women were 
therefore acquiring a more public role in their own right before marriage and identifying with 
the Soviet valuation of productive work. As the following ethnographic example shows, the 
Soviet distinction between productive and unproductive, waged and unwaged labour had 
begun to displace local ideas of value, with domestic labour increasingly coming to seen as 
invisible and unvalucd work: 
" In her study of different cohorts of women in China, Lisa Rofel (1999: 229) makes the point that 
women of the oldest cohort often lived away from their own mothers for extended periods of time 
while working and oflcn did the same with their own children, feeling that this was the most 
appropriate way of caring for children in a world of extended kinship. In my own fieldwork, I came 
, across similar attitudes towards mothering in a number of instances, although with a difference in 
emphasis. People told me about several cases where, according to Kazak custom, a child may be cared 
for by someone other than the mother: the children of a second wife may be cared for by the f irst wife, 
whilst the former carries out other work for the household; a first child may be given into the care of 
tile grandparents, who raise him or her as their own; a child may be 'given' to a childless relative. 
Older inrormants remembered that these customs had been followed in their families, with several 
being brought up by a first wife and giving their first children into the care of their grandparents. On 
Sarybulak, younger women still reported mattcr-of-factly that they gave their children into the care of 
kin for extended periods while they were on the steppe. On Lenin and Druzhba, one of the burning 
topics of discussion in the Kazak communities was which kin to 'place' children with so that they 
could get a better education. 
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'There were eight of us children living in the house and various rclativcs too - thrcc 
people at one point; plus, the present Akim, would come for lunch every day with his 
wife, and a Russian friend, Sasha, and his wife. So, mothcr ncvcr cookcd for less 
than 15/20 people for lunch. Dad would ring up at 11.30 to say x other pcopic wcre 
coming for lunch too - inspectors, people who had come on busincss and so oil, My 
mother wouldn't even ask who and why. She would just start to prepare and gct 
everything ready. One day she was red-faced, standing over the baursaqI and flic 
Akim's wife said, 'Why do you bother? Forget itl You don't get to sce anything 
beyond your own stove. But she replied that they were guests from her husband's 
work and it was right that she prepared for them. She always used to say to mc and 
my sisters, both when we were little and later on too, Never complain about having 
guests. There are many people who would like to have visitors but never have any. 
And never refuse an invitation. People may invite you once, twice, but not a third 
time, and in your old age, you'll want to be invited, to have company. " 
Whereas the older woman saw meaning and dignity in her domestic labour, which was a 
valued contribution to the household's overall strategy, the younger one perceived it as 
drudgery and herself wanted something different. Women in this cohort shared a perception 
that Soviet work structures provided alternative sources of security and status to family and 
kinship networks, and in particular, widened women's horizons and gave them, as 
individuals, new avenues of opportunity. 
This example also demonstrates that the official Soviet model of labour itself had undergone 
some changes in emphasis. With its stress on goals and growth, the Soviet model of labour 
was simultaneously disrupting the 'folk model' of labour espoused by tile older generation, 
and, inadvertently, creating new attitudes to labour reminiscent of capitalist values of 
individualism and utilitarianism84. Whereas, for the older generation, labour for the 
household was a long-term project, involving building and conserving personal relationships, 
for their children, it was important that labour for the household brought more immediate 
returns. Similarly, in an inversion of the official Soviet model, the meaning of labour had 
become 'privatised' in the sense that, in actuality if not in ideology, tile emphasis was 
increasingly displaced from work for the collective onto work to fulfil individual, sometimes 
material, aspirations, such as to buy a wall unit, or a set of porcelain, or a TV. Women as 
'managers' of their household's symbolic status were often the instigators of this new form of 
consumption and display, using their kin and social networks to get access to'tllc best' goods. 
Increasing amounts of time and energy were also 'stolen' from productive work in tile 
collective to devote to work on the private plot and by some in other more lucrative 
activities, from grey to black market, such as trade in privately produced produce or illegal 
trade in cars. This was the generation of 'Soviet Brezilnev consumerism', which is now 
constantly evoked as a lost time of plenty, when we'lived under communism but didn't know 
it'. Reminiscences of work during this period focused on the implicit contract between state 
and individual, by which citizens' duty to work was matched by the state's duty to provide 
social benefits and employment, which in turn provided an opportunity for accumulation and 
consumption. 
83 Converstation with Sveta, Osakarovsky, Fieldnotes August 1998. 
84 For a discussion and further references on the Soviet state's creation of a 'Commodity culturc'sce for 
example, Ries (1997: 13 1). 
78 
This shift in the meaning of labour towards individual reward, money, consumption and self- 
fulfillment was a trans-gendered one in many ways. However, there were subtle gender 
differences in its expression. Although both men and women began by eulogising this lost 
time of plenty, there was a difference in their reminiscences of its most important features. 
First, both men and women often focused on full employment as the central positive feature 
of this time. However, whilst men tended to stress the importance of money wages and their 
ability to purchase items for themselves, women tended to highlight other, social, benefits of 
working and to frame their nostalgia for regular waged work in terms of benefits for the 
household as a whole. As the following example shows, women also tended to put an 
ironical damper on men's more extravagant reminiscences: 
Ded: Before, everything was good (ran'she, vsye bylo khorosho). You could live on 
your salary, the money came on time and you could even get an advance. You could 
save enough to buy whatever you wanted -a television, a car. And there were no 
deficits here, not of food or of anything else. Maybe imported goods from 
Czechoslovakia for instance, were scarce and only available by blat - but everything 
was ours, and good quality. 
Tetya Anya: A pair of shoes would last for two years. A shirt wouldn't fall apart like 
this one he is wearing now. 
Ded: And if it was old, you threw it away and got a new one. 
Tetya Anya: The only thing they didn't sell here was meat, because people had their 
own and didn't need to buy it. We had our own bakery, women didn't need to bake 
bread. And the flour could be trusted - not like the stuff now which is supposed to 
be premium quality but turns the bread gluey after two days. And there was the 
ambulance to take you to hospital in town. Not like now, when you have to find 
petrol by yourself. And even before then, the sovkhoz would find you transport - 
maybe a horse or an ox, but they would find it. 
Ded: You could buy a car a month if you wanted. 
Tetya Anya: Don't be ridiculous. Stop exaggerating. I worked it out that if we saved 
from my salary, yours and the boys' and left enough to live on we could have bought 
one in a year. But anyway, he went and bought a motorbike and crashed it through a 
wall that he didn't even see. Blind drunk, as usual. 
Ded: We used to work then - real work. Up at 7am. 
Anya: Yes, and you'd have had time to get drunk and sober up before then too! 85. 
This conversation took place in the post-Soviet period and partly reflects the current 
disruption of familiar patterns of work, consumption and social relations. In particular, 
women's castigation of men for their failure to assume a proper role in household support 
was one of the common responses to the current changing relationship between the 
household and the public domain. This issue will be addressed in detail in chapter 7. 
Ilowever, Anya's more ironic comments also reflect the fact, like other wives in the 
community, she was responsible for managing the day to day running and provisioning of the 
household. For her husband, waged labour might have been a question of bringing home the 
money for his wife to manage, saving up and getting drunk. For her, it had also to be seen in 
terms of how it could best be combined with domestic responsibilities to ensure household 
well-being. In other words, bringing in a wage was considered to be a husband's main 
contribution to the household, but only one of women's many responsibilities. As Martha 
85 Lenin, fieldnotes 19/8/98. 
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Lampland has expressed it: 'women straddled two worlds, their work and their time bearing 
similarities to the structures of both their parents and their husbands'. Whilst they were 
engaged in waged labour, their lives were also marked by 'the never-ending cycle of 
domestic work ( ... ) unsegmented and undifferentiated 
by days' (1995: ' 324). This was 
reminiscent of the model of labour of the presocialist household. In rural Kazakstan, this 
contrast between two different worlds of work and time had gender, ethnic and spatial 
dimensions, applying to women in general as well as to Kazaks living and working as 
herders out on the steppe. 
Another striking difference in emphasis in men's and women's work histories concerned the 
relative continuity between men's and discontinuity between women's work and family 
identities. Whereas men! s roles in waged labour and the household seemed to fit seamlessly 
into each other, women's stories often seemed to revolve around the split and tensions 
between work and family. On the one hand, far more than men, women often talked about 
education and waged labour outside the home in terms of individual independence, self- 
affirmation and confidence. Many stories centred on the value and excitement of waged 
work, overcoming obstacles, getting things done, being appreciated and valued for one's 
skills and competence. Education and then work had provided a basis for an independent life. 
On the other hand, sometimes implicitly and sometimes explicitly, this was contrasted with 
the world of home and family, governed by traditional norms and expectations. For Kazak 
women in particular, public waged labour paradoxically represented a 'private' space of 
relative freedom from kinship obligations. Buitelaar (1998) describes for Morocco how the 
home can be public or private space for different social actors at different times and how 
seemingly public spaces, such as a hammam, can be experienced as private. Especially for 
Kazaks, the home is not a private space for individuals in the sense we might understand it in 
the West. Rooms are often multifunctional spaces, used for sleeping, eating and entertaining 
at different times of daY86. When at home, a woman was generally'on call': either engaged 
87 in household tasks or expected to play the hostess for unexpected guests . In addition, 
within the home and extended family, roles and behaviour were determined according to 
gender and seniority. As one woman from former sovkhoz Lenin describes : 
86 On Sarybulak and in the outlying villages on Lenin, most homes were arranged and decorated in 
traditional style. Apart from the kitchen, the other rooms would be decorated with felt rugs on the 
floor and walls. A low, round table could be brought in for meals, mattresses could be laid out for 
sleeping or the space could be used for domestic work such as sewing or felt-making. In the Lenin 
central village and on Druzhba, rooms in Kazak homes were more differentiated. It was common to 
find individual bedrooms and aRussian-style' dining room with table and chairs, a display cabinet for 
china and manufactured carpets on the walls. Here, one of the main distinguishing features of Kazak 
homes was the 'summer kitchen' usually situated across the yard from the main house and used for 
cooking and entertaining in the summer months. 
87 In both Slav and Kazak households, there was a gradation of 'public' and 'private' spaces and 
behaviours within the home. One of the markers of these different domains was dress. A Russian 
friend, a woman of my age, spent some time explaining to me the 'proper' difference in dress code 
within and outside the home. Going 'outside' to the sovkhoz administration for example, one should 
put on a good dress and do one's hair and make-up. In the local neighbourhood, for example when 
popping across to a neighbour, one could wear more casual clothes. Inside the house, one could wear a 
khalat (housecoat), but etiquette required that one wear one's 'good' housecoat to entertain visitors and 
one's 'everyday' one when doing chores. Another marker was spatial. In Kazak homes, a distinction 
was often made between spaces where visitors were entertained and the rest of the house; when 
speaking to me in Russian, people often referred to an invitation to enter the latter as going Womoil 
(home), as if entering into a more intimate domain. 
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'When we first got married, I was working in town, earning good money and the 
kollektiv was good, the work was interesting. Ile was working as a teacher on Lenin. 
I said, why not move to town? But he said, no, I have a good job here too. And - you 
know how it is, here anyway, what the man says, goes, and I came here. But his 
parents kept interfering all the time. When I first came here, I didn't know Kazak. I 
could understand it, but not speak, and they were hostile to me because of that. And 
we were brought up amongst Russians and I'm used to speaking my mind. They 
hated that too. They said I was badly brought up. How was I supposed to be? 
Modest Not speak. Defer to them. But that! s not me, I can't live like that' 
(Fieldnotes, 20 November 1996). 
The reference here to marriage is important. Particularly within Kazak families, the pressure 
to marry and start a family was expressed in terms of a moral obligation imposed equally on 
young women and men by their elders. Several men reported that their parents and kin had 
decided when they had reached a suitable age or moment for marriage and had had a 
considerable say in their choice of partner. Others had been found alternative brides by the 
family after they had fallen unsuitably in love with divorced or non-Kazak women. Youngest 
sons, in particular, were expected to live with their parents, look after them in their old age 
and inherit the rights and obligations to land and ancestors. Their choice of employment 
after marriage was therefore limited to the sovkhoz community. However, although marriage 
was a central part of maintaining Kazak ethnicity and kinship solidarities for both sexes, 
these obligations were particularly stringent for women, who were perceived to be the moral 
centre of the ethnos and of the household. Although there were several instances of Kazak 
men marrying out of the Kazak community on Lenin, even to non-muslims, this was 
extremely rare for Kazak women. Second, on marriage, the local model of labour and value 
took precedence in expectations about women's roles. As above, most women in this cohort 
lived with their parents-in-law at least for an initial period, during which they were expected 
to behave with the proper modesty and deference. Whilst their 'inside' work became the 
central underpinning of family and moral value, their 'outside' work was permissible only to 
the extent that it did not risk bringing shame on their husband and his family. Particularly on 
Lenin and Sarybulak, where folk models of labour and value continued to play a greater role 
in working life and local identities than on Druzhba, marriage was a watershed in Kazak 
women's labour force participation. On Sarybulak, in particular, several of the women of 
this age cohort had been 'kidnapped' into marriage against their will and forced to leave 
further education or employment. 
On Lenin, the contradictions between official and local understandings of proper behaviour 
were accommodated by extending Kazak categories to Soviet structures. In Kazakstan, 
unlike in neighbouring islamic societies such as Uzbekistan, 'inside' and 'outside' domains 
were not so much physically as socially circumscribed. In other words, due to the demands 
of the transhumant lifestyle, Kazak women were never 'secluded' inside the home. Rather, 
women and livestock 'circulated freely' from 'inside' one clan (their fathees) to 'inside' 
another (their husband's). In this way, the whole encampment could be said to be 'family' or 
'inside' space. I found that, on Lenin, this idea of inside space was transposed to the sovkhoz 
as a whole, which, like the encampment, was conceptualised as fall one family'. Similarly, 
just as clan relationships could be 'invented' for newcomers to the aul, 'safe' relationships 
were imagined between girls and boys in the same class (odnoklassniki) and of the same age 
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(rovestniki), or colleagues in the same work collective. This allowed women's 'outside' 
activities, such as study or work to be classed as 'inside. Most husbands, vehement 
objections to wives working related to activities which involved travel outside tile Sovkho: 
and meeting strangers, particularly men 88 . However, wives' relationships with male work 
colleagues were an object of particular scrutiny, and women's work collectives seen as tile 
most morally compatible work space. 
Conversely, the seemingly public space of work in the sovkhoz actually gave women a 
private space in which they could to some extent escape from traditional norms of 
behaviour. As one woman put it, 'work is the only place I get to relax' (d1ya menya 
razryadka na rabote)89. This was especially true of work in 'women's collectives' such as the 
accountancy department in the Lenin farm office, where women amongst themselves were 
able to be raucous, vulgar and loud in ways they could not contemplate at home. At the 
women only'gulyankf (parties) which were one of the striking features of work life, Kazak 
women would often speak ironically about their lives and relationships in a way I did not 
observe elsewhere, criticising their husbands, making sexual innuendos and drinking vodka. 
This is not to say that this was a space with no social control. On the contrary, one of the 
marked features of this work collective was the way that women monitored each others' 
behaviour and ensured that boundaries could be played with, but not overstepped, or, more 
importantly, should not be seen to be overstepped. For example, drinking between women 
was acceptable, but for a woman to be seen to be drunk 'inside' the kontora when men were 
present or outside the kontora was definitely noeo. Likewise, to 'steal' time at or after work 
for a gulyanka was fine, but to be too late home and therefore neglect domestic 
responsibilities was not. For example, my hostess and her sister on Lenin described an 
occasion when one of the women from the kontora had got so drunk that she had fallen over 
when dancing with one of the male brigade leaders and had brought a set of crystal glasses 
crashing to the floor. The criticism aimed at her was not just because she had broken these 
precious status goods, which had been brought from home, but because she had also broken 
an important taboo and put all the women's reputations in danger. As they put it: She drinks 
like a man; she doesn't know her own limits. All the men were laughing and mocking her and 
we all felt as through we were her, as though it were us that were behaving that way. 
Afterwards, it might get out that all the women in the kontora were drunkards and 
alcoholics! In a metaphor for women's wider relationship between work and family 
" Men's Jealousy' or 'scandal making' at home was often a subject of women's conversations and it 
seemed that their work lives were particularly at issue. In one characteristic example, a woman 
described how her husband would deprive her of sleep when she first decided to go back to work after 
marriage, constantly waking her up to say, "Why do you want to work? It's just so you can be with 
men". 
8" This is a particular 'ethnic' take on a wider relationship between women and work collectives. In 
'Redefining the Collective' Sarah Ashwin (1999) describes how women workers in general perceived 
work collectives both as a haven from the pressures of running a household and as a vital source of 
emotional support, a kind of 'second family' which acted as a buttress to the actual family, often 
portrayed as a cause of distress. In comparison, although male workers were also attached to their 
work collectives, they provided a different kind of respite, as a form of light relief and all-male haven 
from the female-dominated domestic world. These observations broadly apply to the work collectives 
I observed on Druzhba and Lenin. One interesting contrast is that women in the Lenin work collective 
did drink and socialize together outside work time, which Ashwin found to be a male activity, and that 
men and women in the kontora did sometimes drink and socialize together. 
" Fieldnotes, Lenin, 26.9.97 
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responsibilities, women were therefore stretching, but not breaking, ascribed gender norms - 
whilst they could let off steam, they also had to control themselves because they were the 
mainstay of the domestic sphere, the khozyaika doma", the protector and keeper of the 
family. 
For women of this age cohort, engagement in public labour was therefore important, but also 
something that had to be negotiated with husbands and kin and balanced against other 
responsibilities in the home, smallholding and ritual economy. The latter work, while 
'invisible' and valued less highly in terms of the 'Soviet model of labour' was a key part of 
local models and identities and circumscribed women's work and family trajectories to 
different extents in different sovkhoz communities and ethnic groups. Women's work 
collectives in many ways served as a 'bridge' between the two domains: they gave women a 
status in 'official' life yet were also recognised as a discrete unit to be included in ceremonial; 
they served both to defuse tensions and contradictions and as an agent of social control; and 
the solidarities consolidated at work were the basis for alternative networks that could be 
used to enhance household well-being and status. 
The rural gender contract as an expression of cultural persistence and social change 
The material from life histories illustrates that the rural gender contract was the result of the 
collision and accommodation between two different ways of imagining and structuring 
gender domains, a spatial metaphor of 'inside/outside' and a functional metaphor of 
'productive/reproductive' work, introduced by Soviet development policy. On the one hand, it 
demonstrates the disruption of indigenous categories and a shift over time towards the 
productive/reproductive metaphor. However, 
it also demonstrates that the relationship was more complex. Soviet development brought 
together several different ethnic groups in a new socio-economic environment. The 
establishment of the Lenin state farm community involved their mutual adaptation to each 
other as well as to Soviet norms, roles and values. The result was both a distinction between 
and a drawing together of the two metaphors, which were sometimes opposed, sometimes 
juxtaposed and sometimes transposed, as when Soviet structures were seen in terms of native 
categories, or vice versa. 
91 This term is not the same as the Russian word for housewife, which is domokhozhyaika. It is much 
closer to the supposedly obsolete term domokhozyaina meaning mistress of a peasant household. 
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Indigenous inside/outside metaphor Soviet prod uction/reproduction or 
work/family metaphor 
> Shift over generations towards use of work/family metaphor for talking about gender domains 
> Accommodation of both metaphors in different settings or circumstances 
opposition 
used by Kazaks, population in outlying villages 
in 'informal' talk, in ordering space in the home 
used by Russians, population in central 
village, in'official talk' 
transposition 
sovkhoz as a whole, or parts of the sovkhoz, 
defined as 'inside' space 
work for the household defined as 
'reproductive' 
juxtaposition or'bilingualism' 
both metaphors used by the same individual in different circumstances, as people needed to respect 
both in order to create a 'proper' social identity. 
Figure 2.3: Metaphorsfor gender domains 
On Lenin, the public domain of the sovkhoz was therefore understood both in terms of the 
official distinction between productive and reproductive labour and in terms of local ideas of 
kinship and community. The rural gender contract represented a combined expression of 
these two metaphors. It was a supple and flexible idiom, which enabled ideas about women's 
and men's complementary contributions to a common household project to be transposed to 
the changed conditions. Essentially, the idea that men and women had different roles to play 
was translated into different idioms for talking about the work they did, with men's work 
described in terms of providing a money income, and women's work described in terms of 
feeding the family. This model was flexible enough both to encompass social and economic 
transformation and to accommodate it with local understandings of the 'propee gender 
division of roles. 
The persistence of the indigenous metaphor can be interpreted in a number of ways. One 
argument is that some cognitive structures or cultural elements - in this case, understandings 
about the roles of women and men - are more durable or change more slowly than others? '. 
Another is that Soviet ideology and practice itself helped to reinforce symbolic meaning 
structures (Sneath, 2000,272-3; Humphrey, 1998: 288)93. 
92 Two concepts which are useful here are 'hardprogamming' (Bateson, 1972: 469-505, cited Rudie 
1994: 59) or habitus, a 'common cognitive system of durable, transposable dispositions shared by a 
EFOUP or social class' (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). 
In this connection, Svanberg's (1989) research on cultural persistence and social change amongst 
Kazak refugees in Turkey also provides an interesting point of reference and comparison. He found 
that, unlike the traditional Kazak political and administrative structure, patterns of kinship and gender 
relations persisted in spite of change. He argues that these were especially important elements of 
social reality or 'core values', which, in a new and potentially hostile environment, came to symbol ise 
the identity of the Kazak community and which the group therefore tried to maintain. He also 
emphasises that these core elements themselves changed on contact with the wider Turkish society, 
particularly with the processes of education and urbanisation. 
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The relationship between indigenous Kazak and Slav gender domains on Lenin opens an 
interesting perspective on the interrelation between cultural 'durabiliw and outside 
influences. One of the striking things about the rural gender contract was that it was the 
metaphor which both Kazak and Slav respondents used to express the relationship between 
the sexes. One explanation for this would be that Kazak and Slav indigenous cultures 
converged in their understandings of proper gender domains. 
One of the key debates in the cultural history of Russia concerns the confrontation between 
the 'westemising! principles introduced into Petrine Russia and the 'Asiatic! principles which 
structured Muscovy and which persisted in rural lif04 . Howe's (1991) analysis of Russian 
peasant society highlights some of the similarities in social organisation, notably the 
structure of Russian peasant society into 'communes' (obshchina-mir) reminiscent of Kazak 
clans, which organised economic life and had a similar system of mutual aid, including 
feasting. His analysis, which draws on the work of Russian ethnographer T. A. Bernshtarn 
(1988) also highlights a similar gender and age-related organisation of space and labour 
within the mir and individual households. In ritual and symbolism, women and men were 
associated with different spheres, notably inner and outer space and lower and upper worlds. 
This symbolic ordering was reflected in the division of space within the home, with the main 
living quarters (izba) divided into a male and female half (kut). Howe also gives a number of 
examples of how this gendered separation was reflected in the division of labour and points 
to the centrality of marriage in completing an individual's 'formation' as a social person. 
However, only a minority of the Slav villagers had come directly from peasant backgrounds. 
Another explanation would relate to the demarcation that the Soviet state itself created 
between public and private domains, that is, between the official world of state ideology and 
the private world of the family (Shlapentokh, 1989). This split between outside/official/state 
and inside/private/family domains applied across the Lenin community. It consolidated the 
role of the household for both Kazaks and Slavs, helped to maintain its gender division of 
5 labour and gave women a central position in symbolising and upholding proper moralitY9 . 
This points to a coincidence or growing together of Slav and indigenous identities in at least 
some rural communities under the conditions of socialism96. On the other hand, as this 
discussion has shown, we can also say that, although the rural gender contract was a trans- 
ethnic one, Kazaks and Slavs on Lenin tended to stress different metaphors, with Slavs more 
invested in the production/reproduction and Kazaks more invested in the inside/outside 
. metaphors for ordering gender domains. Similarly, we can say that at community level, 
reflecting their level of incorporation into the state development project, on Lenin, and on 
Sarybulak, the accommodation favoured the indigenous metaphor, whereas on Druzhba, it 
favoured the productive/reproductive one. 
94 For a recent discussion, see for example the chapter on 'European Russia' in Orlando Figes, 2002. 
Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History ofRussia, Penguin, London. 
9' See also the discussion on'Voices, Veils, Visibility'in Pesmen (2000: 248-252). 
96 A similar argument is made by Bavna Dhave's paper (1996) 'A Cross-Ethnic Russian-Speaking 
Identity in Kazakstan. 
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Power, value and inequality in the rural gender contract 
Referring back to the earlier discussion on the indigenous economy, we can also say that the 
rural gender contract contained both elements of egalitarianism and elements of inequality, 
that the different participants evaluated the relationship between them differently and that 
while the contract may have remained 'the same', the balance had altered significantly. 
Although both women and men were 'resource persons' in the public and domestic spheres, 
the value given to their contributions can be seen from various points of view. On the one 
hand, 'the relationship between the dimensions involved in inequality - differentials in power 
and autonomy, prestige and authority, and value accorded to individuals of either. sex - is 
rarely one to one, and men and women need not even agree about the interpretation of 
situations in which both take part' (Rudie, 1994: 77). Whilst male respondents tended to 
stress their authority and the primacy of their contributions to the household, women's views 
were more nuanced. From the 'official' perspective, although Soviet development policy 
stressed women's as well as men's productive roles, it also demarcated and valued public 
over domestic work and gave primacy to public over domestic and ritual resources. From 
the perspective of the indigenous model, the household economy and village ceremonial 
remained important spheres of practice and identity. Rudie's analysis of the changing 
hierarchy in gender roles brought about by modernisation in Indonesia is apposite here: 
Me complementarity between the sexes used to lie on a reproductive and ritual level 
more than on the strictly economic level. Village ceremonial is a joint effort with 
male and female specializations, and husband and wife both work to place their own 
household firmly in the local ritual community. In that sense, there is mutual 
dependency between the spouses that rests on the performance of each in 
complementary unisex collectivities. In a transformed society, the economic 
equality sometimes breaks down, and complementarity can creep in larger areas of 
household work - the housewife role being specialized and ritualized as a goal in 
itself. Whether this situation of dependency is mutual or unbalanced depends on the 
perspective taken. If it is important to have the housewife services as such, it is 
mutual. If we focus on the question of who brings in most of the resources, it will 
usually be unbalanced! (Rudie, 1994: 167). 
Although Soviet policy did not specifically emphasise women's role as housewives, its 
gender ambiguities nonetheless helped to shape just the category of husband-cum-bread- 
winner that it hoped to eradicate, thereby shifting the balance of value within households 97 . 
The following chapter looks at the environment of perestroika and post-socialism, 
specifically the new state ideology of development which has reinforced the construction of 
men as breadwinners and women as homemakers. 
" In the Lenin school library, I discovered a 1980s course book on life-skills, which pointed to the 
dangers of masculinization of women and feminisation of men in Soviet society, and urged girls to 
remember that a husband was the main pillar of support for the family, responsible for providing 
materially and financially. Analysis of an 'essentialist' shift in state gender ideology and policy in the 
late Soviet period is discussed in Buckley, M. (ed), 1986 and Lynne Atwood's work on sex-role 
stereotyping in education, for example, in 'The New Soviet Man and Woman: Soviet views on sex 
differences' in Holland, B. (ed. 1985) Soviet Sisterhood. London: Fourth Estate. 
86 
CHAPTER THREE 
Gendering the Postsocialist Framing of Development 
We have seen that the current development project inherited a landscape in which Soviet and 
indigenous features were intertwined in various ways. In particular, I have argued that the 
interaction between Soviet development policy and local meanings and practices created a 
specific interrelation between public and domestic spheres and a particular constellation of 
gender relations. At state level, development policy was underpinned by a socialist 'gender 
regime' which was variously resisted and accommodated by individuals and communities, 
producing specific 'rural gender contract(s)' at local level. The interrelation between macro 
and micro levels can therefore be seen as a dialectical process, in which the way that the state 
framed development and gender discourse affected the ways in which communities and 
individuals shaped and framed their own experience and, conversely, individual responses 
impacted on the outcomes of state policy. 
The question to be addressed in this chapter is, how is 'development' currently being framed 
at macro level in Kazakstan and how is this framing taking account of gender issues (if at 
all)? What are the ideologies and aims driving development policies and what are the 
continuities and ruptures with the Soviet development model? The chapter looks briefly at 
the processes of state and nation-building, before turning to more detailed analysis of the 
ideologies and aims driving economic development policies. It draws on material from 
several periods of fieldwork conducted between 1996 and 1998, particularly interviews and 
participatory observation in government bodies and international organisations, together with 
discourse analysis of their policy and programme documents and reports. The bulk of the 
research was conducted in 1996, with follow-up research to assess the evolution of ideology 
and practice over the next two years. Although it is a study dated to a particular period, the 
general issues raised are still germane. 
The issue of changes in development ideology and practice is an important one. There have 
been several changes in both since Kazakstan became independent in 1991. These have been 
defined as an initial orientation towards nation-building and the strengthening of political 
independence from 1991-1993; the pre-eminence of economic parameters from 1992-1995; 
followed, in 1996, by certain moves towards social ly-oriented reforms (UNDP, 1997). The 
bulk of my in-depth field research spans the cusp between the two later stages of reform and 
therefore captures a specific moment in a period of complex transformations. In particular, it 
questions the neat division between these two stages of reform, suggesting acertain time-lag 
between the ideological shift to a more social ly-oriented model of development and its 
implementation in practice, especially as regards rural development and gender issues. 
1. Gender, State-Building and Nationalism 
Since Kazakstan's independence in 1991, the earlier discourse of 'democratisation' that began 
with perestroika has largely been replaced by a dual discourse of state-building and 
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economic refbrmýs What shape should the new nation-state adopt and how should it relate 
to the past, both Soviet and pre-Soviet? What does it mean to be a Kazakstani citizen, man 
or woman, ethnic Kazak, Russian, Gen-nan, or Greek? A process of national identity 
formation is currently taking place at state, community and individual level alike as 
Kazakstan finds a place on the global stage and its people their place within the new nation. 
To what extent is state and nation building in Kazakstan a gendered project? What different 
kinds of representations and ideologies of gender are being expressed and transmitted, and 
how do they relate to the representations explored in the previous chapter? Rather than being 
an exhaustive exploration, this section is intended to raise questions about several elements 
of the Kazak state-building project which are contributing to a redefinition of the parameters 
of gender relations and which had resonance at local level in my fieldwork communities. 
As Nick Megoran (1999) points out in an exploratory study, although there is now a growing 
body of literature on the process of national identity formation and reconstruction in Central 
Asia, current scholarship has so far given little attention to the question of whether the 
process is gendered, and if so, how". On the other hand, recent scholarship has argued that 
notions of gender and sexuality are central to the identity formation process in the modem 
nation state. First, to refer back to the discussion in Chapter One, it has been argued that men 
and women have been incorporated differently in the nation state in Western Europe, where 
the seemingly gender neutral political discourse of liberal democracy maintains a division 
between public and private life which excludes women from full citizenship (Pateman, 
1989). Accordingly, the adoption of'Westem' political discourse and models of the state is 
not a gender-neutral process. Second, as discussed in the previous chapter, the former 
socialist countries were a major proving ground for experiments in both the social 
organisation of gender and the attempted redefinition of national identity (Verdery, 1994). In 
particular, as we have seen, in Central Asia, the emancipation of women was one of the 
defining elements of the ideological construction of Soviet Central Asian identities and, 
conversely, gender was also central to the way alternative, local and ethnic identities were 
constructed. As Shirin Akiner (1997) suggests, given this interlacing of gender, nation and 
ethnicity, it is not surprising that, as part of the current, post-independence process of 
refashioning national identities, the validity of the Soviet view of gender relations is being 
called into question. 
In effect, the search for a 'national F to underpin the new state of Kazakstan involves a 
(re)evaluation of the heritage of the Soviet and pre-Soviet past, as well as of the models of 
Imodemity' offered by other nations on the global stage. Reaching across time and space, it 
involves three key processes: the revival of archaic, pre-Soviet forms and values; the 
98 A similar process has been noted in Russia (Pilkington, 1995) and Eastern Europe (Einhom, 1993). 
99 Two exceptions widely available in the West are Shirin Akiner (1997) 'Between tradition and 
modernity: the dilemma facing contemporary Central Asian women' in Buckley (ed. 1997) Post- 
Soviet women: from the Baltic to Central Asia, Cambridge, CUP: 261-304; and Nayereh Tohidi, 'The 
intersection of gender, ethnicity and Islam in Soviet and post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Nationalities Papers, 
Vol. 25, No 1,1997. For local sources, see Usacheva (1997) in the UNDP sponsored Republic of 
Kazakstan Report on the Status of Women, 1997 and the chapters by Miimanbaeva and Shukurova in 
Zhenshchiny Kyrgwstana: Traditsii i novaya real'nost'(Women of Kyrgyzstan: Traditions and New 
Reality) (1995). 
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rejection or inversion of Soviet forms and the selective adoption of 'modem' ones from the 
'western' or 'capitalise other. These processes are not discrete or bounded, but need to be 
seen in relation to each other as part of a complex and often contradictory process of 
100 (re)balancing 
State-building and drawing on the deep past: reinventing tradition 
One of the first things to strike the visitor to Almaty, the usual gateway into Kazakstan and 
the former capital, is the fact that most of the street names have recently been changed. 
Russian names have been replaced by Kazak ones, Kommunistichesky Prospekt has become 
Abylai Khan Dangghyly, Dzerzhinsky has been replaced by Kazybek Bi. Almost overnight, 
a street geography which celebrated Soviet holidays, achievements and personalities has 
been replaced by a specifically Central Asian geography, which draws heavily on the pre- 
Soviet past. This is also the case in the countryside, where many districts and collective and 
state farms have been rebaptized with Kazak names. In Almaty, the most dramatic example 
of this 'retraditionalization' of public spaces has been the raising of a pillar in the central 
Republic Square, topped by a huge statue modelled on the'Golden Man', a warrior's costume 
discovered in Yessik, about 40 km East of Almaty, whose headdress bears a pair of snow- 
leopards and a winged mythical beast. 
This symbolic representation of the nation-state through the honouring of pre-Soviet figures, 
the changing of street, locality and town names and the creation of new national holidays has 
been identified as process common to the 'nationalizing regimes' of Central Asia (Bohr, 
1998). It points towards one of the striking aspects of the nation-building process in 
Kazakstan -a rejection of Soviet-type socialism and an exploration of the 'traditional' past. 
Both State and popular discourse have been marked by attempts to establish linkages 
between the pre-colonial past and the post-soviet present, involving the reviving of 
'authentic' traditional and Islamic customs, institutions, symbols and concepts (Akbarzadeh, 
1994; Altoma, 1994; Akiner, 1995; Werner, 1998b). This is evident in the symbols used to 
represent the new state's international identity, such as the national flag and currency, 
". it is 
also evident in the state's domestic efforts to sponsor the publication of books on Kazak 
history, tradition and genealogy and to introduce a national heritage programme in schools 
102 (Werner, ibid: 5) 
100 1 am indebted to the approach used by for example David Anderson (1998) in his work on 
landscape and national identity. 
'0' The national flag includes a representation of the steppe eagle, which Kazakhs used as a hunting 
bird; the coat-of-arms depicts winged horses, a symbol from Kazak mythology, together with the 
sacred smoke-hole wheel of the yurt; and the national colours of blue and gold, which represent the 
A and the sun, have a symbolic link to the ancient Kazakh cult of the Sky God (Akiner, 1995: 61). 
10ý Various studies in emerging states across the former socialist bloc have pointed to a similar 
resurgence of interest in the 'deep' or 'traditional' past (Humphrey, 1992; Akbarzadeh, 1994; Andersen, 
1998a; Watson, 1994). As Caroline Humphrey (1992: 375) points out with reference to post-socialist 
Mongolia, this is not only because the end of Soviet colonialism has provided an opportunity for 
peoples to reclaim the past on their own terms, but also because 'historical origin in traditional culture 
has become the source of moral authority in the present'. 
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Knowledge that was suppressed during the Soviet period is therefore being openly expressed 
in the public sphere. However, as I argued in the previous chapter, the past is by no means 
easy to (re)establish. For the majority of the Kazak population, direct connection with 
indigenous knowledge and traditions has been lost. The recreation of the past must therefore 
be seen in the light of present concerns: at macro level, in terms of the state's need to 
establish political legitimacy and implement economic restructuring and, at micro level, 
people's need to make sense of rapidly changing circumstances. To borrow Caroline 
Humphrey's phrase, if 'the present is an era the way that a roller-coaster is a place', then the 
pre-Soviet past holds out a promise of rootedness and stability (ibid.: 377). 
What representations of male and female roles are being drawn from traditional culture to 
serve as a blueprint for future development? Whilst a growing body of research has 
examined the implications of 'traditional' symbolic representations and other, manifestations 
of the revival of traditional identities for non-indigenous citizens of tile new states 
(Ayaganov, 1995; Dixon 1994; Dave 1995; Edmunds, 1998; Khazanov, 1995; Kosmarskaya, 
03 1996)1 , the gender specific nature of these acts has not been examined in detail. However, 
as Megoran (1999) points out, the characters being celebrated are almost all male, from 
aggressive warriors such as Timur to mystical poets such as Navoiy, who employed highly 
gendered and stereotyped language. One could say that, symbolically, public spaces are 
being 'retraditionalised', but also 'remasculinised'; which begs the question, where are the 
women and what is their place in this revival of tradition? 
Reconstructing citizenship: relocating women to the private sphere as mothers and 
homemakers. 
The new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakstan begins with a definition of the legal 
status of citizenship and mechanisms for upholding it, and is grounded in the ideals of 
democracy, human rights and the law (UNDP, 1995: 81). In particular, it continues to 
uphold the explicit commitment to gender equality already enshrined in Soviet legislation. 
Section 2 Article 14 states that: 
1. All are equal before the law and the courts. 
2. No one may be subjected to any form of discrimination on the grounds of 
background, social, professional or property status, sex, race, nationality, language, 
attitude to religion, beliefs, place of residence or any other reason. 
103 Timothy Edmunds, for example, stresses that nation-building has been characterised by attempts to 
reassert the prominence of the Kazak'nation' in the political and cultural life of the republic. 
Constitutionally, Kazakstan is defined very clearly as a unitary state, whose purpose is to provide a 
vehicle for the self-determination of the Kazak nation. Thus, although constitutional provisions 
guarantee qual rights to all citizens, this represents aclear choice of an ethnic over a civic identity for 
the Kazakstani state. Nation-building has primarily taken the form of a revival of Kazak national and 
cultural identity and a corresponding process of Kazakization in the administration and government, 
policies which have caused uneasiness among many non-Kazaks in Kazakstan. One interesting micro- 
level study of how Russian women in Kyrgyzstan are reacting to a similar'retum to ethnicity'has been 
conducted in Kyrgyzstan (Kosmarskaya, 1996). 
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Article 27 goes further, stating that marriage and the family, motherhood, fatherhood and 
childhood are protected by the state and that care for children and their upbringing is the 
natural right and duty of parents'04, thereby widening the field of choice for men and 
enshrining their rights, as well as women's, in the private sphere. However, looking beyond 
the constitution to state gender discourse as a whole, the picture is rather more complex. In 
particular, I shall argue that the dominant form of discourse is undermining women's 
citizenship in various ways. 
As I described in chapter 2, one of the most striking features of the Soviet state-building 
discourse was its focus on gender relations, theorised in terms of the 'woman question'. In 
contrast, the most striking feature of the state-building discourse in post-Soviet Kazakhstan is 
the 'disappearance' of gender issues. As Akhmedzhanova and Shakirova (1997) put it in their 
contribution to the 1997 Republic of Kazakstan Report on the Status of Women: 
No conceptually based vision of women's issues has arisen in society over recent 
years. As a rule, the problems of women are lumped together with those of the 
family, children and youth. There is only one governmental structure today devoted 
to women's issues (a consultative-discussion body, under the purview of the 
President of the Republic of Kazakstan), and even that is named the Committee on 
Issues of the Family, Women and Demographic Policy. The Presiderifs program, 
Women and Children of Kazakstan, is still in the development stage! (1997: 19) 
Gender, in terms of the emancipation of women or sexual equality, is no longer a central 
pillar of the state development programme or ideology and indeed, now commonly carries 
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negative connotations . For example, the 
document Kazakstan 2030 (Nazarbaev, 1998), in 
which the president sets out the state's action plan for the next thirty years, makes many 
references to the family, but one has to read a long way into the program to find the single, 
cursory mention of women's rights, in the phrase: 'When parents are concerned for their 
children, in childhood and adulthood, and for their aged parents, when women are respected 
in the family and in society, then we can be reassured about our country. These were always 
important principles to the Kazak people and we must revive them' (Nazarbaev, ibid.: 65). 
However, albeit brief, when taken in the context of the document as a whole, this clause 
points to the implicit gendering of the nation-building discourse, characterised by a marked 
shift in discourse on the family, which is significantly reconfiguring women's citizenship in 
the new Kazakstan. 
Firstly, a connection is being made here between building the Kazak state and the revival of 
national values and traditions, exemplified in'respect! for women. The implication is that this 
'respect' has been lost and needs to be rediscovered or recreated, in order for the Kazak 
people to be 'reassured about their country'. What this means in terms of the constitution of 
: 11 My italics. 
05 A section of the Republic of Kazakstan Report on the Status of Women (1997) points to a 
widespread, negative view of women's emancipation, citing examples from the media such as the 
following: 'The main culprit behind the fact that our girls cannot achieve personal happiness i  satanic 
emancipation and rotten feminism/ feminisation'; or, 'One of the best ways out of this dead-end is a 
return to tradition, and the legalization of marriage to two or more women... ' (Zaitsev and Barteneva, 
Republic of Kazakstan Report on the Status of Women 1997, Chapter 19, 'Women and the Media': 81- 
84,84). 
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the family and the nation, and women's place in both, is implicitly stated in the remainder of 
this paragraph and in the discourse of the document as a whole. On the one hand, there has 
been a shift from the language of women's 'participation' in society to tile more passive 
'respect', in which women figure as recipients or symbols of the nation's honour rather than 
as active contributors to the building of society. On the other hand, the recreation of'respect' 
is linked to an inversion of the Soviet formulation of women's'proper domain' - from 'society 
and the family' to 'family and society'. This inversion is emphasised in the remaining text, 
which speaks exclusively of women's demographic contribution as mothers, whilst making 
no allusion to their role as workers, that was equally constitutive of citizenship in the Soviet 
state. This shift from public to private spheres is revealed in a second, telling shift of 
emphasis: whereas during the Soviet period, the maternal role was divorced from 
domesticity, the domestic context has now been reinstated and child-rearing accorded the 
same importance as child-bearing. This highlights women's role as moral educators of the 
new generation rather than as intellectuals or workers in their own right (Akiner, 1997: 287; 
Usacheva, 1997: 11). Further, it seems that 'respect' for women as mothers involves the 
questioning of certain individual rights granted to women during the Soviet period: the same 
paragraph goes on to question the right to abortion, in the interest of improving wornews 
health and strengthening the institutions of marriage and the family 
In Kazakstan, as in Eastern and Central Europe, women's citizenship is therefore being 
undercut by the ideology of 'retraditionalization', which glorifies the family and women's 
role within it as mothers and bearers of moral, spiritual and cultural values, whereas it is the 
public sphere of the market place and mainstream political institutions that are now the 
important arenas of power and the locus of right in an emerging liberal-democratic state 
(Verdery, 1994; Einhom, 1993). The framing of discourse in terms of women's 'return' to the 
domestic sphere naturalises what is actually a new construction of gendered public and 
private space. As I argued in the previous chapter, in so far as the Kazak indigenous 
economy has been dramatically transformed by Soviet development policy, there can be no 
simple 'return' in this sense. Nationalist discourse asks us to forget that the current domestic 
sphere is being constructed in relation to the emerging market sphere, and thereby masks 
emerging gender assymetries. It asks women to take their'natural' and 'traditional' place as 
'guardians of the fire'and men to take their place as guardians of the family, in the name of 
the nation and future generations. 
The nation as patriarchalfamily 
A similar discourse on the relocation of women to the private sphere has also been described 
in relation to nation building elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe, where it has been 
linked with a shift in discourse on the family and the nation. Verdery has interpreted this in 
terms of a backlash against the socialist state's usurpation of familial-patriarchal authority 
and its replacement by policies and attitudes aimed at recovering that lost authority for men 
in nuclear families (Verdery, 1994: 252). Taking a slightly different emphasis, Einhorn's 
interpretation stresses the nationalist project's attempt to (re)create a national identity based 
on the idealisation of a mythic hannonious community of an earlier epoch, accompanied by a 
model of the family characterised by a strictly gender-divided hierarchy of roles (Einhorn 
1993: 128). 
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In my view, nationalist discourse as it is currently being expressed at state level in Kazakstan 
can be approached from both angles, although the question deserves further attention. The 
return to values of 'respect' for women, now posited as a key Kazak tradition, can be 
interpreted, to borrow Shirin Akiner's (1997) term, as an end to the 'emasculation' imposed 
by the Soviet khudzhum. Order and propriety are to be restored, in both nation and family, 
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and guaranteed by a return of male guardianship . At the highest level, this reassertion of 
patriarchal authority is manifested in the identification of the head of state as 'Father of the 
Nation'. On the other hand, as in Einhorn's analysis, nation is being construed as an idealised 
family or kinship-based community, based on the 'consensus-hierarchy' traditions of Kazak 
society (Nazarbaev, 1998: 16). As Nazarbaev puts it, although the country has so far avoided 
internal conflict, 'we are still a long way from consolidation and unity, and considerable 
efforts will need to be made so that we feel like one big family, know our objectives and 
move towards them with one voice' (1998: 15-16). In this model of family and nation, 
questions of power are occluded: divergent interests are to be set aside in pursuit of a 
common goal - set by the wise patriarch. 
The identification between nation and patriarchal family is a metaphor which runs 
throughout the document Kazakstan 2030. One of the most striking images is the 
07 
personification of the nation as a (male) snow-leopard' who 'will never attack first and will 
avoid conflict' but 'if his home and freedom or the lives of his young are threatened, will 
I protect them at any price; who will be 'wise in bringing up his offspring, protecting them 
from uninvited guests, giving them the tastiest morsels, concerning himself with their health, 
education and outlook, preparing them for early independence in conditions of intense 
competition and adaptability in all environments. He will 'make sure that the water he 
drinks is not muddied and that air and nature are made pure'; and he will be 'united with his 
brothers, who were nourished by the same mother' (1998: 27). 
A number of things strike me particularly here: at one level, the metaphor makes concrete the 
aim explicitly set out at the beginning of t, his section Of the document, that is, the need for the 
new independent state of Kazakstan to combine the best of East and West, ancient and 
'modem. The animal is an explicitly Central Asian beast, which symbolically spans both the 
modem (as the equivalent of the Asian 'Tiger Economies') and the ancient (the environment 
and the land). However, at another level, the image is highly gendered : there is the language 
of the nation as (male) warrior/hero, ready to protect his home and his young; the image of 
the fraternity of Central Asian nations, 'nourished by the same mother, ' reasserting the 
106 One particularly striking example of this kind of discourse is A. D. Serdyukov, Russkii Matriarchal: 
Kniga d1ya mushchin o seksual'nom povedenii zhenshchin, Almaty, 1996. According to his analysis, 
'in the Soviet Union, women and the state conspired to the detriment of men. The fact that women 
dominated goes against natural laws and led to disorder. In post-war Soviet society, everything was 
subjugated to women's and children's needs; socialism survived on the slave labour of millions of 
men. Who will protect men against women and against society? Democratic society requires a sexual 
revolution to restore the rightful place of men. In nature, the male has priority over the female, and 
rotects them in a herd. This book should be seen as scientific research! 
07 As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, the snow leopard is one of the symbols on the 'golden man' 
statue which has been erected opposite the presidential palace in Almaty. 
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principle of kinship and unity among men; and finally, the image of women as mothers, 
whose authority lies in giving birth to the heroes who will defend the nation. 
As the above example shows, the ethno-national symbols which are part of the state-building 
discourse in Kazakstan are being expressed in highly gendered terms, here, in opposition to 
Soviet models of nation and family, as a re-articulation of the 'traditional' values of 
masculine authority over the family/nation and women's authority within the private sphere, 
as mothers and nourishers of the new generation. If the nation is to combine the best of West 
and East, parliamentarianism, secularism and the market, combined with a respect for 
traditional values, then discourse is figuring men as both 'West' and 'East', whilst figuring 
women as essentially 'Easf. 
State-b uilding and Islam 
One of the 'Eastern' poles of the new national identity is Islam. During the Soviet period, 
ethnographers noted that national and religious identity were closely linked in Central Asia 
to the extent that 'differentiating between the religious and the national (was) exceptionally 
difficulf (Vaganov, 1988: 194, cited Akbarzadeh, 1994: 3). On the one hand, the fluid 
nature of Islam in the region permitted the incorporation of pre-Islamic cultural practices, 
such as sacrificing animals, visiting tombs and preservation of ancestor cults, thereby 
intertwining Islamic and cultural identities. On the other hand, the link between religious and 
national identity was further strengthened by Soviet development policies and local 
responses to them, which constructed Islam as an ethnic marker, defining indigenous self- 
identity and differentiating it from Slav or Soviet identities, 08. With respect to Kazakstan, 
although the point is often made that Islam was 'weakee in nomadic society, where 
transhumance and oral traditions inhibited the development of mosque attendance and 
knowledge of the Koran, 'muslimness' was a key part of Kazaks' cultural and ethnic self- 
identifications (Mustafina, 1992; Altoma, 1994). 
Given these strong links between Islam and indigenous cultural traditions, it is not surprising 
that it has now become an important element in the discourse and practice of nation-building. 
As Akbarzadeh (1994) describes, the very fluidity of the Islam that has survived in cultural 
traditions allows it to be used by diverse political forces. His analysis of the ways in which 
the ruling parties in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have invoked Islam to 
consolidate their power bases and pursue the national economic interest is also relevant to 
Kazakstan. 
Most Western scholarship on the revitalization of Islam in Central Asia has been pre- 
occupied with the extent to which it will fill the political vacuum left by the demise of 
communism and particularly the risk of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and regional 
instability. However, again, like the other strands of the 'traditionalist' discourse with which 
it is entwined, the discourse of re-islamicization is also gendered. 
"8 There is an interesting parallel here with some of the literature on Bosnia, which explores a similar 
intertwining of religious and ethnic identity. See for example Comelia Sorabji, in R. Hinde and H. 
Watson (eds. 1995), War a cruel necessity?: The bases of institutionalised violence. Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
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The gendered analyses tend to see both Islamic and traditionalist discourse as part of a 
general propagandising of a 'conservative utopia'which is 'exclusively patriarchal in content 
and repressive towards women' (Usacheva, op. cit.: 12). To cite Usacheva, 'the opinion of 
religious adepts on 'the woman question' is clear: the woman must always and in all 
situations submit to the man, serve him and recognise his supremacy over her in all areas. 
This related to wives first of all' (ibid.: 12). However, as recent feminist scholarship has been 
careful to point out, one must be cautious about construing islarnicisation universally in 
terms of the victimization of women (Ask and Tjornsland, 1998; Fawzi EI-Solh and Mabro, 
1994). Different Muslim discourses depicting modernist, traditionalist and fundamentalist 
trends all have diverging views on women's social position. In addition, women may develop 
distinct voices and participate in the islamisation process in various ways. With regard to 
Central Asia in particular, it has been shown that, in some contexts, women played a central 
role as 'guardians of the faith' in Soviet times transmitting and creating religious rituals in 
private that were taboo in the public sphere (Tett, 1994). From this perspective, it is 
interesting that in Kazakstan, women's involvement in the resurgence of Islam is 
demonstrated in the creation of the League of Muslim Women of Kazakhstan, which is one 
of the few women's organisations to have branches throughout the country. The emergence 
of this official, islamic, women's organisation raises a number of important questions relating 
to the nature of state discourse and its impact on gender relations. 
Contested spaces: theftagmentation ofgender discourse in post-Soviet Kazakstan 
So far I have argued that, symbolically, state discourse is placing women and men in 
different and asymmetrical positions to citizenship and the nation state. In a retrenchment 
from or reversal of Soviet state policies on'the woman question', emphasis is no longer being 
placed on sexual equality, but on returning women to their 'natural' roles in the domestic 
sphere. This shift is being underpinned by rhetoric which draws on a reinvented image of 
family and society in the pre-Soviet, indigenous past. State-building is figured as the revival 
of national identity and the reinstatement of moral and spiritual values that were 'lost' during 
the Soviet period. This process is implicitly gendered: the central symbols of this revival of 
traditional cultural and religious identities are the re-valuing of male figures and symbols in 
public space and the directing of women's energies to the domestic sphere, together with the 
revival of images of the state as patriarchal family, headed by a wise patriarch. 
What are the implications, at macro level, of the fact that men and women are symbolically 
being placed in different and asymmetrical positions to citizenship and the nation state? One 
argument is that since 'traditional' attitudes and practices continued to be influential in the 
private sphere during the Soviet period, their appearance in the public sphere does not signal 
a change but a recognition of how things actually were (Akiner, 1997). While this may be 
the case, it is important to point out that the disappearance of the'Soviet side of the equation' 
changes the locus and meaning of 'traditional' culture. On the one hand, private values and 
practices may be changed by their very emergence into the public sphere, where they become 
subject to different standards of performance and appraisal. Practices that may have been 
flexible may become more rigid and fixed. For example, whilst it may have been appropriate 
for women to 'carry' many important cultural and religious identities and practices during the 
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Soviet period, this may be unacceptable when 'tradition' and religion take on a more public 
face. On the other hand, during the Soviet period, traditional practices and attitudes existed in 
relation to (or in tension with) Soviet ideologies and policies. The fact that individuals were, 
to varying degrees, obliged to follow traditional custom in private and Soviet custom in 
public, also meant that they had an opportunity to negotiate between different roles and 
identities. I have argued that for women, in particular, Soviet ideology and policy 
promulgated (at least in theory) an egalitarian model of gender relations. A body of laws 
existed which could be drawn on by individuals, and protected women's educational, 
employment and reproductive rights. Although neo-traditionalist discourse may not directly 
threaten these rights, it does create a social climate in which rights can be changed or eroded. 
As I have discussed, although equal rights are enshrined in the new Constitution, the framing 
of programmes and policies has been influenced by the new vision of citizenship and the 
nation. As in Russia (Pilkington, 1995) the growing emphasis on the family may be 
influencing the drafting of legislation, such as the Family, Labour and Criminal Codes, in 
ways that undercut women's rights and entitlements 109 . In an interview with a Western 
consultant to the President and Cabinet of Ministers on law reform, I was told that, although 
kalym, bride-stealing and under-age marriage are all illegal under the criminal code, due to 
pressure from South Kazakstan, particularly from the religious right in Zhambul and 
Shymkent, who hold that these are 'traditions' and part of the'Kazak way of life', the law will 
not be enforced by the Procuratoes Office (Prokuratura) at local level in the countryside. 
According to my respondent, a deal was struck at government level and informal instructions 
issued to the Prokuratura not to proceed with cases. In my interviews with local 
Prokuratura officials in my fieldwork areas, I was unable to obtain any further information - 
except that no such cases had been brought or were pending. Unfortunately, I was not able to 
obtain access to the library of the Parliament, where the proceedings of the debates on the 
new Codes are held. The discussion in Chapters 5 and 6 on the establishment of the new 
private (family) farms examines another aspect of the tension between the new emphasis on 
the family and individual rights. 
On the other hand, as Pilkington (1995) notes with reference to a parallel phenomenon in 
post-Soviet Russia, the demise of the monopoly of the CPSU and Marxist-Leninist ideology 
has also permitted alternative sites of discourse generation. Ideologies and representations of 
gender are now being produced, not by a single party, but by different political groupings 
and parts of civil society, the mass media and non-goverrimental organisations. Globalisation 
means that, even in isolated rural communities, TV now provides access to such 'diverse' 
representations of gender as North and Latin American soap operas, Hollywood films, 
advertising and pornographic movies. Gender discourse is therefore, more than ever, a 
contested space. In this sense, 'the fragmentation of the sites of discourse generation is both 
potentially liberating, in that it opens up possibilities for alternative voices to be heard and 
potentially enslaving, in that it may shore-up prejudices and result in the insidious refixing of 
gender identities in a highly limiting way' (ibid: 161). 
"' For a review of gender analyses of legislation in Kazakstan, see the chapters in 'Women and the 
Law', Section 2 of the Republic ofKazakhstan Report on the Status of Women, 1997. 
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In the new-Kazakstan, state-discourse itself is not monolithic or unilinear, but part of an 
ongoing process of social and political dialogue and hence punctuated by contradictions. To 
my knowledge, no in-depth studies have as yet been conducted on shifts in state gender 
discourse since independence in Kazakstan, as they have for Russia' 10. However, although 
the main thrust of state-building discourse is marked by the gender asymmetry explored 
above, my own reading of various official and media sources suggests that the picture is 
more complicated. As Reef Altoma (1994: 164) points out in her study of islarnisation in 
Kazakstan, the leadership is trying to mould the identity of independent Kazakstan into a 
modem, multi-ethnic state, and must therefore steer a complicated course between the 
religious and the secular, the ethnic and the multi-ethnic, East and West. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that discourse on gender relations sometimes gives mixed messages, as in an 
interview between President Nazarbaev and a group of women deputies, which I saw on 
television early in my second trip to Kazakstanill. Although ostensibly a dialogue, the 
meeting took the form of a monologue, almost a harangue by the President, who was urging 
the deputies to be 'objective' and give their wholehearted support to the government reform 
programme, since 'there was no alternative. There was a need for strategic policy, to 
develop the state and the economy and to increase democracy. After appealing to the women 
in their 'primary roles as homemakers' and stressing their consciousness of social issues, he 
moved on to 'big politics', specifically the market economy. The women deputies had 
forgotten how they used to stand in queues before, he said. The market economy was a 
normal economy. It gave people the opportunity to work in the job they wanted and where 
they wanted. Women had to work, since there were many pensioners who needed to be 
provided for by the working population. What I found particularly striking in this 'discussion' 
were the contradictions : between the references to increasing democracy and the appeal to 
the women politi cians first and foremost in their domestic roles as homemakers, between the 
, female' sphere of social issues and the implicitly male sphere of 'big politics'; and then, 
conversely, between the emphasis on homemaking and the stress on women as workers, 
helping to maintain an ageing population. Clearly, the common factor here is the primary 
identification of women with the domestic sphere, in terms of the home and the caring role 
associated with it. However, the question is, how far can this 'domestic' role be expanded 
into the public sphere, into work and politics? The women deputies already occupied a space 
in this public world. What was at stake in this instance was the boundaries of their 
participation. And here, what was most striking was the absence of the voices of the women 
themselves. In all ten minutes of the report, not a single woman was heard. The viewer 
disco vered absolutely nothing about the deputies' own views or (possibly gendered) critiques 
of government policies. 
This raises the question of the extent to which gendered critiques of the current nation- 
building discourse can be voiced. The emergence, since 1991, of a broad spectrum of 
... For Russia, see Pilkington (1995). One possible framework for analysis in a Kazakstani context is 
suggested by Evgeny Zhovtis'(1999) work on freedom of association in Kazakstan, which identifies 
three stages in the democratisation process: 1991-94, when the government, in response to (perceived) 
international pressure was most open to the demands for democratization and observation of human 
rights; 1994-1996, the beginning of a retrenchment from earlier commitments; and 1997-8, marking 
the beginning of more open repression. See Zhovtis, E. (1999) It would be interesting to see how far 
this framework applies to gender discourse. 
... Subbota on Channel 31 at 8.30 pm on 2"d November 1996. Fieldnotes, Almaty, November 1996. 
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women's organisations is a phenomenon which deserves a more detailed analysis than I can 
present here and merits further research' 12 . Briefly, there would seem to be two challenges to 
the gendered construction of the new polity. On the one hand, women are challenging the 
patriarchal prejudices which have excluded them from full participation in the public sphere, 
and are demanding that the public sphere be fully opened to them. A number of the new 
women's organisations are contesting the idea that the revived or reinvented traditions of 
nomadic society can serve as a model for gender relations in the present, and calling for 
gender discourse to be placed firmly in its current context, in other words, for attention to be 
paid to the gendered impact of the current economic and political changes and for gender 
issues to be explicitly incorporated into state policy. Another approach is to 'reclaim' the 
traditionalist rhetoric, by transforming the association of women with the private sphere and 
the accompanying cultural and spiritual identity, into a springboard or platform for women's 
action in the public sphere. One example of this is the islamic women's organisation 
mentioned above. Another is the use of 'traditional' symbols in the discourse of secular 
organisations, such as the umbrella organisation, 'Shiragin'. In the words of one of its 
founders, it's name, which comes from the Kazak word forfire'was chosen because'women 
are fire for the nation, as they are fire for the lamp" 13 . The example of this organisation is an 
interesting one, because it could be said to use both forms of challenge in different 
circumstances: whilst its name gives it a moral legitimacy within the new 'traditionalist' 
discourse, many of its members campaign on a platform that would be more familiar in a 
Western feminist context. This points to the way in which women's organisations, like the 
state and nation, are themselves pursuing a quest for identity, which draws on both trans- 
national and traditional images. 
How representative are such groups and what impact are they having on policy? One 
argument is that they represent a drop in the ocean and that the lack of a coherent women's 
movement in Kazakstan and Central Asia as a whole is a sign of women's victimization or 
passivity (Akiner, 1997). Although they point to resistance to the new traditionalist ideology 
in terms of individual choices in lifestyles or careers - such as distancing from kin networks 
to lead an independent existence or postponing marriage - these are analysed in terms of 
'non-resistance' or 'passivity. However, as Scott (1985) demonstrated in his study on peasant 
resistance in rural Malaysia, 'the existence of those who seem not to rebel is a warren of 
minute, individual, autonomous tactics and strategies which counter and inflect the visible 
facts of overall domination, and whose purposes and calculations, desires and choices, resist 
any simple division into the political and the apolitical'. A clearer idea of how gender 
discourse is being contested comes from an examination of such 'apolitical' forms of 
resistance, particularly as regards how the processes of revival or reinvention of traditions 
are being conducted at local level. This will be examined more fully Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
However, at macro level, the formal, jural and legal aspects of gender relations, at least, are 
"' Studies available when I conducted my field research were Seitova, 'The Formation of the 
Women's Movement in Kazakstan. Women's NGOs' in The Republic ofKazzakstan Report on the 
Status of lVomen, (1997: 25-32); Bauer, Boschmann and Green (1997: 83 -87); Herman, Johnson and 
Estes, (1996: 5-8). NGOs have recently been the object of more detailed research. See for example 
Berg's (2004) study on women's informal networks and nongovernmental organisations in Uzbekistan. 
113 Fieldnotes, Almaty, 5.11.96. 
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being decided in male-dominated public sphere, where the question of women's access to it 
114 is, at best, contested and, at worst, under threat in Kazakstan 
This discussion has highlighted two main aspects of national identity building: the 
renovation of archaic forms and the inversion of Soviet ideologies. The revaluing of 
traditional identities in the public sphere, has also entailed a reappraisal of gender relations in 
nomadic society (where women were already emancipated, and customs were more moral, 
ethical and spiritual and a better basis for the development of a modem society, rooted in 
tradition). However just as, in Soviet period, gender was a shorthand for other issues, here 
again, but in a mirror-image, gender symbolises the value of the traditional way of life but 
gender relations themselves are not really investigated or examined. Similarly, the 
permeability to Western (outside) ideas, has not extended to feminist ideas on gender 
relations. In part, this is due to the dominance of particular economistic discourses in the 
development process, which also have direct implications for the construction of gender 
domains. It is this that I shall go on to explore in the next section. 
11. The Framing of (Economic) Development 
The second of Kazakstan's two strategic goals over the past decade has been to begin to carry 
through the requisite wide-ranging social, political and economic reforms to enable the 
'transition' from the Soviet political and economic system to a 'new and completely different 
one'(Nazarbaev, 1998: 13). As I shall argue in Chapters 5,6 and 7, this'new and completely 
different' society may not in fact fit the blueprint set out by those planning reform. The 
concept of 'transition, which has now become so widespread as to seem natural or inevitable 
is actually very slippery (Hann, 1994; Humphrey, 1995). Not only is its future goal unclear 
and disputed by the various actors involved, but moves, strategies and values may not 
obviously be taking a single direction at all (Humphrey, ibid: 10). However, as widely 
applied in the language of the Kazakstani government and the international donor institutions 
and agencies assisting with the definition and implementation of its development strategy, 
the concept of 'transition' can be equated with a radical shift, at state level, from the Soviet to 
a 'Western' model of development. 
Who isframing development? 
Although Kazakstan has been attempting to choose a development path 'on the basis of [its] 
history and specific circumstances' it is also confronting'a time of growing globalisation and 
increasing interdependence, when powerful external forces will inevitably play a 
considerable role in deciding [its] future' (Nazarbaev, 1998). With the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of Kazakstan as an independent state, the country 
effectively found itself propelled into the global economic system and confronted with the 
n eed to survive within it. In particular, faced with the waning of subsidies from Russia, the 
government turned for loans to international institutions, such as the IMF and the World 
114 For'statistics on women's representation in government and parliament see for exarnple the 
Kazakstan Section in Women 2000, International Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Available 
online at http: //www. ihf-lir. orv-/appeals/001 1096. htm. Last accessed from the World Wide Web in 
2003. 
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Bank and an unprecedented wave of other donor and aid organisations also appeared on tile 
development scene. In return for loans and development aid, pressure was put on the 
government to follow prescriptions for macro-economic stabilisation, and to step up its 
structural reform efforts, particularly in the area of privatisation and market reform (Kaser, 
1997: 9). One of the senses in which we can speak of a shift to a 'western' model of 
development is therefore the new phenomenon of the involvement of external agencies, in 
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shaping the country's development strategy 
The importance of considering a wide range of actors in the west as well as the east when 
studying the 'transition' has been underlined by Steven Sampson (1996: 121), who argues 
that development in the former socialist countries is taking the form of a series of 
lencounters'at different levels between the former communist East and the capitalist West: at 
an abstract level, encounters of symbols, ideologies and models; at a concrete level, 
encounters between institutions, individuals and communities and a broad range of 
international development agencies, financial institutions and NGOs. Action and interaction 
is taking place at various levels, from macro-level policy initiatives down to encounters at 
grassroots level between local communities and western practitioners (of whom I was of 
course one)' 16 . 
Indeed, this aspect of the framing of development in Kazakstan is difficult to ignore. During 
my pilot visit in February 1996,1 was immediately struck by the number and range of 
different development agencies present in the country, ranging from what I term the 'major 
players' to a variety of smaller organisations. The first category included the international 
lending and multilateral organisations. Kazakstan joined the IMF in July 1992 and by 1997 
had received $619 in aid (Kaser, 1997). Substantial capital had also been put in by the 
World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Kazakstan also became a member of the United Nations in March 1992 and 
shortly afterwards joined most of the UN development agencies, including UNICEF, 
UNESCO, UNHCR, UNDP and WHO. A partnership and cooperation agreement was signed 
with the EU in 1995 and was the foundation for the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the 
Community of Independent States and Mongolia) programme. The major players also 
included a range of bilateral donors, such as the American agency, USAID, the German GTZ 
and the British Know How Fund. The second category included NGOs and consultancies, 
often subcontracting for the first and working on particular projects. I conducted interviews 
and participant observation in a number of these, primarily those directly involved in 
agriculture or rural development projects, including HIVOS, VOCA, Winrock International, 
Mercy Corps and the Counterpart Consortium. 
"' The interesting question of the 'new' encounter between Kazakstan, as an independent state, and 
Russia and the other members of the CIS which were formerly part of the Soviet Union, falls beyond 
the scope of this thesis and will not be addressed in detail. Although both Russia and Russian cthnicity 
continued to be important markers of identity at local level in my research communities, the most 
striking feature of the macro level framing of development during the period I conducted my research 
was the new hegemony of Western models. 
116 See also the chapters by Verdery, Hann, Humphrey, Sampson and Mandel in Hann (2002). 
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It is important to note that these various development actors had different agendas and 
varying possibilities for influencing the direction of change 
117 
. An outline of their various 
development aims and priorities in Kazakstan, and how they have shifted since 1996, is 
appended and will be discussed further below. In addition, as I explored in the previous 
section of this chapter, the frameworks they propose are negotiated with the Kazakstani 
authorities, which have their own, sometimes different, reforin agenda 
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. However, we can 
speak of the existence of a dominant development discourse, which has strongly influenced 
the direction of reform in Kazakstan and other former socialist countries (Griffin, 2000; 
Sievers, 2003). 
The ideologies and aims driving (economic) development policies 
Development as the running of an efficient market economy 
When I began my fieldwork in 1996, a particular model of development was being advocated 
to the new independent states by the international community. In effect, Kazakstan had 
emerged as independent power at a specific conjuncture, when the collapse of the USSR and 
its alternative model of modernisation and the rise of a neo-liberal model of capitalism 
derived from the Reagan and Thatcher projects of the 1980s had produced a new 
development paradigm (Hettne, 1994; Rondinelli, 1993; Hewitt, 2000; Kohler, 1995; 
Thomas, 2000; Shlapentokh, 1995). 'Its contours were succinctly outlined by World Bank 
representative, Sir William Ryrie, in an address in 1996. After referring to the 'bankruptcy' 
of the previous consensus on state-led development projects, based on state ownership of the 
means of production and state control of the economy, he pointed to a'new, remarkably wide 
and strong consensus in favour of market-based policies, opening the economy up to 
competition, internal and external, while maintaining monetary stability'. According to this 
paradigm, often referred to as the 'Washington consensus', the best measure of development 
is high economic growth over a substantial period of time; this could best be achieved by 
introducing a market system which, provided markets were flexible enough and allowed to 
work freely, 
-would 
automatically bring positive development results. In other words, 
development had become synonymous with the running of an efficient market economy and 
this was presented as a pragmatic rather than an ideological approach. It was quite simply, 
'the common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists' (Ryrie, 1996: 3-5). 
However, despite its seeming 'pragmatism' or 'neutrality, this model is in fact driven by a 
particular definition and ideology of development, which has had a significant impact on the 
way social, including gender, issues have been incorporated in policies and interventions. 
Development as a transition to western systems 
"' Contradictory tendencies on the donor/international NGO scene in Kazakstan were analysed in a 
report for UK NGO INTRAC (Sinclair 1996) which pointed to a'remarkable American dominance of 
the NGO scene, with a resulting focus on legal, electoral, human rights and environmental issues, and 
little focus on poverty and socio-economic change! See also Mandel (2002b). 
I" See for example Michael Kasces (1997) analysis of the economies of Kazakstan and Uzbekistan, 
where he highlights'the two states' resistance to the'shock therapy'model promulgated by the IMF, 
particularly their concern to maintain a strong role for the state in the economy and to curb social and 
economic differentiation. 
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Although there is a consensus that development is the running of an efficient market 
economy, the diagnosis of how this is to be achieved varies according to the categorisation of 
the country involved. Kazakstan, like Russia and the other former Soviet Republics in 
Central Asia, has been classed as one of the specific group of 'transition' countries or often 
(sic) economies. 
A key feature of the new framing of development in the post-socialist countries is the 
tendency to cast the process in terms of a 'transition' to western systems, with flows or 
transfers of symbolic, practical, technical and human resources taking place from west to 
east, but not vice-versa. This is connected with the existing constructions of the Eastern bloc 
in opposition to the West and the power relations intrinsic to this relationship (Kurti, 1996). 
There was a widespread perception that the West had 'won' the cold war and that the 
dissolution of the former eastern bloc was intrinsically connected with the failure of its 
model of modernisation, which needed to be 'corrected' by embracing the development 
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model of the 'advanced industrial nations' . This has involved the latter making an effort to 
1modernise' the east and 'integrate' the former state socialist countries into existing economic 
and political frameworks, through a gamut of aid programmes aimed at helping them achieve 
'privatisation', 'agricultural reform', 'higher-education restructuring!, 'democratic institutions', 
'legal reform' and 'a developed civil society' (Sampson, 1992). For their part, the 
governments of the former communist states were to adopt western models of development 
by implementing far-reaching economic and political reforms and encouraging their 
populations to change their economic and political culture to embrace market and democratic 
ideas and practices. 
The language of development as the wholesale adoption of western models permeates the 
documentation produced by governments and development agencies to the extent that it 
becomes largely a taken-for-granted frame of reference. The way it has operated in a 
Kazakstani context is summed up in a caustic critique by fort-ner aid worker, Matt Bivens, 
(1997: 74) describing a planned but never filmed episode of a USAID-sponsored soap opera 
'Seekers of Happiness': 'Two fictional families, one Russian and one Kazak, thrown together 
by circumstances, become partners and together achieve a certain level of economic security. 
Along the way, privatisation is shown in a glowing light. One episode merits a fuller 
description: The Kazak and Russian families decide to build a simple house but can't figure 
out how. Suddenly a hot air balloon soars into view. The balloon has 'Soros Foundation' 
emblazoned on it. It lands. Americans leap out of the basket, build the house, and sail away. 
The Kazakstanis wave and cheer. ' 120 
"9 Academic debate on the nature of Soviet modernisation was a focus of'sovietology'. One set of 
explanations (Habermas) saw the Soviet model as a distinctive version of modernity, and argued that 
both western and soviet systems failed to realise the full potential of modernity, since the west was 
dominated by the capitalist economy and the East by the bureaucratic state. Another set of theories 
(Kerr; Talcott-Parsons) argued that the Soviet model was not a different modernity, but a more 
backward or less thorough modernisation. It is largely this model, put forward after the collapse of the 
USSR by political science theorists such as Richard Sakwa which has been taken up by the 
international community. Sakwa, for instance, has categorised the Soviet experience as one of 
Imismodernisation', with societies outwardly having the institutions associated with democratic 
societies, but actually dominated by various 'traditional' forms of kinship and personal ties. 
"0 See Mandel (2002a) for an analysis of the use of soap opera in western development strategy in 
Kazakstan. 
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This description highlights a number of the key elements of the development model espoused 
by government and donor agencies in Kazakstan: 
1) development has been primarily presented as a matter of achieving macro-economic 
security through infrastructural and market reform; 
2) the former, Soviet techniques or know-how are seen as defunct or defective and 
cannot be relied upon in order to build a new and modem 'home! (or nation); 
3) implicitly, ethnic traditions or identities (in this case Kazak and Russian) are a 
potential obstacle or source of discord and insecurity, which need to be 
counterbalanced by the adoption of a 'new' outlook, skills and sense of working 
towards a common goal; 
4) external help is needed, in the forrn of a quick transfer of models and resources: it is 
assumed that western models or systems - or an idealised representation of how they 
function - are more 'efficient! than their Kazakstani counterparts, and can simply be 
transposed to the new location. 
5) aid comes (in this case literally) 'top down, apparently with no attempt to assess 
local conditions, still less to discuss what kind of 'home' the local families might 
wish to build. None of the American experts conduct a social or cultural impact 
study, still less a gendered assessment of which features the women and men might 
find most desirable in their new home. In this sense, aid is primarily technical, 
rather than human, development. 
Transition not development 
'As this critique suggests, the other key feature of the development paradigm being applied in 
Kazakstan is its definition of development. My findings are in keeping with a recent review 
of the period from 1991 to 2000, which highlights that, rather than adopting a people-centred 
view of the process, i. e. as one that increases people's abilities to achieve their potential and 
pursue a life of their choice, the Kazakstani government and majority of aid agencies adopted 
an older model, which focused more narrowly on 'commodity-based development' (Griffin, 
2000: 25 1). With the notable exception of the UNDP and a number of the smaller players, 
who were operating with broader definitions, development was being defined primarily in 
terms of the creation of market economy, macro-economic stabilisation and investment. This 
narrow definition of development had a significant impact on the types of programmes and 
projects being implemented, as well as on the way social and gender issues were addressed. 
Four aspects were particularly salient: 
First, this framing of development prioritised economic issues, with social impacts and social 
policy relegated to the margins. ' Macro-economic stabilisation and market reform were seen 
as 'neutral' or 'technical' matters, which were separate from, and given priority over, social 
aspects of reform. The assumption behind those social-sector programmes which did exist 
was that there was a need to'ease the human and social impacts caused by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union' rather than to investigate the possible or actual impact of 'transition' policies 
themselves. - This was reflected 
in the fact that (again, with the exception of UNDP), very 
few social impact studies were being conducted in connection with development policies, 
programmes and individual projects. However, as other analysts have suggested, the 
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'transition' model does espouse particular social and political values (state ownership is in 
principle bad, private enterprise is the source not only of wealth but also of virtue and the 
individual is the essential unit of polity)(Humphrey, 1995: 9). The logic of tile 'transition, 
framework therefore required that 'excessive' government intervention in the economy be 
removed, which entailed moving away from the socialist development model by drastically 
reducing public investment and expenditure in social sector areas such as education, health 
and public services. It will be recalled that one of the explicit objectives of the Soviet social 
development model was to help women accommodate reproductive and productive labour. 
In this way, social and gender issues effectively became invisible but nevertheless were 
central to the (economic) development policies being pursued in Kazakstan, which were 
radically changing the relationship between public and private spheres. 
Second, the 'transition' framework prioritised macro-level issues. The overwhelming 
majority of aid initiatives focused on reform of legislation, high-level advice and consultancy 
with government, with relatively few programmes focusing on micro-level projects or 
projects outside the Almaty region, where actual social impacts might have been more 
evident. 
The extent to which 'transition' should be considered as a continuation of the general policies 
flowing from the Washington and post-Washington consensus or as a specific or 
qualitatively different model is a moot point. On the one hand, similar critiques to those 
outlined above can also be levelled at structural adjustment and other policies applied by the 
international financial institutions and donors elsewhere. Current development interventions 
across the world are premised on the view that countries are (or should be) moving towards 
Western models of market economy and democracy. These interventions have also been 
widely critiqued for prioritising economic over human and social, including gender, aspects 
of development. On the other hand, in my fieldwork with donor organisations and 
international NGOs I found that the term 'transition' had particular resonance for many 
people, both in terms of the framework in which they operated and their own ideas about 
development practice and priorities on the ground. As illustrated in organisations' 
documentation, 'transition' served to classify Kazakstan and other post-socialist economies 
comparatively in the global arena and to highlight the specific kinds of policy prescriptions 
that were felt to be most appropriate there. At another level, many individual programme 
and project managers had previously worked in 'development' in other regions such as 
Africa, Asia or Latin America. For them, the term 'transition' operated as a means of 
counter-pointing differences between post-socialist Kazakstan and these other regions. At 
both levels, a distinction was commonly drawn between 'transition' and 'development' 
countries and concerns, which, I argue, has had a specific impact on the way gender issues 
have been addressed by the donor community in Kazakstan. The diagnosis of government 
and agencies was that the 'transition' economies were facing three main challenges: 
1) Transition - creation of a market-based economy, with functioning firms, markets 
and financial systems. 
2) Stabilisation - restoration of macro-economic stability in terms of inflation, 
exchange rates and interest rates. 
3) Development - improvement of 'quality of life' as measured, for example, by per 
capita income and the state of the physical environment (ref). 
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Although the three concepts were closely interconnected, 'transition' was considered to be the 
key. At the end of this 'transition' process, it was believed that these countries 'would have 
similar concerns to established market-based states and therefore a range of 'development 
issues! did not need to be debated since they were of less importance' (Gelb, 1996). These 
'development issues'- included other, redistributive measures of social well-being, such as 
life-expectancy, literacy, school-enrolment, equality of income distribution or the liberation 
of women, which 'were not to overshadow the basic macro-economic objectives' (Ryrie, 
1996). 
Fourth, as well as this distinction between 'transition' and 'developing' countries, the framing 
of development priorities in the various New Independent States depended on where specific 
countries were positioned - and positioned themselves - within the group of 'transitional 
economies', which was in turn connected with issues of power and strategic interests. For 
example, from the outset, the American aid organisation USAID categorised the various 
states differently and tailored its policies accordingly, taking account of their resources, 
national policies and priorities and the perception of probable returns on investment. The 
resulting differences in emphasis emerge clearly from a comparison between the strategies 
implemented by USAID in Kazakstan and neighbouring Kyrgyzstan: 
Xazakstan is the largest recipient of US aid in Central Asia. It is classed as a 'resource-rich 
country with considerable trade and investment opportunities, ' which 'has made considerable 
progress towards a market economy' and 'actively promotes Western trade, investment and 
economic support'. Its size and location make it 'a key player in shaping the post-Soviet 
political and economic order'. US national interests in Kazakstan are therefore 'both 
commercial and strategic' and development aid has focused predominantly on macro-level 
structural reform, first privatisation, then 'establishing a transparent, consistent legal and 
regulatory environment to maintain and expand foreign investment'. In particular, as 
described in Chapter 1, much effort has gone into restructuring the potentially very 
remunerative energy sector (USAID, 1996,1998a). 
Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, is described as a small and poor and low-income country, 
significant for its vocal commitment to democracy and market reform and its role as an 
example for the region (USAID, 1998b). Here US development aid has focused on macro- 
level structural reform and economic growth, but also to a greater extent on fostering civil 
society, 'livelihoods', small and medium enterprise development, primary health care and 
particularly poverty alleviation. 
Development agencies' priorities are determined in liaison with governments and are 
influenced by the latters' strategic positioning on the development spectrum. The President 
of Kazakstan has been strongly committed to the 'market development' model promulgated 
by the'major players'. Clearly, this has a strong, strategic component - Kazakstan was able to 
trade on its nuclear capability and its potential as a major gas and oil exporter to negotiate its 
position on the world stage. As described earlier, the government presentation of Kazakstan 
has been of a 'snow-leopard' economy, poised for economic take-off and in the vanguard of 
the Central Asia region. Stipulating that I should maintain his anonymity, a disgruntled 
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project contractor working on a micro-level project for USAID told me that neither the 
Kazakstani nor the US government had much interest in the smaller programmes dealing 
with agriculture and micro-enterprise. He put this down to a confluence of interests to focus 
on high-level or prestige projects, such as reform of the energy sector or the Aral Sea. In his 
view, the Kazakstani government was 'betting on the development of natural resources' and 
, felt it could afford to wait before implementing micro-level development programmes'. ' 21 
This was very different from neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, which was presenting itself as a 
country in need of 'development' assistance 122 . 
The invisibility of gender. results offieldwork with development agencies and NGOs 
All these aspects: the definitions of development as 'transition' and positioning of Kazakstan 
within the 'transition' spectrum, together with the accompanying focus on a quick technical 
, fix! through importing western models and the prioritisation of macro over micro and, 
economic over social, issues, were having a considerable effect on how gender was - or 
rather was not - being incorporated into development planning, implementation and 
monitoring. 
My initial aim was to examine how gender was being incorporated into rural development 
initiatives by looking at programs or individual projects with a specific women in 
development or gender and development component. To go back to Sampson's (1996) idea 
of an encounter between West and East, I thought it would be interesting to look at the 
interface between projects' gender ideologies and practices and local ones, and to examine 
how approaches used elsewhere were being adapted in post-Soviet context. However, in 
1996,1 was unable to pursue this objective, since no programs with a specific gender 
component were being implemented in the rural/agricultural sector. More generally, I found 
that, although most organisations did have a gender and development or women in 
development strategy, which was being applied in programmes elsewhere, it was not being 
applied in Kazakstan 123 . The four organisations whose 
frameworks and activities I studied 
most closely were the World Bank, EU/TACIS, USAID and UNDP. 
At that time, the strategy of the World Bank was to seek to integrate gender into all policy 
and operational work and a WID Advisory Board had been established for this purpose 
121 Interview with VOCA representative, Almaty, 24.6.97. 
122 For a more detailed exposition of the two states' different approaches to seeking foreign aid and 
investment, see for example, Brill Olcott (1996). 
123 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to compare the extent to which these gender strategies and 
programmes are actually implemented in other areas of the world. However, it should be pointed out 
that, although these organisations are theoretically concerned about integrating gender issues into the 
mainstream of their work, there have been widespread critiques as to how far this is so. See, for 
example, for the World Bank, Caroline Moser et al. 'Mainstreaming Gender and Development in the 
World Bank: Progress and Recommendations, 1999, World Bank and, with a specific focus on the 
agricultural sector, Mario Zappacosta and Elisa Montresor, The World Bank's View on Women in 
Agricultural Projects: From 'Women in Development' to 'Gender and Development', Paper presented 
at the XVI Congress of the European Society of Rural Sociology, 
Working Group 16: Women, 
Markets and Agriculture, Prague, 31 July -4 August 1995. 
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124 within the institution . However, 
in 1996 the Europe and Central Asia Region did not have 
a gender unit and' the representatives I interviewed were not au fait with gender 
considerations At that time, neither specific gender assessment of projects nor specific 
gender-oriented projects were being implemented or planned. 
Similarly, gender equality was part and parcel of EU policies and programs, with specific 
programmes for women and rural development being implemented elsewhere, both in the EU 
member states and in developing countries. In 1995, the European Commission had accepted 
a resolution on gender issues in development, according to which women's and men's roles 
were to be taken into acco 
, 
unt in micro, meso and macro policies, including structural 
adjustment policies. In 1996, it had also adopted a gender mainstrearning approach, which 
was to lead to the incorporation of equal opportunities into all EU policies and activities 
(Van Steveren, 2001)125. However, from interviews with EU representatives it emerged that 
social and cultural, including gender issues, were not seen as a priority and were not taken 
into account in programme or project design or monitoring 126 . 
USAID had set up an Office of Women in DevelWment in 1914, tohelp ensure that viornen 
parcl, zipatea ux-j avia be-nefited equallY frOm US overseas development assistance. Goals 
included enhancing the economic StatUS of women throughout the developing world, 
expanding educational opportunities for girls, improving women's legal and property rights 
and increasing their participation in governance and civil society. By 1996, the office was 
moving beyond its earlier emphasis on women-centred projects to a broader approach of 
integrating gender throughout the agency's regional and country programs and projects. The 
strategic objectives of the new Gender Plan of Action announced in March that year were to 
reflect the central role of women in development through better data collection and analysis 
and revision of personnel policies. USAID project development and program officers were to 
have experience of gender issues, new guidelines were issued for grantees and contractors to 
require demonstration of abilities to address gender issues, and each mission was to review 
and revise 'mission orders' to ensure that gender issues are considered at all appropriate 
points in the process of planning, achieving and evaluating program results. However, 
although USAID had been active in Kazakstan since 1992, a preliminary assessment of 
gender considerations was only conducted in December 1996 and highlighted that, although 
there were elements in the mission's programme which 'contributed to WID goals and 
partially addressed WID concerns', gender had not been mainstreamed across the portfolio. 
124 For a more detailed analysis of the World Bank's changing approach to women/gender and development over the period from 1975 to 1995, see the citations above. 125 For a detailed exposition of the EU's resolutions and critiques of them by various non- 
governmental organisations, ee http: //www. at)rode &net/&endgZol. htm Last accessed 9.4.2004. 1'2 6 Similar conclusions were reached in a position paper produced on the EU TACIS programme for 
the APRODEV organisation, which concluded that emphasis had been placed on strengthening the 
economic system and promoting the evolution towards a market-oriented society. Whilst these were important goals, there was no "coherent strategy that describes how these actions will contribute to the 
social development of the societies in question. [ ... ] nor do the current proposals include any 
provision to promote an equitable distribution of the benefits of economic development" (Metz, 1999). 
An overview of the EU's relations with Kazakstan is available at: 
bttp: //eurol2a. Cu. int/comni/extemal relations/kazakhstan/intro/index. htm. Last accessed from World 
Wide Web on 8.4-2004. ' 
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Even the UNDP, whose sustainable human development paradigm had gender equality as 
one of its cornerstones, alongside poverty reduction, environmental regeneration and 
sustainable livelihoods, and which considered women's empowerment as critical for the 
development process, was only just initiating a WID/GAD programme in Kazakstan 1996, 
despite being active in the country since the beginning of the decade. 
My research suggested several specific reasons for this failure to introduce a systematic 
gender framework in Kazakstan. First, as research has highlighted elsewhere, gender tends 
to be excluded where development is defined in terms of economic or technical assistance 
(Goldey, et al,. 1996). Second, to go back to the distinction drawn between 'transition' and 
'development', gender issues were categorised as one of the range of 'development' concerns 
which did not need to be addressed in connection with transition countries. This is explicitly 
stated in USAID's own description of its regional WID activities: 'The USAID technical 
assistance portfolio in Central Asia is focused around three strategic assistance areas: 1) 
Market Transition 2) Democratic Transition and 3) Social Sector Transition. As a program 
geared towards countries in transition, the portfolio is not designed to include a WID-specific 
program nor more long-term WID-style activities, such as girls education, addressed in 
developing country programs' (Herman, et al 1996). As a transition economy, the country 
was seen as having a 'positive gender relations legacy' from the Soviet period: looking at 
indicators such as female education and labour-force participation, the conclusion was that 
no interventions would be necessary in this area. This assessment seemed to rely on Soviet 
quantitative data at face value, without looking at more nuanced critiques of gender 
assymetries under the Soviet system. It was also based on the assumption that this past 
situation would continue or improve under the influence of transition policies and that there 
127 was no need to evaluate or ease the impact of market and social reforms themselves . The 
conceptual isation of transition as a short-term, technical 'fix! also contributed to the failure to 
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mainstream gender issues 
However, in counterpoint, many of the same agencies did apply gender frameworks and set 
up GAD/WID projects much earlier in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. For example, UNDP had 
already set up a Gender Bureau and there were a number of initiatives to encourage women's 
NGOs, including in rural areas of the country. This was partly connected with Kyrgyzstan's 
positioning on the spectrum of 'transition countries' as a poor country, in need of more classic 
'development' assistance. In other words, gender issues were being addressed in relation to 
poverty reduction initiatives but not in relation to macro-economic or stabilisation policies. 
The fact that agencies - at least initially - focused their work in the capital also contributed 
to the lack of poverty-related interventions. Few resources were made available to conduct 
base-fine surveys in other parts of the country, especially in rural areas, where more 'poverty 
oriented' projects would have been appropriate. In this connection, it is interesting that the 
127 A similar argument was made by the World Bank, which concluded that most countries in Europe 
and Central Asia were relatively well endowed, for their income levels, with physical and human 
capital and that the most serious constraints on growth and poverty reduction lay in policies and 
institutions that distorted the framework for economic decision-making. 
128 For example, the USAID assessment team concluded that, since 'the Mission [had] given priority to 
responding to start up and transition challenges, there [had] not been sufficient time to consider how 
the appropriate integration of gender across the entire portfolio could help the mission to enhance the 
impact of its assistance program' (Herman, Johnson and Estes, 1996). 
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only agency to have started to conduct 'development' work in Kazakstan in 1996 was UNDP, 
which was operating with a broad conceptualisation of human development. Their 
programme focused on two specific areas of the country (Aral Sea and Semipalatinsk), 
which had suffered major environmental catastrophe and degradation and in February 1996, 
three pilot projects with WID aspects were being planned there. The Government had 
acknowledged the extremely high levels of poverty and infant mortality in these 
'development' areas, and that they required different kinds of intervention. 
Therefore, although there was no systematic gender framework, some sectors had more of a 
gender component than others. In Kazakstan, projects with explicit gender components were 
markedly absent in the economic, energy, transport and agricultural sectors, and those that 
did exist were concentrated in the democracy/civil society and micro-enterprise/micro-credit 
sectors. In both sectors, women appeared to be playing an active part, both as activists in the 
NGOs supported by development agencies and as beneficiaries of credit. However, the lack 
of a systematic gender approach meant that a gender framework was not consistently 
reflected in the work of individual projects, as demonstrated in a number of interviews. 
One example was D. A. I., which was conducting a project for the Asian Development Bank 
to study rural credit and savings and to develop mechanisms for distributing credit. Although 
the funding organisation was one of the few to have included a gender dimension in its 
strategy, together with a requirement for contractors to include gender in their projects, this 
was seen as a peripheral 'add-on' rather than an essential element. I was told that gender 
issues were 'something that has to be put in for the higher agencies, not a central aspect! 
There appeared to be no monitoring by ADB of the way gender was actually included in the 
project. Neither the western project managers nor the local consultant who had designed the 
central study had been trained in gender analysis. In fact, this was one of the few projects to 
have commissioned a large-scale sociological study in rural areas, which had covered 200 
rural households and 100 agricultural businesses, micro-businesses and farms in 12 oblasts 
and could have produced significant quantitative and qualitative data. However, the failure 
to take account of gender was reflected in the conceptualisation of their nationwide survey, 
which did not disaggregate the data by gender (ADB, 1997). 
Another example was the Counterpart Consortium, a USAID contractor working to 'develop 
sustainable, effective, community based organisations which can have an effect on 
democratic transition and market economy. The organisation had been working in 
Kazakstan since 1994 and had focused on training local trainers, empowering community 
organisations and giving money in the form of various types of grant. In an interview with 
the organisation's Regional Program Director, he began by giving his views as to why gender 
was not an issue that needed to be addressed as such in his work with NGOs in Central Asia, 
11 never consider gender as an issue. Most organisations are started on a needs basis, by 
women'. He had worked in Poland for two and a half years and in Africa for two and a half 
years, and it was 'always women who were the first to reach for help'. This example raised a 
number of issues. Firstly, the organisation was not systematically using gender as a tool or 
concept in planning projects or assessing their impact and, again, the contractor was not 
ensuring that this was the case. Secondly, although women were undoubtedly actively 
involveq in the Consortium's initiatives, the question of gender was being approached 
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primarily in terms of the numbers of women participating in projects. Thirdly, there was an 
unproven assumption that experience could be directly transposed from other contexts, in 
particular that women across the world were likely to initiate projects, as a result of their 
involvement and responsibility for family and community activities. Lastly, and more 
widely, the assumption was that gender issues would somehow look after themselves. 
Unfortunately, this was demonstrably not the case. 
Shift in development policy after 1996 
Already, in 1995, Kazakstan UNDP human development report had suggested the need to 
look beyond the growth paradigm, to see development in a wider perspective: 'to refocus 
transition concerns and hence development objectives, to improve human well-being and to 
accelerate human capital formation. Looking beyond the economic and political perspective 
to the improvement or deterioration of quality of life, the organisation's 'disaggregation of 
data over regions by sex and ethnic origin had permitted the detection of large disparities in 
development concealed in the national statistics'. It had concluded that differences between 
the highest and least developed areas of the country were comparable to the difference 
between such countries as Paraguay and Nicaragua or Iran and Guatemala, and that there was 
disparity between North and South and urban and rural areas, linked to both ethnic 
composition and also gender disparities. In 1997, the UNDP went further, concluding that 
systemic reform in Kazakstan had been an economic, social and demographic disaster and 
that human development had 'gone into reverse'. Although the Government was making 
progress in achieving macro-economic stability, this was being achieved at the expense of 
state support for the social sphere: healthcare, childcare and education. According to the 
1996 human development report, the gross domestic product in 1995 had been only 43.5% of 
its 1990 level, and life expectancy in the same period had fallen from 68.6 to 66.1 years. 
Kazakstan had moved down in rank, from fifty-third in 1992 to seventy-second in 1995 on 
the global human development index scale. The decline in social indicators was continuing, 
with rising unemployment and declining real wages and there had been a sharp rise in 
poverty, estimated to affect one third of the population. Rural areas had been particularly 
affected. Further, women and children had been hardest hit during the transition, 
unemployment in particular being gender skewed, with women accounting for two thirds of 
the hidden unemployed 129 . 
By this second year of my fieldwork, other organisations besides UNDP had also begun to 
conduct detailed social impact and gender studies. Notably, the report published by the Asian 
Development Bank (Bauer, Boschmann and Green, 1997) also concluded that the immediate 
result of restructuring in Kazakstan had been negative and that, although both men and 
women had been affected by the changes, the social and economic costs of transition were 
being borne, at least in the short term, primarily by women. Unemployment was weakening 
sectors which had primarily offered women employment. Deterioration of the social service 
sector had increased the burden of labour for women in the domestic sphere and directly 
impacted on the health and living standards of women and children. Weakening of the social 
"' Data from UNDP, 1997: 85 and the Country Cooperation Framework for Kazakstan, 1997 
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safety net had impacted particularly on certain groups of women, including pensioners, 
single women with many children, and the unemployed. 
As I pursued my fieldwork in 1997-1998, it seemed that the meanings of 'transition' and 
'development' were increasingly being contested. Faced with worsening living conditions 
and disappointing project results, many of the larger organisations were beginning to talk 
about the need to include 'social issues' in their programmes. They were also increasingly 
using terms, such as 'poverty alleviation' and 'people-centred initiatives' from the lexicon of 
'development' 130 . The feeling amongst respondents from donor organisations was that this 
shift was being contested by the Kazakstani government, which was still prioritising macro- 
level projects and for example, insisted on the use of the euphemism 'social vulnerability' 
instead of 'poverty'. As discussed above and in Chapter 1, the ability of the Kazak 
government to insulate itself from redistributive pressures and resist more human 
development-oriented and poverty-focused approaches can be linked with its capability to 
capitalise on oil revenues. However, by 1998, both government and donor organisation's 
descriptions of their strategic development priorities had undergone a significant sea change. 
Three facets of this shift in discourse were particularly significant with respect to my own 
research: a recognition of and commitment to take account of gender issues by at least some 
organisations, an acknowledgement of the specific problems facing rural areas and reference 
to 'people-centred' development. 
Following the preliminary gender assessment in December 1996, which recommended that a 
long-term plan be developed to integrate gender considerations into appropriate strategies, 
programs and projects '' USAID's calls to tender began to ask for gender to be taken 
specifically into account 
131. The report also called for a change in the existing reliance on a 
single women in development officer for the region as a whole, with the creation of a gender 
working group. The UNDP had already gone further in organisational terms. A Kazakstan 
Gender In Development Bureau was established under its auspices in December 1996, to act 
as a focal point for addressing the needs of women in Kazakhstan. As of 1998, the EU had 
made no similar moves. 
More emphasis was also being placed on the specific development problems of rural areas. 
The Central Asia Second Reconnaissance Mission Report prepared for USAID in December 
1997 highlighted that the organisation had 'no strategic goal or objective that [dealt] directly 
with agriculture, rural development or natural resource management' (USAID, 1997). In the 
Kazakstan 2030 strategy, the President also acknowledged that polarisation had been a 
This analysis is supported by that of Griffin (2000). 
131 One call to tender for a major environment project specified that: 'Effectively taking into 
consideration the impact of gender in the environment sector will be important to the contractor's 
success in achieving results. There is no simple "recipe" for how to include gender considerations in 
natural and environmental programs. A general principle, though, is that to conserve and manage 
natural resources in a sustainable way and to ensure environmental protection both women and men 
must work together to maximize the opportunity for new ideas and solutions. Gender issues can be 
looked at on three levels; the policy level - what are the impacts of resource management decisions on 
women; the institutiona iI 
level - what roles does gender play in social institutions effecting resource 
management; and the local level - how are men and women both involved with environmental issues. 
Each Offeror should describe in its proposal how it anticipates dealing with gender issues as an 
integrated part of its activities' (USAID, 2000). 
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marked feature of the relationship between urban and rural areas and that the gap was 
growing. There was a commitment to making rural areas a key target for further efforts 
towards market transformation and to give particular attention to resolving social and 
infrastructure problems. However, this document also highlighted the tensions implicit in this 
paradigm shift: alongside the new emphasis on social problems was the old emphasis that 
these problems 'could mainly be resolved through economic growth' and that 'help would 
only be targeted on the most needy groups'. 
The same document also highlighted a more widespread limitation of any shift towards 
Opeople-centred' development. Alongside the commitment to 'give peasants and rural 
dwellers the opportunity to take greater control over their lives and provide them with the 
means to do so' came the warning that there would be no change in the orientation of policy 
towards privatisation and market reform. Elsewhere in the document (Nazarbaev, 1998: 19- 
20) the government presented itself as an agent of change and the people as a problem. The 
Imentality of several generations formed with Soviet values' needed to be transformed and 
people given a newworld view'based on'self-initiative' rather than 'dependency'. 
Continuities with the Soviet Development Model 
This highlights another significant aspect of the development framework being applied by 
the Kazakstani government and the major international players. On the surface, it appears to 
be a kind of antithesis of socialism. In this context, it may seem strange to talk about 
continuities with the Soviet development model. It is important to flag the novel ways in 
which the Kazak economy is now being inserted in global commodity circuits. However, the 
, inversion' of discourse and 'export! of western models or systems masks a number of 
commonalities, relating to power, specifically, the way in which change is brought about and 
the space for local communities to decide on the goals and means of 'development'. Like tile 
Soviet discourse of development before it, the 'transition' discourse is propelled by ideas 
about backwardness and modernity. Just as the relationship between the Russian centre and 
indigenous periphery was constructed in terms of the lattees 'backwardness' rather than 
economic and cultural difference, the relationship between the west and the post-communist 
east is being constructed in terms of hierarchy rather than partnership. Further, both Soviet 
and 'transition' development models tend to assume that change comes 'top-down' from the 
state and ignore ways in which people negotiate change and initiate their own. 
This applies not only to models or ideologies but also often to more personal interactions. 
Participant observation in donor agencies and NGOs revealed a landscape of stereotypes and 
assumptions about culture and identity that bore a remarkable resemblance to the Soviet era 
categorisation of different ethnic groups, except that westerners had now replaced Russians 
at the top of the pyramid. Comments about the 'laziness' and 'lack of initiative' of ethnic 
Kazaks, opposed to the (relative) energy of Russians and the particular industriousness and 
entrepreneurship of ethnic Germans, were common currency. More generally, as in the 
above example, there was a tendency to equate Soviet culture with a kind of 'dependence 
mentality'. The question of where to place Kazakstani women and Kazak women in 
particular on this spectrum of 'advanced' and 'less advanced' groups was a fraught one. I 
found that projects and their individual representatives were caught up in paradoxical and 
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sometimes mutually exclusive assumptions, based on ideas about Islamic women versus 
ideas about making women central to development, i. e. that rural Kazak women, in 
particular, were 'passive' and would not participate and organise, versus the idea that women 
were good entrepreneurs, good targets for micro-credit programmes and the major actors in 
the voluntary sector. The lens for measuring outcomes seemed often to be the extent to 
which local women were able to articulate the 'right' position rather than the extent to which 
they could voice their own concerns. 
The apparent shift in development priorities towards social, rural and people-oriented 
development was therefore a limited phenomenon. It was certainly not apparent in my rural 
fieldwork communities in 1997-1998, where Bivens' (1997) critique remained an apposite 
one. His example ended with the departure of the Soros experts. We did not see how the 
Russian and Kazak families reacted once the experts had flown away in their balloon, what 
they said about them, and whether they tried to change or adapt the house that had been built. 
However, to continue the metaphor, research on new architectural styles in Almaty showed 
that the full-scale 'zapadnyii remont' (Western makeover) of old homes and the building of 
new villas modelled on 'Dallas-style' ranches was going hand in hand with the inclusion of 
local features 132 . In the 
following chapters I explore the framing of rural development in 
particular and how it has been experienced and shaped in my fieldwork communities and 
argue that local responses are in fact far more complex than the framework might suggest. 
in his paper on'Building Kazakstan' presented to the Anthropology in Post-Socialist Societies 
Workshop in June 1999, Victor Buchli pointed to a parallel 'Santa-Barbaraness' and localism in styles 
and living arrangements. Ethnic Kazaks' villas, in particular, were built to accommodate several 
generations and visiting kin and often had both 'Western' and 'Kazak' entertainment rooms, the latter 
with yurt forms and ethnic motifs, together with traditional Russian saunas (banyas). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Framing of Rural Development 
'Privatization is the very basis of rural reform' 
Yesimov (1995) 
This chapter explores more specifically how current rural development policies in Kazakstan 
have been shaped in relation to the development model described in Chapter 3.1 argue that 
the invisibility of gender in the overarching development model has been carried through 
into these policies and that the outcome is that the gendered aspects of agrarian reform have 
not been taken into account. 
I. Rural development as privatisation, 
Current policy on rural development in Kazakstan and the other states of the former Soviet 
Union can be situated against the background of ongoing debate amongst both Western and 
Soviet analysts on ways to increase the efficiency of Soviet agriculture. At the end of tile 
Gorbachev period, there was a consensus that the rural sector was experiencing major 
problems, but two competing diagnoses as to what they were and how to resolve them 
(Shanin, 1990). The first prioritised the structural and technical problems relating to the 
command economy, emphasised the relative productivity of private plots in relation to the 
state and collective farm system and recommended privatisation and market reform. The 
second emphasised the human dimension of agricultural production and proposed a broader 
conception of rural development, focusing on community participation. By the time 
Kazakstan became independent in 1991, it was the former approach which had come to 
dominate the policy of both government and extemal advisers on agricultural sector reform 
and which has been reinforced in the current context. 
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As I suggested in the previous chapter, the relationship between donor organisations and 
government involves negotiation over goals and priorities. From my interviews with key 
informants in the Ministry of Agriculture, it was clear that farm restructuring and land reform 
were contentious issues and that there were divergences of opinion between government and 
foreign advisers and between central government and ohlast and rayon levels. The issue of 
private ownership of agricultural land, in particular, has been bitterly disputed (Gleason, 
1993; Wemer, 1994; ADB, 1996a). Until 20th June 2003, when the new land code was finally 
passed, agricultural land could only be held under 99 year leaseholds. The new code, which 
introduces full private ownership, met with fierce opposition in the Kazak parliament 
(Majlis), where deputies questioned the very idea of private ownership of land, on the 
grounds that it was incompatible with Kazak nomadic tradition, and expressed fears that it 
would only benefit the wealthy 
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. Nevertheless, 
in contrast with neighbouring Uzbekistan, 
Kazakstan moved much further and faster towards the privatisation and structural reform 
agenda advocated by international organisations. 
133 For more detailed analyses of agricultural reform in the USSR over this period, see for example, 
the contributions in Moskoff (ed. ) (1990) Perestroika in the Countryside. 
134 'Short-lived, but still a mutinyThe Economist, June 26h 2003. 
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Just as the overall development challenges facing the post-socialist countries have been 
defined in terms of the need to boost economic growth through 'transition' to market 
economy, rural development has been framed primarily in terms of the need to increase the 
efficiency of the agricultural sector, notably through land reform and restructuring state and 
collective farms. According to this rationale, pushed by the'majoedevelopment players and 
largely espoused by the Kazak government, during the Soviet period, the agricultural sector 
of the economy was prevented from achieving its full potential because of the lack of market 
features, such as private ownership, or tenure, of land 135 . Following this logic, 
decollectivisation and the introduction of private ownership or tenure would give people 
working on the land a real stake in its production and hence lead to increased efficiency. 
Supporting evidence for this was the high yields on private plots, which consistently 
exceeded the yields of state and collective farms. 
Accordingly, the Kazakstani government has framed rural development primarily in terms of 
market transformation of the agricultural sector. Agriculture refortri has covered a number of 
different areas, including: land reform and farm restructuring; restructuring of supply, 
processing, marketing and distribution systems; restructuring of rural financial institutions; 
136 and restructuring of public administration in agriculture . My own field research and 
a nalysis focused primarily on the restructuring of state and collective farms into private 
enterprises, particularly the redistribution of land and other assets. . 
Description of the Farm Privalisation Process 
In 1991, the 2120 state farms (sovkho2y), formed either during the Virgin Lands Campaign 
(1954-1960) or during the consolidation and iff igation projects of the 1960s, were the main 
farm structure in Kazakstan, together with around 430 collective farms (kolkhozy). The 
USSR law on Peasant Farms, adopted in 1990, already permitted those who so desired to 
take land and farm individually. In 1992, the new Kazakstani Government initiated a broader 
land reform and farm privatisation programme, under which the former structures would 
reorganise into new agricultural enterprises, either cooperative farms, joint stock companies 
or individual 'peasant' farms (krestyanskie khozyaistva). The government farm privatisation 
and restructuring programme focused mainly on state farms, although some collective farms 
were also re-structured and some state farms, mainly those with a research or educational 
role, were not to be privatised (ADB, 1996b: 25; Coulter, 1996: 4). By 1996, the farm 
privatisation process was held to be almost complete. In April of that year roughly 93% of 
the state farms had been re-registered as private entities (Gaynor, 1996). However, these 
quantitative indicators hid a much more complex picture. 
At macro level, legislation on land reform and farm restructuring had evolved through 
various stages to reflect changing goals and policies. Reports on the agricultural sector 
135 For a contrasting analysis in Uzbekistan, see Deniz Kandiyoti, Agrarian Reform, Gender and Land 
Rights in Uzbekistan, UNRISD, Geneva, 2002. 
136 For a (primarily technical) analysis of reforms across the whole sector, see for example World 
Bank (1994); ADB (1996b). A detailed analysis of the privatisation of distribution systems can be 
found in a series of reports conducted for USAID by the Carana Corporation in 1995. 
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commissioned by the Asian Development Bank state that no less than 20 significant pieces 
of legislation were published over the period from 1991-1995 and conclude that the 
legislative framework had 'evolved piecemeal rather than as a crafted design with a foreseen 
outcome! (ADB, 1996b: 25) 137. This led to a general state of confusion and flux with regard 
to basic conceptions such as land ownership and the legal status of the new enterprises. At 
local level, this 'fuzziness' translated into particular areas of concern"'. First, under the new 
Land Code, agricultural land was still defined as state property that could be held under 
temporary or permanent use rights. The Land Code also'contained a long list of reasons wily 
an individual could be deprived of land rights previously granted', including non payment of 
the land tax, using land for non-agricultural purposes or letting land lie fallow for three years 
(ADB, 1996b: 15). Moreover, it was local administrations which ruled on these issues. in 
these conditions, although state farm members were entitled to withdraw a share of land, 
many were anxious - and with reason - about the stability of their rights. 
In addition, the process by which legislation was to be implemented in practice was not 
clearly defined. Crucially, there was no standard model of farrn restructuring to serve as a 
basis for a comprehensive national restructuring program'". Both government and outside 
consultants recognised that rural privatisation had been an ad hoc process, with considerable 
latitude given to local authorities and individual farm directors in shaping reform. Again, at 
local level, this fluidity translated into particular concerns. Local power relations played a 
major role in determining how state farms restructured and who benefited. Geographical 
location and farming systems were also a key factor in shaping community strategies. The 
approach adopted in areas of steppe pastureland, where the main agricultural activity was 
semi-transhumant herding, or in areas of semi-arid cultivation, differed considerably from 
the strategies in areas of fertile, agricultural land. In the first, the main concern was not the 
division of land, but the redistribution of livestock and/or assets, although in some places 
people were reverting to pre-Soviet land claims through family lineages. In the second, the 
higher population density and relative scarcity of irrigated land, made land claims an 
explosive and divisive issue. With no standard, state-wide model of farm privatisation, local 
authorities and rural communities were largely responsible for deciding how to conduct the 
restructuring process"O. Nevertheless, privatisation was mandated from above and local 
strategies were influenced by the changing macro-level policy environment. Analyses 
produced for western donor agencies identified three broad phases in rural reform between 
137 A selected list of the key legislation governing land reform and farm privatisation is appended. See 
also Arkhipov (1997) for a detailed local source. 
139 The term 'fuzziness' was first used in a similar context by Verdery (1999) 'Fuzzy Property: Rights, 
Power and Identity in Transylvania's Decollectivization. 
139 The ACDI/Koch project described above represented one attempt to produce a replicable 
privatisation model for the dairy sector in Kazakstan. Although it had the backing of the oblast 
authorities, it was not pursued further. Contrastingly, in the Russian Federation, a model restructuring 
program was piloted in Nizhni Novgorod province, with international donor support, in 1993. See 
Wegren (1994). 
140 Although some issues will be touched upon, a detailed discussion of the relationship between 
central and local government and the latter's influence on the shaping of reform falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. Research in Russia and Uzbekistan has flagged the key role of local authorities, who are 
most closely involved in the day-to-day management of economic and agricultural policy, as well as 
the importance of the power and attitude of individual local officials (Perrotta, 1995: 6; Mearns, 1996: 
13). 
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1991 and 1996, marked by increasing attempts on the part of the government to shape the 
privatisation process (World Bank, 1994: 37-39; ADB, 1996b: 25-26) 141 . 
Phase 1: 1990-1992 
Under the 1990 USSR Law on Peasant Farms, those wishing to become private farmers were 
already entitled to leave state farms and create peasant (family) farms. This opportunity was 
consolidated after independence, in the Land Reform Law of 1991. At this stage, the process 
was governed entirely by local administrations and no particular limitations were set on land 
or asset quotas for independent farmers. This legislation was later criticised for tending to 
favour the established hierarchy, by providing an opportunity for more powerful individuals 
or cliques to 'grab' resources. The 1991 law also initiated the wider reorganisation of state 
farms into new private entities. The most common path for privatisation was a nominal 
change of ownership of state farms into cooperatives or joint stock companies, with no 
fundamental change in the property rights of workers or in management and organisation. 
Phase 2: 1992 - 1994 
In 1992, legislation was enacted to speed up the privatisation process and to develop a 
common - and more equitable - approach to the transfer of ownership. The key policy goal 
was to distribute land and asset shares to state farm employees, which they could then use to 
either form individual ( family) farms, contribute to the capital stock of a joint stock 
company, co-operative or collective enterprise or sell or exchange with other shareholders. 
Every state farm worker was to be allotted the rights to an identifiable piece of land on the 
basis of a life-time, inheritable lease. 
This reformed privatisation model involved the following steps: 
prior to privatisation, the State Committee for Privatisation. assessed the value of the 
farm property, 
, 
taking into account debt, inflation and depreciation and established a 
standard 'property share' (imushchestvennyipai) for each member of the farm; 
similarly, a'standard 'land share' (zemel'nyi pai) for each farm member was 
determined based on the total area of the farm and the number of farm members, 
taking into consideration land quality; 
farm management conducted an informal consultative process to try to establish a 
consensus on the structure of the new farming entity, and the allocation of property 
and land shares; 
a general meeting was held at which farm workers formally adopted the new form of 
farming entity, signed a foundation agreement, established bylaws, approved the 
allocation of land and property shares and elected a farm manager; 
141 See the appendix on legislation on agrarian refonn and farin restructuring. 
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whatever farm structure was chosen, workers wishing to leave the farm and form 
independent or smaller fanning units had the legal right to redeem their land share 
certificates for demarcated land plots (Gaynor, 1996: 2). 
Phase 3: 1994 - 
By 1994, when it was clear that most former state farms were still merely undergoing a 
change of name and economically viable new farms were not being created, further 
legislation was introduced to encourage farm directors to cooperate in the privatisation 
process and to provide incentives to increase farm production. Under this new legislation, 
subject to the approval of the farm workers, farm directors who had held their post for more 
than 20 years could be allocated 10% of the farm's land, as well as temporary use of another 
10% that could be converted into permanent use rights if farm production improved 
significantly over 5 years. 
Although my research focused primarily on the ways this redistribution process was 
implemented and experienced in local communities, aspects of the wider processes of 
agriculture sector reform also had a significant impact on local decisions and are germane to 
the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Description ofthe privatisation process in farms' wider environment 
As well as the radical changes taking place within individual farms, the wider environment in 
which they were situated was also changing. Under the old command economy system, both 
production and marketing were controlled by state structures. A network of state enterprises 
provided agricultural inputs, equipment and maintenance and repair services. Marketing, 
processing and distribution took place through another network of state-owned enterprises 
such as grain elevators, flour and feed mills, slaughter houses, daily processing plants, 
vegetable storage warehouses, canning and bottling factories and stores. At the centre of the 
system were state orders through which commodities were procured to supply state stores, 
public institutions and the military, to meet requirements of deficit producing oblasts and 
fulfil trade agreements. Only limited supplies went through alternative cooperative or private 
farm markets. Quantities to be procured were determined at national level and allocated 
between regions and farms on the basis of long-standing production plans. Local 
administrators played a key role in approving farm production plans and allocating state 
order quotas. Without the approval of local authorities, local farm managers had little leeway 
to change cropping patterns or use alternative market channels (World Bank, 1994: ii, 11)142. 
142 The information in this section comes primarily from two detailed reports published, respectively 
by the World Bank (Kazakhstan Agricultural Sector Review, December 12,1994, Agriculture, 
Industry and Finance Division, Country Department 111, Europe and Central Asia Region, Report No. 
3334-KZ) and the Asian Development Bank (Strengthening the Implementation of Agriculture Sector 
Reforms, TA No. 2356, Final Report, Volume 1: Main Report, September 1996). More detailed, 
primarily technical analysis of the privatisation of distribution and marketing systems can also be 
found in a series of reports conducted for USAID by the Carana Corporation in 1995. 
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Following independence, two key changes were made to this integrated system: first, 
concerted moves to privatise the entire inputs, processing and marketing system and second, 
reform and finally abolition of the entire system of state orders. 
Like farm restructuring, the privatisation of agricultural processing, marketing, storage and 
input supply firms took place in different stages. Initially, in 1993, the various state agencies 
were incorporated as state joint stock companies; then, towards the end of 1994 and 
beginning of 1995, these state companies were reorganised into non-state, independent joint 
stock companies. However, as for farm restructuring, the regulatory framework emerged 
piecemeal and the privatisation process was 'haphazard, inadequate and at best, grossly 
mismanaged' (Haghaycghi, 1996: 17). Similarly, like farm restructuring, the privatisation of 
these firms took place on a completely separate track from industrial privatisation, one key 
feature being that it was a closed process, with shares limited to employees, suppliers and 
the state. Controlling shareholdings often continued to be held by oblast or rayon 
administrations, who were also often behind the creation of new private supply and 
marketing firms. In 1994, the World Bank concluded that, at local level, things took place 
much as they had before: "The emerging marketing channels resemble the previous vertical 
ones andmany of the structures and people from the old state ( ... ) organisations are still 
in 
place and functioning as they always have. " (World Bank, 1994: ii). In particular, Rayon 
(district) administrations appeared to have considerable power over the four most significant 
aspects of agricultural operations: water, electricity, storage and processing (Haghayeghi, 
1996: 17). 
Between 1995 and 1998, the situation gradually evolved, as more independent private 
processing and marketing firms were created and a layer of private traders and middlemen 
emerged. - However, the different types of farm were located in different positions. One key 
difference was between the new small independent private farms, which were able - or 
obliged - to rely on the emerging private supply and marketing sector, and the large joint 
sI tock company farms which tended to be locked into a more regulated structures. For 
example, in the meat and dairy sector, it was already reported in 1994 that the old supply and 
distribution structures were collapsing or being bypassed. The large former state farms 
already accounted for less than 10% of production, whereas 90% of meat and 92% of milk 
were produced by non-state farms and private plots and 78% of meat and 95% of milk were 
-processed and delivered to market by private wholesalers and retailers (Carana Corporation, 
1995). In contrast, by 1996, the proportion of grain marketed through private trading 
channels represented only around 5% (ADB, 1996: 63). The key factor in the meat and dairy 
sector was the emergence of small-scale players and intermediaries, who made concerted 
efforts to bypass the old structures (Carana Corporation, 1995). On the other hand, in both 
sectors, oblast officials often tended to force the remaining large farms to sell to the old 
process ing/storage facilities. In the grain sector, in particular, large farms predominated and 
Oblasts and Rayons retained far greater control over production, processing and marketing. 
Here, large farms initially reaped the advantages of 'insider' relations with local 
administrations, which often gave them preferential treatment with respect to procurement of 
inputs and eventual sale of crops (Haghayeghi, 1996). However, as the state procurement 
system disintegrated and terms of trade changed, the large farms were put into an 
increasingly untenable position. 
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Quantities earmarked for'state orders'- renamed 'state needs' in 1993 -were reduced 
gradually. In 1994 they represented only 40% of 1990 levels. However, the amounts 
involved were still significant, particularly for grain. 
Table 4. lState Procurement ofAgricultural Products, 1980-1995 
In percent of total production 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 1995 
GrN 60.8 61.0 52.0 28.8 44.1 32.0 25.4 8.5 
Seedcotton 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 97.6 99.0 99.0 -- 
_ Sugar beets 94.2 93.0 91.2 84.9 34.6 27.7 
. 
0.2 
Sunflower seeds 72.0 64.5 1 78.0 49.1 1 37.7 1.9 0.2 
Potatoes 28.4 29.2 1 24.6 16.8 1 10.3 6.0 1 2.7 
Fruits and berries 39.7 51.1 39.2 7.0 55.1 21.3 113.0 
Vegetables 68.8 74.0 59.5 47.5 31.4 19.4 110.5 
Livestock and poultry 121.0 113.3 120.8 101.8 72.9 60.4 39.3 
Milk and dairy products 50.3 55.8 58.4 52.7 40.5 37.1 27.2 
E gs 57.3 159.5 161.5 57.8 146.6 46.4 38.3 
Wool 152.1 154.4 130.4 156.7 144.1 138.9 6.3 1 
Goskornstat figures 
The new private farms (krestyanskie khozyaistva) were not subject to procurement quotas 143. 
However, the state procurement system had a direct impact on the strategies of the large 
grain producing farms, which were obliged to fulfil certain quotas. Notionally, the large 
farms could freely market the remaining grain outside state needs requirements. However, in 
practice, they often needed to contract their crop to the oblast or rayon administration in 
exchange for input financing and in return were obliged by the administration to market their 
output under their instructions. Officially, barter agreements with local industry (exchanging 
meat or grain for coal, construction materials or consumer goods to pay farm staff) could 
also only be undertaken with the approval of the oblast administration. Even following the 
abolition of the state needs system in 1995, oblast administrations were held responsible for 
ensuring basic food supplies and continued to interfere in the activities of agricultural 
producers/traders, particularly in the grain sector (ADB, 1996: 60). 
Large farms were caught in particularly negative terms of trade. Prices paid by the state were 
considerably below world market prices and also delays of two, four or even six months 
were common, in conditions of rampant inflation. On the other hand, input prices were 
amongst the first to be liberalised, with price controls removed on farm equipment and 
critical inputs, such as fertiliser, pesticides and veterinary supplies and substantial increases 
in the price of petrol, diesel and electricity. Direct subsidy prices to farmers were also 
sharply curtailed, from a peak of 10 to 12 % of GDP prior to independence to 2 to 3% of 
GDP in 1993. In 1994, the only remaining direct subsidy was for animal feed. 
Large former state farms were therefore caught in a cycle of deteriorating conditions. In 
1995, almost 80 percent of the large scale farms were reporting losses. As the Carana 
143 In contrast, in Uzbekistan, the state procurement system in agriculture was maintained and both the 
new farmers and the collective enterprises were bound by the same procurement obligations. See, for 
example, the analysis in Kandiyoti, 2002. 
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Corporation reported to USAID: 'Many state farms seemed trapped in a destructive cycle. As 
a result of serious cash-flow problems most sovkhozes have not paid cash wages in many 
months. Workers are thus paid either with animals or in free feed which they use to fatten 
their own animals. The workers then sell this low cost (as they perceive it) meat through the 
bazaar at a lower price than the state enterprises, making it extremely difficult for the state 
enterprises to sell their own production profitably on the open market. The state farm's cash 
flow thus becomes even worse, and the worse the state farm's cash problems become, the 
more they are forced to pay their workers in kind and workers are forced to sell meat at any 
price just to get cash. As a result, state enterprises are indirectly cutting their own throats by 
essentially strengthening their main competitors. The cycle is likely to continue until the 
state enterprises are completely bankrupf (1995: 16). 
Gender implications of the economisticframing ofrural development 
The outcome of privatisation reforms in the agriculture sector was of keen interest to the 
international agencies during the period I conducted fieldwork. This policy analysis largely 
prioritised its economic aspects. When I began my research, the focus of debate remained 
which size of farm and model of restructuring could provide optimal economic and technical 
efficiency. Whilst some analysts considered that the flagship of reform should be the creation 
of small family farms, others argued that this would lead to the excessive fragmentation of 
agricultural land and that such farms would be too small to be commercially viable (Davis, 
1996; Parker et al, 1996; Uzun, 1996). Likewise, I found that this economic and technical 
focus was being translated on the ground in the types of development projects being 
implemented by international organisations in rural areas of Kazakstan. In 1996, neither the 
Kazakstani government nor the donor organisations were conducting holistic or 
comprehensive rural development programmes. The latter were concentrating on piecemeal 
projects in particular sectors, notably macro level policy analysis and recommendations, 
loans and financing (including credit for small and medium enterprises), technical assistance 
(improvement of productivity and yields) and, on a lesser scale, support for civil society, 
notably farmer associationS144. 
In terms of donor support for rural privatisation, a number of projects were concerned with 
privatisation of agro-industry, others were providing support to the new private fan-ners, but 
few were focusing on the farm restructuring process itseIV45. In 1996,1 found only two 
projects, with rather different orientations, which could be said to bridge the paradigm 
change I referred to in Chapter 3. The first, ultimately aborted, USAID-sponsored project to 
privatise a number of dairy farms in Almaty Oblast pointed backwards to the technocratic 
approach to reform I have just described 146 . The project had been planned purely in terms of 
the economic efficiency gains that could be made by splitting off the potentially profitable 
dairy sections of bigger farms. Equity and transparency were important aims of the project, 
144 in a report for the NGO INTRAC, Sinclair (1996) also highlights that the global interest of donor 
community and INGO collaborators in credit for small to medium enterprises\farmer associations as a 
developmental tool was reflected in Kazakstan and'seemed to be the only approach currently under 
use and consideration for rural economic development'. 
143 in contrast, for example, with Russia, where organisations such as Winrock International were 
supporting farm restructuring. 
116 Koch dairy modernization project, Chilik Raion, Almaty Oblast (ACDI, 1995). 
121 
which sought to inform the farm communities about privatisation and enlist their support for 
the initiative. However, no social or gender impact study had been planned and, although tile 
project manager acknowledged that splitting a previously united community might create 
conflict between those included and excluded from the new enterprises and that tile fate of 
the social services previously provided to the community as a whole had not been resolved, 
he concluded that they were'not out there to deal with this side of things'. Tile project's draft 
privatisation plan confirmed that the restructuring of the social services was outside the 
project's remit, since 'until there exists an infrastructure of thriving small and medium-sized 
enterprises that can be taxed by local and federal governments, there will be no money 
available to support a social services network' (ACDI, 1995: 13). In contrast, one pilot 
project, for EU TACIS, was conducting social analysis of restructuring farms, looking at tile 
broader effects of the process on the social as well as the productive sector. Their analysis 
had concluded that privatisation had differential effects on the farm population, according to 
status, ethnicity and age, and was not gender neutral, especially in view of women's 
relationship to the social sphere and the gender stratification of production (Dale, 1996). 
11. Social and cultural issues in farm restructuring 
This latter analysis reflects emerging critiques of the purely technocratic approach to 
agricultural reform in post-socialist countries, which point to the importance of cultural and 
social issues in understanding and aiding rural reform. In Russia, the reluctance of many 
rural communities to split up into private farms, which was widely perceived as resistance to 
reform, has led a number of analysts to examine the rural privatisation process at micro level. 
They conclude that it is vital to understand the diverging interests and attitudes both between 
and within rural communities in order to understand why rural privatisation is taking its 
current trajectory (Brooks, et al, 1996; Brustinow, 1995; Channon, 1995, Perrotta, 1995, 
1996). Again in Russia, other analyses highlight that, even in cases where there seems to 
have been relative success in creating new rural institutions, it is important to understand the 
cultural continuities, in terms of attitudes and behaviours, which underlie them (Wegrcn, 
1994: 216-218; Hivon, 1995). For Central Asia, in particular, several analysts critique tile 
current land reform and farm restructuring model for its focus on stark choices between state, 
private and collective ownership, which do not take account of the very different ownership 
traditions in pastoral economies (Mearns, 1996; Sneath, 1996). 
By 1996, in line with the 'paradigm shift' described in the previous chapter, some of the 
western agencies operating in Kazakstan had also begun to address the social and cultural 
implications of farm privatisation. Research commissioned for the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB, 1996b) concluded that farm privatisation was entering a second stage - tile 
establishment of profitable farming units - and that this involved considerable social costs. 
The report called for the development of a clear farm restructuring strategy, which would 
require analysis of the perceptions and attitudes of farm employees and former employees. 
However, I found that, unlike in Russia, apart from the TACIS project mentioned above and 
pilot research conducted by a Western anthropologist in the south of the country (Wcmcr, 
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1994) little micro-level research had actually been conducted, 47 . Likewise, with the 
exception of the TACIS project mentioned above, there had been no farm-level gender 
analyses of rural privatisation 149 . Some research on women's participation in agrarian reform 
had, however, been conducted in other post-socialist countries. These provided a 
comparative context for framing my field research. 
Gender issues in farm restructuring 
The framing of rural development as privatisation raised two gendered issues: first, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it seemed that a range of 'development! issues directly 
affecting women, in terms of health, education, well-being or empowerment, were excluded 
due to the definition and objectives of current rural reform policy; second, as exemplified by 
the USAID project described above, the process of rural privatisation was cast primarily in 
terms of increasing the efficiency of the productive sector, which resulted in a lack of 
attention to the other, equally significant processes involved in decollectivisation. In fact, 
rural privatisation involved a separation of production and social services that were 
previously all 'public'. A state or collective farm was notjust an economic unit of production, 
but what has been called a 'total social institution', which provided members with a status 
and identity, determined civil rights and duties and served as a social institution of 
production, exchange, consumption and culture (Humphrey, 1995: 7). State and collective 
farms were responsible for a broad range of services generally provided by various different 
institutions in other societies, such as electricity, heating, water, housing and transport, 
schools, kindergartens and hospitals, clubs, libraries and sporting facilities. In the 
privatisation model, these assets were perceived to be a major brake on economic efficiency, 
and were to be divested to local authorities or private enterprises. This was an inherently 
gendered process, since women stood in a particular relationship to these public goods. 
Firstly, far more women than men were employed in the social sphere, as teachers, doctors 
and so on and secondly, women were the primary users of these services, many of which 
had been specifically introduced to help them combine productive with reproductive labour 
and had been seen as evidence of the emancipation of rural women from their previous life 
of drudgery (Vasil'eva, 1975). Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 1, rural 
privatisation therefore involved a fundamental shift in public and domestic domains, that was 
not gender neutral. In Russia, research indicated that, since women had formed the majority 
"' In 1997, the ADB commissioned its own socio-economic survey of rural Kazakstan to assess the 
social and economic impact of agricultural reform (ADB TA No. 2448). It questioned 3,300 
respondents from six former sovkhozy and six former kolkhozy in 15 of the Republic's 19 oblasts, 
regarding their experiences between 1991 and 1996, looking at land share distribution, new farm 
structures, perceptions of restructuring, changes in benefits and services, household membership, and 
food consumption. Unfortunately, the data was not disaggregated by gender. For example, the focus 
was on interviewing owners of the smaller private enterprises, addressed throughout as though farmers 
are men. Therefore, although the survey draws interesting distinctions between subsidiary and private 
farms, it is not possible to see whether there is a gender distinction in ownership. I's important research which has been conducted in Central Asia since the end of my fieldwork 
includes Koopman' s study for BASISIUSAID on Gender Issues in Farm Restructuring in Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan (1998); Kudat, Peabody and Keylar's study for the World Bank on Social Assessment 
and Agricultural Reform in Central Asia and Turkey (2000) and Kandiyoti's study for UNRISD on 
Agrarian Reform, Gender and Land Rights in Uzbekistan. 
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of workers in rural services, they now made up most of the newly unemployed and that 
women with young children had also been prime targets for redundancy (Bridger, 1997: 46). 
Secondly, as discussed in Chapter 2, state and collective farms did not only comprise a 
public sector of socialised labour, but also the sector of individual households, with their 
various income-generating strategies, notably their production from household plots or 
livestock. Again, the privatisation framework had only considered this sector in so far as it 
might serve as a blueprint for increased efficiency of the new independent private fanns. 
However, looking back to the discussion in Chapters I and 2, given other experiences of 
capitalist modernisation of agriculture and the importance of this domain in local practices 
and identities, the relationship between subsistence farming and market-oriented agriculture 
was likely to be an important one. Given the experiences of capitalist penetration of 
agriculture elsewhere, one possible outcome was that women and men would be channelled 
respectively into 'subsistence' and 'commercial' agriculture. In Russia, research had found 
that one of the outcomes of market reform in the countryside had been a growing reliance on 
subsidiary farming for household survival and, given that the bulk of labour for household 
production was female labour, a concomitant increase in women's burden of work (Perrotta, 
1995a). On the other hand, in Estonia, it seemed that the refocusing on the domestic world of 
the family farm had 'diluted rather than increased the difference between male and female 
burdens', with men and women operating together as a team (Abrahams, 1994: 225). 
Another set of gender issues concerned the changing pattern of property rights and 
entitlements brought about by agrarian reform. It has already been demonstrated that 
different models of agrarian reform have different impacts on gender relations (Palmer, 
1985; Jacobs, 1996). Important variables include the extent to which the model of reform 
takes account of women's separate rights in land, both de jure and de facto, the extent to 
which patterns of household labour and land use and the social wage are considered, facility 
of access to resources and credit and the importance of women's organisations (Palmer, 
1985). Comparative research on different models of agrarian reform has suggested that, even 
where one of the aims of reform has been to share land more equitably between individuals, 
concerns for equality have seldom recognised women's interests, which are often subsumed 
under those of the household or family. Land is commonly assigned to the (male) household 
head, in which case kinship systems play a significant role in determining the outcome of 
land reform. Women may either lose rights or their rights may be largely unaltered - 
however, patrilineal and patrilocal kinship and residence systems, such as those in rural 
Kazak society, have often restricted the possibility of female autonomy (Jacobs, 1996: 36). 
One key issue in the Kazakstani context was therefore how land and property shares had 
been calculated and allocated during the restructuring process. In a collective or state farm, 
women were registered individually as members of the collective and their labour was 
visible, individually remunerated and a source of economic independence (Croll, 1981: 362). 
Therefore, to the extent that agrarian reform had been concerned to share land and assets 
amongst the farm membership, women and men both stood to benefit. However, the gender 
division and stratification of labour across the public and private domains on state and 
collective farms was also likely to influence the outcome of land reform and farm 
restructuring. During the late Soviet period, research suggested that, although women made 
up a substantial proportion of the collective agricultural work force, their parallel roles in 
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subsidiary farming and childcare meant that they tended to perform a lower number of labour 
days than men. In addition, women tended to be concentrated in the lower-skilled and lower 
paid jobs (Croll, 1981; Lubin, 1984; Allot, 1985; Bridger, 1987). Consequently, both 
women's labour input and annual earnings from the socialised sector tended to be lower than 
men's and, to the extent that mechanisms for allocating land and property were based on 
149 these factors, women might be disadvantaged . On the other hand, other Soviet-era studies 
suggested that in some female-dominated areas such as dairy work, it was possible for 
women to earn relatively high pay in the form of bonuses for fulfilling production plans 
(Humphrey, 1998: 260) and that rural women were often less mobile than men, who were 
more inclined to move from one job to another (Hivon, 1995: 87). Some categories of 
women might therefore have benefited over others and over some groups of men in the 
calculation of entitlements and division of land and property. 
Another gendered issue was how entitlements, contributions and rewards were being defined 
and registered in the new enterprises. Even if both women and men had both become 
shareholders and were therefore in a position to contribute to the new enterprises, the value 
of their shares and their weight in decision-making might be very different. Research in other 
post-socialist states suggested a number of issues that could be important in the Kazakstani 
context. One key distinction was likely to be between the communities or groups which had 
opted to 'stay together' in a new form of collective enterprise (cooperatives or joint stock 
companies) and those who had opted to become independent private farmers (Hivon, 1995b, 
Kancff, 1995, Perrotta, 1996). In the former, those with a higher number of shares could 
expect higher benefits. Further, the emphasis on market values of profitability and efficiency 
Caroline Humphrey (1998: 534) gives a useful breakdown of wages for different occupations on 
collective farms: 
Payfor one man-day ofvarious groups ofworkers in collectivefarms of the Tatar ASSR between 1966 
and 1976 
1966 1976 









Chairman 7.51 414.9 9.45 308.8 
Chief specialists 5.61 300.0 6.71 219.3 
Agronomists (lesser) 5.21 287.9 5.00 163.4 
Zoo technicians (lesser) 4.90 270.7 4.93 161.1 
Veterinarians 2.51 138.7 3.60 117.6 
Engineer/technician 4.32 238.7 4.70 153.6 
Brigadiers 3.43 190.0 4.67 152.6 
Heads offiermy 2.95 163.0 4.25 139.0 
Tractor drivers/ 4.02 220.0 5.56 181.7 
combine operators 
Drivers 3.35 185.7 4.70 153.6 
Milkmaids 2.41 133.2 3.98 130.0 
Stockmen/shepherds 2.39 132.0 3.86 126.1 
Pigmen 2.55 140.3 3.90 124.2 
Manual workers 1.81 100.0 3.06 100.0 
Source V. V. Dyukov, Osnovnyye napravleniya sovershensNovaniya raspredeleniyapo trudu v 
kolkhozakh (Basic directions in the improvement of wage distribution in collective farms), lzd 
Kazansk, Universiteta Kazan, 1979, p. 88. 
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was likely to lead to a reduction in the workforce, with a distinction between sharcholdcrs 
and those actually employed by the new enterprise. According to research conducted for 
ADB, the relative balance would depend on the type of fanning system. The impact was 
likely to be particularly severe in the mechanised grain producing regions, where the existing 
land : man ratio was 25-30 hectares per person, whereas an economic ratio was closer to 300 
hectares per person. In other words, given an average land share of 25 hectares, it would 
require 120 people to form a 3,000 ha farm, but only 15 would be employed initially and 
eventually only 10. The final report concludes that farm privatisation 'created a situation 
whereby farm employee/dependants face the highly unpalatable decision of voting 80-90% 
of themselves out of a job in the interests of creating sound economic farming units' (ADB, 
1996b: 32). 
In view of the existing gender division of agricultural labour, divestiture of social services 
and women's reproductive responsibilities, women could be particularly vulnerable to 
unemployment. 
On the other hand, the 'flagship' end-goal of rural reform, the creation of independent family 
farms, also had specific gender implications. As Hivon (1995a: 78) points out, this form of 
restructuring represents a shift from a collective to a household form of ownership and 
agricultural production and to analyse it purely in terins of economic efficiency is to miss the 
particular impact on women of the division of labour and power within the household. On 
state and collective farms, both women and men were registered as individual members with 
individual entitlements, but this was not necessarily the case in the new family enterprises. it 
was likely that women's and men's roles and positions were being shaped by cultural norms 
and power relations within the household or wider kin group. Important questions included 
how women's and men's land and asset shares were being officially registered and how their 
respective labour contributions were being assessed and rewarded. In addition, given that one 
of the key objectives of rural reform was to unleash individual entrepreneurship, another 
question was how women and men were contributing to the new independent farms and 
particularly whether both were becoming private farmers in their own right. One of the 
striking findings of my research with representatives of government and donor organisations 
was the widespread assumption that women were not - or could not become - farmers in this 
sense of owning and managing enterprises in their own name, the few known exceptions 
proving the rule, although neither authority was collecting gender-disaggregated data on 
farm ownership. 
Research in Russia and Estonia pointed both to the determining role being played by women 
in the new private farms and to the relatively low number of women officially registered as 
farm heads (Abrahams, 1994; Hivon, 1995a; Bridger, 1997). It suggested that men's and 
women's roles were being shaped both by practical economic factors, such as where 
individuals could contribute most effectively to household income-generating strategies, and 
by gender ideology and the gender division of labour. One interesting feature of these studies 
was their contrasting findings with regard to women's involvement in the new enterprises. 
On the one hand, Sue Bridger's (1997) analysis highlighted the ways in which former 
patterns of male and female labour on collective farins, reinforced by media images and 
official attitudes which cast private farming in terms of male farmers assisted by wives and 
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family, were making women subordinate workers in the family farms. On the other hand, 
whilst commenting on women's relative under-representation amongst private farm heads, 
both Myriam Hivon (I 995a) and Ray Abrahams (1994) emphasised women's key roles in the 
creation and operation of family farms. The studies also raised questions about how pre- 
Soviet and Soviet practices and identities were shaping men's and women's roles in the new 
enterprises, and how far the new enterprises were changing existing patterns of work and 
values. Whilst the first two emphasised the relative stability of local gender ideology and 
basic patterns of gender relations, Abrahams found that the nature of both male and female 
labour was being redefined in the shift from state to family farming, and that existing 
divisions between men's and women's work and the values attached to them were blurring in 
the new conditions. However, he also suggested that pre-Soviet practices and identities in 
Estonia - in general a strong tradition of family fanning and in the case of the maritime 
communities he studied, a farming system that affirmed women's independence - had also 
influenced this outcome. These studies therefore highlighted that the gendered outcomes of 
agrarian reform in post-socialist countries were shaped by and needed to be addressed in the 
context of local farming systems and gender ideologies. 
Setting gender issues in a community context 
I have argued that one of the limitations of the 'transition' model of rural development is its 
failure to address change in the context of whole communities. A similar critique can be 
levelled at many feminist critiques of transition, which have not placed gender issues in this 
wider context. In this context several issues were important in analysing the process and 
outcome of farm restructuring. Whilst agrarian reform may have a negative impact on 
women's entitlement, it may also widen the gaps between different sectors of communities 
and, in that gender is also entangled with age, class, ethnic and other factors, between 
different groups of women as well as between women and men. 
First, existing patterns of stratification of the farm population during the Soviet period, 
including those of social status, ethnicity and age, were likely to interrelate with gender in 
creating new patterns of inclusion and exclusion. Across central and eastern Europe research 
had found that those who were already involved in market-oriented private farming or had 
specialist skills, and those who already held powerful positions in the farm or local hierarchy 
had benefited most and that there was a growing gap between this social group and others 
who had lost their security and status or had been forced into subsistence activities for 
survival (Kovach, 1994: 379). This had also been identified as a problematic issue in 
Kazakstan's agrarian reform, where it appeared that local elites had often 'grabbed' and 
consolidated control over resources (ADB, 1996b: 32; ADB, 1997: ii., 63; Hagayeghi, 
150 1996) . In this instance, women's 
lower representation in skilled work and positions of 
power in the farm hierarchy could lead to them being relatively disadvantaged. On the other 
hand, some categories of women could be among the beneficiaries, either as a result of their 
own positions or through informal family or kin connections. Similarly, the question of who 
had had access to what information and how was also important. 
150 For a more detailed account of local experiences, see for example, 'Na puti k agramomu rynku: Pai 
-u baev, krest'yane - na podbor'e' in Aziya - Ekonomika i Zhizn'No. 19 (147). 
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Second, referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2, research in other post-socialist 
illustrated that local understandings of work, concepts of identity and relations to tile state 
formulated during the socialist period had informed and directed responses, both moral and 
pragmatic, to the post-socialist economy (Pine, 1995: 53). The questions of who was taking 
up entrepreneurial opportunities and more broadly, how the emergence of tile market and 
withdrawal of the state was perceived, were likely to be influenced by the communities' 
degree of incorporation into the state and local kinship, gender and community organisation. 
Equally, if rural reform was creating a dichotomy between new commercial and 'subsistence, 
domains, the way this shift was gendered and the way it was perceived in different 
communities was likely to be influenced by local understandings of state, market and 
domestic domains. 
The core of the next chapter is a case-study of the farm privatisation process in my two 
research communities, together with additional material from shorter visits to a number of 
other farms. By investigating the various stages of privatisation - redistribution of land and 
assets and the formation and operation of new enterprises - from the grassroots level, it has 
been possible to explore how the process has been embedded in or intertwined with social 
and cultural, including gender, issues. 
The discussion focuses on two aspects: 
In Chapter 5, taking a narrow definition of privatisation as the policy of redistribution of the 
land and assets of state farms, I discuss the significance of gender in this process, looking at 
i) the extent to which existing gender disparities affected the shaping and outcome of 
redistribution and enterprise formation; ii) the extent to which the privatisation reform itself 
produced new gender disparities and iii) how the different examples of redistribution and 
reorganisation compare in this regard. 
In Chapter 6,1 discuss how far this 'narrow' privatisation framework is sufficient to 
encompass or explain the changes taking place in people's lives and communities. By 
looking in detail at one example from my fieldwork, I show that, to understand the nature of 
the new private enterprises emerging in Kazakstan, we need to look beyond the model of 
economic efficiency and individual entrepreneurship being propagated at macro level. In 
particular, this model fails to capture the specific ways in which the introduction of tile 
market is intertwined with public (state) and private (kin, domestic) spheres in Kazakstan. 
With respect to gender relations, it obscures the further transition by which women are being 
'privatised' in the sense of being relocated in the domestic sphere. It also makes invisible 
women's roles in the new private and domestic sphere, both in terms of their contribution to 
the domestic economy and their role in market activities, both of which are central to the new 
enterprises' functioning and survival. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A View from the Grassroots - Experiences and Perceptions of 
Farm Restructuring in Three Rural Communities 
'What do we have in our hands? Two cow tails and our subsidiaryfarm. What does the 
Directorhave?. The whole sovkhoz. Now talk about opportunitiesfor getting rich! ' (Woman 
respondent, Lenin sovkhoz, September 1997) 
This chapter takes a narrow definition of privatisation as the policy of redistribution of the 
land and assets of state farms. Using material from my fieldwork communities, it explores 
the significance of gender in this process. 
As I flagged in Chapter 1, in the agricultural sector, the 'transition! to market economy had 
led to a crisis of mounting losses and declining output and productivity (ADB, 1996b: 4-6; 
Haghayeghi, 1996; World Bank, 1994). According to the 'transition' model, the key to 
improving performance was to accelerate the 'transition' through more rapid pricing, trade, 
marketing and agrarian reform and targeted help for the more vulnerable groups (World 
Bank, 1994: 10). However, at local level, the loss of the entitlements provided by state farms 
and their replacement bytargeted' benefits was widely perceived as immoral or unjust. Many 
rural people, or communities as a whole, experienced restructuring primarily as a move into 
the vulnerability of unemployment, poverty and exclusion. It was against this background 
that I began my field research in rural communities to investigate how far the 'transition' 
model captured the processes taking place at local level and the gender impact of farm 
restructuring. 
My field research can be seen as a series of 'snapshots' of the changes taking place over three 
years as the former state farms made their way through the restructuring process. They did 
not begin the process at the same time and, once begun, it did not proceed at the same 
speed'51. Indeed, the term 'process' does not capture the complexity and messiness of the 
changes which took place. Some of the key aspects of this complexity were flagged in the 
previous chapter, including the piecemeal development of legislation and local influences on 
its implementation, including local power relations and farming systems 
The analysis begins with a reading of the post-privatisation landscape as I found it during my 
last period of fieldwork in the Summer of 1998, which is indicative of how the different 
communities and sectors within them used their land and property rights and entitlements 
and how gender f igured in the outcome. It then turns to the processes which led them there. . 
1. Working backwards: Reading the post-privatisation landscape 
In 1998, my research communities were representative of the two main outcomes of 
privatisation in rural Kazakstan. Whilst in some areas, the majority of former collective and 
state farms had been dismantled and replaced by private enterprises, in others, most had 
'51 See the appendix on farm privatisation statistics for a brief overview of the restructuring process in 
the fieldwork communities and its relationship to regional and national patterns. 
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opted for little more than a change in name, with virtually no alteration in either management 
or production structures (ADB, 1996b: 29; World Bank, 1994; Coulter, 1996; Yesimov, 
1996)1 52 . 
Former Lenin sovkhoz typified the option of 'staying together'. The state farm had 
reorganised as a single joint-stock company, which was still in the process of being 
registered. Few people felt that private farming was a viable option. Only five small 
independent farms had been created. Three were still leasing their land from the former state 
farm, whilst only two had gone through the full legal registration procedure. Three of these 
independent farms had been set up by senior farm officials, who continued to have close 
links with the former sovkhoz and its director. One was owned by a group of Kazak kin, who 
had money to invest from trading and had many connections in the district. The other 
belonged to a group of cooperating Slav households who had pooled their combination of 
technical expertise and money from large domestic smallholdings. None of these 
independent farms were headed by women, although women had contributed shares towards 
them and some were also involved in working for them. The overwhelming majority of the 
sovkhoz membership had signed their shares over to the new enterprise. However, whilst 
they saw this as a way of maintaining security and stability in the face of chaos, they actually 
risked losing their entitlements. 
Although, on the surface, the successor enterprise appeared to be very similar to its 
predecessor, beneath the surface fundamental shifts were taking place in its ownership and 
employment practices. On the one hand, the status of the new shareholders was far from 
clear. The new enterprise was being registered in the Directoes name, which would give him 
sole title to land and property. In 1998, attempts by two of the otdeleniye to split off from the 
main enterprise, came to nothing since the director was unwilling to relinquish his hold on 
their shares. Shareholders wishing to set up private farms were also facing opposition from 
the director and problems obtaining their land and assets. On the other hand, although 
employment in the joint stock company continued to be the mainstay of most households' 
survival strategies, together with petty trade, subsistence farming and out-migration of family 
members for paid work, the state farm had been unable to pay money wages for over four 
years and the issue of how many people its successor could continue to keep in employment 
was becoming increasingly acute. In particular, it was clear that not all those who had 
contributed their shares to the joint stock company would be actively employed by it. The 
full impact of the distinction between shareholders and employees was not yet apparent. 
However, the Director told me that only about 30% of the population were working, and 
although he was trying to maintain work for as many as possible, this was made difficult by 
the farm's disastrous economic and agricultural situation and it could not continue to'provide 
for the rest for free as well'. Although he had tried to maintain employment for single 
mothers with large families, his main concern had been to find alternative employment for 
the enterprise's male employees. 
152 According to figures from the Asian Development Bank (1996b: 29), by mid-1996,2332 state 
farms had been privatised into 6050 new fanning entities, a conversion ratio of approximately 1: 2.6, 
but, on average, less than one independent (peasant) farm had been created out of each sovkhoz. 
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However, the distinction between shareholders and workers was becoming academic as the 
farm neared total bankruptcy. That Autumn, the farm was declared 'unviable' by the regional 
authorities, threatening workers and non-working shareholders alike with the loss of their 
entitlements. As the prospects for making a decent livelihood began to look increasingly 
bleak, people's major concern was when and how to leave the community with the maximum 
of what was due to them. Individuals' struggles were played out against the background of 
local power relations. My host and her sister, who worked in the farin office and had a wide 
network of relations and connections outside the community, were able to use their leverage 
to obtain at least part of what they were owed and were therefore able to purchase new flats 
in the rayon centre. On the other hand, other households without these connections were 
unable to convert what was owed them into concrete assets and were even unable to sell their 
own houses in the village. My last image of the community bore no resemblance to the 
image of a newly efficient agricultural enterprise or a patchwork of independent farms, 
where sovkhoz members' entitlements had been transformed into concrete ownership over the 
means of production. It was rather a shell-shocked landscape of empty fields, dilapidated 
farm buildings and machinery, boarded up public services and abandoned private homes"'. 
The Lenin state farm was very slow to restructure and many of the processes relating to 
changes in ownership and management were still in embryonic form. In contrast, the 
landscape of both Druzhba and Sarybulak seemed totally changed. Both communities had 
not only followed the 'approved' model of privatisation but were in the vanguard of the farm 
restructuring process and by 1996, the original state farms had already fragmented into a 
patchwork of successor enterprises. In 1998, around 50 new farming enterprises of various 
types existed on Sarybulak and between 300 and 450 on Druzhba 154 - At one end of the 
spectrum were the large producer cooperatives, which tended to be based on former state 
farm structures, such as departments or brigades. As in the case of Lenin, legal title to land 
and assets was often held by one individual, generally the former head of department or 
brigade leader, whilst the shareholders who had signed over their entitlements tended to be a 
mix of pensioners, ancillary and blue-collar agricultural workers. Dividends were largely 
paid in kind, either as a proportion of the produce or harvest, or as inputs and services for 
domestic smallholdings. 
On Sarybulak, the Sarybulak Association, the successor to the former collective, was typical 
of this kind of cooperative. Its Director, a former Komsomol secretary and trade union 
president, had attended the Communist Party School in Almaty and had many high-level 
contacts in government. As well as running his own private farm, he also held sole title to 
the association's land and assets, which he often referred to, confusingly, as 'mine'. In return 
for ceding their land and assets, the 227 shareholders were guaranteed a supply of hay and 
153 It is important to point out here that I am not suggesting that there was a direct correlation between 
'staying togethee and this negative outcome. The neighbouring state farm had also opted to remain as 
a large joint stock company but was showing a profit in 1998. Humphrey (1998: 12) argues that the 
biggest difference between collectives in Buryatiya was whether they worked or not and that this was 
linked to distance from markets, assets and links to the state, but also to individuals, the ability of 
some leaders to plan strategically and fit together the diverse 'actants'. 
"' The figures I was given varied considerably: according to the land office, there were 434 private 
farms in the community in October 1998, whereas the village administration gave a figure of 385 
registered farms and an additional 200+ which had not gone through the full registration procedure. 
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feed for their own smallholdings. Only a minority of the shareholders, mainly men, were also 
employed by the enterprise and most engaged in a number of other income-generating and 
survival strategies, including subsidiary farming, seasonal work for other farm enterprises, 
poaching of the local saiga antelope, petty trade, mostly in home-brewed vodka in the village 
and milk products in local towns, and the production of handicrafts. 
Similarly, on Druzhba, it was mainly pensioners, ancillary and blue-collar agricultural 
workers who had put their shares into collective enterprises. For example, Sveta, a Kazak 
former agronomist, now in her sixties, and a widow, explained that she had primarily taken a 
land share to pass on to her son. He was still a minor and, feeling that she herself was too 
old to become a private farmer and concluding that, with no machinery of her own, she 
would have to pool her resources with others, she had put her share of four un-irrigated 
hectares and five irrigated hectares of land into a producer co-operative. By 1998, the 
original co-operative had disbanded, and she was leasing out her land, some to a local 
research institute and some to a private farmer in return for a share of the produce. It is 
worth looking more closely at this second land tenure arrangement in particular, which was a 
typical strategy within the Kazak community. For some time, I was puzzled at the exact 
meaning of the term rodsmennik (usually used in Russian to mean 'kin' or 'relative') and 
tried to elicit more details about the degree of family relationship involved. After a good 
deal of confusion, it became clear that that the man was not in fact a close blood relative, but 
a member of the same Kazak rod (clan), who had only recently come to the area from the 
ecologically devastated region of Karakalpakistan. Sveta's land share was just one of those 
that he was 'managing'. The arrangement between Sveta and this clan member was not based 
on any form of legal contract but on the trust associated with kinship relationship. When I 
asked her if she had a written agreement, she exclaimed 'no, of course not, he's my 
rodstvennik! ' He was 'a good man' she told me, would give her half the produce from her 
fields because of their clan relationship (as opposed to the usual 15%) and additional 
vegetables as well as the barley from her own fields. Although the land was still hers, he 
made all major production decisions, such as which crops to sow. Unfortunately, after the 
harvest, Sveta received only a few sacks of grain from her fields. This did not seem to be an 
isolated occurrence and illustrated the vulnerable position of those left with title to land but 
without the experience or resources to farm it themselves. On former sovkhoz Druzhba, their 
land was being taken by more powerful farmers, either temporarily in the form of similar 
'leasing' arrangements or more permanently, since, according to local interpretations of the 
legislation, any land lying fallow could be reclaimed by the local administration and 
redistributed to those who were able to farm it. The most vulnerable members of the 
community, including women pensioners, therefore risked losing their land, as the larger 
landowners 'gobbled up'their holdings'55. 
One of the most marked characteristics of the landscape on Druzhba, and one which both 
distinguished it from Sarybulak and made it unusual in the national context, was that, 
although the entire state farrn had initially been restructured into large producer cooperatives, 
by 1998 these had all been disbanded, mainly into independent private farms (krestyanskie 
"I According to the ADB (1996b), the category of private farms is dominated by 2,500 such 'majoe 
landholders, who are strongly differentiated from the mass of smaller farms. 
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khozyaistva or small enterprises) and a much larger proportion of the population was now 
engaged in private (peasant) farming. These independent farms, seen as the flagship of the 
privatisation reform by the donor community, existed in both communities and fell into 
different categories, according to the size and quality of their holdings. On Druzhba, 
respondents suggested a classification based on the size of farm holdings: 
a) Under 5 hectares e) no equipment 
b) 5 to 10 hectares f) some equipment 
c) l0to50hectares g) full equipment 
d) 50+ hectares 
Another key distinction was how much of the most precious irrigated land each farm 
possessed. A similar classification applied to Sarybulak, where the primary focus was 
holdings of hayland (liman), livestock and equipment 156 . 
In both communities, the largest private farms were commonly established early on, 
generally between 1991 and 1994 but sometimes sooner, mainly by high-level administrators 
or senior agricultural workers. On Sarybulak, most of the former shepherds had withdrawn 
the livestock they pastured, together with 'their' traditional pasture lands, hayland (liman) and 
Winter housing (zimovka) to establish well-equipped enterprises. The most widely talked 
about example in the community and rayon as a whole was that of a former herder who 
headed a private farm with some 650 sheep, 150 goats, 750 horses and 85 cows. He and his 
wife had both worked as herders from 1966 and 1968, respectively, and had pooled their 
shares, together with those of his two brothers and the couple's five sons, three daughters and 
two daughters-in-law, to set up the enterprise. 
I 
Similarly, on Druzhba, the largest private farms were also those which had been established 
earliest and tended to be headed by former sovkhoz senior administrators and brigade leaders. 
However, there were some notable exceptions. One of the largest private farms was owned 
by Dina, a 52 year old Kazak widow, who had previously worked in a sewing cooperative. 
She had been one of the first to take up private farming back in 1989, when it became 
possible to lease land (arenda), leasing 28 hectares and setting up a small enterprise focusing 
on sugar beet, maize and vegetable production. The initial results were good and by the time 
the sovkhoz began to privatize, she had already been able to acquire a tractor and some other 
agricultural machinery. When the sovkhoz restructured in 1995, she received a land and 
asset share, which she combined with her daughters' land shares to form a krestyanskoe 
khozyaistvo. She was therefore one of the handful of people who immediately withdrew and 
registered their land and asset shares, rather than putting them into one of the new producer 
cooperatives. Shortly afterwards, these independent farmers came together to form a farmers' 
association and elected her as its head. The idea was not to combine their shares, but to 
follow a Western 'cooperative' model, creating economies of scale by working the land, 
marketing and selling together. When an EU TACIS project began work in the village, she 
"" The original state farm covered an enormous 235,006 hectares of land. During the restructuring 
process, it was not pasture land, per se, which was most at issue, but pasture land with sufficient water 
points and the availability of the hayland (liman) needed to produce animal fodder for the winter. See 
Humphrey (1998: 458) for a discussion of the vital role played by hay land in the similar pastoralist 
collective system and the domestic economy of villagers in Buryatiya. The average size of peasant farms varies widely: in steppe areas, they may average 400 hectares, in irrigated areas, 40 hectares and 
close to cities, as small as 4 hectares (ADB 1996b: 28). 
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was one of the farmers to benefit from their micro-credit programme, and became tile head 
of one of the AffS (machinery) groups it helped to form and support. By 1998, she owned or 
controlled at least 180 and possibly as much as 300 hectares, including a large amount of the 
most fertile, irrigated land 157 . By then, her fan-n focused on cereals and horticulture, 
producing mainly wheat, barley, fodder crops, potatoes and sugar beet. However, it also had 
a sideline in dairy production, and was branching out into food processing, with the launch of 
a mini-mill'and plans to set up a bakery. Hers was one of the very few farms to have a full 
range of machinery, including tractors and combines and other equipment needed for Ole 
different stages of agricultural production and also owned many of the former sovkhoz's 
agricultural buildings in the central village, including barns and animal sheds. 
In both communities, this type of large independent farm was vastly outnumbered by smaller 
ones, which were often established later than those in the first category and owned fewer 
hectares of land or fewer stock and less or no equipment of their own". On Sarybulak, 
around 30 families had moved from the centre to the outlying parts of the community when 
they received their shares in order to farm independently159 . Although they had all obtained 
summer pasture land, not all of them made use of it. As one former tractor driver explained, 
since his private farm had no machinery, only horses, they would need to hire trucks from 
the Sarybulak Association to get to their land, which made using it unprofitable. Similarly, 
on Druzhba, the majority of small farms had received land shares but no asset shares, and 
therefore no machinery or other equipment, making them dependent on the larger enterprises 
or outside services during key periods such as harvesting. 
One example I got to know well was a farm managed by Bota, a 38 year old Kazak woman 
and former kindergarten administrator. She told me that she and her mother had initially 
leased 6 hectares of land in 1991 and had subsequently registered the farm as a private 
enterprise. Since her mother was too old to work and her husband was a driver and often 
absent, she herself was the head of the farm. In the course of subsequent visits, I learned that 
the farm was actually registered in her father-in-law's name. It officially comprised his and 
his wife's land shares and the official members included the couple, their two sons (including 
Bota's husband) and a grandson. Bota's name did not appear on the document and, in the 
records, I did not find any land registered under her or her mother's name. In practice, 
however, Bota was clearly responsible for running the farm. According to the 
tprogramme 160' established in 1992, the enterprise was to focus on livestock production and 
"' over the three years I conducted fieldwork in the village, it was clear that the amount of land she 
held increased considerably, but it was difficult to get a precise figure, either from the farmer, the local 
authority or the land office. There appeared to be two factors: first, she had been able to get more land 
through the local authority, as smaller landholders banded back entitlements they could not work, or, 
more controversially, had their land taken from them; second, a number of people who had a small 
land plot but no equipment to work it had passed their land to her. Although they continued to work 
the land themselves, he provided the equipment, seed and fuel, paid the tax and irrigation charges and 
received half the harvest in return. Some of these land transactions were registered but many were 
informal arrangements. 
"' The category of private farms in Kazakstan is dominated by 2,500 such 'major' landholders, who 
are strongly differentiated from the mass of smaller farms (ADB 1996b: 28). 
119 These figures were provided by the village Akim. 
160 Respondents in the Almaty Land Office informed me that initially, all private farms had to produce 
a detailed programme in order to get land, showing what they hoped to produce, in what quantities and 
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would also use its 2.5 hectares of irrigated arable land to grow sugar beet and lucerne and 
produce pumpkin for seed. However, at the time of my first visit in 1997, although some of 
the land was planted with clover and sugar beet, a sizeable proportion was given over to 
potatoes, melons and other crops for the family's own consumption. It was July, and Bota 
was making constant trips between these fields, to supervise fieldwork and irrigation, and 
home. I realised that as well as running the private farm, she also ran a domestic 
smallholding, with three cows, half a dozen pigs, sheep and poultry, which provided for the 
family's needs and some surplus goods to sell. Meanwhile, the garden plot provided the bulk 
of the family's vegetables and fruit. Bota's enterprise had no farm machinery, so was reliant 
on other farmers for ploughing and harvesting. She could not afford to bring in workers, so 
help at busy times, such as harvest, came from relatives from the city and women friends or 
former colleagues, who received produce as payment. In addition, she housed and provided 
for a Russian woman pensioner, with no family, who helped out with domestic work, 
childcare and care of the stock. In 1998, despite having received credit from a donor agency's 
farmer support programme, the farm was not doing well. Even less of the land was given 
over to crop production and she had sowed only barley and lucerne - all for the domestic 
stock. Instead, she was improving her domestic smallholding so that she could keep more 
pigs (100+) and more cows. If the farm was not working well from the point of view of 
cereal and beet production, she told me, the problem was that machinery was becoming 
increasingly expensive to hire, since drivers from the machinery association and the bigger 
landowners, who initially offered cut-price or free services, were not doing so any longer. 
As this example shows, the category of small private farms merged or overlapped with the 
next category of subsidiary or household farms (pod'sobnye khozyaistva). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, most households had maintained a domestic smallholding during the socialist 
period and rising prices, unemployment or salary arrears made subsidiary farming a practical 
necessity for household subsistence after 1991. However, many subsidiary farms also 
produced a surplus that could be sold for profit. Conversely, by 1998, many private farms 
did not make a profit and were mainly used for family subsistence. On Druzbha, there was an 
increasing tendency for male farmers to leave agricultural work to the women in their 
households, whilst they took on paid employment in the sprouting small enterprises around 
Almaty. On paper the key difference between the two categories was that private farms were 
legally recognised as private enterprises, whereas subsidiary farms were not. However, in 
practice, since many private farms had never been officially registered and many subsidiary 
farms were equally large, this legal distinction was blurred. 
Most households in both communities owned at least a small domestic smallholding, with 
enough stock and land to meet their immediate needs. However, in terms of agricultural land 
and assets from the restructured state farms, a substantial number fell into the category of the 
landless or 'dispossessed' - those who had either not been eligible for shares, had apparently 
never received them or who had subsequently ceded or effectively lost their entitlements. 
This was a relatively disparate category. On both Druzhba and Sarybulak, many 
respondents, particularly social sector and ordinary farm workers, were vociferous in their 
where it was to be marketed and sold. The early records generally contained details of this kind. 
However, as the reform had progressed, these criteria had been abandoned and later records did not 
contain such programmes. 
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criticisms of the restructuring process, claiming that they had never received or had been 
unable to redeem their entitlements. Others had received shares but had been unable to use 
them and by 1998 had ceded them to other enterprises or individuals. Still others had not 
been eligible to receive shares in the first place. This was a major sub-category on Druzhba, 
where large numbers of in-migrants, mainly ethnic Kazaks from the 'diaspora' in 
Karakalpakistan and Kyrgyzstan had chosen to settle since 1991. Many people in this 
category worked in some way for the new family farms. On Sarybulak, the largest of these 
employed families of 'close relatives' (fifteen in the case of the herder described above) who 
helped with the hay cutting and other seasonal work, in return for hay, meat and Winter fuel. 
Similarly, on Druzhba, the smaller farms, such as Bota's, often relied on seasonal help from 
kin and former colleagues whilst the larger ones employed in-migrants and labourers from 
the city, as well as having various share-cropping and other similar arrangements with 
villagers. For example, in 1997, Dina had II permanent and 30 seasonal workers at planting 
and harvest time. In 1998, this had risen to 35 permanent workers, mainly local families 
working under share-cropping arrangements and local families and in-migrants with no land 
or asset shares, and she also brought in additional labour from Almaty during the busiest 
periods. 
Clearly, the different communities and different groups within them had chosen - or been 
obliged - to respond differently to the new ownership opportunities. On former sovkhoz 
Lenin, the vast majority had opted against establishing private farms. In the other two 
communities, whilst a minority, mainly the former senior administrators and specialists, had 
opted to create their own independent enterprises early on, others had done so much later 
and, as on Lenin, some people, particularly social sphere and lower-echelon agricultural 
workers and pensioners, had chosen to put their shares back into a larger enterprise. On 
Lenin the Farm Director seemed set to become sole owner of the enterprise. In the other 
communities, the largest and most powerful enterprises were consolidating, as those that 
were unable to survive either sold up their land and assets or handed them over to the larger 
producers. Therefore, behind the apparent discontinuity between the Soviet and post- 
privatisation landscape, there was a striking continuity between the previous socio-economic 
hierarchy and the present 'winners' in the reform process. As other researchers have 
described elsewhere (Verdery, 1998), it seemed that the former elite had been able to use the 
decollectivisation reform to convert its former political power into economic power based on 
private ownership" . 
Having said this, it is important to note that, in 1998, the 'winners' and 'losers' in the 
restructuring process were engaged in a game of snakes and ladders. Early advantage did not 
necessarily translate into long-term gains. Not all the enterprises that were established early 
on were successful. On Druzhba, Bota! s farm was not unusual in experiencing difficulties. 
Similarly, on Sarybulak, a former senior shepherd and Party Member had been amongst the 
first to take land and livestock in 1992. He had then owned 650 sheep; by 1998 only 30 
remained. He told me that several of his 14 children had got married since 1992 and his 
flock had mainly been sold off to finance their marriage feasts, each of which had required 
161 Many respondents talked about the phenomenon of shareholdings becoming concentrated in the 
hands of former senior farm personnel and administrators. Research for the ADB (I 996b: 32) suggests 
that this is a marked tendency nationwide. 
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the sale of around 30 animals. Conversely, despite the odds, initial disadvantage was 
sometimes overcome. On Druzhba, GuInara, a Turkish woman doctor from one of the 
outlying villages, was originally allocated less than one hectare of land. However, after 
considerable ffort, she had managed to obtain a further 10 hectares of unirrigated land to set 
up a small independent farm, mainly producing fruit and vegetables. Her husband, who had 
worked for 25 years as a driver, had received 18 hectares of unirrigated and 4 of irrigated 
land, and had also set up a farm in his name. Neither of them had been allocated machinery 
and both farms relied largely on the same pool of family labour, although they hired some 
labourers during the busiest periods. Neither Gulnara nor her husband were aware of the 
donor support programme operating in the community and the only credit they had received 
was a loan of $500 from GuInara's brothers. Despite these obstacles, by 1998, she had been 
able to make her farm a viable concern and was planning to diversify into cultivating 
flowers. These two examples demonstrate the fluidity of the landscape in my research 
communities and the fact that, in 1998, privatisation could not be seen as a 'completed' 
process. 
What of the place of gender in this changing landscape? I have deliberately chosen to 
foreground women in the examples cited above. My reading illustrates that both men and 
women received land and asset shares from the restructuring process and that both were 
involved in the operation of the new farming enterprises that had emerged from privatisation. 
However, it also flags a number of significant findings. 
First, in relation to gender and entitlement, there were both parallels and differences in 
patterns of ownership between the three communities. On the one hand, there appeared to be 
a correlation between gender and decisions to put shares into collective or independent 
enterprises, with women over-represented as shareholders in producer cooperatives and 
under-represented asowners of private farms. On Lenin, none of the new private farms were 
officially owned by women. Similarly, no women-headed farms were officially registered 
for Sarybulak, although I found three that were effectively managed by women. On Druzhba 
women officially owned a significant proportion (around 28%) of the new private farms, 
although, again, women farm owners were in a minority compared to men. 
Table 5.1: Gender composition of private farming on Druzhba (official statistics ftom the 
Land Office) 
Deeds - (GosAkt) issued for 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 
private 
farms on Druzhba 
No. of GosAkts 17 38 126 
16 7 12 19 141 276 
No. of GosAkts issued to women 5 6 19 6 2 3_ 19 40 80 
Notes: The GosAkI was issued on completion of the cadastre by the Land Office. Figures 
were held separately depending on whether the cadastre was carried out with state funds or 
other funds (rayon, sel'sovet and individual). Officials in the land office pointed out that the 
number of Goýakls issued did not necessarily correspond to the actual number of enterprises 
since : 
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a) The changes in land ownership legislation and in enterprise composition meant that the 
same enterprise was sometimes registered a number of times under new documents. 
b) Some people paidfor their GosAkt and then sold up. 
C) Many people still had only their share (pai) and certificate (sviditel'stvo) since those that 
did not have the money did not come to get their land registered. 
d) According to figures from the Almaty Oblast Land Office, as of 1.1.98,2305 private 
(peasant) farms had been created in Druzhba's rayon, of which 1677 (c. 72Yo) had 
received a GosAkt- 
This gendered pattern of ownership raised a number of issues. Why were women under. 
represented as heads of independent farms in all three communities? What had led to the 
different patterns on Lenin, where no women had become owners of private farms and 
Druzhba, where a relatively large number of women had done so? What explained the 
discrepancy between the number of farms officially registered in women's names and the 
number of farms, that were de facto being managed by women? What were men's and 
women's roles within the new enterprises and how were their relative contributions valued 
and reflected in rights and entitlements? 
Second, gender was also a factor in the typology of the different independent farms. Maps 
and records from the Land Office showed that on Druzhba, female-headed farms were a 
minority in the first category of farm (50+ hectares), whereas they were over-represented in 
the last two categories (0-5 and 5-10 hectares). My interviews suggested that differences in 
size of holdings were also correlated with differences between male and female farmers in 
terms of ownership of important assets, such as technology and farm machinery. Again, 
what explained these differences and how had women such as the powerful fan-ner on 
Druzhba managed to achieve their more advantageous position? Further, in view of the 
discussion in chapters I and 2 on the feminisation of subsistence and women's traditional 
role in subsidiary farming, examples such as that of Bota! s farm flag the importance of the 
relationship between gender and private and subsidiary farming. Were the dual processes of 
consolidation and fragmentation leading to a further blurring or distinction between the two 
categories? Did people in the community itself perceive a dichotomy between the two and, if 
so, was it gendered? 
The following part of this chapter explores the processes which led to the gendered 
landscapes described above, highlighting the interrelationship between gender and official 
models of ownership, local farming systems, power relations and cultural rules and practices. 
The analysis explores: 1) the official models used for allocating land and asset shares and 
how these were influenced by local understandings and perceptions about entitlement and 
local power relations; 2) the concrete translation of entitlements into the creation and 
functioning of the new enterprises. 
Defining land and property entitlements: Analysis of the farm privatisation 
process 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that farm restructuring, although an hoc process, had 
followed three main phases. There had been a shift from an initial 'ad hoc' phase of reform, 
when legal aspects were poorly defined and local power 
interests played a significant part, to 
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a more structured and equitable system, in which all members of the community were able to 
benefit, irrespective of gender, age, social status or ethnic background. Therefore in 
principle, at least from the second phase of privatisation, one of the explicit concerns of the 
farm restructuring process in Kazakstan was to divide land and assets between all members 
of the farm community, including employees, retired employees and ancillary workers (e. g. 
teachers) on an equitable basis (ADB 09/1996: 32). In theory, this meant that both women 
and men, as individuals, were entitled to shares and that women had an equal stake in the 
property of the new agricultural enterprises. However, the picture which emerged from my 
fieldwork was much less clear-cut. In so far as neither gender, age or socio-economic status 
were specifically factored in during the elaboration and implementation of privatisation 
policy and that the allocation of shares was based on the existing labour and salary structure, 
its socio-economic divergences were reflected in the outcome of reform. 
Official methods of calculating entitlement 
Officially, a number of different methods were used for assessing the land and property of 
state farms and dividing them into individual shares. These were taken up by each farm 
according to the preferences of the rayon or oblast administration and the wishes of the 
community as expressed at a general meeting. 
Individual shares could be calculated on various bases: 
1) all members were simply allocated equal amounts of land and/or assets, taking 
quality into consideration. 
2) more usually, either land or asset shares, or both, were calculated on the basis of 
three factors : 
salary; 
years of service; or 
family composition. 
My fieldwork communities used various combinations of these methods of calculation. On 
Lenin and Sarybulak, land was divided equally between all members of the community, 
whereas assets were calculated on the basis of salary and length of service. On Druzhba, the 
salary/service method was used to calculate both land and assets. On Miinbulak sovkhoz, 
which abutted Sarybulak, land was divided equally, whereas asset shares were calculated 
according to length of service alone. In contrast, in the neighbouring Dzhambul oblast, 
shares were calculated on the basis of family composition. 
One key finding of my research was that, in all cases, one of the second options had been 
selected for whichever resource was at a premium. In the case of the vast farms in 
Dzezkazgan oblast, it was the availability of livestock rather than pasture land that was at 
issue, and selective coefficients were used to determine asset shares. On the other hand, on 
Druzhba, fertile, irrigated land essential to successful agricultural production was scarce and 
land shares were also calculated according to selective criteria. The same selective criteria 
generally applied also to shares in key farm equipment, such as tractors and combines, 
together with farm buildings and, in the case of the sheep-breeding farms, wells or water 
points and the limited irrigated land for fodder production. 
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With the exception of the first method, where land and assets were simply divided equally 
among members, the division of future land and asset holdings reflected previous socio- 
economic relations and therefore advantaged some groups over others. In my interviews 
with donor organisations, it was often remarked that young people had lost out with regard to 
both pay and length of service. They had therefore received lower shares and this, in turn, 
had made it very difficult for them to set up private farms on their own162 . On the other 
hand, it seemed to be assumed that men and women had benefited equally from these 
different methods of calculation. 
In practice, it was not possible to conduct a full statistical analysis for all the communities, 
since important data was either missing or unavailable. On Druzhba, although data on land 
shares was provided by the Land Office, there was no data on asset shares and the 
documentation on the gender composition of the workforce had 'gone missing' when the 
sovkhoz was disbanded. Conversely, on Lenin, the latter information was available but, after 
getting permission to look at the documents on asset shares, the Director then decided that 
they were 'confidential'. In addition, for various reasons, notably that very few individuals 
had actually taken land and assets to farm independently and that the farm was bankrupt and 
therefore unable to pay salaries, let alone share dividends, people had not been motivated to 
find out themselves about the size of their shares. However, enough statistical data was 
available to draw at least an indicative picture that I checked against detailed life and work 
histories. 
Coefficient method 
Gender discrimination was clearest in the 'family coefficient method' being applied in South 
Kazakstan, particularly in Chimkent and Dzhambul oblasts. The following example was 
reported to me by a colleague who was conducting research in Sarasuiskii rayon, Dzhambul 
Oblas ? 63 . According to this method, different co-efficients were allocated to different 
members of the household: 
Family member Coeff icient 
male head of family: I 




children : 0.2 
The total amount of land distributed to each household was calculated by adding up the 
coefficients of its members and allocating the requisite number of hectares. In the case cited 
as an example, a household comprising 10 members, husband, wife, two adult sons and their 
wives, one daughter and two young children had a total coefficient of 5.5, which 
162 According to one survey, the median age of private farm heads is 45 (ADB 1996b: 28). 
163 1 am grateful to Sarah Robinson from Warwick University for providing this example from her 
interview with the rayon administration in 1997. 
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corresponded to 580.2 hectares of land. From the example given, it was not altogether clear 
whether the wife, daughter or daughters-in-law had worked for the sovkhoz before 
privatisation. However, it appeared that this attribution of coefficients reflected an 'ideal' 
representation of men's and women's contribution to agriculture, rather than actual work 
carried out on the sovkhoz by different family members. As such, women were 
disadvantaged in the calculation of shares, particularly if they wanted to set up their own 
independent farms. On the other hand, the system of allocating land according to the number 
of household members also meant that the shares of all rnýmbers of the family, including 
women, were vital in order to create a viable independent enterprise, and this may have 
ensured women some influence in the new enterprises. This method was not used in any of 
my core fieldwork communities, and its implications merit further research. 
Length ofservice (stazh) 
Some state farms used length of service as the sole criterion for calculating asset shares. On 
Miinbulak, the former farm Director explained that years of service were expressed in 
monetary terms, and members could then 'buy' the corresponding amount of fann. assets 
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. 
For example, 16 years service would have equalled 1617 tenge, of which 31% would have 
been taken in livestock, 25% in buildings, 16% in equipment, 18% in machinery and 3% in 
transport. According to the 
, 
documents in the community Akimiat, members' length of 
service had ranged from 2 to 42 years, with long and short work records being spread across 
the different branches of the farm. The longest work records of 42 and 40 years were held by 
workers in the Avtopark, but records of over 30 years were also found amongst shepherds, in 
the administration, construction brigade and school. 
Gender did not appear to be a significant factor in connection with length of service. Any 
periods , 
of maternity leave had been included in women's work record (trudovaya knizhka). 
On the outlying fermy where sheep were pastured, brigades were often based on family 
labour. Women worked alongside their husbands as 'assistant shepherds' and often had as 
many years of service to their credit. On Ferma No. 5, for example, the senior shepherd, a 
man, had worked for of 24 years and had received a monetary share of 2425 tenge, whilst his 
wife had worked for 22 years and had a share of 2223 tenge. Their son, in contrast had 
worked for only 3 years and had a share of 303 tenge. Since assistant shepherds earned on 
average 30% less than shepherds, the wife would have been disadvantaged if the pay 
differential method had been used. However, under this system, she had an equal stake in 
the creation of a private enterprise. On Sarybulak, where it was predominantly the former 
shepherds who set up independent farms, the use of this method therefore meant that women 
and men were, at least in theory, given equal weight in their creation. 
ý" Interview with former Farm Director, Miinbulak, 26.7.98. Assets were valued at considerably 
below their market value., For example, one sheep cost 16 tenge, whereas the market price was around 
2,000 tenge. 
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Pay and length ofservice 
On Druzhba, shares were calculated on the basis of both pay and length of service. Data 
from the official list of shares drawn up in 1994 showed that, although both women and men, 
as individuals, were granted land and asset shares, this method produced a noticeable gender 
differential, cut across by age and occupational status. 
Table 5.2: Share allocation on Kolyashchi otdeleniye (agricultural workers) 
Men Women 
95 shareholders 55 40 
Average land share 7.6 hectares 5.5 hectares 
% allocated over 10 
hectares 
21% 7.5% 
% allocated less than 3 
hectares 
18% 32% 
highest share 16 hectares (team leader, 30 
years service) 
lowest share 0.48 hectares (young woman 
field worker) 
Curiously, the land shares of the most senior white-collar workers, including the former 
Brigadier, did not appear on the document and it was not possible to ascertain in interviews 
exactly how much land they had received. 
From a dejure perspective, although the models officially used for calculating shares did 
extend entitlement to both men and women, they therefore tended to disadvantage women to 
varying degrees. The length of service criterion did not discriminate against women, at least 
in these instances, where work records took account of periods of maternity leave. On the 
other hand, the family coefficient method strongly discriminated against women, whilst the 
pay and service method on average benefited men over women, whilst confirming the 
divergences between different age and occupational groups and therefore beriefiting some 
groups of women over men and other women. However, one important finding to emerge 
from my fieldwork was that the theoretical basis for the calculation of shares was in many 
instances less important than how legislation was interpreted at local level and the ways in 
which these interpretations were mediated by power relations and interests within the 
communities concerned. 
Local understandings of entitlement 
Local concepts of membership 
Although all members of state farms, including pensioners and ancillary workers, stood to 
benefit from reform, sovkhoz membership - and therefore entitlement - was defined within 
local communities themselves. The issue was a controversial one in all my fieldwork 
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communities. Some of the tricky issues involved the status of redundant employees, 
ancillary workers, pensioners, children - including grown children living away from the farm 
- and migrants. Gender was particularly salient in connection with the first three issues. 
On the one hand, the timing of the share calculation and allocation was crucial to the 
definition of membership and had a decisive impact on the entitlements of unemployed 
members of the community. On farms such as Lenin, which were slow to privatise, the 
shares were calculated after mass layoffs had taken place in both the agricultural and service 
sectors. Although, in theory, if the person concerned had not yet taken up other work and 
still had their work book (trudovaya knizhka) from sovkhoz employment, 65, he or she might 
still be eligible for shares, it was not clear if this had been consistently respected. However, 
it was clear that at this point, in 1995, the largest layoffs had occurred in the fernale- 
dominated livestock-rearing sector, where 40 of the 60 female workers had lost their jobs, 
and in the service sector, where the kindergarten had closed and the hospital staff had been 
cut by half. The few alternative jobs created as the farm switched to cereal production had 
mostly gone to unemployed men. The Director explained to me that the sovkhoz had tried to 
maintain men's employment as far as possible, although it had also made an effort to find 
alternative mployment for single mothers or mothers of large families. 
On the other hand, a distinction was commonly drawn between two groups of sovkhoz 
members, ancillary employees and agricultural workers, or as people often put it, between 
'social sphere' workers and 'sovkhoz' workers proper. For example, on Sarybulak, a 
distinction was drawn between 'hezvozmezdnaya(free) shares, which were only allocated to 
agricultural workers and the 'vykupnaya chast (purchaseable shares), which were allocated 
to everyone, including social sphere workers. On Druzhba, it was decided that since social 
sphere workers were not involved in actual agricultural production, they were not full 
members of the sovkhoz and therefore should not have the same rights to land and assets as 
agricultural workers. In recognition of the fact that ancillary workers needed to be given 
some incentive to stay in the countryside, they were allocated land shares, but the coefficient 
for calculating them was lower (1.5 for social sphere workers, children and pensioners as 
opposed to 2 for'agricultural workers). Social sphere workers were totally excluded from the 
allocation of asset shares. On sovkhoz Lenin, similarly, no asset shares were allocated to 
social sphere workers, although land was divided equally between all members of the 
community. 
The off ic 
' 
ial share distribution documents illustrated that this distinction between agricultural 
and social sector workers had a considerable impact on the relative size of shares. Going 
back to the example of Miinbulak sovkhoz, social sector workers, the majority of whom were 
women, received much lower'shares than agricultural workers with the same length of 
service. - 
165 According to my informants, the w ork book from the former employer is retained until the person 
concerned finds new employment and is issued a new one. 
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Tahle 5.3: Share allocation to agricultural and social sector workers on MUnbulak sovkhoz 
Total Women 
Agricultural workers 200 51 
Social sector workers 99 79 
Profession Work record Share allocated 
Shepherd 22 years 2,223 tenge 
Teacher 26 years 437 tenge 
Uo--ctor 127 years 1454 tenge 
Likewise, unlike agricultural workers, none of the social sphere workers from Druzhba's 
Kolyashchi otdeleniye received a land share of over 10 hectares, whereas many received less 
than I hectare of land. 
Table 5.4: Share allocation to employees in the Kolyashchi village school 
Total Women Men 
Shareholders 25 24 1 
loc t %Y( allocated over 10 
hectares 
0 
highest land share 4 hectares 
lowest land share 0.2 hectares 
Pensioners, a group also dominated by women, were in a similar situation"'. The 
Kolyashchi team leader, who was almost at retirement age when the sovkhoz was privatised, 
received a land share of 16 hectares, whereas a recently retired colleague received only 4.7 
hectares of land. Neither social sphere workers nor pensioners were eligible for asset shares. 
Distinctions were made between agricultural and social sphere workers in all the former state 
farms I visited. The explanations I was given centred on assessments of the relative value of 
people's labour contributions: whilst agricultural work was seen as contributing directly to 
the productivity of the farm and the development of land, and therefore as giving full 
entitlement to shares, work in the social sphere was seen as secondary or subsidiary, and 
therefore giving lesser or partial entitlement. Although it seemed that this division or 
categorisation of sovkhoz members existed prior to reform, it had been thrown into relief by 
the government's framing of restructuring, particularly the policy of removing responsibility 
for the social sphere from sovkhozy to local authorities. Suddenly, one group of employees 
were perceived to 'belong' to a different structure. Many agricultural workers therefore felt 
that it had been fair to allocate lower coefficients to social sphere employees, since they were 
now remunerated by the local authority and were thereby 'privileged' to receive a money 
wage. The division had clearly been sharpened by conflict over resources. 
166 According to figures from the village Akimiat, as of I January 1998, there were 1564 pensioners in 
the Community, of whom 1013 were women. This figure includes other sectors besides the former 
sovkhoz. 
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In the light of this, it was striking how little reaction it provoked among women who had 
been disadvantaged. This was partly due to the fact that relatively few social sphere workers 
had taken part in discussions on share allocation and knew little about the process. On 
Druzhba, for example, representatives had been sent to meetings from the schools and 
hospital, but the full workforce had not attended. However, many social sphere workers 
were not motivated to find out about their land and asset shares, since they did not intend to 
take up fanning in any case. A common formulation in my interviews was 'zachem inne 
nuzhna? '- what would I need land for? - followed by the assertion that farming was'dirtyor 
'demeaning'work and they preferred their currentjobs. However, the few women teachers or 
doctors who did intend to use their land and asset shares were often vocal in their criticism. 
Women such as Gulnara, the Turkish fanner already mentioned above, complained that the 
system was unfair, because teachers and doctors had received paltry land shares and no 
equipment unless their husbands worked for the sovkhoz. In order to set up her independent 
farm, she had had to negotiate with the farm and rayon authorities to get additional land, and 
this had not been easy. This particular informant had had to demonstrate considerable 
energy and determination to get her land entitlement. In this, she had been strongly 
supported by her husband and other kin. Others, with less support, had found it very difficult 
to do so. Another informant, a teacher, complained that although she had been allocated one 
hectare of land, she had been unable to find out where it was. When she had gone to the 
Aimiat, they had refused to tell her, on the grounds that it would be no good to her since she 
'wouldn't be able to farm it anyway'. 
Two points merit underlining here. First, social sector workers largely shared the widespread 
understanding that agricultural labour was 'not their affaie. However, although there was 
some truth in this, it meant that extra obstacles were placed in the path of those women 
teachers, doctors, shop-workers and so on who did intend to farm themselves or to take their 
shares to contribute to a family enterprise. Effectively, the view that fanning was 'not their 
affaiebecame a self-fulfilling prophecy. As the original producer cooperatives disbanded, 
and more people were obliged to take their shares, this issue became increasingly acu , 
te. 
Second, although these women saw the situation as unfair, they did not themselves interpret 
it in tenns of gender discrimination. Against the background of unequal distribution of shares 
in the community as a whole, the women I spoke to distinguished between themselves as 
ordinary workers and the 'nachalniki', or between poor and rich. As the woman teacher put 
it, 'Some people got hundreds of hectares and some of us got nothing at all. The rich have 
long arms. The people that were already in a good position, well they took everything and 
the poor just stayed pooe. However, given the gender structure of the sovkhoz labour force 
prior to privatisation, the distinction between 'sovkhoz' and 'ancillary' workers effectively 
discriminated against women. The predominantly female social sector workers - and 
pensioners - were left with less land and no technical means to farm it. Since equipment was 
too expensive to purchase, they were dependent on others, either relatives or new 
associations of machinery owners, to carry out the necessary farrn work, especially at 
ploughing and harvest time. 
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Local concepts of labour, use and ownership 
Membership was just one of the areas where the allocation of land and asset shares was 
intertwined at grassroots level with other layers of rights and entitlements which had more to 
do with Soviet, or even pre-Soviet values and conceptual isations, than with liberal, market- 
based ideas of ownership and property. As in the case of membership, rights were perceived 
to accrue from working or knowing the land or using sovkhoz property. 
Some respondents felt that previous control or use of sovkhoz land and assets should be 
reflected in its division. -An example of this was the widespread practice of allocating 
property by work specialisation, whereby dairy workers received cows, tractor drivers 
received tractors and so on. On Lenin, the separation of land and assets had not taken place, 
but the outline of the process was already clear. In 1998, drivers and machine operators had 
taken to bringing their vehicles home each evening rather than returning them to the central 
compound. It was explained to me that if the sovkhoz were to disband, they were therefore 
sure of keeping 'what was theirs'. On Sarybulak, the process had gone further. Although, 
officially, all sovkhoz members were to receive shares in livestock, buildings, machinery and 
so on, in practice, previous use often trumped the official model. In particular, former 
shepherds had claimed and won ownership over'theiestock and use rights over certain areas 
of pasture on the basis of Soviet work practice and using their informal connections with the 
farm management and local authorities. 
As Anderson (1998: 78) describes for the Soviet arctic, a form of 'socialist individual land 
tenure' already existed for certain occupations within the state farm structure. His example 
of 'state fishermen' or 'state trappers' on isolated outposts (tochki), enjoying the position of 
single, authorised producer for a particular span of land, also applied to the shepherds on 
distant outposts on the steppe. In this instance, particular shepherds were considered to have 
exclusive rights over certain tracts of seasonal pasture land, together with the associated 
housing, wells and buildings. Although these outposts had been given Soviet names, they 
were generally referred to by the names of their shepherd 'owners. As one respondent put it 
'all the shepherds have their own place' (u kazhdogo est'svoe mesto)167. On Sarybulak, the 
shepherds were largely able to maintain these Soviet era use-rights, in the face of conflicting 
claims from other members of the community who now also had entitlement to land. That 
they were able to do so was linked to the fact that land claims were negotiated at a level 
where informal power relations were dominant. Theoretically, the privatisation reforms 
should have led to each member of the sovkhoz being allocated land shares which would then 
be converted into individual title to land. However, in practice, the local authority decided 
that the 26,000 hectares of pasture land was 'common land' (obshchaya). Actual property 
titles were only issued for hay land whilst the amount of pasture land allocated to each 
individual depended on the amount of tax they paid to the local authority, 68 . 
In effect, 
shepherds were able to use this system to maintain their former privileged relationship with 
the local authority (Anderson, ibid: 79). 
Caroline Humphrey (1998: 233) found a similar pattern in rural Buryatia. 
168 Land tax was 43 tyn per hectare per year. According to the local authority, the average amount of 
land per farm is between 3 and 5,000 hectares, and the smallest amount, 500 hectares. 
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In my conversations with shepherds on the zhaylau, it also emerged that they saw their deep 
knowledge of the land and animals as a further claim to entitlement. The former shepherd 
with the largest private farm explained that he had worked with stock for sixteen years, that 
he knew them and it would have been too painful to see animals he had raised put into other 
hands. Similarly, part of what made the pasture land 'hiswas his knowledge of its ecology, 
of the other animals that shared it, the saiga antelope and the wolves and their relationship 
with the stock, of the range of different plants which grew there and the relationship between 
herding and the health of the land (Fieldnotes, 22/23.07.98). He also stressed that the 
animals too had their own relationship to the land - they knew it well, and would run away 
or become sick if they had to move to unfamiliar territory. To cite Anderson (ibid: 75) once 
again, 'knowing how to use the land and how to maintain a proper relationship with the 
sentient persons that one may encounter [were] necessary skills for gaining an entitlement to 
land for a herder. 
On the other hand, those who had not had use rights over land or assets during the Soviet 
period, or felt they had not been respected, framed their claims to entitlement in different 
ways. Many respondents in this category felt that the outcome of reform was a gross 
injustice, since their past labour for the state farm had also earned them entitlement. Others 
evoked deep knowledge and long-tenn, sometimes pre-Soviet customary usage as a moral 
imperative for current entitlement. As in the following extract from an interview on 
Sarybulak, people often combined or switched from one discourse to another: 
I worked on the sovkhoz for 12 years, milking cows, doing other jobs. I pastured 
sheep here for 5 years. My husband built the dam here with his own hands. But 
when we set up our farm, we were given only pasture land, a long way away. The 
authorities began to give out hay land (liman) but we never found out about it. 
People should have been given their liman in 1994, but it was hushed up. Only some 
people knew from the nachalstvo and got the land they used to use before. I worked 
hard. I should have been given the land which is next to our house, but a stranger 
(chuzhoi chelovek) has it. He leased land before, in 1991. He is a bai. He got 
everything - equipment, credit at 3%. And now he is a big fanner. He owns the 
agroferma. I should have got that land. All the years I've lived here, all the livestock 
we pastured (skol'ko god zhila, skol'ko skotpasili ). " 
On Sarybulak, another approach was to evoke a competing claim for 'use' or 'knowledge' of 
, 
the land based on pre-soviet, clan-based land tenure rights. Unlike in any of my other 
research'communities, respondents here and on the other former state farms in the same 
rayon often referred to their ancestral clans, complete with details about migration routes and 
traditional pasturage. In this context, a number of people in the community who had not 
worked as shepherds and therefore could not claim 'use' rights over particular areas were 
reaching back to the pre-Soviet past to 'claim' land which had belonged to an ancestor 
(Idedlpraded tam zhil, - my grand father/great-grandfather lived there). They would point to 
particular landscape features or tombs as marking the boundaries of 'theie teff itory. In 
addition', here, , unlike _ 
in any other areas, several respondents explicitly referred to the 
livestock contribution which their grandparents or great-parents had made to the original 
169 interview with woman respondent on former Teu-Moinak otdeleniye, Sarybulak, 5.8.98 
147 
kolkhoz, and called for a restitution of this initial property"O. One of the reasons behind this 
was clearly that the original kolkhoz had been founded on the basis of three clans (uru) and 
that this composition had remained largely unchanged throughout the subsequent changes. 
Relatively few Russians orKazaks from different clans had in-migrated to the community. It 
was difficult to assess just how important these clan divisions were during the Soviet period. 
However, it did appear that they had been heightened in the context of privatisation. In other 
words, it seemed that clan identity had been revived in the new context of the struggle over 
ownership of sovkhoz land and assets, specifically to give weight to individual claims 1 71 . 
Several of the respondents I interviewed on the Summer pasture, who had not previously 
worked as shepherds, had been able to obtain land in this way. 
Gender and local understandings of labour and use 
The previous patterns of labour, knowledge and use-rights being invoked as a basis for 
current ownership and entitlement were also gendered (Chapters 2 and 4), and I found that 
gender interrelated with local understandings of entitlement in specific ways. On the one 
hand, the allocation of property by work specialisation was generally disadvantageous to 
women wishing to set up private farms and further widened the starting point between male 
and female-run farms. Since most tractor drivers and machine operators were men, 
technology tended to remain in their hands, whereas it was difficult for women working in 
other branches to obtain it. This was another disincentive for women wishing to start an 
independent farm and widened the starting point between male and female-run farms. On 
the other hand, on Sarybulak, shepherds' informal 'use rights' appeared to extend to women 
as well as men. At least one of the women managing a private farm had been able to obtain 
'her' pasture land when she set up her enterprise. Since the others had set up their enterprises 
together with their husbands using land which had 'belonged' to both, the issue of individual 
entitlement had not come to the fore. However, gender was a complicating factor in claims 
over clan-based user rights over land. 
One woman fanner explained that it was her husband and his kin who had a claim to certain 
areas of land in the community where their ancestors were buried. As an incomer from a 
different clan, she had no such claims, although the 'belonging' to the land was passed on to 
her children"'. It would seem that, framed in these terms, women who married into the 
community would have no claim to land they had worked with their husbands on their own 
behalf, although they could lay a claim as mothers. Interestingly, in this context, this woman 
farmer had a very personal way of retelling the story of the relationship between the three 
main clans in the community, the Boltaly, Shakhar and Karabala. Despite the differences 
which had arisen between them, she said, they were originally all Naimans. More than that, 
they were three sons of the same mother, and, while she was alive, had lived together in 
170 See Humphrey (1998: 94) for a discussion of the role of shares in the establishment of the first 
collective farms. 
171 In the other communities clan membership was not a feature of the competing claims to entitlement 
but on Druzhba private farmers' claims to land were challenged by counterclaims about customary 
use-rights to common pastureland. 
172 The fact that the children 'belonged' both to her husbands' clan and to the clan's land was central to 
her explanation as to why she could not leave the community altogether and return to Chimkent oblast 
to look after her elderly father. 
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harmony and friendship. Her retelling emphasised the importance of the mother's role as the 
'originatoe and 'regulator' of clan relationships to land. This aspect of the story was never 
mentioned by any of the men I interviewed. As this example shows, if clan-based 
understandings of land rights continue to play a role in the community, in-marrying wives in 
173 particular might be at a disadvantage in asserting individual claims . Women's land tenure 
rights may also be threatened in other ways. 
Another woman farmer on Druzhba emphasised that land was to be passed on to her son, but 
not to her eldest child, a daughter aged 24. When I asked why she wasn't considering giving 
her daughter land, she was incredulous at the idea: 'Why would she need it? She'll get 
married. What would she need land forT (Zachem ei nuzhna? Ona vyidet zamuzh. Zachem 
ei zemlya? ). In the future, the traditional custom of girls marrying outside the community 
and being provided for by their husbands may also lead to Kazak women being increasingly 
excluded from land tenure. 
Power relations and entitlement 
Just as official models for allocating land and asset shares were influenced by local 
perceptions of entitlement, they were also entwined with - and frequently trumped by - local 
power relations. The gender and other inequalities of the post-privatisation landscape also 
need to be placed in this wider context of the manipulation of land and property inventories 
and share allocation to the advantage of particular groups. Most commonly this took the 
form of 'prikhvatisatsiya' (from the word 'khvatat. - 'to seize'), the process by which 
powerful members of the collective, usually the director and highly placed farm officials, 
used their position to their own advantage during different stages of restructuring. Donor 
organisations and the Kazak government suggested that a chaotic period of ad hoc reform, 
which gave free reign to local power relations, was followed by more egalitarian process. 
My fieldwork suggested that the division was not so clear cut and that power relations 
continued to play a significant role in the later stages of reform. Informants referred to 
various means by which senior management had continued to influence the share allocation 
process, ranging from manipulation of share inventories - for example, by failing to include 
land and assets already being leased from the sovkhoz and creative interpretations of 
legislation"' - through control or manipulation of information to outright disinformation, 
harassment and threats. 
173 On the other hand, in some instances, the connection between men and land may work to incomer 
women's advantage. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, I came across one case of a woman being able to 
obtain land where her husband could not. They were both incomers to the village, but whereas it was 
felt that the husband was not entitled to land, since he had 'his own land' elsewhere, as a woman, she 
had no'clan' land and was entitled to land near the village. 
174 For instance, one informant told me that she knew of several cases of 'creative' local application of 
legislation in the Druzhba district, where the decree entitling farm directors who had worked on a 
particular sovkhoz for 20 years to 20% of total shares had extended to other directors. In other words, 
a director who had worked for 8 years, would be eligible for 8% of the shares, and this was interpreted 
to mean 8% of all livestock, 8% of all land, 8% of all machinery, etc - amounting in actual fact to 30 
or 40% of shares in some cases. She told me that nobody had brought a case to court, since they were 
too scared. ' 
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Sarybulak was a particularly useful case study for exploring this aspect of the 
interrelationship between dejure and defacto aspects of farm privatisation. The director of 
the association had written an 'official' version of the process for an oblast-level conference 
on privatisation, which I was able to compare with his oral account of events and those of 
other community members, including local officials and former agricultural and social sector 
employees, now variously private farmers, unemployed or engaged in myriad 'survival 
strategiee. This comparison illuminated the elisions and omissions in the official version 
and highlighted the points of conflict within the community over how entitlements were 
allocated in practice. 
According to the 'official version', privatisation closely followed the prescribed guidelines 
designed to ensure an equitable redistribution of the farm's land and assets. Following a 
general meeting in May 1992, a privatisation committee of 14 people was established to 
oversee the restructuring process. The committee first conducted a complete inventory of the 
sovkhoz's land and property (then comprising 235,006 hectares of land, of which 11,218 
hectares of hay land; 37,889 head of sheep, 193 head of cattle and 1852 horses). They then 
allocated individual shares, which, as we have seen, were calculated on the basis of 
members' labour contribution to the sovkhoz as of May 1992. Shares were allocated to 707 
people, including 456 sovkhoz workers, 18 pensioners and 133 infrastructure workers. 
According to the official document, at this initial stage of the restructuring process, 78 
people left the collective to form 12 peasant farms and 2 small businesses. The remainder 
joined the direct successor to the sovkhoz, the Sarybulak cooperative. Between June 1992 
and the next phase of restructuring, various members of the cooperative left to form a further 
4 small enterprises and 10 peasant farms. Then, on 15 November 1994 there was a general 
meeting of the cooperative, at which it was decided that it should be fully privatised. On the 
basis of the general meeting and 'at the wish of the members of the collective' the cooperative 
split up into 3 small enterprises, the Sarybulak Association and 21 peasant farms. By this 
time, the remaining assets of the cooperative comprised a mere 9103 sheep, 13 cattle and 250 
horses. According to the document, of these, 2223 sheep were distributed in lieu of back pay 
and a further 2911 sheep went to cover the enterprise's debts. Notwithstanding, the report 
also stated that all the new krestyanskie khozyaistva received livestock, housing, agricultural 
buildings and equipment, in accordance with their share allocations. 
However, in my various discussions with the report's author and other members of the 
community, it became clear that the process by which privatisation had been decided and 
individuals had actually been allocated their shares had been rather more opaque. On the one 
hand, the official document had entirely omitted the initial, 'ad hoc' stage of privatisation 
described by the donor agencies, during which substantial sovkhoz assets had already been 
distributed. As described above, around 17 people, mainly shepherds, had withdrawn from 
the collective before the process described in the document, taking considerable assets with 
them. On the other hand, the report did not mention the considerable changes in the 
conditions under which people were able to leave the collective over the period between 
1992 and 1994. In 1992, when shares were allocated on paper to the entire community and 
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the sovkhoz officially became a private enterprise 175 people who left to farm independently 
were able to do so on advantageous terms. With their shares, they were able to buy stock and 
equipment from the collective at well below market price. 176 However, the majority of the 
population did not start to withdraw real shares until much later, in 1994, by which time, the 
conditions were not only much less advantageous, but in real terms, very little actually 
remained. In effect, on both Druzhba and Sarybulak, a considerable time elapsed between the 
inventory and allocation of asset shares, by which time many moveable items (machinery, 
livestock) had either already been allocated or had 'disappeared'. Many villagers never 
received their due. It was widely alleged in all the communities that the nachalstvo (farm 
officials) had used the privatisation reform to 'cream off assets for themselves. 
'They didn't understand about shares; they were afraid to take them; so others took 
them and then it was already too late'. (Interview with village Akim, Sarybulak) 
'At first, people left on a volunteer basis to become farmers. They already knew 
what they were doing. The state gave them lots of advantages, credit and tractors. 
One or two years later, there were already far fewer sheep left on the sovkhoz and 
there was no order. Only the people who actually pastured the livestock got any 
shares at all. Because the process took place so gradually, some people got animals 
and complete pieces of equipment, but the others only got paper shares, not real 
shares'. (Interview, Sarybulak, nauchnyii sotrudnik, 30.7.98). 
'The leadership (nachalstvo) made sure that they got what they wanted, then people 
with powerful relatives and connections (znakomy), and the rest were left with 
nothing. I worked for 27 years and got nothing, apart from a share of hay land last 
year. The association is not a real one, it's just called an association - it is actually 
run by just one powerful, rich (krupnyl, hogatyi) farmer. He managed to use his 
influence to keep all the equipment. He wanted to keep people dependent - so that 
they would need him for machinery for the harvest and transport for transhumance. 
( ... ) Sultan-Bai gave 
his land to the association and gets to buy hay in return. But 
why should I give my land to them and then have to pay them for the produce from 
my own land? Better I keep it for myself and maybe use it later on'177 . (Interview on Arai zimovka, Sarybulak, 2/8/98. ) 
'You can't trust people to form an organisation. Everybody cheats everybody else. 
Here in Turar there are a lot of 'collective' krestyanskie khozyaistva with lots of 
people, but they are not productive. The management (nachalstvo) takes everything 
and the others are left with just 5 sacks of flour. It's better to take your own land and 
farm it yourself, even if you have no equipment. Most people had no information. 
The management called a meeting and just said that there was private property now 
and they would get land, livestock and equipment. But the livestock they gave out 
was all sick. I'm a doctor and I know - the cows had mastitis or were blind. Where 
they got them from I don't know. The officials got the best livestock and the 
"' The term he used was 'kollektivnoe obedineniye'. This term was used by local authorities to 
distinguish a new voluntary association of shareholders from the former collective concept, but it 
cannot be related to any of the various forms of business enterprise actually specified by the Civil 
Code (ADB, 1996b: 29). 
` It also seemed that some people 'bought' their shares, whilst some were 'given' assets, but the 
author of the report was unwilling to explain further and although this was mentioned by various 
respondents I was never able to fully elucidate this aspect of reform. "' The 'rich farmee referred to is the author of the ofricial privatisation report. Sultan-Bai is a friend 
of the respondent, also present at the interview. 
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equipment. They knew that the end of the sovkhoz was coming. Other people didn't 
understand. Then they held up the process. Told people to get together in groups. 
Otherwise people would have taken their own land much earlier. ' (woman farmer, 
Druzhba) 
'He arrived to take the Directoespost with a 'bare ass' (golaya zhepa). And soon 
after, he was well-dressed, kitted out in completely new clothes from head to foot. 
Now he has a flat in M. And his daughter had a huge dowry. And all that on a 
directoes salary? That was when the livestock started to disappear too. There are 
none left now, only heifers. The other director started to build the new club, wanted 
to build a swimming pool and tennis courts. He planted trees all along the roads. 
No-one understood what the boxes around them were for - so that when the gales 
blew, in Winter, they wouldn't be buried in snow... When he died, everything 
stopped! (sovkhoz accountant, Lenin) 
V Privatisation was a mistake. All it has meant is that the Director is lining his 
pockets, whilst most people haven't seen any money wages for the past 5 
years. 
Qu. How does he make money out of it? 
V Take the blocks for house-building that he has just sold. I heard he sold 
them for cash. Do you think that money goes into the sovkhoz budget? How 
do you think he paid for the 70,000 tenge laser operation to treat his wife's 
kidney stones? Before there was more accountability (democracy). Before 
you could have complained to the Party representative here - or at Rayon or 
Oblast level - and he would have been removed from his post. Before, the 
director was appointed. But now anyone who has money and the right 
connections can become director. 
Qu. Couldn't you take him to court? 
V It would be no good. For one, half the sovkhoz is related to him. Three 
brothers and their wives and their families, not to mention the aunties and 
uncles. The same goes for the question of the asset share. There's no point in 
even trying to get it, because even if you were successful in court 1) it would 
take a lot of money (bribes) and 2) someone would set fire to your bam or 
your hours at work would be cut - in general you would be forced to leave of 
your own accord! (Lenin: interview with teacher/private farmer) 
'The people who started private farms in 1992,93,94 are doing OK now. Except for 
the drought this year. They got help from the government. But now it is too late. 
Nobody is prepared to take the risk. If in some cases the Director has taken 
everything, the workers are themselves responsible. They just keep quiet. So you 
have to suppose that they are content, that their needs are being met. We preferred to 
stay in the sovkhoz - we thought it was impossible to make it on your own - better to 
stay together (sam po sebe otdel'no ne vyzhivesh - luchshe derzhat'sya vineste'). My 
coupons are lying at home and as for the shares... We'll never see any dividend from 
those! (Lenin, woman post off ice worker, 6.10.1997) 
Qu. 'I heard something about the director taking everything? 
D Yes, he took everything. He's a millionaire now. We had 3,000 head of 
cattle. Over three years, he sold them off, bit by bit. He was swimming in 
money. He bought a house in Almaty -3 storeys, with a veranda, just like in 
those American serials. He bought a whole mikro-rayon (district). He gave 
a car to one of his children. And you should have seen the wedding he 
organised, they were celebrating for a whole week. Someone said that 
Nazarbaev is as rich as Rothschild -I said you don't have to look further than 
our Director. 
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Qu. But isn't that all your money, your pai? 
Qu. (KG) Did you sign everything over to him? 
D. Yes, most people did. But we were proud - we preferred to take our shares 
and try to make a go of it on our own. But it was impossible. It's very 
crowded in the south - you don't get 20 hectares of land, you get 1.5. That's 
not much. You can sow onion and live really well, but you need to irrigate 
the fields and thaf s expensive. It was free for the first two years, but now 
you need to pay a lot of money. There were four of us - thaf s6 hectares. 
But we couldn't irrigate. The crops failed. There's a struggle for every little 
bit of land. And if s impossible to keep livestock - there are private farmers 
(arendatory) all over the place and there's nowhere to pasture them any 
more. Some people who took land, the ones who had a big domestic 
smallholding, did OK. They could slaughter their stock and use the money 
to buy goods and sell at a profit (kupi-prodazh), and then invest in the private 
farm. But we couldn't do that. If sa struggle between the wealthy farmers 
and the rest; they're squeezing the others out. if you can't use your land, it 
will be taken off you. We had to sell up and move - we had debts, for fuel 
and fertiliser. To be square with people we had to pay them off. 
Qu. Didn't they allocate irrigated and unirrigated land to everyone? 
D. In theory, yes, but in practice, no. People who, say, invited the local Akirn to 
a feast, who had connections, they were the ones that got the best land. The 
whole process of getting the land law passed took such a long time -3 years - 
because the private farmers wanted private ownership but the President said 
that the land should be Kazakstani. ( ... ) 
The sovkhoz had a whole range of small. food processing enterprises, for 
sausage and butter, which supplied Almaty. The chief specialists - the head 
economist and the zootechnician - who were in with the Director, wanted to 
take them. 
Those of us in the farm office, we knew about the privatisation - politicians 
would come by. The head economist told us to take our shares; otherwise 
we would be left with nothing. But then, for example, his barn caught fire - 
'by accident'. But the whole sovkhoz turned out to help put the fire out and 
there must have been a whole barrel of petrol, it was burning so, fiercely. 
The Director intimidated people - there was no encouragement to take 
shares. He wanted to take everything for himself. 
Qu. And thaf s what he did? 
D Yes. He started to lay people off. And in general he used the farm as his 
own private business to enrich his relatives. He milked it for 3 or 4 years. 
It's still functioning, but only just! (Conversation on Plodorovsky, with 
former accountant from Dzhetiginskii sovkhoz, near Almaty, 7.9.1997). 
As these examples show, villagers perceived power relations to be important not only during 
the 'first wave" of privatisation but also in the later stages as 'notional, shares were 
transfon-ned into real parcels of land and concrete assets. Their accounts highlight 
inequalities within rural communities in the concretisation of entitlements. 
Concretising land andproperty entitlements: Theformation ofnew enterprises 
once land and asset ' 
shares were allocated uslovno (on paper) to the sovkhoz membership, the 
next stage was for the collective to decide on the structure of the new farming enterprise(s). 
In theory, this decision-making process was an egalitarian and democratic one. The farm 
management was supposed to conduct a consultative process to establish a consensus, and 
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the final decision was to be made at a general meeting of the full membership. Whichever 
farm structure was chosen, members wishing to leave the farm and form independent or 
smaller farming units had the legal right to redeem their land share certificates for 
demarcated land plots and to withdraw their assets. All sovkhoz members were therefore 
theoretically able to transform their hypothetical shares into real shares or property. 
However, these hypothetical entitlements were only valuable to the extent that they could 
actually be concretised and a number of factors, including systems of assigning title to land, 
access to information and social and cultural understandings about authority, work and 
community, influenced the ways in which the different communities and sectors within them, 
chose to use their entitlements or were constrained in doing so. 
Systems of assigning title to land 
After the point where share certificates (svidetel'sma) were issued to the membership, state 
farms followed different systems for assigning title, which had a significant impact on the 
extent to which individuals were able to assert their ownership of land and assets. One 
informant, the powerful woman farmer from Druzhba, distinguished between three key 
variants, which were pertinent to the situation in my research communities: I)Confirmation 
of individual title 2) Director has sole title to land and property or 'Director takes all' and 3) 
Director maintains control over title through kin or other connections or 'Director, cronies 
and relatives take all'. 
Druzhba and two other farms in the district had followed Variant 1). Each shareholder was 
issued an off icial land title (Gos At na Zemlyu) with an identified parcel of land and an asset 
share. At this point, people could decide whether to form associations or to go it alone, but 
their legal rights were clear. My informant considered this to be the optimal variant for 
protecting individual entitlement. I found that, although many people felt that the 
restructuring process had not been entirely transparent, hey often cited the fact that they had 
actual paper certificates and real parcels of land as an encouragement to find out about their 
rights and consider becoming private farmers. Although many had originally joined 
producer cooperatives and had not been keen for them to be disbanded, unlike in the other 
variants, they had been able to redeem their land, if not their assets, when they did so. 
In 1998, Lenin sovkhoz was an embryonic representative of Variant 2). During the meeting 
to decide on the future of the sovkhoz in 1997, the farm director explained that people could 
now take land and asset shares and farm individually, but also discouraged the membership 
from doing so and advocated the solution of creating a producer cooperative or other 
collective enterprise. The vote on restructuring was called directly after speeches by the 
director and local officials about the disastrous consequences of restructuring on farms which 
had split up. , 
one argument used both on Lenin and the neighbouring sovkhoz, Plodorovsky, was that, if 
people left the collective, they would go hungry and be left without water and electricity. 
This argument was endorsed by the rayon Akim, who warned people that things were much 
worse on the farms that had split up and, if they decided to do so, they would be 'on their 
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own'., Another technique used on both farms was to emphasise that taking one's land and 
asset share would also mean taking on the corresponding share of the sovkhoz's debt, that 
their machinery could be seized by the state farm's creditors and they could face 
bankruptcy"'. Rather than issuing individual titles, members were told to sign an agreement 
(zayavleniye) giving their land and asset shares to the cooperative. 
On both Lenin and Plodorovsky, the population seemed to have been swayed by these 
arguments and had 'signed over their shares like sheep without discussion'. Nobody received 
even a paper certificate detailing their shares. Most people were unaware that their notional 
(uslovno) shares did not guarantee their future entitlement. In fact, until an individual 
shareholder actually goes through the process of getting title to land (Gos akt na zemlyu) and 
the new 'patent' authorising production, they have no legal claim to their land. As I left the 
field in the winter of 1998, the title deeds for the new joint stock company were being 
written up in the name of the Director, who would then have total control over land and 
assets. This had already occurred on Plodorovsky and other farms I visited in the Almaty 
region, where the director had been able to use his legal title to his own advantage. On the 
one hand, informants explained that after the harvest, when the shareholders could expect to 
receive their dividends, the director could claim that, after taxes and other contributions had 
been paid, only a small dividend remained. This dividend would be paid in kind in the form 
of flour or cheap Chinese goods, enabling the director to cream off profits and, in that the 
goods were often purchased cheaply on the bazaar, to charge them to members at far above 
the actual purchase price. On the other hand, any shareholders who subsequently decided to 
withdraw their land and asset shares would have to go through the director, who could show 
them the Gos At and say that they had signed away their shares. Even if they took the case 
to court, nothing could be done, since the title was legally in the directoes name and the 
former sovkhoz member had signed away his or her rights. This had not (yet? ) occurred on 
Lenin. However, one group of prospective private farmers told me that the Director had 
refused to release the land they wanted, on the grounds that it was being used by the sovkhoz. 
Instead they had been offered an 
- 
alternative plot of poor quality land some distance away on 
the edge of the farm, which bad not been cultivated for three years. It was only through 
subterfuge and going directly to the Land Office that they had managed to get the land they 
wanted, they said. They explained that there was no point in even trying to get their asset 
share because, 'even if you were successful in court a) it would take a lot of money (in 
bribes) and b) someone would set fire to your sarai or your hours at work would be cut - in 
general you would be forced to leave the community your own accord'. Other informants 
from Plodorovsky and the farms in Almaty region also referred to such direct or indirect 
intimidation or in some cases even violence, which created a climate of fear and dissuaded 
people from trying'to redeern'their shares. 
Sarybulak represented a combination of Variant 2) and its more subtle form, Variant 3), 
which complied with new legislation. After a Presidential decree that an entire sovkhoz 
17' The actual legal situation in this regard seems to be very unclear. None of the people I 
interviewed, including a judge working in the rayon centre and an administrator in charge of giving 
legal advice to new farmers in Karaganda was able to say to what extent private farmers were liable 
for sovkhoz debts, though the judge said that any liability was minimal and that the issue was being 
used to manipulate the rural population into signing shares over to directors. 
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should not be re-registered as a producer cooperative under one name, two slightly different 
practices emerged. On Sarybulak, the original cooperative was forcibly 'disbanded' and its 
members obliged to take their shares under unfavourable terms, whilst the director formed 
the Association, which maintained control over most of the land and assets. In other 
instances, the Director and chief specialists, and/or their kin and connections created separate 
Ocooperatives', in which case, as above, individuals trying to withdraw from the cooperative 
would find that they could not do so. 
When Variants 2) and 3) were used, people's status was a key factor in their ability to 
maintain their entitlements. Those with some kind of leverage, due to their position in the 
community (position within the farm hierarchy, economic clout, kinship or patron 
connections) or links with powerful outside patrons, were better placed to negotiate with the 
farm director and other authorities than those without it. As one private farmer, a former 
tractor driver, from Plodorovsky described: 
'The Director didn't want to let me take land. He said, 'Why do you want to become 
a bourgeoisT I said, I don't want to become a bourgeois; Ijust want to have my own 
land, make my own money. In the end, he gave me his permission - but he didn't 
give me any equipment, not even my tractor, which should have been mine. And he 
tried to give me land miles away, near the hills. He was afraid I would set a bad 
example to others. But one man, my father's age, a clever man, with two degrees, he 
got his equipment, no problem. He was the first to get land on lease too. But then he 
has connections - he's in with the Oblast Head of Forestry, you see. They go 
hunting together. He only has to say the word. The Director didn't make any 
problems for him! 
What this respondent did not say was the fact that he got land at all was most probably linked 
with the fact that he too had a degree of power through kin in Karaganda and through his 
father, who held the powerful position of Head Accountant on the sovkhoz for many years. 
Although Variant 1) gave most protection to individual shareholders, all prospective private 
farmers faced the obstacle course of actually obtaining a plot of land and getting it registered 
with the authorities, involving negotiations with the'director and the outlay of money, not to 
mention often bribes and exchanges of favours. Here again, gender and socio-economic 
status combined to produce cumulative advantage and disadvantage. Again, I found that the 
distinction made between social sector and agricultural workers in the allocation of shares 
was carried forward into the concretisation of shares. Even on Druzhba, where people had 
received individual title to land, social sphere workers found it especially difficult to obtain 
their shares. Similarly, women such as the sister of the farmer cited above, who had a senior 
management position on Lenin sovkhoz, were able to use their leverage to obtain land and 
assets for private farms or to withdraw their own shares. On the other hand, a woman 
teacher with no powerful relations and no financial resources had found it more difficult to 
get through this process. Again, the local discourse around disadvantage focused on the 
distinction between 'pooe and 'rich' or 'workers' and 'management', and did not highlight 
gender. However, my periods of participant observation graphically illustrated the gendered 
hierarchy of relationships, which impacted on people's ability to negotiate their entitlements. 
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In 1998, the Lenin farm Director was often absent and information about his rare visits 
would spread informally but rapidly 'on the grapevine'. The way in which people 'got an 
audience' with him, the order in which they were admitted and the attitudes they adopted 
were evocative of their relative positions. On one occasion, I arrived mid-morning to find 
several women pensioners, a middle-aged mate Kazak worker and a younger woman from 
one of the poorest families, who had already been waiting for two hours. As they sat there, 
the various specialists, without acknowledging either the secretary or the people waiting, 
would barge into the Director's office. I noted that they were purposeful, walked briskly, 
gave the impression of being powerful, important and busy. With the exception of the head 
accountant, all were men. There seemed to be various different levels of authority: the 
specialists from the farm office each came in and out several times; the specialists from the 
otdeleniye ntered, waited a while, then walked straight in. Meanwhile, the 'ordinary' people 
sat and waited patiently. As I sat taking notes, the younger woman took me to one side and 
tried to tidy my hair behind my cars, telling me that 'there are men here, after all' and that I 
should 'make myself nice for the Directoe. She herself was dressed in a headscarf rom 
which no hair escaped and a long skirt over leggings. When it came to her turn to see the 
Director, she demurred, telling me that I should go in first since she could always return the 
following day. The other people waiting agreed. When I insisted, she did go in, but came 
out straight away, saying that one of the specialists was still with the Director and he couldn't 
possibly speak to two people at once. One of the pensioners told me, 'you see, they are our 
specialists, it would be inappropriate (nepolozheno), bad (nekhorosho) to insist or to go in 
before them. ' Shortly afterwards, the Director got ready to leave, and it was uncertain 
whether or not he would be back that day. 
Relations within the farm were therefore governed by a hierarchy of authority, which seemed 
to be accepted, at least in public, by the ordinary members of the sovkhoz. Public space was 
also governed by set gender norms, which placed men before women, who were expected to 
be patient, modest and defer to men 179 . This hierarchy of authority was reflected in the 
resources available to villagers in negotiating their entitlements and in getting vital 
information about privatisation and their rights. 
111. Gender, Information and 'Staying Together': A Case Study of Sovkhoz 
Lenin 
One informant in Almaty oblast compared the current agrarian reform programme 
unfavourably with ' 
the Stolypin reforms initiated in Russia in 1905. The Stolypin reform had 
three clear points that peasants could understand, he told me: 1) everyone had the right to 
leave the mir; 2) people could take their land strips and garden plots to form a farm and 3); 
"I My main informant, the woman I stayed with during most of my visits and who had recently 
returned to the community after many years on the neighbouring'Russian'sovkhoz, explained that she 
had been criticised by her mother's kin for her ignorance of these public gender norms. Over dinner, 
using a'map'of condiments and cutlery on the table, she demonstrated how a younger person should 
always'give way'to an older person when walking along the street, stopping to let them pass first, and 
that a woman should always do the same for a man. She had been condemned as nevospitannaya 
(badly brought up), neskromnaya (immodest) and ignorant of Kazak tradition for not doing so. Since 
she had come to the community, she had continually to negotiate between her'informal' identity as a 
Kazak woman and her official one as a senior farm official. 
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land could be passed on to one's children. The current reform was like history coming round 
again on a bigger scale, he said, only this time, even after six years, nobody understood the 
essence of the reforms. Although somewhat exaggerated, his critique highlighted the 
striking lack of information and confusion about privatisation amongst rural populations. 
In order to take part in decision-making about the future of their enterprises and to make use 
of their shares, sovkhoz members needed information about the reasons behind privatisation, 
the process involved and what their rights, entitlements and options were. However, in 
Kazakstan, as in Russia (Perrotta, 1995: 5), 1 found that representatives of aid agencies 
unanimously criticised the lack of effort on the part of the state, local and farm authorities to 
explain either the principles behind privatisation or the practical arrangements for 
implementing it, together with the resulting inequalities in access to information across 
communities. Within the donor community, the fact that so many state farms had opted to 
'stay together' was widely perceived as a form of resistance to government reforms in the 
agricultural sector and the lack of information and the innate conservatism of the rural 
population were the two reasons most often cited to explain it (ADB 1996: 30). It was 
argued that, if the farm membership had been more aware of their rights and options, they 
would have taken up the new entrepreneurial opportunities in greater numbers. 
Despite the evident gendered pattern of farm ownership, gender was rarely mentioned in 
relation to this aspect of reform in Kazakstan. Elsewhere, it was suggested that women were 
one of the most 'conservative' sectors of farm populations in the sense that they were the least 
willing to opt for change and to take up the new entrepreneurial opportunities (Perrotta, 
1995). Two possible alternative frameworks suggested themselves. On the one hand, 
women's ability to take up the new opportunities might have been constrained by lower 
access to information. On the other hand, women and men might have had different interests 
and perceptions of the opportunities and risks of reform. Who held what knowledge about 
the privatisation process and the new rights and entitlements? How was information 
circulating and did men and women have equal access and equal knowledge about 
privatisation? Or, alternatively, did men and women have different kinds of knowledge about 
the process? This section draws on a detailed case study of the links between information, 
knowledge and perceptions of privatisation on the Lenin state farm, which had opted to 'stay 
together' and where no women owned or managed private farms. 
In this state farm, the approach of the rayon authorities and the community's relative 
isolation had clearly combined to reduce access to information for the community as a 
whole, including the farm management. At the meso level, the absence of a nation-wide 
government information campaign meant that the relationship between state farms and 
regional and local authorities was one of the most important vectors for infortnation about 
restructuring. Discussions with the Lenin rayon Akirn showed that, beneath the official 
discourse, local government approaches to reform differed both from state policy and from 
each other and had a considerable influence on the model of restructuring adopted by local 
state farms. On the one hand, echoing the language of the 'Kazakstan 2030' development 
programme (Chapter 3) the Akirn stressed that it was important that everyone should become 
a property owner (sobstvennik) and feel that he (sic) was 'his own boss' (sam khozyain) and 
stated that the main problem was to change mentalities, get people to understand the new 
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conditions and take advantage of the new opportunities. On the other hand, he veered 
between this 'official line', and explicit criticisms or ambivalence about the reform strategy, 
sliding between the idea that individuals needed to change their (backward) mentality to the 
idea that the state ought to have taken more account of people at local level and their specific 
circumstances. These included the fact that people had been used to working collectively and 
had lived comparatively well under the old system, and the area's particularly difficult 
climatic and agricultural conditions. He ended by saying that, in these circumstances, it was 
neither efficient nor feasible to split up large cereal-producing state farms, which needed to 
be able to cultivate vast tracts of land with sophisticated machinery. Although he stressed 
that local officials like himself were relatively powerless, since they were appointed rather 
than elected by local constituents, the local administration was responsible for implementing 
the farm privatisation programme promulgated by central government and there was a strong 
correlation between the views he expressed and the outcome of restructuring in the district, 
where all II former state farms had opted to reorganise as producer cooperatives or joint 
stock societies. Informants from outside the local administration often suggested that, while 
paying lip service to the idea of privatisation, both the administration and farm directors had 
preferred to maintain the status quo. In other words, they had promoted the policy of 
enterprises remaining united with known farm directors in control, thus preserving their own 
power bases, networks and privileges. Private farmers, in particular, reported that both farm 
directors and the rayon administration had made it very difficult for them to form and 
operate their enterprises and that withholding information had been one of the key ways in 
which they had maintained their power. Conversely, both the Akirn and the Lenin farm 
director downplayed the question of access to information. The Lenin farm director stressed 
that the privatisation process had been entirely transparent and cautioned me about believing 
rumours that farm officials were drawing any extra benefits for themselves. He positioned 
'himself 
as a benevolent paternalist, cushioning the worst effects of increasing economic and 
social differentiation on women, pensioners and children and protecting the farm 
membership against themselves through keeping the enterprise united until they understood 
privatisation and changed their mentalities: 
'People say that the farm officials are taking things for themselves. How is that 
possible? You can see for yourself that everything is visible here. No one could get 
away with that. It isjust that people have turned nasty. Life is hard. In fact it is they 
who are stealing from the sovkhoz, terribly. They've got used to doing it. We need to 
change people's mentalities. They don't understand. But you can't make people work 
when they're not getting a salary. If s understandable. I'm not concerned for my own 
future. I have education, connections, and intelligence. But most people here have 
less education. There are growing divisions in the community. Maybe that's why 
there are all these rumours about the farm officials taking things. The people who 
have their wits about them are beginning to live a bit better; they are working hard. 
And people say that they are stealing, grabbing things. That's not the case - its 
rubbish; don't you believe it. In the town, where there are enterprises, there are 
officials like that. But I was bom here. I can see how people live. My conscience 
wouldn't allow it. Not like the young people now - everything for themselves, 
grabbing. It is different here. We were brought up differently. Maybe there is 
something wrong with our economy, our political system, but our moral and spiritual 
education is better than yours. We help each other. What is happening now is 
normal. In any normal society there is a selection between people. People with 
more education live better. But before, simple workers earned more than officials. 
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Maybe that's what it is - people are envious. People don't understand. The people 
who live worst are women, pensioners, and children. I can see it - but people don! t 
understand it yet. If we had split into private farms, what would have happened? 
They would have set fire to the fields, the hay, and the tractors. Together, we don't 
trip each other up' (Lenin, fieldnotes, S. 10.1997). 
It was extremely difficult to establish the veracity of either claim, particularly in the climate 
of increasing breakdown of trust referred to by the director. However, the persistence of the 
rumours about the seizure of resources highlighted the lack of transparency surrounding the 
restructuring process. Contrary to what he told me, I found that privatisation was a far from 
'visible' process. What was clear was that neither he nor the local administration had made 
concerted attempts to inform the farm membership, or even its senior and middle-level 
management, about the process or their legal rights and entitlements. 
The Lenin farm managements' accounts of restructuring tended to suggest a uni-directional 
relationship between the state farm and the local authority, with the latter giving and the 
former following instructions. I heard that the rayon authorities initially 'told' the community 
to reorganise as a producer cooperative, so that they would be left in peace. As legislation 
evolved, they were then 'told' to register as an A. 0. Ooint stock company) instead, and 
finally, in 1998 to register as a subsidiary enterprise, to ensure that past debts were annulled. 
The farm office had no copies of the relevant legislation, even for its own staff, let alone for 
consultation by the wider membership. The specialists stressed that, although the rayon had 
organised training courses for the farm officials responsible for implementing reform, they 
themselves had been unable to attend and had very little knowledge about the issues 
involved. As the head accountant explained: 
'There is no funding. The bus, hotel and food alone would cost 15,000 tenge. We 
don't have that kind of money. Take the new bookkeeping methods. They came from 
the rayon and explained for one hour. They said there would be courses in 
Karaganda to learn more about it. They didn't give us any of the new forms. We 
don't know how to formulate things properly, so the tax inspectorate will fine us for 
doing things the old way. The rayonjust said, get on with it, do as you think best. ' 
These observations about the farm's increasing financial difficulties and resulting isolation 
were bome out by my own participant observation. Between 1996 and 1998, contact and 
communication between the community, its district and regional centres and other 
neighbouring towns became increasingly erratic. Whereas, during the first year, there were 
almost daily comings and goings between farm management and local officials, in the last 
year these had practically ceased. Local officials seldom came to the community. On the 
other hand, debt and spiralling petrol prices meant that the enterprise was no longer operating 
regular transport services and, even within the farm's senior management, only the director 
himself still had guaranteed access to a car. Farm officials were often unable to get to the 
district centre for meetings or had to use their own contacts and networks to find transport. 
Within the community as a whole, access to transport - and to the outside world - was 
therefore an increasingly fraught issue and a visible sign of the emerging social and 
economic differentiation. A small number of people, notably households who had already 
owned a car during the socialist period and the enterprise's drivers, were able to use or, in tile 
second instance 'borrow' their vehicles to act as private taxis. With the closure of the public 
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bus service, this was the only transport option available to most people, but many could not 
afford their services. As I discovered for myself, access to transport was also becoming a 
gendered issue. Like other women in the community, I found that my own need to get to the 
rayon centre or further afield had to be negotiated around the priorities of the handful of 
vehicle owners, most of whom were men. It was accepted that I and the other women 
travelling with me, even the head accountant, would defer our needs to theirs, often waiting 
for several hours whilst vodka was drunk and various deals were struck, a frustrating and 
sometimes even threatening process which made it difficult to plan or meet our own 
objectives. Inequalities of access to transport therefore impacted on peoples' ability to access 
rietworks and information outside the community. As the donor organisations had suggested, 
there therefore appeared to be a direct correlation between lack of information and a 
conservative approach to reform, with women particularly disadvantaged. However, when I 
began to look in more detail at access to information and views on privatisation within the 
community, I found that the relationship was more complex. 
At the micro level, within the community, information about privatisation was certainly a 
scarce and restricted commodity, kept within the management circle and passed along 
informal channels, via kinship, work and neighbourhood relations, rather than openly 
disseminated, circulated and discussed. I found that knowledge about restructuring had 
entered into the hierarchy of authority described above, decreasing proportionately with 
distance from the farm office, the hub of farm activity, and with status in the farm hierarchy, 
with the Director and chief specialists the best, and ordinary workers on the periphery, the 
worst informed. From my interviews, it was clear that few people knew about the various 
options, available or what their new rights and entitlements were. My informants' accounts of 
the period - between my first and second visits - when key decisions were taken about 
restructuring, suggested that the farm management had failed to involve the whole 
community in the required 'consultative process'180 . The general meeting to decide on the 
future structure of the farm had not been attended by the full membership. In particular, 
difficulties with transport and - some said deliberate - failure to inform people in time meant 
that those living on the periphery had been largely unable to attend. As a woman informant 
from the farm off ice described: 
'There was no official announcement that the meeting was to be held. You know 
how it is. They say Wednesday, then the rayon administrators don't show up. On 
the morning itself, we had to frantically ring around the otdeleniye. So not 
everybody found out about it. And there was no transport, so people just had to 
On other occasions, I personally observed the way in which information was restricted to the farm 
management. For example, on my second visit, I interviewed a district official who had come to 
discuss the upcoming auction of the boarding school and kindergarten buildings with the Director. He 
told me that the management was required to discuss the impending sale with the full membership. No 
meeting was ever held. Although notice of the sale was to be posted in the local press, few people in 
the community had access to newspapers. It appeared that the farm director was the only member of 
the community to be informed about the auction. According to the official, if no one from the 
community came forward to buy the buildings - which would probably auction for as little as 300 
tenge - they would simply be demolished and the materials sold off, The Director had apparently 
expressed an interest in buying them. 
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make their own way, on tractors and so on'81. There was no place for the 
troublemakers. So it was mostly the nachalniki (management). ' 
Relatively few women had attended the meeting to decide on the future of the enterprise. 
One explanation was that women were marginalised in the formal hierarchy, with the 
Director, seven of the eight chief specialists and the four heads of the otdelenic all men, 
along with eleven of the next level of employees (sluzhashchie). There were also fewer 
women than men among agricultural workers and social sector workers had not been 
encouraged to attend meetings. However, this did not provide a full explanation. To go back 
to the earlier example of the Lenin farm office, public space was governed by a particular 
gender code of conduct, according to which men were expected to act as the 'public' and 
women as the 'private' face of the household. As a woman teacher and main breadwinner for 
her extended family explained: 
'My little brother decides important questions. Even though I'm the one who feeds 
the family, he decides. If s like that in Kazak families. There is a difference between 
inside and outside. A woman must not contradict her husband or a man in public, 
but in private she may argue. In public, she must always defer to her husband. Even 
if he is an alcoholic' (Lenin, field notes, 21 November 1996). 
Accordingly, although both women and men might well be involved in decision-making, 
men but not women, were expected to take on the responsibility for playing a role in public 
debate. To cite another espondent: 
'People here are passive. Many times I've tried to goad them into action. I don't go to 
meetings any more because it makes me too angry to see people silent, when 
beforehand they make critical remarks to each other. The women - OK - but the 
men should be able to get together, say from the Avtopark, the NITS, and confront 
the director, ask him to account for this year's harvest, check through all the 
paperwork. There must be one of them who can get his head round it. People say 
it's not worth it. They won't understand what is written anyway. And the director 
will hide the truth. What's the point? But we're supposed to be an 'A. O. '- it's their 
organisation. All of us have our share of money invested in if (Lenin, Fieldnotes, 13 
October 1997). 
Conversely, women were expected to be responsible for maintaining the 'domestic front'"'. 
Therefore, women's absence from the general meeting cannot be simply interpreted to mean 
that they were not involved in the decision about what form the future enterprise should take. 
I found that both men and women had clear ideas about whether their sovkhoz should or 
"' Already, by this time, access to transport was one of the main dividing lines in the community. On 
my first visit, it was relatively easy to find ways of visiting the outlying villages. By my second visit, 
however, it was much more complicated. Since the enterprise was practically bankrupt and petrol was 
expensive, it was no longer operating any transport services. Few people had their own vehicles. 
Those with access were mainly men, either the sovkhoz specialists or drivers, who could 'borrow, 
official vehicles and acted as private taxis, but for a price many people could not afford. 
"' I found a similar pattern on the Dzezkazgan farms, where informants told me that most of the 
shepherds had attended information meetings, but the women had not, since 'they had to stay and look 
after the smallholding'. This did not mean that women had not been interested or involved in 
discussions. On the contrary, in this instance women respondents were often more willing to talk, at 
second hand, about what had happened at meetings. 
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should not have split up. Informants reported that there had been considerable debate but 
that it had all taken place 'underground - in groups of relatives'. When speaking to me, the 
overwhelming majority of women and men were equally vehement in their view that it was 
'better to stick togethee. A typical formulation of this position would be: 'We preferred to 
stay in the sovkhoz - we thought, there's no way you can survive alone, better to stick 
togethee(sam po sebe otdel'no ne vyzhivesh - luchshe derzhat'sya vmeste). The majority of 
the population, both men and women, were therefore reluctant to leave the collective 
enterprise to start a farm on their own and their views were reflected in the outcome of 
reform. 
Was this outcome due to the lack of information about privatisation? Would the farm 
membership have felt more empowered and acted differently if it had been able to make 
more informed choices? Undoubtedly, either due to ineffectiveness or deliberate intent on the 
part of the local and farm authorities, the sovkhoz membership was not given adequate 
information about privatisation or their rights and entitlements and this had contributed to a 
sense of powerlessness and fatalism. As one woman put it, 'if we had all been given actual 
shares, pieces of paper you can hold in your hand, then of course we would feel as if we 
could act to change things. We'd have the Director out in no time. But, as it is, there is 
nothing we can do'. On Lenin in particular, few people had been aware of the potential 
concern that they could lose their entitlements if the farrn director registered the new 
enterprise in his own name. Even. on the neighbouring farm, where one private farmer had 
explicitly told people that this was their last chance to take their shares and leave the 
sovkhoz, before the director became the 'master' (kho2yain) of the new joint stock company, 
I was told that 'people just demanded 'bread', 'light', 'water' - they weren't interested in the 
, 'question of 
land'. As this example suggests, people's decisions also need to be situated in the 
context of their own experience of reform. For the majority, the major issues were the 
maintenance of basic subsistence, food, light and water, rather than rights to land, and their 
choices reflected anxiety about preserving a minimum basis for existence rather than 
ideological preferences about ownership. 
Therefore, the desire not to leave the collective was not solely the result of a lack of 
information or misinformation, but also a rational response to the difficulties involved and a 
reflection of people's assessment of opportunity and risk and moral value. For the majority of 
,, my 
informants on Lenin, it appeared more advantageous to stay in ajoint-stock society and 
-work collectively than to risk running a farm on their own. When I asked informants why 
they did not want to start their own farm, they gave a number of reasons. They explained that 
agriculture was particularly difficult in the area, which was often subject to drought. 
Whereas, in the south, farmers could grow different varieties and the fields were smaller so 
they could irrigate if necessary, in their area, the size of the fields would be a problem for 
individual farmers, who could not afford to bring in planes to spray water and pesticides as 
the big enterprises did. Others cited problems with equipment: without government support 
or credit it would be far too expensive to purchase machinery and other inputs. Others 
focused on the isolation of the community: even if in theory it would be more profitable to 
farm independently, there would be too many problems in actually getting their produce to 
town, especially when one took account of petrol and the wear and tear on vehicles. As we 
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have seen, under the 'official discourse' about privatisation, similar concerns were voiced by 
the rayon Akim and other representatives of the regional and local authorities. 
A further set of reasons for not becoming private farmers concerned the loss of the support 
and benefits provided by membership of a collective. The head of one of the new private 
farms explained that its members had used land granted by the rayon Akim rather than their 
own land shares to set up the enterprise, so that 'if anything happens, we are still members of 
the sovkhoz and entitled to the services it provides'. Although by 1998, wages had not been 
paid for six years, these services and privileges were still considerable. Members of tile 
collective were eligible to receive meat, bread, and milk, together with winter coal and 
fodder for their subsidiary farms - when these were available - either in lieu of wages or at 
well below market rates. In addition, enterprise members had social security and medical 
coverage, which was still extremely important, even if many medical services now had to be 
paid for. 
A final set of reasons was connected with the way villagers understood community, 
solidarity and entitlement. There was a perception that becoming a private fanner meant 
undermining community solidarity for selfish, individual gain. Respondents told me that, 
although private farmers might be doing well, they were'only in it for themselves, ' didn't pay 
taxes and didn't pay into the pension fund. In the state farms that had split up, everyone was 
'looking out for himself or herself (kazhdii sam po sebe) and nobody helped anybody any 
more. 'Staying togethee, representing order, mutual help and support was therefore 
counterpoised against 'splitting up', representing selfish greed, disorder and chaos. 
These reasons were not specific to either women or men. However, men and women did 
tend to rank them differently, with men placing more stress on the agricultural problems and 
women on the social aspects and the loss of the benefits of membership of the collective. 
This gender difference was also reflected in the way in which women and men talked about 
the privatisation process in general. In answer to my question about how privatisation had 
been conducted in the community and how it had affected their lives, both men and women 
often referred primarily to disorder (besporyadok) or collapse (razvao and the fact that the 
main consequence was that various people, particularly the farm officials, were now able to 
steal or scrounge (vorovat' ,- khapnut) state property. Judging reform according to the 
perceptible results in their own lives rather than by reference to abstract ideological 
preferences, they saw reform as a watermark between 'now' and 'before': 'before' salaries had 
been paid on time, there was plenty of everything and it was even possible to save to buy 
luxuries; now, wages hadn't been paid for years and they lived from day to day, scraping to 
make ends meet'183 . 
However, whereas men often spontaneously went on to refer to privatisation in the sense of 
changes in enterprise structure, women rarely mentioned privatisation in this sense without 
being prompted by me. Instead, they referred most often to everyday difficulties with 
money, medicines and food: how to pay for the children's clothes and schoolbooks, how to 
183 Perrotta. (1995) found a similar pattern in rural Russia, where the majority of respondents were also 
more concerned with basic survival than questions of entitlement and ownership. 
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maintain the family's health and how to get food on the table. In this context, one of the 
most striking phrases used by several women in focus group interviews was that the main 
result of privatisation was that the farm management had literally 'eaten everything up' (oni 
vsye s'eh). It seemed that whereas men were looking through the lens of their 'outside' roles, 
women were mainly seeing the problems and opportunities of privatisation through the lens 
of their 'inside' or domestic responsibility of 'feeding the family'. Thus, although on Lenin 
both men and women were resistant to the idea of leaving the collective, women respondents 
saw a particular disincentive in doing so. Although they agreed that private farming might 
ultimately be more profitable, they felt it was also a much more risky venture in terms of 
family security and provisioning. 
Attitudes towards setting up private farms also varied between different categories of 
women. On Lenin, where the shift away from agricultural work for women was perceived as 
a sign of progress and modernity (Chapter 2), age and profession were key factors. Older 
respondents, many of whom had worked as tractor or combine operators, tended to be less 
opposed to the idea of private farming than the younger generation, although they felt that 
they were too old to take up the opportunity themselves. On the other hand, younger women, 
particularly those employed in administrative or social sector work valued the status and 
position this gave them and often saw agricultural labour as dirty and demeaning. They 
explained that whereas being an employee meant regular hours, having one's own income 
and benefiting from a network of colleagues who provided both friendship and crucial access 
to information and resources, becoming a private farmer would entail the loss of these social 
networks, as well as involving long hours and exhausting work, with no clear value or status. 
It was interesting that many women social sector workers on Druzhba also held a similar 
attitude, summed up by one informant who had lost her job as an agronomist in 1991 and 
whose husband and son had set up a private farm with which she did not want to be 
involved: 
'Why should I work for the farm? What for? When I worked, I felt like a human 
being. Now I am nothing. A housewife. I used to have my own niche, I felt 
independent, I had my own money. Now look how my husband and son are working 
- round the'clock. If I need something, I have to ask them for money. But I prefer to 
work as an employee. You get up in the morning, go to work, come home. Women 
felt protected before. They worked and felt like human beings! 
On Druzhba, even women who had become private farmers also referred to the particular 
disincentives and problems they faced: 
'Things are much more difficult for women private farmers than for men. The men 
come home and usually have a wife who has done everything in the house. But I am 
responsibl 
,e 
for everything, the ogorod and the house as well as the fields. Some 
days, like today, I think I will go mad. I had to milk the cows, but then something 
needed seeing to in the house; then I was baking the pirozhki, but had to go to the fields halfway through and get my daughters to finish the baking. Both of them 
work to a strict rota, there's no spare time. Then I had to get back to check the pies, 
then back to the field to give drinking water to the boys. And now I have to go and have words with the other water users, because they're taking more than their share. 
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My husband oesn't help much. The farm is my responsibility. ( ... ) But there are no benefits for farmers, not even child allowance. One of us had to stay in production 
to have a workbook and social security. We can't count on the future. Anything 
could happen. The land could be taken away again. We mustn't put all our eggs in 
one basket! (Fieldnotes, 18 July 1997) 
For women, then, the choice of what form the new enterprise should take could not be 
weighed up in terms of relative profitability alone, but was also part of a wider net of 
concerns connected with their domestic responsibilities and their own status. In particular, 
many respondents perceived the move from the protective umbrella of state employment, 
which made women 'feel like human beings', to the 'family' form of labour on private farms 
as threatening to their independence. This was in strong contrast to many male respondents, 
who explicitly saw farming as an opportunity to become one's own master (sam khozyain). 
The discourse of the private farmer as his 'own master' appeared to dovetail more closely 
with local perceptions of men's roles. Both the terms 'khozyain' (boss/master) and 
Isobstvennik' (property owner) are of masculine gender and carry connotations of authority 
and leadership. The opinion, voiced by both men and women, was that both pertained to 
men's 'outside' responsibilities and it was therefore inappropriate for women to take on major 
leadership roles. This view was clearly expressed by the woman oblast administrator 
responsible for giving legal advice to the new private farmers. Discussing a forthcoming 
legal case, in which the widow of a private farmer was disputing ownership of the farm with 
her brother-in-law, she said that it would be a bad thing if the woman won, since 'women 
rarely know how to be leaders' (redko zhenshchina umeet rukovodit ). Both male and female 
respondents within the Lenin community echoed her views. 
On the other hand, the local division of labour also contributed to the widespread perception 
that women didn't or couldn't farm. My questions about women farmers and women's roles 
in the new private farms were generally met with incredulity, even among respondents uch 
as these, whose wives were had contributed shares to the new enterprises: 
Qu. What will your wife's role be on the farm? 
V. (Amazement). What role? She won't be involved. She might help out from time 
to time. 
Qu. But her share is part of the farm. How will you organise decision-making? 
V. I haven't thought about such trifling details as that. There are major questions to 
be decided. As a share-holder, my wife is a founding member. God forbid it should 
ever come to that, but she can withdraw her land and farm it herself, do whatever she 
wants. 
Qu. How are the women in the family involved in the farm? 
A. (Non-plussed)., 
Qu. In the South a lot of women have become farmers... 
A. Things are different here. Everything's going back to how it was before. There is 
no work for women. They sit at home and raise (vyrashchivar - literally, grow) the 
children. 
Qu. Did you ever consider leaving the sovkhoz to set up a private farm? 
L. 'Yes, we thought about becoming private fartners. My husband can drive a tractor 
and operate machinery. He can turn his hand to anything. He could do the 
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agricultural work with my son and my daughter and I could concentrate on the 
vegetable plot and the livestock, the cows, sheep hens and geese'. 
As these examples show, farming was generally equated with agricultural work with 
machinery, which was defined as 'meWs work', and not with women's activities, which were 
generally categorised as 'help'. Only a few respondents, all of them women, included them 
explicitly in their discussions of private farming. Within the Lenin community and the 
surrounding region, the new discourse on private ownership and the 'restoration' of women's 
'traditional' roles therefore combined with the local gender code and division of labour to 
discourage women taking up private farming, especially as owners in their own right. 
An exploration of people's knowledge about privatisation on Lenin illustrates that the donor 
organisations' diagnosis of farm populations either as latent entrepreneurs, who, if given the 
right information, would take advantage of the new opportunities, or as innate conservatives, 
resistant to change, was overly reductive. Although lack of information about privatisation, 
rights and entitlements had certainly contributed to the community's resistance to the 
government-sponsored model of restructuring, it did not provide a full explanation of it. The 
decision to 'stay together' was a product of local models of authority, knowledge of farming 
conditions I and perceptions of opportunity and risk as well as confusion about 
the 
privatisation process itself. In addition, the farm population was weighing up the new 
entitlements to own land and assets against another set of 'social' entitlements and 
community ties which would be threatened by the move to private farming and which had 
not been taken into account in the official privatisation model. In terms of gender, women's 
marginalisation in the formal hierarchy certainly meant that they were less well-informed 
about privatisation per se and relatively excluded from the formal decision making process. 
On the other hand, women did make their voices heard through the informal channels 
underpinning the formal farm structures. What they expressed showed that men and women 
had different kinds of knowledge about the opportunities and risks of reform. In particular, 
wometfs concerns about securing family provisioning and their own status fell outside the 
privatisation framework of entrepreneurship and economic efficiency. From another angle, 
the way in which women and men highlighted different kinds of knowledge about 
pr, ivatisation, conformed to the existing'gender contract' within the community (Chapter 2). 
Although both men and women held strong opinions about whether the state farm should 
Istay together' or 'split up', it was more compatible with this gender cod6 for men to openly 
voice opinions about the privatisation process per se. It also appeared to be more compatible 
within this gender code for men than women to become private farmers, although, as 
discussed in the next section and the following chapter, local discourses also obscured the 
extent to which women were actually contributing to the new private farms. 
This section has highlighted the external and internal factors which shaped the Lenin 
membership's decision to 'stay togethee and dissuaded people from perceiving private 
farming as a viable option, particularly for women. The following section draws a contrast 
with the other communities, which opted for more radical restructuring and more people 
became private farmers, in order to begin to explain this outcome, both overall and with 
respect to gender. Specifically, what had made the difference between Lenin and Sarybulak, 
167 
where no women officially headed private farms, and Druzhba, where a significant numbers 
of women had become farmers in their own right? 
IV. Gender and private farming on Druzhba and Sarybulak 
Information, donor involvement andfarming systems 
In terms of external factors, access to information and donor support were two areas where 
the experience of Druzhba and Sarybulak diverged from that of Lenin. In both communities, 
a far higher proportion of informants were knowledgeable about the decollectivisation 
reform in general and their own rights and entitlements in particular. However, the link 
between access to information and support, more radical restructuring and greater 
involvement of women farmers was not clear-cut. 
First, the fact that informants were more aware of the issues surrounding privatisation 
appeared to stem primarily from the fact that the process had begun earlier and had already 
evolved through several stages by the time I began my fieldwork. As on Lenin, there had 
been no proactive grassroots information campaign about restructuring. Similar controversies 
over information and the relationship between local authorities and farm management were 
widespread in all three state farm communities, irrespective of whether they had opted to 
stay together or split up. Whilst the 'dispossessed' made recurrent claims that local 
authorities and farm management had channelled information along their own insider 
networks in order to cream off resources and maintain their own power bases, local officials 
and farm directors tended to downplay the question of access to information and highlight 
factors such as local mentalities and/or agricultural conditions to explain why some people 
had not withdrawn their shares to become private farmers. Again, there was a strong 
correlation between the models of restructuring espoused by district or regional authorities 
and the models adopted by local state farms. In the Dzezkazgan region, which the 
government had chosen as a pilot area for rural reform, the local administration was in 
favour of more radical restructuring and Sarybulak was typical of the majority of farms that 
had followed suite. Likewise, Druzhba had initially followed the district pattern of 
establishing producer cooperatives. However, it had subsequently departed radically from the 
model promulgated by the local authority, as the producer cooperatives disbanded and more 
people became private farmers. A key difference between this and the other two 
communities was that the state farm and its individual members had been less dependent on 
the rayon authority for information. The community's proximity to Almaty meant that 
information was more easily available from a variety of other sources, at least to those who 
knew where to look for it and a far greater proportion of respondents, including women, had 
made trips to the land office. On the other hand, the decision to disband the first wave 
cooperatives was often controversial and imposed by the new management rather than 
chosen by their membership as a whole. Only a minority had decided, rather than been 
obliged, to 'go it alone' and greater access to information was therefore only a partial 
explanation of the high number of private farms created in tile community. 
Second, outside support from donor organisations was another possible variable in 
explaining the more radical reform. Neither Lenin nor Sarybulak received any outside aid, 
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either during or after restructuring. However, on Druzhba, although no assistance was given 
with the privatisation process itself, various forms of aid were subsequently offered to 
private fanners. Being close to Almaty, and being known for its 'progressive' approach, the 
former sovkhoz was targeted for technical assistance by a number of donor agencies. In 
particular, the EU TACIS programme piloted its private farmers support project there, which 
included a micro-credit scheme for farmers. The rationale behind this project was that private 
farms were not receiving support from government to face their many legal, credit, training 
and marketing problems. It was hoped that the creation of a grassroots fanner co-operative 
movement would help farmers to be proactive, rather than waiting for government aid. 
During the first stage of the prcjectý which ended in 1996, various forms of assistance had 
been provided. On Druzhba, a number of farmers' groups and associations had been 
supported or initiated, including a general farmers association, 'Dzhuldiz, a sugar-beet 
growers association and several MTS (machinery) stations. One of the main instruments for 
fostering the development of these associations was a Farmer Credit Fund created to provide 
seasonal and long-term loans to private farmers. Under this joint TACISMSAID scheme, 
implemented by the US non-profit organisation, MercyCorps International, credit was 
provided to -individual farmers, provided they formed credit groups with at least five 
members. As of February 1996,87 farmers had received fuel and seed under the seasonal 
loans scheme and 15 groups had taken out $430,000 credit to be repaid over 2-15 years. In 
addition, the project had also organised extension training. Twenty farmers had visited farms 
in Germany and Portugal to study Western. farming and irrigation methods and Western, 
sugar beet seed had been provided to local growers. Under the second stage of the project, 
which was contiguous with my fieldwork, the aim was to work closely with other USAID 
contractors to extend the model to other oblasts, whilst responsibility for grassroots work in 
the rayon was passed to local counterparts in the Agro National Farmers Association. 
Although the donor project did provide a focus for people to discuss privatisation and 
resources for private farmers, its impact on the number of private farmers - specifically 
women farmers - was indirect. I found that only a minority of the new private farmers were 
aware of its existence and still fewer had actually benefited from it. The project management 
told me that no community-wide information and awareness-raising campaign had been 
conducted, since the project had limited funding and needed to restrict the number of 
applicants. Instead, people had come to them by word of mouth. My interviews on Druzhba 
suggested that the original beneficiaries had all come from the central village. They had 
included the 'first wave' private farmers, formerly influential members of the state farm 
management, and others connected to these two groups through neighbourhood, clan or other 
informal connections. Information about the project had mainly been passed along these 
people's networks and those of the local administrators. This lack of transparency meant that 
menand women not allied to the original beneficiaries did not get access to its resources, 
whilst the project itself also suffered adversely. Many of its procedures were 'hijacked' by 
other processes, as micro credit arrangements entered into existing relations of reciprocity 
and exchange that were difficult to monitor and control. As on Lenin, perceptions of 
cronyism and corruption also meant that the project lost out in terins of trust. 
From the perspective of gender and other aspects of inclusion/cxclusion, the project had not 
conducted stakeholder analysis or social surveys in the community and no particular attempt 
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was made in terms of outreach to women or other potentially disadvantaged groups. No 
social or gender monitoring of beneficiaries was being conducted and gender disaggregatcd 
data was not being recorded. The inclusion of women fan-ners in the donor project was 
haphazard rather than a deliberately planned outcome. Project staff pointed to one high 
profile case - the successful woman fanner described at the beginning of this chapter - as an 
example of women's inclusion, but no analysis had been made of her particular situation and 
how it might differ from that of other women in the community. I found that she was 
atypical in a number of ways. First, it was rare for a woman to have specialist higher 
education and technical agricultural expertise like hers. Second, she had capital to invest in 
the private farm from a previous enterprise, a sewing cooperative. And third, although she 
was concerned to distance herself from her previous status and from the nachalstvo in 
general, she was the wife of a fon-ner sovkhoz director, had contacts among the Kazakstani 
political elite and sat on the state farm's privatisation committee and therefore had more 
connections and influence than most women in the community. The personal example and 
views of this fanner herself had had no little influence on the fact that other women farmers 
had been included as beneficiaries in the project. On the one hand, she had passed 
information along her own networks, which had included women, and on the other, she had 
been explicitly concerned that women farmers, who 'needed to feed their families' should 
receive support. More broadly, her example had been instrumental in encouraging other 
women in the community to take up private farming. She was well known in the community 
and many of the women private farmers and entrepreneurs I spoke to explicitly stated that 
she had served as an example to them that women could run a private farm or business. As 
Chambers describes, 'the history of a [development project] success points to the primacy of 
the personal' (1992: 41). However, this personal example does not fully explain why so 
many women took up private farming on Druzhba, nor the existence of women farmers in 
other communities uch as Sarybulak. 
As on Lenin, external factors such as access to information and outside resources were just 
one of the factors shaping different perceptions of reform, as the state farm communities and 
their individual members tried to balance profit and risk with survival and sustainability, 
independence with mutuality and solidarity. The communities and different groups within 
them bad different and increasingly divergent understandings of what the'right' balance was, 
in which gender played a significant part. Referring back to the discussion in Chapter 2,1 
found that overall, on both Sarybulak and Druzhba, private fanning was more congruent with 
the communities' previous discourses around state, economy, moral value and the household 
and also with women's roles in the local gender code. 
Local farming systems, and their gender division of labour, were key determining factors in 
people's perceptions of private farming. On Lenin, few people seemed to feel that large- 
scale cereal production could be successfully undertaken by private farmers. However, in 
the two other communities, there was a perception that farming could be conducted 
sustainably and perhaps even profitably by private farmers as well as by large enterprises. 
On livestock farms like Sarybulak, both herding and fodder production could be carried out 
on a small-scale basis using household labour, and the previous decentralised production 
system (koshara) meant that people were already used to working more independently and 
across a broad area of expertise. Similarly, on Druzhba, where a wide variety of crops could 
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be grown, irrigation was possible and links with potential markets were better, private 
farming was also perceived more positively. In addition, for some groups, notably the 
Turkish, Korean and Uighur populations, subsidiary fanning was already a second economy 
activity rather than a purely domestic one during the Soviet period. This gave them a 
springboard into private farming and their farms often continued their previous and relatively 
lucrative niche of vegetable and flower cultivation. 
In both these fanning systems, women had played a far more visible role in agricultural 
production, which was being transposed to private farming. On Sarybulak, both women and 
men were involved in the main activity of herding. Herding brigades were often based on 
family groups, which were also the recommended basis for constituting the new private 
farmS184. Similarly, on Druzhba, although few women had experience of the machinery- 
dominated branches of work, they did the bulk of the more manual labour in sugar beet and 
horticultural production, both branches that could fairly readily be transferred to smaller 
private enterprises. In this region of Kazakstan, there was a long tradition of women's 
involvement in these two branches and many brigade and team leaders were women. When I 
asked why so many women had taken up farming in the community, women respondents 
often cited the fact that this agricultural experience could be readily transferred to smaller 
private enterprises. Others referred to their experience of managing small-scale production, 
saying that their private plots had made them familiar with comparable farming techniques 
such as seed selection and crop rotation. In the Turkish, Korean and Uighur communities, it 
was common for women to work primarily on their private plots rather than in sovkhoz 
production, and their predominant role in fieldwork and marketing was also transposed to the 
new private farms. In addition, these respondents, whose families had arrived in Kazakstan 
as deportees during the Stalin era also made a specific connection between land, work, 
autonomy and survival. In the words of one Turkish woman farmer, 
'There in Georgia, we had land like now -a house, a vegetable plot, then further 
away our fields, vineyards, nut trees; and in the hills, 60 sheep and 10 cows. [In 
Kazakstan] it was because of the land that [my family] survived. When you know 
how to work the land, you know you will survive. They worked. Ploughed. Bought 
a cow and little by little things improved. We Turks are prepared to labour in the 
f ields or plot - two hours before work. When I lived in Esik, I worked on the sovkhoz 
during the holidays, on sugar beet, tobacco and grapes. And we've always had a big 
private plot. I am not afraid of fieldwork and I am not afraid of taking land' (Turkish 
woman farmer, Druzhba, Fieldnotes, November 1998). 
As this example demonstrates, internal, cultural sets of factors also determined how the 
communities - and different groups within them - perceived private farming. In Chapter 2,1 
drew a distinction between the Lenin, Druzhba and Sarybulak communities in terms of how 
they were incorporated into the Soviet development project. I argued that Lenin represented 
a particular symbiosis, where a strong identification with the state collective was matched by 
a strong identification with the private sphere. 
184 By law, private (peasant) fanns (krestyanskie khozyaistva) were generally to be constituted on a 
kinship basis (ADB, 1997: 3). 
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Like a Central Asian 'throat singee whose simultaneous bass hum and high melody 
intertwine to produce complex harmonies, individuals combined these different regimes of 
value, using different idioms at different times and in different settings, but the two idioms 
harmonised in their stress on solidarity and reciprocity and their opposition to second 
economy activity. Here, private farming was perceived as inimical to this symbiosis, both to 
the 'public' collective and to family and kinship networks. In contrast, on Sarybulak, the 
scale of value tilted further towards the Kazak kin community and on Druzhba, towards tile 
second economy. Although similar hostility to private farming as 'divisive' was also 
expressed in these communities, the following ethnographic examples demonstrate how it 
was made 'compatible' with local discourses and how these shaped the gender division of 
labour and patterns of ownership in the new farms. Here, unlike on Lenin, women's 
involvement in private fanning was either not perceived to transgress the local discourse on 
the gender division of labour or was accommodated within it. 
Share and labour contributions to privatefarms and models ofownership and reward 
Women's shares were as vital as vital as men's to the creation of viable independent farms, 
which were typically created by pooling the shares of several related households, 85. On 
Sarybulak and in the Kazak community on Druzhba, family farms were characteristically 
186 organised by brothers together with their wives and children . In the other ethnic 
communities, patterns of relationship were more diverse, often also including work 
colleagues or neighbours. In both communities, the original contributors often included a 
wider circle of other relatives, particularly pensioners, who were too old to farm themselves. 
Although a wide circle of relatives often contributed to a new enterprise, there was not 
necessarily a concordance between these contributors and those actually working for the new 
farm. In general, labour responsibilities were allocated to various 'core' households and their 
members, according to their age, gender and expertise. Within the new private farms, ideas 
about the proper disposition of age and gender roles within families were shaping both the 
organisation of labour and the conceptualisation of property and entitlement'87 . 
To take the example of one of the biggest private farms on Sarybulak, cited above. The 
founding members, a former sovkhoz shepherd and his wife, together with his two brothers, 
five sons, three daughters and two daughters-in-law, pooled their 300 household stock with 
some 300 additional stock from their amalgamated shares. The shepherd pointed out that all 
these contributors, both men and women, had a work record and the right to a share of 
sovkhoz assets and all had contributed to the new enterprise. The bulk of the farm work was 
conducted by two of the sons and their wives and children. Both households would spend 
the winter on the zimovka, looking after the livestock. The eldest son, who had formerly 
worked as a tractor operator, was responsible for work with machinery. The second son had 
specialised in horse breeding and was responsible for the stock. The eldest sons' wives also 
115 One indicator of the importance of women's labour contribution to family farms was the number of 
instances I came across where women's resistance to taking up private farming had been a key factor 
in households' decisions not to do so. 
186 Henderson (1997) also found this agnatic principle of organisation to be common in rural 
K rgyzstan. 
1&ýSneath (2000) describes a similar transposition of the folk model of gender oles and the associated 
division of labour to private farms in inner Mongolia. 
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played an important part in the running of the farm. The shepherd explained that they 
worked 'on the same level' ( na ravne) as their husbands, although on different tasks. 
Following the traditional gender division of labour, which had continued both in sovkhoz and 
domestic production, they were responsible for feeding and looking after young animals, 
together with milking and the preparation and some sales of dairy products, mainly during 
the Spring and Summer months'88. At various times of year, a far wider circle of kin was 
also involved with farming activities, including shearing, herding on the summer pasture and 
hay cutting. These included the brothers, the three youngest sons, the daughters and one son- 
in-law, together with the members of some ten or fifteen related households who 
occasionally worked for the enterprise in return for the provision of basic necessities for their 
own families and household stock. As to overall management and administration, this fell to 
the father. It was he who obtained the necessary inputs (dostat), who organised large-scale 
sales of stock and fleece and who made final production decisions. He was also the official 
head of the enterprise and if s legal representative (juridicheskoe litso). 
With regard to how asset and labour contributions were reflected in property rights and 
rewards, the term that recurred most often in people's explanations of how their enterprises 
operated was 'vsye ob shchee' -which can perhaps 
best be translated as 'everything is in 
common' or 'everything belongs to everybody'. As one man put it, 'It has onlyjust happened 
here, this dividing up of things into yours and mine; before, everything was in common. We 
were taught differently and we really don't understand it. "89 Only in one case did I come 
across a private farm where the members had explicitly organised as a'mini sovkhoz', with an 
accountant who calculated individuals' work contributions and paid salaries accordingly. 
People would explain that nobody 'kept accounts' of who had put in what to the enterprise. 
Similarly, nobody was paid individually (lichnye dengi) for his or her farm labour. Instead, 
any benefits were either divided between the core households involved in the enterprise or, 
alternatively people could take what they needed, often after a meeting when everybody 
discussed whether it was really necessary. In other words, the new private farms were 
generally seen in relation to family property and relations in general, rather than as a discrete 
economic or productive entity, with corresponding calculations of entitlements. Sneath 
describes this pattern as 'corporate family ownership' (2000: 182). On Sarybulak and in the 
Kazak community on Druzhba, this approach to entitlement and reward often extended 
beyond the core farm membership and into other work and leasing arrangements. Like 
Sveta, the Kazak woman pensioner described earlier in the chapter, those who did not have 
the wherewithal to farm independently frequently handed their shares over to wealthier kin 
or clan members (po znakonistvu, po rodstvu) to farm, in return for a share of the produce 
and rewards. In general, this was done on the basis of trust rather than contract. As one 
former farm specialist from Sarybulak explained: 
'Many people hire themselves out to their relatives or acquaintances (znakomy). But 
the relationship is not one of employer, employee. If s more like the relationship 
188 So far, most of the dairy products they produced had been for the households' own use rather than 
for sale. However, the following year they planned to start producing mare's milk on a larger scale to 
sell for profit. One of the daughters-in-law was to be in charge of this aspect of production. 
189 1U nas tol'ko chto poshlo - eto tvoe, eto tvoe. Ran'she vsye obshee bylo. Nas uchili po drugomu. 
Nam ochen' neponyatno. ' Interview, Teumoinak, Sarybulak 5.8.98. 
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between a host and his guests. The host will never ask how many days a guest is 
staying. Every day, he will provide whatever the guest needs and wants. No account 
will be made. It is the same with the working arrangement. Tile host/guest 
relationship has spilled over. People know that they should make agreements, 
contracts, but it is not part of their way of thinking. So a man, his wife and their sons 
may work for a rich relative an entire winter, herding over 200 sheep and see nothing 
at the end of it. ' (Sarybulak fieldnotes, 30.7.98). 
A parallel can be drawn between this arrangement and the practice of 'handing back' shares 
to producer cooperatives or joint stock companies. In both cases, for those who were 
unprepared or unable to farm independently, the abstract value of land and other property 
had to be weighed against the wider entitlements conferred by membership of a larger group. 
The resulting relationship, whereby private farms supported a broad circle of kin, often in 
return for labour contributions, was reminiscent of the pre-Soviet form of kin labour 
organisation discussed in Chapter 2 and like it, had aspects of both solidarity and inequality. 
In fact, the local 'obshchi? model obscured the ways in which account was taken of 
individual contributions and the contradictions, including gender-related tensions, which 
existed within and between households190. The extent to which individuals benefited from 
common assets depended on hierarchies of authority and the values attached to different 
areas of work. Women's labour contributions were sometimes counted as'different but equal' 
spheres of work, sometimes as'help'and sometimes as'domestic work'. The knowledge and 
relative bargaining power of household members of different ages and sexes also varied 
considerably between the different enterprises I visited. 
In the enterprise cited above, all the members of the 'core households' I spoke to, including 
the two daughters-in-law, seemed relatively well informed about the creation and operation 
of the enterprise and were able to tell me about their share and labour contributions. 
Although, characteristically, the proceeds from their sales of butter, cream and cheese went 
back into the'common'pot, both they and their husbands and father-in-law appeared to value 
their contribution and they had a degree of influence. They had, for example, been able to 
stipulate that money needed to be spent to equip the children with clothes and books for the 
new term. This was not always the case. On another summer encampment, the head of the 
enterprise, founded by five different households, presented himself as its sole proprietor, 
with ultimate power over all decisions regarding production and reward. They had a 
common purse (kotek), he told me, but he was the head of the enterprise, and when someone 
wanted something, they came to him and he would decide. As on Lenin, he made no 
mention whatsoever of the women members' labour contribution to the farm, saying only that 
they did the 'domestic work'. He presented the model of decision-making in his own 
household in similar terms. When I asked him about the division of authority and 
responsibility, he blustered that he was the head of the household, and what he said was law. 
190 There was a similar tension on ceremonial occasions, such as weddings and funerals. Although the 
overt emphasis was on mutual support and solidarity, people also took careful account of help and 
gifts given and received. On this question, see Werner's work on the gift economy in Southern 
Kazakstan and Kandiyoti's (1998) research, which describes the contrast between the fluidity and 
apparent spontaneity of helping arrangements and the tight monitoring of reciprocity within social 
networks in Uzbekistan. 
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If his wife didn't want to listen to him, she would have to leave and find someone else'91. As 
on Lenin, despite the discourse on men's dominant role within the family, women often had 
much greater authority than this would suggest. However, in this particular case, the young 
wife of the head of the enterprise did appear totally cowed and to have little say in decision- 
making. 
Where perceptions in all three communities coincided most closely was in their normative 
models of authority. Headship of the family and family enterprise was generally conceived 
in terms of mate kinship, hierarchy and obligation. On Sarybulak, the official head of the 
enterprise was usually the most senior male, either the father, or if he was elderly, the eldest 
son. This position of authority gave greater weight in decision-making, but also needs to be 
seen in terms of obligation or responsibility: where the senior male had retired or fallen ill, 
the next in line was often obliged to take control of the family farm. In terms of male-female 
hierarchy, although senior female kin might have the experience and skills to run a farm, 
local ideas of appropriate behaviour, together with the informal practices governing 
entitlement discussed above, often made it difficult for them to do so. For example, Fatima 
had worked as an assistant shepherd with her husband for many years, on winter and summer 
pasture a considerable distance from the central village. Unlike many shepherds, she told 
me, her husband had encouraged her to learn all aspects of herding. She had been completely 
inexperienced at the beginning, but had learned how to ride, how to herd the livestock and 
even how to use a rifle to kill antelope and wolves and how to set traps. She and her husband 
had set up a family farm, which they had run for four years, together with their eldest son 
and his wife. But her husband had died the previous year, and she had sold up most of their 
stock and handed over their land to one of the wealthiest private farmers in the community. 
When I met her, she was living in the central village, but had just come to an agreement with 
the Head of the Association to take care of a large herd of the latter's stock, which she would 
herd together with her own remaining animals. She would receive a wage of 50 tyn per head 
per month and, in return for handing over a share of the young from her own stock, would 
receive feed to keep her own as well as the association's livestock over the winter. She told 
me that she now regretted the decision to sell up the private farm. She and her husband's 
dream had been to be able to 'look after themselves' (sam sehe ukhazhivat'sya). It had been 
much harder work and much riskier than staying with the sovkhoz, because you were 
responsible for everything, but they had been doing well. She wished that she had carried 
on, but when her husband died, his kin had been adamant that this was not possible. A 
woman by herself, even with an adult son, could not hope to manage an enterprise alone. It 
was better for her to work for the association. Implicitly, in taking her on as an employee, 
the head of the association had recognised her skill and competence as a herder. The work 
she would conduct for the association would be little different from working on her own 
enterprise. Both involved spending most of the year in isolation out on the steppe and 
required considerable self-reliance. The sole major difference was that in the latter, she 
would have been responsible for the 'provider' tasks of obtaining inputs, whereas in the 
, 
former, this aspect was taken over by the association, which therefore took her 'under its 
protection'. It seemed that for a woman to fulfil the'head of enterprise/provider' role was to 
191 "Ya glava khozyaistva,, ya reshil, ona delaet chto skazhu. Ne khochet mne slushat'- puskai! Poishchet drugogo. U nas nety takoe obychai". Fieldnotes, July 98. 
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step outside the proper division of responsibilities, in some way shaming both herself and her 
kin, who would be seen as not fulfilling their proper obligation towards her and particularly 
their deceased relative's children. The equation between men's provider role and farrn 
headship appeared to be widely shared in the community. When I asked tile village 
administration whether there were any women-headed farms in the community, I was first 
told that there were none. Then, on leaming that at least three women were farming on their 
own, I was told that a few women, who had no husband, no 'providee (korntilits) did have 
farms, but in any case, it was their sons or other male kin who were actually responsible and 
carrying out the work. It also seemed particularly important that men should be seen to be 
responsible for the 'outside' work. of negotiating to obtain inputs and find markets for 
produce, which often involved dealing with 'non-kin' middlemen. This aspect of local 
discourses around gender will be explored more fully in the case study in the following 
chapter and the discussions on the turn to subsistence and local constructions of the 
marketplace in Chapter 7. 
However, the woman farmer I interviewed painted a different picture of her activities, which 
stressed her own power and managerial authority as well as the importance of kin. As she 
explained, 'When you have good, hard-working sons and daughters-in-law, then it's possible 
to be a woman farmer. But otherwise, if they aren't obedient, it's impossible. I'm lucky. 
They listen to what I say. But if s me who makes all the decisions (razibirayus), me who 
does all the deals, to sell the produce, here and further afield' (Fieldnotes, Sarybulak, 7/8/98). 
She told me that starting the farm had been an obvious decision: the sovkhoz was going 
down the tubes (sovkhoz propao and one had to look after oneself and one's own (nado 
ukhazhivat'za sebya i svoikh). She had been an assistant shepherd and knew the work. Her 
husband had died seven years before, but in any case, he had been off herding all the time or 
drunk and she was used to taking all the decisions herself. Women's work was to milk, make 
kumiss and kurt and clean and wash - everything had its use, if there was time you did what 
had to be done. If you weren't stupid, you could do anything (esli ne durnaya, vsye 
smozhesh)192 . Asher account shows, women's headship was difficult to accommodate within 
the local gender code, but could be justified by the need to look after one's family and men's 
failure to meet their proper obligations, through physical absence or moral deficiency. Her 
account also highlights the difference in authority which often existed between senior 
women and their daughters-in-law. 
On Druzhba, although many more women had become farmers in their own right, farm 
headship was also difficult to accommodate with local models of gender and authority. Even 
where women did have formal title to land, the relationship between this and their position in 
household and family decision-making was a complex one. Unlike the majority of social 
sector workers, GuInara, the Turkish woman doctor and farmer mentioned earlier, had made 
a sustained effort to identify and secure ownership of her land. Not only this, she had 
registered her land separately from that of her husband as a different krestyanskoe 
khozyaistvo, which was very unusual. Thus, although she and her husband farmed all their 
192 Other women in the village confirmed this picture of energy, strength and self-reliance. I was told 
that she had managed to get work in the shop, despite the fact that she had no specific training. Then 
in 1970, she had decided that her husband and herself would become shepherds, to get him out of the 
village and away from the alcohol. 
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land together, each had a separate farm registered in their own name, and each was listed as a 
, member of 
the other's farm, together with their children. Her determination to own her own 
land was in keeping with the dynamic, decisive and competent persona she assumed at work 
in the clinic and her account of her childhood. 193 However, there was a contradiction 
between her formal land rights and autonomy and the persona she adopted within the family. 
Although her husband had had three strokes and she effectively managed both the farm and 
the household, at home she was much more 'eclipsed' than at work, deferring to her husband 
as the khozyain (head) of the household. Following their marriage, they had lived with her 
parents-in-law for several years. For the first year, according to Turkish tradition, she had 
remained silent and not spoken in their presence, as a mark of respect'94 . They then built a 
house in the same compound as her parents-in-law and continued to maintain close links. 
Gulnara had always had to temper her 'outside' independence and autonomy with 'inside' 
modesty and recognition of a fairly strict gendered code of behaviour. Although her role had 
changed with seniority and as she conferred the bulk of the domestic chores on her 
daughters, her family role did not fully reflect her fortnal, work persona. From our 
conversations it was clear that, despite the paltry pay, she did not want to give up her job as a 
doctor - which she loved and which brought her financial independence - for full-time 
private farming. In this case, Gulnara! s positions as a doctor and as a private farmer in her 
own right were 'made' compatible with the local gender code by her observance of its 
obligations in the domestic and ritual spheres. On the other hand, like other women social 
sector workers, she did not perceive private farming alone as a satisfactory source of 
satisfaction and independence. 
Women's roles as private farmers were also accommodated within the local gender code 
through the discourse around their work. Although women were often officially or de facto 
heads of farms, both men and women generally presented this as a 'secondary' activity, with 
men's activities, such as driving, described as bringing in the bulk of the family income. 
Similarly, whilst male farmers tended to speak about farming as an entrepreneurial or 
market-oriented activity, women farmers tended to present it primarily in terms of 'feeding 
the family'. As Bota described, 'The farm is my responsibility. We had to take land - with 
perestroika, things started to collapse and at least with land you can feed the family - mother 
earth will feed you'. Even Dina, who had become one of the most successful private farmers 
in the community, presented her activities in a markedly different way from similarly 
successful male respondents. Whilst she did refer to her aptitude and desire to be her own 
boss, she also framed her role as a fanner in terms of women's responsibilities in raising the 
younger generation: 
. 
'My farm work, for example, what's it for? People often ask me why I do it, why on 
earth I need so many tractors or cars. But what else would I do at this point in time. 
I live, in the country. What am I supposed to do? Go into the town and trade 
cigarettes and vodka on the street? That's not my thing. I want to work. I want to 
act. And apart from that, I feel that my work is useful. I have an influence on other 
people. I am an example for the young generation. There are a lot of young people 
Her father had encouraged her to study, and she had been the only Turkish girl from her village to 
attend a boarding school and then go on to further education. "' This tradition was still being followed in the Turkish community - GuInara's younger daughter had 
-just been 'stolen' and could only communicate with her husband's family in sign language. 
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who are out of work, who get drunk all the time, a big problem with alcoholism. 
When they saw that I was working the land and could afford to buy myself a new car 
every year, they began to wonder, how can this woman (tyetya) work the land and 
buy a car? Lots of them have started to work the land now. So this farm work has a 
positive influence on the young. It teaches them a love for work, or if not love, then 
at least that you need to work to survive. I can't say I live well, but I am surviving. 
if you want to live better, then you have to make it happen yourself. ' (Fieldnotes, 
5.8.97) 
I have already mentioned that, on Sarybulak, one of the obstacles to women farming 
independently was the perception that activities such as negotiating to obtain inputs and find 
markets were the responsibility of men. Although I observed a numerous occasions where 
Dina herself managed negotiations with potential suppliers or customers, including tile 
owner of the local sugar-beet processing plant, she did also employ a series of male farm 
'managers' (intendent), who conducted some of this work. In my final year of fieldwork, it 
was her new son-in-law who fulfilled this role. On the one hand, the 'social capital' she 
accrued from her position during the Soviet era had given her important contacts and skills in 
conducting transactions in her own right. On the other hand, as a woman, it was clearly also 
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useful to have a man to 'front' the farm on certain occasions 
In our conversations, Dina often referred, implicitly or explicitly, to local constructions of 
gender and her relationship to them as an entrepreneur and private farmer, stressing the ways 
in which her work put her outside women's traditional role in the gender division of labour, 
but also connecting her willingness to transgress gender and other boundaries with her 
success in the new market environment. These two themes emerge clearly in the following 
transcript, which was her answer to my question as to whether she would have been running 
the farm if her husband were still alive. 
'Before, I was the Director's wife. People were always at hand, at my beck and call. 
If the car broke down, 14 or 15 people would stop to help; just because I was the 
Director's wife. I didn't like all that. It was nothing to do with me as a person. It 
was as if I was in his shadow, as if I didn't have an identity of my own. Now, I'm 
the Director. It's me who finds out why a tractor has broken down and me who 
sends people to do the harvest. I like that. It would have been the same if he were 
still alive, though. He was a Party man. He always played by the rules. I like to be 
out in front, I'm sharp and I always see the way things are going. I plan ten years 
ahead. By the time other people have caught up, I'm already bored and moving on 
to something else. I was the first person to buy a tractor, a plough. Peoplesaid1was 
crazy. What do you want to privately own these things for? When I was 13,1 
learned to drive a tractor. I was the only woman in the village who could. Then I got 
bored and already went on to driving a car. In the North, when I came back from 
studying in 1971, there were a few other women driving tractors, but no women 
driving cars. Here even, in the South, when we came in 1978,1 was the only one. 
They used to make fun of me, honk their horns, drive in front of me to block my 
way. I remember when I was working as an accountant in Uznagach. The whole 
journey to work was like that - them driving in front of me and me driving in front 
of them! (Fieldnotes, 5.8.1997). 
'95 1 am grateful to Deniz Kandiyoti for focusing my attention on this aspect of the strategies of 
independent women farmers, which was an important one in rural Uzbekistan. 
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For Dina, breaking rules, including gender rules, was therefore a key aspect of being an 
entrepreneur and successfully adapting to change. At the same time, by stressing her 
'personhood' instead of her'womanhood' she risked putting herself beyond the pale, treading 
a fine line between belonging and exclusion from the moral community. 
In some ways, this was a risk incurred by all successful rural entrepreneurs, both men and 
women. As on Lenin, the institution of individual, private ownership was perceived to be 
leading to the emergence of divisions between rich and poor, explained by the former in 
terms of the appearance of capitalist entrepreneurs and by the latter in terms of the re- 
emergence of the feudal bais of pre-revolutionary times'96. I was struck by the similarities 
between this situation and that described by James C. Scott in his study of peasant resistance: 
'To exploit (these) new chances for capital accumulation ( ... ) large farmers and landlords have stripped away many of the economic and social ties that previously 
bound them to poorer villagers. ( ... ) In doing so, they have found themselves 
operating in something of an ideological vacuum. What we observe (in Sedaka and 
elsewhere on the Muda plain) is an emerging capitalist agrarian class which has been 
steadily shedding its ties to labourers and tenants but which acts in a largely pre- 
capitalist normative atmosphere that makes it extremely difficult to justify the action 
it has taken. They are, in this sense, capitalists who are obliged to explain 
themselves - to justify their conduct publicly' (1985: 184). 
The tension between capitalist accumulation and moral and social obligations was reflected 
in the way the'big farmers'talked about their enterprises: on the one hand, they were keen to 
present them as dynamic, efficient, profit-oriented businesses. On the other, they were 
equally concerned to emphasise their role in supporting the community, stressing that'we all 
help each othee or 'we are all developing together! For example, the Director of the 
Sarybulak Association stressed his skills in marketing, recently demonstrated in a lucrative 
sale of fleeces to Turkey, and his credo that, as a private farmer, he could not work for free. 
On the other hand, he also emphasised his social responsibility, saying that, since he had 
taken people's shares, he also had a responsibility to provide them with hay, feed and so on, 
in good time for the Winter and services for people in need. Interestingly, he had recently 
organised a major feast for his uru, complete with traditional horse racing, similar to those 
which clan leaders held in the past, thereby consolidating his legal title with a'moral'title to 
ownership and leadership within the community. 
However, the behaviour of successful women farmers, such as Dina, was framed in gender 
specif ic 
, 
terms. It was not just their membership of the 'moral community' that was at issue, 
but also their membership of the specific 'female' moral community'97 . The most virulent 
criticisms of Dina were from other women. Observing the interactions between her and 
other male private farmers, it seemed that she enjoyed considerable support and respect. In 
196 In pre-soviet Kazak society, the terin referred to the head of the aul; it is now widely used 
pejoratively to denote villagers who are perceived to have benefited most from reform, such as private 
farmers with large holdings. See Zhumalieva Z. 'Pervyi paren na derevne ezdit na belom 
"Mersedese"', Karavan. 9 May, 1997. 
197 These questions will be discussed in more depth in Chapters 6 and 7, in connection with the 
analysis of changing meanings of labour and social networks. In particular, her position regarding 
solidarity/differentiation changed considerably over the period I conducted my fieldwork. 
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meetings with the TACIS representatives, she was clearly the main spokesperson. Similarly, 
during the busy harvest period, when I accompanied her to the fields, she seemed to have an 
easy and comradely relationship with the other male farmers and combine operators. Her 
views on agricultural issues were listened to and often followed. Indeed, several times during 
my stay, potential private farmers came to see her from as far afield as Semipalatinsk oblast 
to ask for information and advice. Typical comments from male respondents stressed that she 
'had what it took! to be a successful farmer. It was possible, of course, that men in the 
community talked about her in a different way amongst themselves when I was not present. 
Many of the women private farmers and entrepreneurs I spoke to explicitly stated that her 
example had been inspirational in encouraging them to create a private farm or business. 
However, in many cases, their respect was tinged with ambivalence about her crossing 
accepted boundaries, as in the following comments, where my respondents expressed 
mingled admiration, envy and disapproval: 
'She is amazing, she could take on any man. She's totally ruthless. She goes for 
what she wants and doesn't care what people say. ' (Former director of a public 
enterprise, now a trader, Fieldnotes 15.7.97). 
'She is clever, cunning (umnaya, khitraya). She saw the situation. She was the wife 
of the Former Director and she took her place. She grabbed equipment. ' (Woman 
private farmer, Fieldnotes, 1.11.98) 
Former women co-workers specifically linked their claim that she had misappropriated their 
shares with complaints that their personal relationship with her had changed: 
'With most women of my generation, I can talk about everything under the sun - 
children, grandchildren, health problems. I remember how in the sewing workshop 
we used to talk, to share our problems. But I can't do that with Dina anymore. Often 
she doesn't greet me in the street, just walks on by. What kind of behaviour is that? 
We're both people! Sometimes she does, sometimes she doesn't. Anyway, I feel 
intimidated by her now. And how her daughters have changed! Her daughter used 
to be such as shy little thing. And now she has become a right little madam, skirt as 
short as you like and cigarette in hand. Dina used to be beautiful - but she has 
always been called a 'man in women's clothing! (muzhik v zhenskoi odezhde). ' 
(Former worker in the sewing cooperative, Fieldnotes, 10.08.1997) 
If 'all labour of emotional connectedness is designated as female' (Oakley, 1985: 201), by 
becoming an entrepreneur, Dina was seen to have transgressed these rules of female 
relationship and community. Further, both she and her daughters were criticised for 
limpropeefernale behaviour - her daughters (and through them Dina herselo for assuming 
the 'Russian' attributes of smoking and wearing immodest clothing and Dina for being a kind 
of 'false woman'. A number of respondents used a similar term, referring to her as a 'man in 
a skire (muzhik v yubke). 'So, although similar criticisms about resource grabbing were also 
levelled at male farmers, criticisms of Dina carried a particular gendered sting in the tail, 
focusing on her withdrawal from the female collective, her neglect of her proper motherly 
role in educating her daughters and her rejection of proper femininity. She herself 
recognised the gendered price she had to pay: 
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'I haven't been a woman for a long time, just a person. The only feminine thing 
aboutmeismysex. I have never believed that a woman should just take care of her 
appearance, look like a picture. I never supported that. I always saw women as 
people, as good upstanding people, good friends, good mothers, good housekeepers, 
hardworking people. But now I have become not only a hardworking person. I have 
started to do men's work. And I'm not a woman any more, just a person of female 
sex at the moment! (Fieldnotes, 5.8.1997) 
Perhaps one of the reasons why Dina felt able to transgress gender boundaries in this way 
was that her ambivalent relationship to the community may have given her greater freedom 
to pursue her own path. She and her husband had both been 'outsiders'. Her husband had 
been appointed sovkhoz Director over a locally preferred candidate, and she was extremely 
bitter about the reception they had received and the community's treatment of her after her 
husband's death. Her accounts of this period stressed her exclusion from the moral 
community and social support and her struggle to maintain her own and her daughters' rights 
and position. Other women farmers tended to present their activities in ways that were more 
congruent with local perceptions of women'spropee roles. 
We can look at Dina! s case and that of other women farmers in the community from two 
different angles: on the one hand, as on Lenin and Sarybulak, local discourses around 
women's 'propee roles were an obstacle to women becoming private farmers in their own 
right; on the other, women's roles in 'feeding the family' provided them with an acceptable, 
or 'moral' way of entering market production, which, together with the farming and share 
allocation systems, partially 
, 
explains the greater number of women farmers in the 
community. However, we also need to unpick the relationship between local discourse and 
practice, particularly in terms of the relationship between women's actual contribution to 
private farming and its reflection in land and property ownership and the differentiation 
between 'subsistence' and 'commercial' activity, which was beginning to be an important 
factor in the further development of private farms. 
In that private farms entered into the new sphere of market and law-based property relations, 
gendered local discourses around authority and the value of labour were influencing the way 
entitlements were translated into official membership of enterprises and title to land and 
assets. By law, one of the steps in officially registering a private farm was to draw up a list 
of members and establish one of them as head of the enterprise. This gave the enterprise 
head and members a number of rights and obligations. In terms of obligations, each member 
I was liable for tax and needed to contribute to their own health and social security insurance. 
In terms of rights, the enterprise head was the signatory to the official land title and had the 
. 
right to sign financial documents and take decisions regarding the operation of the enterprise. 
The enterprise members were granted property rights in the enterprise, and disputes over 
land and property were to be resolved by the courts. 
On both Sarybulak and Druzhba, I found that women's actual contributions to the new 
enterprises were not necessarily translated into forinal entitlements. First, men, as heads of 
households, tended to be registered as heads of family farms, even where women were de 
facto acting as farm managers. Second, women's involvement in the new enterprises was not 
always reflected in the official membership documents. On Druzhba, practice had shifted as 
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legislation evolved. Initially, potential farmers needed to prove that they were able to work 
their land before they could set up a private farm. At this point, people tended to list all 
family members, including the extended family, to prove that tile land would not fall into 
disuse. By 1998, however, the situation was rather different. Taxes were payable for each 
member of the enterprise, which led to under-recording. The different values ascribed to 
men's and women's labour, together with the fact that some women, particularly social sector 
workers, preferred to maintain their social rights from waged employment, was leading to a 
tendency to list only male kin. 
At that time, formal entitlements were in many ways less significant than informal, local 
practices. However, as legal and market reform progressed, it was likely that official deeds of 
ownership would come to take on greater importance. In the acrimonious conflicts between 
'winners' and 'losers', the winners were already beginning to use their possession of title 
deeds as a 'trump card' in their claims to entitlement'98. Similarly, so long as households 
continued to farm together, the question of individual men's and womenis entitlements 
remained in abeyance. However, in the event of a spouse's death or divorce, for example, 
women's lack of formal entitlement was likely to be an important issue. There was also a 
growing tendency for larger family farms to split into smaller ones, which made individual 
ownership rights a more pressing issue. As in communities such as Lenin, which opted to 
'stay togethee, members wishing to, or being obliged to leave large family farms, would need 
to negotiate the terms of their departure with the head of the family/enterprise. As we have 
seen, gender was one of the factors influencing access to power and resources within both 
families and family farms. 
A further point was that the official statistics on men's and women's employment in private 
farming that would be passed to the macro level to inform future policy, also presented a 
skewed picture of their actual contributions. 
Table 5.5: Druzhba -figures on male andjemale employees on privatefarms. 
Number of private farms Number of employees Men Women 
1997 385 1300 - - 
1998 434 1100 800 300 
officials in the Akimiat told me that, although they had begun to record gender 
disaggregated ata, the figures on the numbers of men and women working for the new 
private farms were approximate, based on a model estimate of three workers per farm, 
typically a father, son and his wife. As we have seen, this model did not reflect tile 
complexity of actual work relations on private farms and, like local discourse, undervalued 
women's contribution to their operation. 
On Druzhba, local discourses tended to frame men's farming as 'commercial' and women's 
farming activities as'feeding the family'. It is important to distinguish between two different 
198 For example, one farmer told me he had bought 8,000 sheep in 1992, which turned out to be 
someone lse's share. When I asked whether he intended to compensate the shareholder, he said he 
had no intention of doing so, he had paid money for them and they were now his property. 
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aspects of this: whether ways of talking about men's and women's roles in private farming 
primarily reflected the 'rural gender contract! in the community or whether they also reflected 
actual gender patterns of labour and differences in orientation between male and fernale- 
owned farms. 
By 1998, there was a growing differentiation in the community between a minority of large, 
commercial farms and the majority of small farms, like Bota's, where the boundaries 
between commercial and subsidiary farming were blurred. Before the cooperatives 
disbanded, only ten truly independent private farms had been established. For the majority, 
the decision to take up farming was part of a family survival strategy to cope with the 
growing uncertainties of the post-independence period. To be registered, these farms needed 
to produce a detailed 'business plan' for the land office. However, even if these programmes 
framed them as 'business enterprises, ' they were also used to supply household needs. As 
economic and land reform progressed and problems with credit, machinery, irrigation and 
land complicated market production, increasing numbers of these small farms shifted further 
towards subsistence production. Thus, on the one hand, although men and women in this 
category talked about their farms in very different terms, they were not actually very 
different from each other. On the other hand, there were gendered patterns within these 
farms and between these and the larger enterprises. The family plot was traditionally 
women's domain and their ultimate responsibility for feeding the family was reflected in the 
fact that it was often women, rather than their husbands, who took primary responsibility for 
the family farm, whilst men took up other niche positions, for example, as drivers. However, 
even where men were originally involved in this category of private farm, as the balance 
shifted towards subsidiary farming, they increasingly tended to hand over the day-to-day 
running, if not the control, to the women in the household as they took up paid employment 
elsewhere. The category of small farrns was therefore becoming ferninised in a number of 
ways: firstly, as we have seen, by leaving them with less land and less or no equipment, the 
share allocation system had concentrated women farmers in this category; secondly, the 
sexual division of labour meant that women were often, de facto, responsible for family 
farms; thirdly, the exodus of men and the association of subsidiary farming with women's 
work was creating a growing difference in perceptions of the different types of farming, 
which was reinforcing a gendered division between farms. 
As market relations extended deeper into the community, the existence of the new form of 
commercial farming was pushing subsidiary farming into a new category of 'subsistence'. 
Conversations with Dina and other respondents illustrated how this shift towards subsistence 
was changing the values people ascribed to this type of fanning. In 1996, Dina explicitly 
referred to women like Bota as 'private farmers' (chastnikl). By 1998, however, her views 
were rather different. She was mdking a distinction between farmers, like herself, who were 
'standing strongly on their feet' and the others, who were 'merely' engaged in farming for 
subsistence or survival: 
'Bota is not a proper farmer. What did she sow this year? Just a bit of grass and 
some barley. Anyway, the land isn't hers. It belongs to her father-in-law. And she 
drinks. Why are you spending time with her and the other women like her? They 
are just alcoholics! (Fieldnotes, 2.12.1998) 
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If being a 'real farmer' meant owning land and producing for the market, the majority of 
farmers and most women farmers were excluded from this category. Moreover, the way 
these farms were valued in the market oriented discourse of efficiency and productivity, 
threatened to lead to a process of cumulative disadvantage. 
During the crucial harvest period in 1998, Dina explained the 'new, Western' credo that was 
beginning to shape her own decisions: 
'Wheat is standing in the fields unharvested because there is no combine. Say there 
are 5 members in your association, including yourself, one a woman with 5 children 
farming alone on 3 hectares - whose wheat would you harvest first? Probably your 
own? Thaf s the way you do things in the West. What did I do? I harvested the 
woman's wheat, because I felt sorry for her. How is she going to manage with her 
children, with nothing to put in their mouths? And what would people say?; that 
you've done your own harvesting first and left hers to rot in the field? It's in the 
Soviet mentality to help and support each other, friends and family, not to let each 
other down. But I won't do it again. If I lose my wheat, thaf s 300 tonnes down the 
drain, if the other woman loses hers, if s 30 tonnes. And she would be unable to help 
me out if that happened. I won't do the same next time. ' (Fieldnotes, 19.9.1998) 
According to this rationale, it was no good helping the weakest, when they were going to go 
down the tubes; credit and support ought to go to the strongest, who would then help the 
others. Dina explicitly contrasted this 'Western' way of thinking with the 'Soviet' one and 
said she had learned it from the donor support project. 
In effect, the donor project had deliberately chosen to focus support on the most profitable 
farms. The criteria for allocating credit ruled out applicants who only had sufficient land to 
feed the family, applicants whose farms had not been registered or who did not have title to 
land and applicants who had no equipment (not just a house or land) to commit as collateral 
for the loan. As one project manager recognised, these criteria were to some extent 
subverted by informal practices. At least in one case (Bota) a woman fanner with no title to 
land had used her social networks to obtain credit in another farmer's name. However, 
formally, these criteria mitigated against women farmers receiving further support. In this 
way, the donor support project, oriented primarily by the macro level 'transition' discourse on 
economic efficiency, was helping to establish and reinforce a gendered differentiation 
between commercial and subsistence farms. 
V. Conclusions 
Taking a narrow definition of privatisation as the policy of redistribution of the land and 
assets of state farms, I have argued that gender was a significant factor in this process, 
looking at: 1) the extent to which existing gender disparities within communities affected the 
shaping and outcome of redistribution and enterprise formation; 2) the extent to which the 
privatisation reform itself was producing new gender disparities and 3) how the different 
examples of redistribution and reorganisation compared in this regard. 
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The aim of land reform and farm restructuring was to redistribute land and assets from large- 
scale (public) state enterprises to private ownership in smaller agricultural enterprises and 
family farms. Its two main objectives were to increase efficiency and people's sense of 
'ownership'. Each individual state farm member was to be given entitlements to be converted 
into property ownership and a stake in a new agricultural enterprise. However, the way 
reform was framed at macro level meant that the objective of increasing people's sense of 
ownership was in tension with the objective of increasing efficiency. As reform progressed, 
it was acknowledged that not all shareholders would be able to become 'efficient producers' 
and 'efficient production' would mean drastic reductions in the rural labour force. At local 
level, power relations within communities also subverted equitable redistribution, both in the 
initial 'ad hoc' stages of privatisation and under the new 'egalitarian' share-distribution 
models subsequently implemented in most communities. Both stages reflected existing 
socio-economic relations, and the distribution and previous inequalities of power within state 
farm communities were largely reproduced and consolidated as reform progressed. Farm 
officials, specialists and elite workers were able to take a 'larger slice of the cake' and initial 
differences were widening, creating categories of those who had land and assets and those 
who did not; those who have enough land and assets to be able to live comfortably or make a 
profit and those who only had enough to survive. Even in the many communities that 
resisted division and where these wide and evident differences were'in abeyance'there was a 
tendency for power and resources to be consolidated in the hands of individual farm 
directors. 
Gender equity was not given priority in the reform of the agricultural sector. The models of 
redistribution promoted at macro level contained an inherent tension between the assumption 
that the 'gender neutral' individual would enjoy new property rights and the assumption that 
families were the basic unit of society and that reforms should be structured around the 
family unit rather than individuals. Moreover, restructuring did not take account of the 
existing gender division of labour and power on state farms and within families or the ways 
in which local discourses might shape different constraints and opportunities for women and 
men. However, gender was an important element in the picture of cumulative advantage and 
disadvantage described above. 
The systems used for calculating individual entitlements varied between communities, but all 
made a distinction between agricultural and service sector employees, with the latter 
consistently allocated lower shares. Given the previous gender structure of the labour-force, 
this discriminated against women, but to differing degrees, depending on the previous 
farming system. In mechanized cereal production farms like Lenin, relatively few women 
worked in public agricultural production, whereas in extensive livestock and horticultural 
farms like Sarybulak and Druzhba, a larger proportion of women worked in agriculture. 
Here, the extent to which women benefited in relation to men and certain categories of 
women in relation to each other, depended on the calculation system used. Systems for 
allocating land and property shares were also influenced by local understandings of labour 
and use rights. In all the communities, one of the outcomes of share allocation was that 
women tended to lose out o, n the material assets needed to create a viable new enterprise and 
reform therefore reinforced the concentration of technology in men's hands. Further, given 
their former position in formal state farm structures, women in general, with a few notable 
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exceptions, had less direct access to information about the privatisation process and about 
their rights and entitlements, less access to power than men, and therefore less opportunity to 
convert initial shares into real property. Those women who did become powerful private 
farmers were generally exceptionally well connected and well educated. 
Where tenure over land and assets continued to be held by a cooperative enterprise, women 
theoretically maintained their individual entitlements. However, the value of individual 
entitlements was in question and gender was likely to be important as reform progressed. 
First, there was a trend towards the differentiation of shareholders and employees, as 
cooperatives could not employ all those who contributed to them. On farms such as Lenin, 
men's domination of agricultural production, together with the increasing layoffs of women, 
was likely to Make this a gendered differentiation. A considerable proportion of non- 
employee shareholders were also likely to be women pensioners. Shareholders were likely 
to have less influence on management and less capacity to define the future of the enterprise 
and get their needs met than employees. Second, where cooperative enterprises were 
profitable and real dividends were paid, gender differentials in share allocation would take 
on more importance. Third, the tendency for title to be held by (male) farm directors was at 
best, unlikely to give women greater avenues for decision-making and influence. In 
communities such as Lenin, joint stock companies were conceived as a large family and the 
relationship to the farm director framed in paternalistic terms. In this local model of 
authority, access to resources was governed by hierarchies of gender and seniority that 
positioned the senior male as 'khozyain' (master), with authority over women and younger 
men, Although this model was flexible and adaptable and did give women informal channels 
to negotiate around their own interests, this flexibility was not necessarily transposed into the 
legal arena, as many farm directors used reform to consolidate their own individual 
ownership of land and property. Further, the moral obligation for support and reciprocity in 
the Soviet and local models was being eroded by the further extension of capitalist relations. 
As in rural Buryatiya (Humphrey, 1998: 11), one of the key outcomes of reform was tile end 
of the assumption that collectives would provide employment, social support and security for 
all, from childhood to old age. As social services were divested to other authorities and 
efficiency and economy became the main prerogative, it was also becoming increasingly 
difficult to support 'useless' workers, including women coping alone with large families, and 
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pensioners 
Where large enterprises were broken down into small farms, the fact that privatisation gave 
women and men individual and independent title to land and assets was counterbalanced by 
the fact that the preferred unit was the family farm. Individuals were advised to put their 
shares into private farms (krestyanskie khozyaistva) comprising several households, 
generally linked by kinship. Within these farms, family structures and customs, residence 
arrangements and ideologies of gender influenced women's ability to hold and control land 
and assets. Both local ideologies of gender and the practice instituted by reform meant that 
land title tended to be held by household heads, usually men, who controlled and managed 
resources. Trade transactions with large suppliers and market outlets, in particular, were seen 
`9 See Kandiyoti (2003) for an analysis of gender, land rights and entitlement in Uzbekistan, which 
considers shirkats, the Uzbek equivalent of 'staying together'. 
186 
to be men's responsibility. In predominantly Kazak, herding communities such as Sarybulak, 
reform also led to the resurrection of patrilineal relationships to land and farm ownership that 
posed problems for women wanting to hold land on their own behalf As in the larger 
cooperative enterprises, the fact that family property was framed as 'collective' (obshchii) 
rather than individual, meant that individual entitlements needed to be negotiated. Women's 
access to and control over land and assets varied considerably. In most cases, women put 
considerable assets towards new enterprises and their labour contribution was often vital. 
However, on some family farms, women's and men's labour contribution were seen as 
complementary and equal, whereas on others, men's work was seen as 'productive' and 
women's as 'subsidiary' or 'reproductive'. The gender division of labour and local ideologies 
of gender influenced these values. They were also influenced by market and land reforrn 
itself, which transferred control from the more distant 'director/patriarch' to male heads of 
household, and which was creating different categories of commercial and subsistence farms. 
In particular, local discourses were combining with the logic of market efficiency to mean 
that women's work in rural smallholdings was more likely to be classed as 'subsistence', 
'subsidiary' or reproductive, regardless of their actual contribution to fanning. Women 
therefore faced particular economic and cultural barriers to farming independently. However, 
they were also using considerable initiative and creativity in using farm restructuring to 
ensure the survival and development of themselves and their families. 
From the case studies it is clear that a number of issues fell outside the 'narrow' definition of 
privatisation entirely. First, it is evident that people in rural communities themselves were 
using other concepts of rights and entitlements, which did not fit neatly into the privatisation 
model. Second, the material suggests that, to understand the relationship between farm 
restructuring and gender relations, we need to look beyond the simple 'political science' 
dichotomy between public (state) and private (non-state) spheres, to take account of a further 
'private'or domestic sphere of kinship and the family. It is this I shall go on to conceptualise 
and discuss in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER6 
The Broader Meaning of Privatisation 
The previous chapter explored rural privatisation from the perspective of the redistribution of 
land and assets and the implication of this for men and women of different social categories 
in the rural communities I studied. The analysis demonstrated that, despite the 'egalitarian, 
principles ostensibly underpinning reform, it benefited certain groups more than others, 
thereby creating or consolidating divergences within communities. These divergences, both 
between wealthy and small landowners, and between landowners and landless people, 
seemed set to widen as market reform deepened. From a gender perspective, although the 
reform gave women as well as men the possibility to obtain individual title to land and 
assets, the extent to which they actually benefited was determined by the redistribution 
models used, the locality's agricultural profile and local and external perceptions of male and 
female roles. 
Moving beyond the question of entitlement, the case studies also began to demonstrate the 
enormous difference between the ideas that were fuelling privatisation and the actual 
practice. The redistribution of land and assets was embedded in other processes and could 
not be looked at in isolation from kinship relations, household survival strategies and the 
restructuring of gender identities. Community responses to the state-imposed farm 
restructuring programme could not be understood purely in terms of the refon-ners' categories 
of state and private ownership and economic efficiency. To take account of this and to 
incorporate local people as actors in the current reform, analysis needed to move beyond the 
economic analysis of public and private sectors to consider the domestic sphere of family 
and kinship relations. This was essential in order to understand the gender implications of the 
current reforms. 
To recapitulate, briefly, the arguments around the shifting boundaries between the public and 
private sectors of the economy and the state, civil society and households set out in chapter 
one: first, the mainstream approach, which has been central to the debate around the 
'transition' of state socialist societies and the development policies implemented there, 
distinguishes between a public (state) sphere and a private (non-state) sphere of the market 
and civil society. It argues that the socialist state engulfed the private sphere, which now 
needs to be 'restored' to its proper place in order to increase efficiency and liberate individual 
initiative and participation (USAID, 1994; Nazarbaev, 1998). This process is presented as 
gender neutral (Ryrie, 1996). Second, western feminist analysis argues that this approach is 
gender blind in that it is implicitly built on the exclusion of thedomestic sphere of family and 
kinship relations. Since this is held to be the domain of women, any shift in the relationship 
between the state and non-state sectors of the economy and the associative spheres of the 
state and civil society will also impact on this invisible domestic sphere in gendered ways, 
which may be detrimental to women (Pateman, 1989; Einhorn, 1993). Third, research in 
anthropology suggests the problems inherent in applying both these analytical frameworks 
across cultures without sufficient attention to local gendered framings of work, leisure, 
exchange, difference, and power (Bruno, 1995; Pine, 1994,1995,1996,2002). In the 
postsocialist context, 'the categories of public and private must be regarded not only as 
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descriptions of social organization, but also as ideological reference points according to 
which people perceive and interpret matters of responsibility, morality, and social identity - 
questions that may take on particular urgency at moments of dramatic social upheavalo200. 
This chapter lays the groundwork for the remaining part of the thesis, which focuses on the 
two, broader conceptual isations of privatisation as a gendered and culturally specific re- 
ordering of public, private and domestic spheres. It begins with a close reading of one 
particular private farm, which illustrates that the first definition is not sufficient to capture 
the processes currently taking place in the countryside, particularly from the point of view of 
gender and that a more meaningful analysis must take account of both the second and third 
approaches. Moving beyond private enterprises per se, it then draws on material from the 
state farm communities to explore the shifting interrelationship between households and 
state, market and domestic domains. 
1. Complicating the private enterprise model: case study of a private farm 
The case-studies in Chapter 5 sketched some of the ways in which micro-level research 
undennined or complicated the macro-level framing of rural reform. They demonstrated that 
at local level, people were often motivated by different interests and concerns to those 
encapsulated in the privatisation programme. This section draws on one particular fieldwork 
example to explore in more detail some of the ways in which the macro level model of new 
private enterprises was complicated from a micro-level perspective and the specific gender 
implications of this. In particular, I argue that this model excluded the further 'domestic' 
sphere of household/kin relations in which private enterprises were embedded and therefore 
failed to capture the specific nature of the private farms which were emerging and obscured 
women's contribution to their creation and functioning. 
During my first visit to sovkhoz Lenin, I discovered that one of my host's brothers had 
established a private farm on the neighbouring state farm. My first 'interview' with the head, 
Kairat, took place during a birthday feast being held for his wife, to which I was also invited. 
I subsequently built up a close relationship with the whole extended family, staying for 
extended periods in various different households, with Kairat and Madina, with the sisters in 
the Lenin central village, another sister in town and an aunt in one of the outlying villages. 
So, what was interesting about my relationship to this particular farm was that I was able to 
see it in a very detailed way and particularly how it was embedded in the wider context of 
household and extended kin. 
In my first talk with Kairat about the farm, my impression was that it operated as just the 
kind of commercial ly-oriented 'private' enterprise which the reforms hoped to produce. He 
told me that he had created the enterprise in 1995 and officially registered it with the 
authorities as a private farm (krestyanskoe khozyaistvo). After a false start in the first year, 
when he had sowed grain with disastrous results, he had moved into vegetable production 
200 J. Pattico, Call for Papers for a proposed panel on 'Public and Private Perspectives on Society, 
Ideology, and Change in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union' for the 2001 Annual Meeting of 
the American Anthropological Association. 
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and now produced mainly potatoes and carrots on 6 hectares of land near tile canal. He had 
some technical equipment, including a lorry, a tractor and an irrigation pump. The enterprise 
was one of only 7 private farms set up on the former sovkhoz, which had reorganised as a 
joint stock company, and Kairat was proud of the fact that the new enterprises were more 
productive and efficient than the parent farm. He was happy to be 'his own mastee (sam 
khozyain), able to make his own production decisions and was keen to tell me that, despite 
the drought, his farm was making money. The main problem was to market the farm's 
produce and to find credit for further development of the enterprise. 
Although people generally referred to the enterprise as 'Kairat's farm, ' this was something of 
a misnomer since, although Kairat was officially registered as its director, he was not a single 
entrepreneur. Two brothers and a close Russian friend were also formal members, had 
contributed land shares and were involved in production and marketing. As I discussed in 
the previous chapter, this pattern of brothers or a father and sons setting up a farm together 
was a characteristic one for Kazaks in my research communities. Although, by law, a private 
farm must be registered in the name of one person, who has formal leadership status, the 
actual structure was generally much more complex. 
This complexity was often not formally recorded and still less so when it came to women's 
involvement in the creation and operation of the new private farms. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the gender structure of labour in the region's farming system and the local 
'normative model'for decision making combined to discourage women from becoming farrn 
heads in their own right and to discourage their formal registration as farm members. When I 
asked Kairat and his partners whether their wives were members of the farm, they initially 
treated my question as a great joke. However, talking to Madina, I began to see that her 
contribution was considerable. Characteristically, the redistribution model used on the 
sovkhoz meant that, as a 'social-sphere' worker, her land share had been calculated at a lower 
coefficient than that of her husband and she had not been eligible to receive an asset share of 
machinery or livestock. However, she had received a land share, which she had contributed 
to the private farm and also contributed her labour on a frequent basis. Especially at the 
beginning, when they were just getting off the ground, she and two of the other wives had 
worked in the fields alongside their husbands, weeding, iff igating and harvesting. Although 
- now that they were able to 
hire workers - she did less fieldwork, during harvest time she 
still went to the fields most evenings, together with Kairat and sometimes with the children, 
to harvest carrots and potatoes. Apart from this direct involvement in agricultural 
production, Madina was responsible for organising the labour of the mainly female workers 
the farm seasonally employed (mostly neighbours, friends, relatives and former colleagues) 
and for selling produce from home. And not least, their household served as 'host' for the 
farm, which involved cooking and caring for the frequent guests - such as visiting traders and 
suppliers. So, although Madina's work was 'formally' invisible, she was actually making an 
important contribution to the private enterprise. 
I also began to realise that the enterprise could not be considered in isolation. Kairat and the 
other male partners described the farm as the main input to their households, but when 
pressed for details were reticent about specifying 
its actual contribution of the enterprise to 
household income. It gradually became clear that the enterprise was actually part of what has 
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been termed a 'livelihood jigsaw'201 . In other words, each of the four households directly 
involved were pursuing a range of different - and essential - subsistence and income- 
generating strategies, in which women played the major role. 
With the closure of the kindergarten, Madina had been made redundant and was now putting 
increasing time and energy into work on the domestic smallholding, which provided the bulk 
of the household's meat, dairy products, eggs and vegetables and occasionally asmall surplus 
which she bartered or traded for other goods. The task of managing the domestic economy 
fell to Madina, although Kairat would 'help out! with the heavier work, such as mucking out 
the stable and forking hay. All three of the other wives were employed 'off farm', one as a 
teacher and the others in the administration of the joint stock company. This work brought 
various benefits - the school was by then one of the few employers to pay money wages, if in 
arrears; and, while the joint stock company did not often pay in cash, employment did give 
entitlement to goods in lieu of wages and to vital social benefits, including medical care and 
pensions. In addition, two of the wives also occasionally traded in goods from home and one 
sometimes produced a particularly lethal home-brew vodka for sale. So, the private farm 
was only one of a range of different inputs to the households involved. Public-sector 
employment, the domestic smallholding and informal trade were vital alternative sources of 
(relatively) steady money, food and social security. 
Moving beyond the four households which were officially or formally involved in the 
enterprise, the picture became even more complicated. A much wider circle of kin had been 
involved in the creation of the farm, were still involved in its operation and benefited from it 
in various ways. Kairat's sisters had been instrumental in establishing the farm. The director 
of the joint stock company had been hostile to members separating from the enterprise and 
had refused to hand over the asset shares that were due. It was only because two sisters were 
able to use their positions to obtain all the machinery, together with seed and fertiliser, from 
Lenin sovkhoz, that the farm became a viable concern. They continued to 'obtain' resources 
in this way on a regular basis. As I observed, they also organised sales of the farm's produce 
through their own networks of neighbours, colleagues and friends. 
On learning that their brothers were planning to drive the lorry over with potatoes and carrots 
for sale, they would begin to spread the word in the village that there would be good quality 
produce for sale. By the time the lorry actually arrived, several days later, the village would 
be primed. The men would leave the women in charge of the proceedings. Kairat would 
decide whether goods were to be available for barter, but apart from this, the eldest sister 
acted at her own discretion in setting prices, generally after checking with a friend, now a 
trader, as to the current prices in the local town. The sale would take the good part of two 
hours - time 'stolen' from the sisters' off icial jobs in the Lenin farm administration. Later, the 
20 '.This term was used by Wheelock, Ljunggren and Baines (1999) in their comparative analysis of 
rural entrepreneurs in Norway and England. They suggest that behaviour is rarely 'enterprising' in the 
individualistic sense put forward in small business policy, but that small enterprises are more usually 
part of ajigsaw'of livelihood sources for rural households. The construction of such jigsaws' takes 
place within the household and draws on individual and community understandings of what is right 
and expected of women and men when it comes to income generating and caring responsibilities. As 
such, it draws on existing gendered power relations, but may, on occasion disrupt them. These 
insights inform the discussion in this section and its development in chapter 7. 
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sister who lived in the local town would take charge of sales there, using her networks in a 
similar way. So, while the four men formally involved in the farm were responsible for 
long-distance sales, on the markets in Karaganda and further afield, along with local sales to 
formal structures such as wholesale dealers, close female kin were largely responsible for 
local and informal sales of produce. These two areas were associated with specific moral 
values and meanings. Local sales were felt to be less lucrative but more secure, being based 
on existing relations of trust and solidarity; on the other hand, the market was seen as a cut- 
throat arena where one was likely to be cheated. The brothers' accounts of their travels were 
heroic tales of confronting an alien outside world, pitting their wits and daring against the 
'immoral' middle-men who produced nothing of their own and returning with money for their 
families. 
Moving even further outward, the fact that Kairat had been able to bypass the Farm Director 
to get the good land he wanted and to get the farm registered at all was at least partly due to 
the influence of high-placed relatives and connections in the rayon and oblast administration. 
As he put it, 'you need both a good head and connections to make it as a private farmee. 
These connections were not built up by Kairat himself, but developed by his parents through 
everyday and ceremonial acts of hospitality and exchange. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
'ritual economy' of feasting and gift exchange was a particular feature of the Kazak 
community, involving long-term strategies of building solidarities through reciprocities and 
mutual indebtedness. Kairaf s parents had invested a good deal of energy in nourishing their 
household's social networks, his father through his position as head accountant and his 
mother through managing ritual obligations with kin, neighbourhood and community. The 
wife of a key oblast official had been adopted into the family on the death of her mother and 
put through college at its expense202 . The rayon 
Akim had come to the farm as a young 
specialist and had been taken under Kairaf s father's wing - cating at the family's home most 
days. Kairat's mother had rarely cooked for less than 15 people for lunch. So, although 
Kairaf s parents had come to live on a 'Russian' sovkhoz, they had maintained strong links 
with the Kazak community on Lenin and further afield, on which Kairat was able to draw in 
founding the private farm. This resource was a key advantage in terms of start-up and 
viability over the majority of Russian private farmers in the community. 
So, the first 'complicating! factor to emerge from my fieldwork was that the model of 
individual entrepreneurship did not fit the actual situation. In the context of rural Kazakstan, 
the creation and functioning of the new private enterprises could not be understood without 
taking a much wider perspective and looking at the ways they were intertwined with and 
reliant on kin relationships beyond the individual entrepreneur or even household itselc In 
terms of gender, the individual entrepreneurship model obscured women's contribution to tile 
emerging private enterprises and marginalized the other household survival strategies in 
which they played a crucial role. This was especially true in communities such as this one, 
2" See Humphrey (1998: 343-7) for a more detailed discussion on how kin networks were used in 
economic and political manoeuvring in another former pastoral regional of the USSR. She suggests 
that, in rural Buryatiya, adoption was a strategy employed especially by 'career officials' in order to 
widen their circle of kin and acquire control over labour resources by getting people placed in the 
division of labour in positions complementary to their own. 
192 
where women were rarely registered officially as heads or members of private farms and 
their labour was therefore informal and'invisible'. 
The 'privatisation model' also assumes that the new enterprises will be profit or market- 
oriented. This was certainly the way that Kairat presented the farm to me initially. However, 
when I began to investigate further, it became clear that this was only part of the picture. 
Like the ma ority of the private farms discussed in the previous chapter, this one actually had 
a dual orientation - both towards market production and towards subsistence. Although it did 
produce food for the market, much of the produce was not actually destined for outside sale 
but for direct consumption by both the four households officially involved and a much wider 
circle of kin. It fact, it was impossible to consider the private farm in isolation from this 
wider network of kin and the interdependencies this involved. The sisters and other kin, 
viewed the farm primarily as an 'extended family resource': a source of food, particularly in 
times of trouble, such as the drought which had struck the region two years running, and for 
more vulnerable family members, such as the youngest sister, unemployed and pregnant, and 
the divorced sister with a child to support. For both the extended families of the male 
partners and the extended families of their wives, the farm was therefore primarily part of a 
wider network of kin reciprocities. 
This situation set up conflicts and tensions: between commercial and kinship orientations, 
between the extended family and the four households directly involved as partners in the 
farm and between and within these four households themselves. Who was the farm 'for'? 
Was it a profit-making, commercial enterprise or part of a kinship survival strategy? What 
was the place of money and other exchanges? What was the value of the different 
contributions and how should they be rewarded? 
These conflicts were increasingly evident in the day-to-day running of the fann. One of the 
signs of this was the increasing tension over the meaning of work for the enterprise. Two of 
the main issues were what - or whose - activities should be classed as work and how work 
contributions hould be measured and rewarded. What seemed to be emerging was a growing 
tension between two concepts of work: first, work as a commodity, whose quantity and 
effectiveness hould be measured and rewarded accordingly in the interests of the efficiency 
of the enterprise; and second, work seen as part of a whole, as just one contribution to 
household and kin strategies, which could - and indeed, should not - be measured in terms 
that would split household and family unity or disrupt long-term kin reciprocities. Here we 
can see both how values and practices connected with kinship and ethnicity were shaping 
work practices and how market values were beginning to penetrate and undermine values 
based on kinship and solidarity. 
Let me explain what I mean with some concrete examples. As Kairat admitted during my last 
fieldwork visit in 1998, production decisions were not based on 'efficiency' criteria alone 
and, as head of the enterprise, this was causing him increasing problems. Until then, he had 
been dividing subsistence produce and the cash or goods from sale of the surplus produce 
equally amongst the four households directly involved. His major headache was his eldest 
brother, who had taken to drink and was doing less and less work for the farm. In the 
interests of the enterprise, he would have liked to have paid him a smaller share. However, 
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he felt obliged to put family solidarity above efficiency considerations and to continue to 
reward each member equally. In addition, according to Kazak custom, as the middle brother, 
he told me he was traditionally bound to defer to his eldest brother, and to act against this in 
his capacity as head of the enterprise would be strongly criticised by the extended family. So, 
production decisions had been shaped and circumscribed by kin commitments and authority 
relations within the family - as Kairat was increasingly coming to feel, to the detriment of the 
enterpriSe203. 
However, kin solidarities were being increasingly stretched by the existence of the 
enterprise. Although, as discussed in the previous chapter, everyone associated with the 
farm expressed the idea that 'we do everything in common' (vsye obshchee) and that 'we do 
not measure individual contributions', there were now increasingly bitter wrangles over 
which of the four men worked harder and who was actually pulling their weight. Each 
thought that he was working the hardest but that the others were being paid better. Similarly, 
amongst the extended kin, there were increasing complaints about some family members 
receiving preferential treatment and others being passed over when produce was given out. 
So, although relationships within the enterprise continued to be expressed in the idiom of 
kinship, their content was in the process of changing. 
One incident in particular shed light for me on the way in which gender ideology was 
operating to make the women the upholders of the kinship idiom and the 'glue' holding the 
enterprise together. I was sitting in the kitchen with Madina and one of Kairat's sisters, 
drinking tea and talking about the farm. Madina was explaining how she and two of the other 
wives had worked alongside their husbands in the fields and how hard it had been. She said 
that for her, it was natural to help with the private farm, it was just one of the things that 
were there to be done, like looking after the family smallholding and taking care of the 
children. She helped her husband and he helped her. They didn't keep count. She said that 
Kairat had asked her if she wanted to become an official member of the farm, but she had 
said n0204. Why would she? The only reason to do so would be if she did not trust him. She 
went on to say that the youngest brother's wife, Aigul, was the only one who hadn't done any 
work in the fields. Yes, Kairat's sister interjected with some disapproval - she thought she 
ought to be paid for her work like the men. They both went on to criticise her for this: she 
thought her work was so valuable that she should be paid for it, did she? She was too big for 
her boots. She didn't realise that her contribution to the household was worth nothing in 
comparison to what her husband brought in through the farm. She only worked short hours 
203 On Lenin, one of the only private enterprises, a shop, was purportedly bankrupted because its head 
gave too much on credit or as gifts to his many relatives in the community. In the village, he was 
often praised to me for his solidarity. 
204 There is an interesting dichotomy here between the way that Kairat dismissed my questions about 
his wife's membership in the farm and his wife's insistence that they had discussed her membership: 
concluded that this was a good example of how the 'gender contract' operated in different 
circumstances and of how men and women represented it in different ways. On the one hand, there 
had been a change in my own status between the two interviews: when I spoke with Kairat, I was a 
newcomer and outsider, whereas when I spoke to Madina, I was more of an'insider, 'who could be 
party to more of the actual workings of relationships. On the other hand, Kairat and Madina stressed 
different aspects of the 'gender' code, Kairat, that of male authority and Madina, that of mutual 
dependency and trust. 
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and brought in 1,200 tenge a month . She didn't appreciate how hard Mischa worked and 
the fact that everything in the house, including her precious TV, had come from him. The 
only thing that she had brought in her dowry was the wall unit (stenka). And she was greedy 
and grasping and wanted new things all the time. Given the sheer vituperativeness of the 
criticism, Aigul was clearly breaking important norms, as follows: 
First, for a wife to bring up the idea of payment for labour 'for the family' was clearly 
unacceptable behaviour, even in the context of a private enterprise. Although agricultural 
labour was organised and rewarded according to relations of reciprocity rather than on a 
contractual basis, there was a further gender distinction in the division of rewards. Although 
Kairat talked about sharing the produce and profits equally among the four households, it 
was primarily the men's work which counted. The women's work was classed as subsidiary 
'help'. Aigul's behaviour in asking for an individual, monetary appreciation of her 
contribution was heavily criticised, not just because it was a direct challenge to the kinship- 
based organisation of labour, but also because it transgressed women's proper position within 
it. 
Second, the fact that the criticism was framed in terms of Aigul's failure to recognise 
Mischa! s primary, breadwinning role takes us to the 'rural gender contract' created by the 
accommodation between indigenous and socialist practice and values. One of the main signs 
of the changing relationship between the sovkhoz and the household was the erosion of the 
'male wage' - both through increasing layoffs and because work for the joint stock company 
was paid in kind, if at all, and was therefore bringing less and less financial benefit. On the 
other hand, women working in the social sector were, along with pensioners, some of the few 
to be paid in money. This shift, which will be explored in more detail in chapter 7, threatened 
men's position as main breadwinner and heads of household and undermined the gender 
contract. I found that women's reaction to this was often to collude in shoring up their 
husband's identity, by downplaying their own contribution to the household economy and 
emphasising their husband's, in an attempt to 'keep the order of things'. This seemed 
irrational, but made more sense when I looked at what the undermining of the main 
underpinning of men's role and sense of identity meant for many women. Kairafs sister was 
a case in point. Since her husband had been made redundant, he had become increasingly 
depressed and had opted out of his household responsibilities, which was a source of great 
humiliation and shame for her. As she explained to me, she had a man at home - so called - 
but what was the use of him? She had to run around all over the place, getting coal and hay. 
This was much more difficult for her, because it was usually a man'sjob and they negotiated 
deals over bottles of vodka. She couldn't do this and the men mocked her all the time, 
"' In 1997, the exchange rate was approximately 75 tenge to the US dollar. For the oblast as a whole, 
official statistics put the average monthly income for state enterprise mployees at 62 10 tenge, for 
A. O. employees, at 8265 tenge and for private farmers, at 1595 tenge. However, a survey of 624 
households conducted in August 1997 found that household's average money income was 4246 tenge 
per month, but varied from 5070 tenge in the towns to 2217 tenge in rural areas. In many sectors, 
people had not actually received money wages. Over 47% of those surveyed were living below the 
household minimum threshold of 3449 tenge per month. On the other hand, enterprise directors and 
individual entrepreneurs could have a monthly income of 14,000 tenge. Figures from 'Sotsial'no- 
ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Karagandinskii oblasti 0 1-09-1997', Staticheskoe Agenstvo Respubliki 
Kazakstana, Karaganda, 1997. 
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saying, 'was she a man herself or 'didn't she have a real man at homeT. Apart from Aigul, 
the other wives therefore saw one of the functions of the private farm as to reaffirm their 
husbands' role as provider, rather than as an opportunity for themselves formally to become 
entrepreneurs. So, within the enterprise, gender ideology was operating to locate men and 
women differently in relation to the market and domestic spheres and Aigul's behaviour in 
asking for a monetary appreciation of her contribution was a direct challenge to this pattern. 
Third, criticism of Aigul also focused on the fact that she was 'greedy' (zhadnyi) and selfish 
and thought about consumer goods all the time. In actual fact, at other times, tile other 
women were equally fascinated by this topic and could talk endlessly about the new 'status 
symbols' such as linoleum for the floor or a wall unit, their prices and where they could be 
obtained. As I suggested in the previous chapter with reference to Druzhba, this was often a 
criticism levelled by women at other women who were 'distinguishine themselves by 
engaging in trade or entrepreneurial activity. Equally vituperative criticism was levelled at 
women who were trading in liquor and clothes and perceived to be making money from their 
activity. On other occasions, Kairaf s sister also berated Madina herself for being greedy and 
persuading Kairat to stop sharing the proceeds of the farm. This, I think, is the crux of the 
issue. In a microcosm of what was happening in the community at large, the private farm 
was heightening the inequalities between the individuals and households who were involved 
in relations of mutual support. As such, it was putting strain on these relationships at a time 
when the erosion of public support in the form of wages and services was making them 
increasingly vital - at least for some members of the family. By evoking the 'greed' and 
'selfishness' of the new entrepreneurs, people were bringing them into the normative 
atmosphere of the moral economy, asserting the 'propee limits of individualistic and money- 
making behaviour and the claims of love, kinship and solidarity. What particularly interested 
me about the example of Aigul was the light it shed on the gendered aspects of this process. 
The underlying tensions between the farm as commercial enterprise and the farm as family 
resource were largely played out not between the men but in emotional conflicts between 
sisters-in-law or between sisters and sisters-in-law. One way of looking at this is to see it as 
masking conflict between male kin, which would be too disruptive and dangerous, and so is 
'displaced' as conflict between women. 206 Just as women's 'invisible' productive labour was 
actually an important contribution to production as a whole, their invisible 'emotional' labour 
'contained' or 'managed' the underlying contradictions and was therefore vital to the survival 
of the enterprise and of family solidarities. 
The question was, for how long? In 1998, the sisters no longer received shares of tile 
harvest, as Kairat decided that the farm could no longer Support the whole extended family 
on a regular basis. In turn, they were beginning to'account' for their own contributions to the 
farm, and were extremely upset that their work was not recognised. It was in this year that 
they told me for the first time about their involvement in the start-up of the enterprise. Rather 
than deflecting deeper conflicts onto conflict with their sisters-in-law, they were also 
beginning to criticise their brothers themselves, contrasting their own attitude that they 
'would jump out of their skins' for their brothers, with their brothers' neglect of them. Of 
"' I am grateful to Frances Pine for drawing my attention to this aspect, which is an important one in 
the Polish villages she has studied. 
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course, they were busy, but they no longer made the effort to come to see them, not even for 
birthdays and other celebrations that had always been so significant before, they said. The 
farm, and the profit relations it had introduced, was perceived as an undermining, foreign 
element in relations of reciprocity. Whereas relations of reciprocity remained important for 
the sisters, who were respectively divorced and single, they were becoming less so for the 
brothers. With the increasing commercial success of the farm, the latter could now buy in 
hired labour and were no longer so dependent on the extended family. My fieldwork 
therefore captured a particular moment in the creation of the new enterprise, as its initial 
reliance on kinship reciprocities shifted towards greater reliance on market relations. 
However, this is not to say that Kairat's farm and others in my research communities will 
necessarily end up 'fitting'the macro-level model of entrepreneurship and private enterprise. 
As other research has demonstrated, this model is in itself flawed, even in relation to Western 
society, and it is likely that the domestic sphere will continue to influence its further 
evolution in specific ways (Wheelock, Ljunggren and Baines, 1999). 
What we can conclude is, to understand the nature of private enterprises in rural Kazakstan, 
and especially to get a fuller picture of women's role in their creation and functioning, it is 
important to look a good deal further than the idea of an individual entrepreneur, driven by 
ambition, establishing a business for profit. As this brief discussion shows, the mainstream 
approach to reform adopted by development agenciesfails to capture the specific ways in 
which private enterprises are bound up with the state and domestic domains in postsocialist 
societies such as Kazakstan. On the one hand, private enterprises and households continued 
to rely on the successors to state farms for inputs and services. On the other, one of the 
impacts of government reforms in Inner Asia has been to strengthen the economic 
importance of kinship relations (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999: 137). As collective and state 
farms relinquished ownership of livestock and other rural resources, the family was playing 
an increasing role in productive activity. However, since families were not clearly bounded 
units, but part of a network of social obligation, private farms such as Kairat's also entered 
into wider relations of obligation and reciprocity. At the same time, they represented the 
entrance of new market and commercial relations into families and social networks. As such 
they were also disrupting and shaping family and kin relations in new ways. The idiom of 
kinship was masking the emergence of new forms of inclusion and exclusion, visibility and 
invisibility and inequality. However, commercial relations were introducing new ways of 
valuing family members' labour and other contributions, stretching generalised relations of 
reciprocity to breaking point and heightening the differences between haves and have-nots 
within the extended family. Gender ideology was playing a key role both in keeping these 
contradictions from rising to the surface and in structuring new working and social relations. 
The gender implications of changing forms and meanings of labour and social networks will 
be explored in more detail in Chapter 7. The next section moves outwards from the private 
farms to set them in the context of the wider changes that the emergence of the market has 
brought in the relationship between households and the state. 
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11. Restructuring and the emergence of a new market sphere 
The example of Kairats farm demonstrates that economic reform was resulting in a 
confrontation between the new capitalist values and practices and those that emerged from 
the accommodation between pre-socialist society and the socialist development concept. 
Existing household strategies based on a combination of public-sector employment, the 
domestic economy and long-term systems of reciprocity and exchange were colliding with 
the new model of the economy and entrepreneurship, which stressed individual labour and 
remuneration and immediate money transactions between market actors with no future social 
obligations to each other. 
The growing importance of commercial and profit-related priorities and the erosion of 
relations of solidarity point to a growing consolidation of the 'new' market sphere. In all 
three communities, money and market transactions were beginning to intrude into more areas 
of daily concern, finding their way into relationships and transactions where they would not 
previously have played a role. Even on Lenin, where resistance to market reform was most 
evident and few people had established independent private farms, the division between 
those with money and those without was becoming as significant as the divisions between 
kin/non-kin, and those with and without access to blat. As one man put it: 'Money is the 
most important thing now. Having connections is not as important as having money' 
(Seichas dengi, svyaz ne tak vazhna kak dengiyo'. Privatisation meant that some previously 
free public services now had to be paid for. This was the case for much of the higher 
education available in the nearest cities, Karaganda and Akmola, especially in the new and 
upcoming areas such as business management, law and economics"'. Closer to home, on 
the sovkhoz itself, schoolbooks were no longer free. In 1998, a complete set of books cost 
900 tenge for first year pupils and up to 2,000 tenge for pupils in the I I' class. Similarly, all 
medicines, apart from children's vaccinations, now had to be paid for. Even in the district 
hospital, most drugs and all the bandages, gauze, cotton wool and other such supplies had to 
be obtained and paid for by sick person's family themselvesý09. With little petrol available in 
the community, the ambulance had to be paid for too - when it was available, since the 
drivers often used it to do jobs on the side. Moreover, perhaps unsurprisingly in view of the 
low wages in the education and medical sectors, bribes were often essential210. In these 
207 Vodka was initially the medium of exchange. In order to obtain certain kinds of help from 'useful 
friends' (znakomye) and even neighbours and kin, it became necessary to 'pay' a standard rate in 
bottles of vodka. In 1998, cash was being used more directly. See Hivon (1994) for an analysis of the 
use of vodka as a medium of exchange in rural Russia. 
2138 After the closure of the sovkhoz kindergarten, childcare facilities were no longer available on 
Lenin in any case. However, elsewhere, pre-school education was also one of the first areas to 
introduce fees. In the neighbouring town, two kindergartens had closed and, as of 1998, the remaining 
one charged fees of 2,000 tenge per month. 
'09 in many cases, there is now a division between state and 'private' fee-paying healthcare in the same 
hospitals or clinics. In the maternity hospital in the nearest town, those who can afford it can pay for 
beds on a private ward, where husbands may stay with their wives, babies are kept with their mothers 
and the nurses wash the nappies. In 1997 on the public ward, there was often no light, no hot water 
and nowhere for the women to wash themselves. The mothers had to wash their babies'nappies 
themselves in cold water. 
210 Before the sovkhoz hospital closed in 1998, the doctor had been replaced by a nursing sister, whose 
main function seemed to be to give out sick notes in return for a bribe such as a box of chocolates. At 
a much more serious level, my host told me that one of her sisters had got septicaernia s a result of an 
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circumstances, people were increasingly turning to home-produced remedies and other forms 
of self-treatment. The market was also 'upping the ante' for households. With the influx of 
consumer goods and the appearance of advertising and Western television serials, having 'the 
right clothes' and products was becoming increasingly important. This was especially 
noticeable in the local town, Molodezhnyi, where fashion and consumer goods were 
becoming markers of social differentiation. At Pervyi Zvonok the celebration of the first day 
of the new school year, several teachers and parents pointed out the striking difference 
between the poorer children and the expensively dressed children of the chelnoki (shuttle- 
traders). On Lenin itself, where social differentiation through the use of consumption-related 
status symbols was less noticeable, there was no longer a school uniform and children often 
asked for expensive consumer goods. In August 1998, Kulande, a recently widowed mother 
told me that, because of the increasing competition between children, she had felt obliged to 
spend a fifth of her family allowance on blackjeans for her son. This was both a question of 
status and of playing a proper role in social networks and the gift economy, something which 
was becoming increasingly difficult for poorer households such as hers. To mark Pervyi 
Zvonok, mothers held one or several feasts to which relatives and female work colleagues 
were invited. The guests brought clothes and school materials, which were now expensive 
and a major headache for many households. However, relationships of solidarity built 
around work units were beginning to fracture. On the one hand, Kulande's entire work 
collective had been made redundant and no longer participated as a unit in the Pervyi Zvonok 
feast. Having limited resources, she was also unable to hold a feast for relatives and had not 
been invited to any other feasts. On the other hand, within the surviving work-based 
networks, women whose children were already grown up were starting to begrudge giving, 
on the grounds that they would not receive an 'equal' gift in their turn and unequal access to 
resources was also complicating participation. Even obtaining a gift was now a difficult 
undertaking in itself, requiring access to relatives in town or money to purchase goods from 
the traders who visited the village or women in the community who traded from home. 
Those with the least resources to contribute were therefore excluded from the social 
networks that could provide mutual suppore". 
In fact, as well as eroding or replacing existing structures and strategies in some areas, 
market reform was paradoxically reinforcing them in others. For some, subsidiary farming 
and social networks were providing a springboard into market activities. For many, market 
reform was restoring them from their role in enhancing household status and well-being 
during the late socialist period to their original primary function of ensuring subsistence, and 
in the case of the moral economy, security and a level of protection against subsistence 
failure. Notwithstanding the different patterns of 'restructurine, in all three communities, the 
majority of households were increasingly turning to the domestic economy and to kinship 
networks and other solidarities as a 'buffee against the inroads of the market. Even on 
Druzbba, which had the highest number of private farms, the domestic economy was 
operation and had almost died because they had not realised that they needed to give the doctor a 
bribe. Only when they brought a sheep, and ten sacks of potatoes, carrots and cabbage from Kairat's 
private farm did she begin to receive proper treatment. Another woman on the ward had apparently 
paid $200. These kinds of stories were very widespread. 
For a detailed analysis of the changing role of the gift economy in postsocialist Kazakstan, see for 
example, Werner (1997b). 
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essential to household survival and kinship and community solidarities were important, both 
as a practical way of managing land, and as a value system which was evoked to explain or 
justify new market-based economic practices. Market and domestic spheres were therefore 
intertwined in specific ways that did not fit easily into the existing categories used in framing 
rural refonn. 
111. Restructuring and the collapse of the public sphere 
Beyond the primary meaning of the farm restructuring process discussed in the previous 
chapter, decollectivisation was embedded in wider processes of change, which were of more 
immediate concern to people at the grassroots in rural communities. In Chapter 2,1 argued 
that the accommodation of indigenous society and state socialism had produced a specific 
interrelationship between households and the state in rural areas in Kazakstan. On the one 
hand state and collective farms had shaped patterns of working, socialising and conducting 
family life. The sovkhoz had created a 'public domain' which provided employment, and 
services and shaped people's values and identities. On the other hand, despite the changes in 
structures and values brought about by state socialism, the private domain of households, 
together with kin and other support networks, continued to play an important role in people's 
lives. During the Soviet period, rural households were 'multiple-income management units' 
(Dragadze, 1998) where the judicious deployment of household members in wage-earning 
and self-provisioning activities was important to household well-being, as were the 
cultivation of broader networks of friends and kin, who could provide favours such as loans, 
hospitality and residence pen-nits. Current reform needs to be put in the perspective of a shift 
in this interrelationship. 
In practice, the experience of my fieldwork communities was not one of the withdrawal of 
the state and the emergence of a new sphere of private enterprise and civil society, but 
primarily one of withdrawal and collapse and a corresponding shift towards reliance on the 
domestic economy. This change was graphically reflected in the landscape of the 
communities themselves, the disappearance of public services evident in the state of public 
buildings such as the kindergarten, hospital, cultural centre and state shops. From this 
perspective, my experience in rural Kazakstan was an interesting counterpoint to Sigrid 
Rausing's work on the physical experience of 'de-collectivisation' in a village in Estonia, 
where change was reflected in the restoration of the church and manor house and the 
emergence of a new caf6 (Rausing, 1996). In all my research communities, one of the most 
evident signs of change was the abandonment and increasing dilapidation of public 
buildings. This was especially the case for Lenin, where the kindergarten, guesthouse and 
four state shops lay disused and boarded up, the new cultural centre stood half-finished and 
raided for materials, even the hospital had closed and the streets were filled with uncollected 
garbage. This collapse of public spaces and services was one of the aspects most frequently 
referred to by villagers as symbolic of the current changes in their lives. Far from bringing 
about a (re)birth of private enterprise, rural reform was seen as causing the loss or death of 
an important dimension of community life. 'Chechnya without the bombs' was how one 
respondent described the landscape of the community, whilst many referred to the fact that 
the sovkhoz was 'dying and would soon be dead'. This was experienced as a sense of deep 
loss by people in the village, as a change in priorities in many ways aberrant and explained to 
202 
Households tried as far as possible to be self-sufficient, particularly as far as food was 
concerned, buying only tea, sugar, macaroni and sweets for entertaining, on a regular basis. 
With the closure of state shops and transport services, it was now difficult and expensive to 
get to the nearest town, and people were heavily reliant on home-grown food. Over the 
summer, cows gave a good yield of milk, which could be separated to produce cream for 
making butter and sour cream. Households could also hope for one or two calves to rear per 
year. A proportion of these dairy and meat products could be sold or bartered and some 
stored for consumption over the winter. Apart from the cattle, Kazak households often had 
horses, which were let loose to roam in the steppe, sheep, often looked after by relatives on 
the otdeleniye, and hens and geese. During the short growing season, all household members 
helped with the subsidiary plot, where they grew potatoes, cabbages, pumpkins, onions, 
peppers, tomatoes, and cucumbers. Over summer and early autumn, vast stores of salads and 
preserves were laid down in underground store-rooms to last until the following spring. 
However, in 1997 and 1998, households were forced to purchase what they needed since the 
drought had wizened the home-grown crops on the stalk and led to bush fires which had all 
but destroyed the hilly area where people traditionally went to collect berries forjam. 
Although households tried as far as possible to live self-sufficiently from their family 
smallholding, this alone was not enough to ensure subsistence, especially since it relied 
partly on inputs from the former sovkhoz. In fact, on Lenin the further disintegration of the 
sovkhoz was putting the future even of family smallholdings in doubt. In 1998, the disastrous 
harvest meant that the enterprise was unlikely to be able to meet its commitment to provide 
hay to all its members. As one respondent calculated, one tonne of hay cost 3,500 tenge and. 
one cow needed three tonnes of hay for the Winter, a vast sum of money for most 
households, even those where one or several family members were employed in the service 
sector that was still paying money wages 213 . Moreover, the smallholding could not generally 
provide the extra income needed to cope either with unplanned emergencies such as illness, 
or planned strategies such as obtaining further education for children. 
In these circumstances, households were backing up the smallholding in other ways: with 
state benefits, production of handicrafts, trade, community reciprocities and migration 
strategies. For many households, pensions and child allowance, although meagre and often 
paid many months in arrears, represented the sole possibility of getting money in a virtually 
cash-less local economy. By 1998, pension day was the centre of the local micro-economy, 
as traders who had previously visited the central village once a week now came only on 
pension day or when the teachers were paid. Pensioners were therefore becoming family 
'resource persons', often contributing directly to their children's households by paying for 
coal, hay and food. 
Trade was also an important household survival strategy, although the profile of trade on 
Lenin was very different from that on Druzhba, reflecting the two communities' relative 
distance from markets and availability of transport, as well as local attitudes. On Druzhba, 
commerce and trade were a new boom phenomenon. A busy daily market had sprung up 
outside the former state shops, which had themselves been taken into private hands and the 
213 For example, two teachers salaries would bring in around 10,000 tenge per month. 
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Sunday market, which had existed in Soviet times, was busier than ever. One of the 
particularly striking features of this new and highly visible phenomenon was the 
overwhelming predominance of women. On the daily market, all the small stalls, selling 
cheap imported clothing from China, toiletries, stationery, tea and vodka, were run by 
women. On the weekly market, women also predominated in commodity vending, with men 
more evident in the sales of farm produce, particularly meat and livestock, and in specific 
sectors such as car parts and machinery. Surveys of trade in the Almaty area found this to be 
a typical pattern"'. At this time, a spate of newspaper articles was also exclaiming over the 
chelnoki or shuttle trade phenomenon, with many people, again particularly women, leaving 
on tshop-tours'to Pakistan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, where they bought goods 
in bulk for sale back in Kazakhstan 215 . In contrast, on Lenin, although trade was also seen as 
largely 'women's affair' it was mainly invisible, conducted via relatives, neighbours, friends 
and colleagues on the sovkhoz and beyond it. A few households with access to their own 
transport sold meat from their smallholdings on the market in Karaganda. More sold 
produce to visiting wholesale traders and most occasionally bartered eggs, milk or butter 
from the smallholding against macaroni or tea from visiting commercial traders. Some 
women in the community also produced home-brew vodka for sale to other villagers. In 
1996, a dozen women went on regular 'shuttle-trade' trips to Almaty, but by 1998, this had 
become too expensive. On the other hand, three households in the central village had turned 
part of their home into a'shop', supplied by relatives living in the local town. A final strategy 
was temporary - or permanent - out-migration for paid employment. It was common for at 
least one household member to go to live with relatives in order to get work in the nearby 
town, either in the open cast coal mine or in public services and new market enterprises. For 
young men and women in the community, this was now the major hope of employment. 
The importance of social networks in migration strategies and trading alerted me to their 
changing roles. As well as being more dependent on the domestic economy, households 
were also increasingly reliant on these kinship and other support networks, to fill in the gaps 
left by state support as well as to develop market activities (Humphrey and Sneath, 1999: 
136). To cite Piraiinen again, although households might appear to be autarkic and self- 
sufficient. 'this increased independence from the off icial society and economy would not ( ... ) 
be possible without an embeddedness of the household in a fabric of kinship and community 
relations, characterised by a sense of mutual responsibility. As the Soviet state has dissolved, 
and with it the social contract ( ... ) between society and its members, solidarities that may be 
defined as more 'traditional' have replaced the former solidarities between individuals and 
official Soviet socieW (1996 : 10). 
At household level, these networks were manifest in a number of areas. Work-based 
networks could be called on to get information about where to obtain goods at the best prices 
or who might be willing to barter a horse for some sheep. At the same time, households 
2 14 Drawing on a longitudinal study of flea market and collective farm market trading in Almaty in 
1996 and 1997, Gulsum Myrsagalieva, found that on average, women comprised 72% of vendors at the 
two markets, more specifically 80% of flea market vendors and 65% of farm market vendors. They 14 
also comprised the majority of street vendorsý . 211 See for example "Dazhe s maslom gorek khleb "Chelnokov"'I in Karavan, No. 44,30.10.98; 
website http: //www. caravan. kz/1 998/10/44/44-08-O. htm. 
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maintained close links with their neighbours. Now that electricity was erratic and often cut 
off altogether, those with outside bread ovens would bake bread for several neighbours. If 
someone's cucumber or tomato crop had perished, another neighbour might have a surplus. 
Particularly during preparations for winter, when households had to find alternative sources 
for tile fodder, fuel and other goods no longer provided by the sovkhoz, kin and other 
networks were the scene of frenetic chains of exchanges. Relatives on the otdeleniye often 
helped households in the central village by pasturing their sheep and getting hay for their 
smallholdings 'on the side'. On the other hand, the increasing difficulties with transport 
meant that relatives from the otdeleniye often stayed over when they needed to do business in 
the centre or on their way to or from town. In fact, particularly in the summertime, 
households became much more elastic entities altogether, with considerable coming and 
going between different parts of the sovkhoz and rural and urban kin. 
These networks, usually 'submerged' in the private sphere, were periodically crystallised 
much more visibly in ritual occasions, marked by feasting and gift exchange. The ostensibly 
social gulyanki were a visible sign and way of symbolically consolidating networks that were 
a basis for the exchange of gifts and favours. Similarly, reciprocal relationships between 
households were reinforced on the ritual and symbolic levels by the tradition of chai-pitie or 
tea-drinking, actually a substantial meal. At a wider level, households cemented their links 
with neighbours, colleagues and family through rituals such as the sogym feast, held to mark 
the slaughtering of livestock for the Winter. In late November or early December, kin and 
neighbours would get together to slaughter, skin and butcher a steer or a horse, afterwards 
eating kuurdak, a meal made with the fresh meat. In the week that followed, a series of other 
feasts would be held, and gifts of meat presented to other households, who would invite 
others in their turn. Therefore, as well as providing food for subsistence over the winter, 
sogym was an opportunity to literally nourish relationships of reciprocity. During my visits to 
Lenin, almost every week was punctuated by at least one big event and probably several 
smaller ones as well. All these occasions involved a huge investment of time and labour and 
considerable expense. As one of Kairat's sisters described their mother's funeral: 
'The funeral was tile biggest Lenin has ever seen - 700 people. I know because we 
had prepared 500 scarves with money in and we needed to make 200 more, it wasn't 
enough. Many people came out of respect for my father. The Akim came too - the first time he had come here for a funeral. So many people came that we couldn't 
hold the meal at home - the old people complained, but there was no space. We had 
to hire the toikhana and use Krasnonosov's house as well. We needed 14 sheep and 
2 horses for the meal. Three sacks of baursaqi. Biscuits. Raisins. There was no 
drink, but the pieces of cloth worked outjust as expensive in the end. She lay in for 
three days, and the house was full of relatives. My sister and I had to 'sleep' in the 
kitchen on chairs. The women came to lay out the body - we'd bought French 
perfume. It was expensive, but we thought we could use it for presents afterwards. 
Only one of the babushki went and put it in her pocket. Somebody saw her, but we 
didn't want to make a scene. A lot of men were involved in digging the grave and 
they all had to be fed. Afterwards, four babushki stayed here for 40 days, until the 
pominki. They were as capricious as children. They had no teeth, so I had to prepare 
special food. Then one relative had told me that according to tradition, I had to 
invite people again, every Friday until the pominki. It turned out that that was wrong 
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- but her family came every week and took home a bucketful of besbarmak every 
time. Then there was the pominki and a year later a second one, for 400 people 216 .I 
What had changed from the Soviet period was the immediate significance of these social 
institutions to rural households. On the one hand, as demonstrated in the example of Kairat's 
private farm, at a time when relationships of trust had broken down and when 'neutral, 
market structures did not yet exist, social networks were playing a key role in the creation 
and operation of new enterprises. This particular funeral brought together the huge social 
network which Kairat's parents had assiduously built and he had drawn on powerful patrons 
within it to set up his private farm. However, in this example, other, less prosperous 
households within the network were stretching custom to bring food home from a feast to 
contribute directly to household consumption 217 . In addition, now that the safety net of state 
support was broken, social networks were the first line of defence in a crisis such as an 
illness, in the family. In this instance, as the former state farm slipped further towards 
bankruptcy, two of Kairat's sisters drew directly on this network in order to leave the 
community and find work and housing in the rayon centre. 
As this example shows, different households were situated within the same network in 
diverse ways and might use it for different purposes. However, the importance of being in a 
network can be gauged from the time, energy and resources devoted to these ritual occasions. 
A large proportion of the livestock raised in domestic smallholdings were slaughtered for 
special occasions, visits from relatives or given to other family members. Much of the 
pickles and other preserves produced by women were also destined for big feasts or 
entertaining guests at home, or as gifts, and valued purchased items, such as confectionary, 
were uniquely destined for such occasions. Similarly, one of the primary reasons given for 
engaging in trade was to be able to afford the gifts needed for weddings and funeral 
celebrations. Even the poorest households devoted considerable resources to the ritual and 
gift economy, despite the proportionately greater investment of their resources this required. 
One of the most important concerns for Kulande, the widowed single mother cited above was 
to put on a'propee funeral for her husband. My research echoed other findings that suggested 
that exclusion from social networks was correlated with increased likelihood of poverty and 
conversely, that those who could afford to exchange more gifts seemed to be faring better 
than others (Wemer, 1997a and b; Kandiyoti: 1996). 
In effect, the erosion of the sovkhoz public sphere and the turn to the domestic economy and 
social networks was producing new patterns of differentiation and inequality. In the state 
farm structure, access to paid employment was the major determinant of social stratification. 
Although it was still important, the key strategy was now to obtain labour in the social 
sector, where money wages were still being paid, rather than in the agricultural sector, where 
they were not. The growing importance of the domestic smallholding was also bringing other 
factors into play. Successful management of the domestic smallholding required various 
216 Conversation with Karashash, Lenin, Fieldnotes October 1997. 
217 1 found an interesting historical parallel to this situation in the novel 'Ochevidets' which I found in 
the sovkhoz school library. Referring to a period of hardship in the aul, one of the characters 
comments that: 'Golodno v aule. Esli k komu priedet gost', to soberetsya syuda ves'aul v nadezhde na 
ugoshchenie' (People in the aul are going hungry. If a guest arrives at someone's yurt, the whole aul 
gathers in the hope of being given food). 
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skills and resources that were not distributed equally across the community. In the struggle to 
obtain inputs, particularly feed for domestic stock, residence in the outlying villages 
provided greater access to grazing and hay land, thereby enabling households to maintain a 
larger herd and to possess more tradable and exchangeable resources. On the other hand, 
access to transport was a key factor in obtaining inputs and selling outputs. Households with 
their own transport were occasionally able to buy goods more cheaply and sell their own 
produce more dearly outside the community. Others had to rely on the traders, the 
kommerlsanty, who came to the central village and bought, sold or bartered goods at a mark- 
up. Similarly, social networks provided crucial opportunities for extending the range of 
individual households in getting support and obtaining, selling or exchanging goods and 
services and this social capital was also unevenly distributed across the community. 
Households' strategies varied according to their access to these resources and their 
perceptions of tile new environment. 
Household strategies and local cultural patterns and identities 
In Chapter 21 also argued that, under socialism, people continued to order their social 
relations in particular ways, connected with indigenous cultural, ethnic and gender identities. 
State farms were composed of various groups, who stood in different relationships to the 
public and private spheres it embodied. On Lenin, the central village was relatively more 
identified with and incorporated in the sovkhoz public sphere than the otdeleniye and distant 
herders' encampments. It was in the central village that the bulk of the public administration, 
services and amenities were concentrated. Similarly, it was here that households identified 
with and relied most strongly on public labour for the sovkhoz as a source of income and 
personal status and value. On the other hand, the otdeleniye were perceived as more distant 
from the public sphere and correspondingly as more rooted in indigenous 'tradition 2 is. This 
distinction between the centre and periphery, Soviet and traditional culture, was also an 
ethnic one. The central village was predominantly Slav and German, with the Kazak 
population concentrated in the periphery. Although both Kazak and Slav respondents 
identified strongly with'theie sovkhoz, and with their own identity as'mestnye Iyudl (locals), 
this shared identity concealed rather different imaginings of what the community 
represented. Slav respondents, in particular, tended to identify with the Soviet concept of 
building a new and modem productive and cultural infrastructure in the wildemeSS219 . On the 
other hand, Kazak respondents identified with an image of the sovkhoz as an extended 
2 is This contrast was evident in the way people talked about the different parts of the community. It 
was common for people to refer specifically to the central village as 'the sovkhoz', for example, when 
talking about going into the centre from one of the outlying villages. My respondents also told me 
that, during the Soviet period, it was seen as a 'step up' in status to move from the otdeleniye to the 
centre. 
219 It is interesting that the Russians I met on the neighbouring former sovkhoz, Plodorovsky, did not 
identify in the same way with the Soviet development project. This community had originally been set 
up as a labour camp for kulaks and other repressed people under Stalin, some of whom had opted to 
stay on when the camp was closed. Here people identified much more strongly with their own family's tradition of hard work and survival, rather than with the Soviet state. There were many more 
private farmers here, and several of them explicitly referred to their pride in their kulak ancestors and 
their example as models for their own decision to go it alone. 
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family, within which all the smaller kin groupings and other collectives took their place 220 . 
At risk of simplifying, Slav respondents identified the community with the public sphere, 
which the Soviet state had helped to build, whilst Kazak respondents extended existing ideas 
of kinship and relatedness to incorporate the new sovkhoz public sphere. Tile balance 
between indigenous and Soviet culture had also shifted across generations, with the younger 
generation of Kazaks more identified with the latter. How were these factors influencing tile 
strategies of different households? 
As one respondent described, when it came to household strategies on the domestic 
economy, 'people do different things - some turn to trade, some to their private plot, it all 
depends what you feel at home with'. These choices were often explicitly linked to ethnicity: 
the Russians were used to keeping a private plot, the Kazaks to relying on livestock and 
Uzbeks, for example, engaged in trade. Each ethnicity had its own 'niche,. On Lenin, these 
ethnic differences were at once significant and increasingly blurred, as survival necessitated 
the adoption of unfamiliar practices. For example, in the central village, although Slav 
respondents generally referred to their private plots as the basis for subsistence and Kazak 
respondents to the need to keep livestock, in actual fact, households of both ethnicities were 
pursuing both strategies. Similarly, whereas previously there had been more 'ethnic 
specialisation' in livestock, some of my Kazak respondents had begun to keep pigs, since 
pork was now considerably more profitable than beef". The preferred option was for tile 
Kazak household to keep their pigs with those of their Slav neighbours rather than in their 
own sarai, thereby blurring but not totally overstepping ethnic - and religious - boundaries. 
In fact, the most salient distinction made by my respondents in the central village was 
between themselves and the otdeleniye. The otdeleniye were much more 'Kazak' and much 
more 'traditional', I was told. Here, households continued to keep more stock, in the old way. 
They had access to more and better grazing land. They relied on meat and dairy products 
and did not bother with cultivating vegetables. On my visits to the outlying villages, I found 
that this was largely the case and that respondents here largely identified themselves with 
this distinction. Access to resources and cultural identities were therefore combining to shape 
different household strategies. 
The same was true of households' strategies on social networks. Although the vitality and 
inclusiveness of the ritual economy was one of the most striking things about sovkhoz Lenin, 
Kazaks and non-Kazaks were incorporated in different ways. Not everyone in the 
community shared the view that the increasing emphasis on feasting and gift exchange was 
the best focus for household strategies. One Slav woman respondent described how the issue 
had become a bone of contention between herself and her Kazak husband. Whilst he felt that 
the household's resources would be best employed by holding a big wedding feast for their 
son, thereby nourishing the web of kin and community solidarities, she felt that they would 
do better to focus on the needs of the immediate family circle by giving him money to get set 
up in life by renting and equipping a flat. She framed this difference of opinion in ethnic 
220 As I have already described, Soviet hierarchies had been incorporated into Kazak feasts, such as 
porninki, so that extra sittings were organised for work colleagues as well as close and extended kin. 
These feasts therefore included'the whole sovkhoz'as aTamily' including Russians as well as Kazaks. 
221 In September 1997, pork was selling for 120 tenge per kilo and beef for 85 at the Karaganda 
bazaar. 
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terms, saying that she did not understand why'at a time like this, people here, Kazaks, spend 
so much on weddings and are trying to outdo each othee. I found that Kazak households 
tending to invest much more heavily in this social institution than non-Kazaks or more 
'Russiried' Kazaks. The majority of the Kazak population on Lenin had extensive kin 
networks on which they could now draw. My Kazak informants carried extremely detailed 
kinship maps in their heads into which they could place virtually every Kazak member of the 
sovkhoz, from close family to distant third cousins, and a great part of the other local state 
farms and towns as well. These maps traced long-term relationships, which reached back to 
past ancestors and forward to the youngest generations. Kin obligations and solidarities were 
therefore conceived as an ongoing continuum and, in the current circumstances, as the most 
solid form of relationship. Any household strategy, from getting hay to leaving the 
community, was generally discussed in terms of which kin, where, might be able to provide 
support. 
In contrast, the Slav population on Lenin generally lacked extended kinship networks of this 
kind. Most families had originally come to Kazakstan either as deportees or as volunteers, 
leaving the bulk of their extended family behind elsewhere. They had also tended to have 
fewer children. Not only this, but the younger generations had often left Kazakstan to study 
and work elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Before the collapse of the USSR, this family 
mobility and fragmentation had been offset by the subsidised transport links which meant 
that family members could keep in regular contact. However, this was no longer the case. 
Unlike my Kazak respondents, who were confident of obtaining support from kin, the refrain 
often repeated by my Slav respondents was 'komu my nuzhnyi,? '- or'who needs us nowT. If 
Slav households on Lenin could not rely on kinship support to the same extent as their Kazak 
neighbours, they had developed other, non-kin-based support networks during the Soviet 
period, although these were often perceived to be less stable. Two forms of network, based 
on work collectives and neighbourhood relations, have already been discussed. Although 
these were shared by both Kazaks and non-Kazaks, they were much more central to the 
latter, as I observed when I stayed with Lena, another of Kairaes sisters and her Russian 
husband, Victor, on the opposite side of the central village. In their street, mainly built by 
Slav Tselina volunteers, neighbourhood relations were particularly close. As Victor put it, 
'(our neighbours) are closer than many of my actual relatives - we can rely on each other for 
any kind of help and we are totally at home in each other's houses! It was with a neighbour 
that Victor had decided to set up a private farm, rather than with members of his own family. 
Slav households also maintained 'functional friendships' (Piraiinen, 1996) with 'useful' 
people both on and off the sovkhOZ222 . Therefore, whereas most of my Kazak respondents 
were devoting more time and energy to broad kinship networks of reciprocity, my Russian 
respondents were focusing primarily on close family and on negotiating non-kin blat 
relations to maintain their domestic economy. 
222 Examples of the blat networks used by non-Kazaks on Lenin included the 'friendships' with militia 
officers in the nearby town, who could provide access to petrol and other goods 'on the side'. In 
particular, they controlled what was locally termed the'winter garden'where passing Uzbek lorries 
would be'persuaded'to unload a proportion of their load as a'fine. If one knew the right militia 
officer, the winter garden was a good source of free fruit and other goods. 
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As for strategies on the domestic smallholding, boundaries could be blurred. Although 
Kazaks and Slavs tended to have different types of social network, these were often used it, 
symbiosis. One characteristic example of the interaction between kinship, Mal and 
neighbourhood networks was an incident where a Slav man ran over a Kazak neighbour's 
goose and was beaten up by the owner. The neighbours gathered to try to resolve the 
incident. Whilst the Kazak neighbours focused on using their 'kinship' maps to place tile 
owner of the goose and the police officers who had arrived at the scene, the Slav neighbours 
drew on their own networks (in this case, a useful friend in the local hospital who could be 
persuaded to falsify the result of the breathalyser test) so that the neighbourhood could reach 
an amicable conclusion which did not involve the 'outside' authorities. Another particularly 
striking feature of Lenin was that the feasting and gift exchange that accompanied it often 
incorporated the community as a whole, particularly for weddings, funerals and 
remembrance celebrations. Therefore, although the state farm office no longer provided a 
spatial, public focal point for the community, there was another kind of focal point, hidden in 
the private sphere 223 . Or, looking at 
it in a slightly different way, we could say that the ritual 
economy had become the'public' face of households and the community as a whole. 
On the other hand, there were limits to this symbiosis and inclusion. At the individual and 
household level, the example of Kairafs extended family highlights some of the boundaries. 
Taken together, the various households had access to a broad spectrum of resources 
(including the Kazak households' kin-based and Victor and Lena's neighbourhood-based 
social networks, the private farm, waged employment and domestic smallholdings) which 
could be used in concert to boost their opportunities and well-being. However, as we have 
seen, the private farm was disrupting the strategy of maintaining reciprocal kin-based 
networks of support. In addition, in 'marrying out', Lena had been effectively marginalised 
from the wider family. In response, she was moving increasingly away from maintaining 
kin-based networks towards neighbourhood solidarities and market-based transactions with 
non-kin. She was also much less willing to contribute her own household's resources 
(notably access to transport) to the other households. In this sense, there was a tendency 
towards polarisation rather than inclusion. 
Likewise, although the ritual economy was now in many ways the 'public face' of tile 
community, traditional support networks were not compensating for the demise of the 
Sovkhoz public sphere by serving as a springboard for new, inclusive, conceptions of 
communitY211. One sign of this was that, with independence and the resurgence of Kazak 
223 Humphrey (1998 : 483487) describes the renaissance of an alternative 'spiritual' or 'religious, 
space, on one of the former kolkhozy she studied in Buryatiya. Here a specific site has been created 
for gatherings of 200-300 people for the Emege-Ezhiin sacrifices and rituals, reviving shamanist 
spiritual links with the earth. On Lenin, no alternative ritual space of this kind has been created. 
Pominki and other large gatherings are held in the home, usually in one or several yurts, or in one of 
the remaining Soviet social spaces, the toikhana, although this was now often described as an 
infringement of 'proper' Kazak tradition, and seen very much as a last resort. 
224 MiS is not the case in all rural communities. In other cases, the ritual economy has served as an 
embryonic basis for activity in 'civil society'. For example, through the 
Hivos organ isation in Almaty, 
I met two women from a sovkhoz in Semipalatinsk oblast, who 
had founded an NGO. The initial 
catalyst had been a big clan celebration. Over the Winter, village women had got together to prepare 
for this, making felts and other decorations. Afterwards, they had decided to extend their cooperation 
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national identity, the ritual economy was being framed as more exclusively Kazak. So long 
as the sovkhoz existed, its structures had been integrated into the Kazak ritual economy. Non- 
Kazak as well as Kazak sovkhoz members had participated in pominki and other feasts as 
members of particular work teams and collectives. Now, Slavs reported that they felt 
increasingly uncomfortable, since they were being pressured to perform muslim rituals on 
these occasions. Slav women married to Kazak men also reported that they were coming 
under pressure from their husband's families to convert to Islam and that their children felt 
that they were having to choose between a Kazak and a Russian identity. In a mirror image 
of the stratification of the sovkhoz public sphere, the ritual economy was therefore marked by 
tensions around belonging and exclusion. Another sign was that the informal, village-wide 
tradition of organisation for traditional ceremonial events, rooted in the kinship and clan 
relations, was not being extended to compensate for all the public functions formerly 
provided by the sovkhoz administration, women's council and trade union. One such example 
was the failure to organise a meal for'Old People's Day' on 1 October, formerly managed by 
the state farm. Although people appreciated this occasion and had a lot of experience in 
organising big feasts for weddings that could be transposed to this smaller-scale event, they 
objected that it was not their responsibility to organise it. Everybody was now trying to 
survive 'on their own' (sam po sebe) and could not possibly find any extra resources for a 
celebration of this kind 225 . Therefore, people did not perceive the withdrawal of the state as 
liberating them to participate in a new democratic civil society by creating horizontal links, 
but as the disappearance of the prerequisites for any collective action beyond the confines of 
'traditional' support networks. It was no longer a question of actively cooperating to build a 
community, as it had been in the past, but of shoring up what remained of it as a bulwark 
against further erosions in quality of life. From this perspective, the model of 'civil society' 
envisaged in the macro-level development model had little sense at local level. Rather than 
being integrated into a new market/democratic sphere, the community as a whole was being 
repositioned in a new 'subsistence' domain. 
Another point of contrast within the community, was whether the 'defensive traditionall . sm, 
of relying on the domestic economy and kin and other solidarities was seen as a viable long- 
term alternative or as a temporary or stop-gap measure. In 1998, there was an evident sense 
of dislocation, loss and despondency at the 'death' of the sovkhoz in the central village and 
amongst the Russian and 'Russified' Kazak population there, many of whom were planning 
to leave. Here, the collapse of the public sphere was perceived to leave a vacuum, which 
could not be filled by reliance on the domestic economy. Paradoxically, in the most isolated 
third oldeleniye, where it might be thought that life would be still harsher, people were 
staying put. In 1998, respondents here were more sanguine about the disappearance of waged 
employment and public services. So long as they had enough livestock, they saw no reason 
to leave. Electricity had always been erratic. Employment had always been limited and they 
to helping the wider community and had decided to form an association. Fieldnotes and tape, 
17.12.96. 
225 For example : 'Ifs true that women have a lot of experience in organising. But maybe it's the 
Kazak way - everybody gathers together for occasions like weddings and pominki. But otherwise 
peoplejust aren't used to organising anything on their own initiative. Before, we were always told 
what to do, and we did it. There's o much that could be done. Take all the rubbish in the streets, it 
just needs omeone to organise people to get together and collect it. But nobody wants to take 
responsibility on themselves! Lyuba, Fieldnotes, 11.10.97 
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had always relied more heavily on their domestic smallholding. Moreover, they were nearly 
all members of the same uru and would stick together and survive, as they always had 
226 
. 
It appeared that those formerly most marginalised from the sovkhoz public sphere were now 
those most likely to remain. On the one hand, their position on the periphery of the sovkho-, 
and its public scheme of values had been offset by the centring of their locus of security and 
identity on the household and informal community, which were less affected than waged 
employment by the collapse of the public sphere. On the other hand, the most marginalised 
groups had developed informal networks and labour strategies which, at least initially, made 
them more adaptable. On the Lenin otdeleniye, the greater availability of land and fodder 
made it possible to maintain a large subsidiary farm. Likewise, the existing kin-based, inter- 
household and inter-generational divisions of labour could be extended to 'colonise' new 
spaces. The most common pattern was for individual households to diversify their 
contributions to a joint strategy according to age, with the older and middle collorts 
remaining to manage the smallholding, whilst the youngest cohort found paid employment in 
the local towns. Rural and urban households were therefore dependent on each other for 
different types of resources. 
Looking beyond Lenin, this framework also applied to the other state farm communities. On 
Sarybulak and Druzhba, although many people regretted the loss of health and welfare 
services, the collapse of the sovkhoz was not perceived in such dramatic terms as on Lenin. 
On Sarybulak, as on the Lenin otdeleniye, it was perceived that the demise of the sovkhoz 
could be compensated by households and systems of kin support and reciprocity. 
Subsistence farming was seen by many as a viable pursuit in itself and by others as a possible 
springboard for market activity. On Druzhba, the state 
farm had been just one of tile 
employment options available in the community, and many 
households had developed forms 
of secondary economy activity in opposition to the state. Here, the breakdown of the state 
farming and industry could be more easily compensated by new commercial possibilities in 
private farming, trading and waged employment 
in the private enterprises springing up 
around Almaty. On the other hand, as I argued 
in the last chapter, the gap between those 
who had access to these opportunities and those who were 
being forced into subsistence 
activity was growing. 
Conclusion 
According to the 'transition! model, reform would lead to the emergence of a new non-state 
sector of market and civil society, which would take on many of the 
functions of tile state, 
thereby leading to a more efficient division of responsibilities and an experience of increased 
choice, opportunity and democratic accountability 
for communities. However, although 
systemic transformation was changing loci of value and meaning, this was not 
in the ways 
envisaged at macro level. Privatisation and market reform were 
leading, to varying extents 
in different localities, to the emergence of private enterprises and the commercial isation of 
local economies. However, although private enterprises and services were emerging, they 
were embedded in complex ways in the domestic sphere and could not 
be seen in isolation 
226 Unlike the rest of the community, this village was dominated by the Altyntory uru. 
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from wider subsistence and support strategies. In fact, for local households and communities, 
the most evident sign of rural privatisation was the erosion of the public functions formerly 
assumed by the sovkhoz and the ensuing incapability of the state to take care of its rural 
citizens. In this context, in order to maintain their well-being, most rural households were 
turning to a survival strategy of 'defensive traditionalism' (Piraiinen, 1996). In other words, 
they were withdrawing as far as possible from the market economy and sphere of monetary 
exchange, whilst seeking to increase their self-sufficiency through subsistence production 
and reliance on kinship networks, patron-client relations or community ties. Far from 
promoting 'modernisation', rural privatization therefore seemed in many respects to be 
strengthening patterns of social and economic behaviour which existed prior to the planned 
or market economy. However, we cannot see this shift in terms of a simple 'return' to the 
past. The picture in my research communities was a peculiar combination of increased 
traditionalism, on the one hand and increased dependency on the market, on the other. Just 
as 'traditional' behaviours adapted to and intertwined with socialist structures and practices, 
they were now adapting to the introduction of the market. These entwined processes were 
producing new vectors of inclusion/exclusion and inequality, relating to access to resources 
across the different spheres, the money economy, access to work and access to kinship and 
social networks. Although the nomenklatura, those 'included' in Soviet times, had often 
managed to convert their resources into assets in the new circumstances, the most 
marginalised groups had also developed niches and strategies which helped them to react 
creatively and adaptively. The next chapter looks more specifically at the gender dimension 
of these processes. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Restructuring and the Rural Gender Contract 
'We must expect that there will be tensions between (-) stable elements and the incentives to 
change - tensions that have to be dealt with in negotiations both between men and wolnell 
and within persons. We may also expect that there may be cleavages between the ways in 
which men and women describe the world. Such cleavages partly reflect different 
experience, and may take the form of clearly different (conflicting) interests. Such cleavages 
may remain relatively untouched by changes in the circumstances o the economy and )f 
education, or they may mirror such changes. ' 
(Rudie, 1994: 156-7) 
The previous chapter analysed how political and economic reform was changing tile 
environment in which households were situated and how households were adapting their 
strategies to meet these changes. I argued that reform was leading not only to the emergence 
of a new market sector of private enterprises and services, but also, more visibly, to the 
collapse of the state enterprises and services and increased reliance on strategies such as self- 
provisioning and social-networking. 
Just as development policy was changing the parameters in which households operated, it 
was also changing the thematic repertoire available to the individual men and women within 
them. As discussed in Chapter 2, under socialism, household strategies could be described as 
a form of heterophony, where 'a melody divides into several dissonant voices, each with its 
own variation of the theme, which is improvised by the individual singers until the end, when 
the song reverts to a single theme' (Figes, 2003: 181). Here, the theme or melody was tile 
rural gender contract, the conceptual scheme which defined the activities of household 
members as complementary contributions to household status and well-being. Tile variation 
was expressed in the different ways individual members combined work for the state farm 
and work in the domestic economy. In the sometimes uneasy accommodation between pre- 
socialist and socialist models of gender domains, men's and women's 'proper' roles, resources 
and sense of identity were located in different places. Although women and men both 
continued to be associated with the public and domestic spheres and had specific tasks in 
each, men's primary role came to be defined as their 'outs ide/prod uctive work for the state 
farm and its financial contribution to the household and women's as their 
, inside'/reproductive work for the domestic economy and its moral or spiritual contribution to 
the family and the ethnos. On the other hand, spaces in the local and socialist models left 
room for other resources and identities: education and work for the sovkhoz gave women 
their own independent material and social resources; conversely, on tile margins of the 
socialist model, in'Kazak'state farms and outlying villages, as well as in the niches provided 
by the second economy, both sexes identified more strongly or drew more resources from tile 
private domain. 
This chapter looks more specifically at the gender dimension of the reconfiguration of public 
and domestic domains. It explores two questions: 
first, how was gender intertwined with the 
new vectors of inclusion/exclusion and inequality and second, how far were changes in the 
economy and household strategies disrupting gender relations or how far were gender 
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domains resistant to or shaping change at local level? The analysis draws on the 
ethnographic examples already presented in Chapters 5 and 6 together with additional 
material from conversations, interviews and individual life histories. Given their centrality 
both in macro-level and local discourse, it focuses particularly on the changing forms and 
meanings of work and social networks. 
1. Changing forms and meanings of work, value and social networks 
At the macro level, work and the relationship between the individual, family and wider 
society were key elements in the socialist development model and were equally important in 
the new development ideology. In socialist ideology, the locus of value and status was work 
for the state and for the collective; in the new ideology, labour maintained its centrality, but 
the scale of value was inversed as private enterprise replaced state enterprise and emphasis 
shifted to the need to liberate individual initiative to restore society, economy and polity. 
The feminist critiques of transition discussed in Chapter I made a direct connection between 
the gendered subtext of the new ideology and women's position on the labour market and in 
the family. They highlighted that, as the state receded, both sexes were to be 'set free' from 
the repressions it had imposed, but whilst men were to be liberated to fulfil their'natural' role 
as hero-provider-cntrepreneurs in the new market sphere, women were to be liberated from 
the 'unnatural' gendered division of labour the state had enforced to 'return' to their 'natural' 
and 'propee place in the home. In Chapter 3,1 argued that a gendered reading of state 
discourse on nation-building and economic development in Kazakstan illustrated that, here 
too, a division was being created between market and domestic domains, constructing men as 
breadwinners and women as homemakers. In Chapter 1,1 explored existing analyses of the 
interaction between this paradigm and gender relations at micro-level, which pointed in two 
directions. One argument was that avenues of opportunity in the new market domain were 
being closed to women, whilst their burden of caring and reproductive work was increasing 
and made 'invisible' (Verdery, 1994). Consequently, women were being forcibly relocated to 
the home and, within households, risked losing their financial independence, access to 
resources and relative bargaining power (Fong, 1993; Funk and Mueller, 1993; Bridger et al, 
1996). Another argument was that the alternative or informal niches and resources - 
including social networks - which women had developed under socialism were putting them 
in a good position to seize new opportunities (Bruno, 1996b; Bauer et al, 1997). It was also 
argued that the meaning of state, market and domestic domains could not be inferred and that 
the values ascribed to them in local contexts might be important in shaping women's and 
men's strategies and relative positions (Pine, 1994,1995). 
At local level, in everyday conversations and more formal interviews people often structured 
their experiences around a division between 'then/before' (ran'she) and 'now' (seichas). This 
dividing line was as much a moral as it was a temporal one. If 'before' was a system 
#complete with its frameworks, rules and shared practices which found a legitimacy in 
people's everyday lives and in their production of values and culture' (Bruno, 1996: 60), 
'after' was a shifting economic, social and cultural landscape where all that was solid 
appeared to have melted into air. As reform progressed, basic and important areas of daily 
life were ceasing to fit the moulds which people had come to expect under the socialist 
system. Again, two of the subjects which recurred most frequently were the changes in work 
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and social relationships, their impact on individuals' sense of identity and status and tile 
inequalities they were introducing in communities, households and families. In Chapter 5,1 
argued that ideas about and arguments around labour and solidarity were an important 
metaphor for talking about entitlement and in structuring working relationships in tile new 
private farms. In Chapter 61 discussed the changes in work and family. Waged labour had 
become a scarce resource to be pursued in competition with others rather than a right and 
secure possibility. Some branches of labour had disappeared altogether or were being eroded, 
whilst other new or formerly despised branches were expanding. Work-based support 
networks were also changing along with employment structures, some surviving in altered 
forms, others losing their cohesion and usefulness. Whilst the family was coming to assume 
a greater role in subsistence production and the provision of care, kin and other solidarities 
were simultaneously unden-nined by the increasing differentiation brought by the market 
economy. These shifting forms and meanings of labour and social networks were also 
changing feelings about what'the good life'was, how far it was available and how to achieve 
it. What was seen as desirable or possible for some groups was perceived or experienced as 
inappropriate or impossible for others. Looking at current changes in conjunction with the 
values ascribed locally to the state, market and domestic domains, previous cultural 
constructions of gender domains, and the situation of the rural economy as a whole, tile 
analysis in this chapter teases out the complexities and ambiguities of this shifting situation. 
U. Gender and local constructions of the marketplace 
From the perspective of the macro-level development model, the new market domain was a 
neutral or impersonal space, where money transactions were enacted between individuals 
acting essentially on the basis of economic calculation. However, the material discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 has demonstrated that this was at best a partial picture. To the frustration of 
Western donors, many rural communities opted to 'stay together' in collectives rather than 
take up entrepreneurial opportunities; and even independent farmers saw their enterprises in 
terms of survival and kin solidarities as well as efficiency and commercial returns. Whilst 
Western project managers decried the illogic of keeping a cow, when the cost of feed, time 
and labour would make it cheaper to buy milk and invest elsewhere, most villagers saw 
keeping livestock as an eminently rational strategy. In seeking to make sense and use of the 
new circumstances, people were therefore drawing on existing knowledge, relationships, 
identities and strategies in ways that influenced the way the market was constructed. 
At local level, the market was an unfamiliar domain but not a neutral one. Under socialism, 
work outside state employment was morally suspect, either seen as not 'real' labour or 
associated with bourgeois exploitation and individual enrichment. On Druzhba, it was tile 
most marginal groups, such as the Turks and Koreans, who systematically engaged in 
alternative work such as market trade. On Lenin, not engaging in trade was equated with the 
moral values of Soviet civilisation and indigenous values of solidarity, and as something 
which set the community apart from the 'undeveloped' South of Kazakstan. Although 
accepted to different extents, these values were prevalent in all three communities and did 
not simply disappear in the new environment. Similarly, although there were many new and 
unknown players, including foreign firms and donor organisations, those involved in market 
activity, from 'big' actors such as farm directors, to 'small'actors such as stallholders on local 
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markets, were often known to each other and had been involved in long-standing working 
and social relationships. This embeddedness of the market in existing relations and value 
systems was inter-reacting with the new macro and micro-level environment to shape market 
behaviour. From this perspective, cultural constructions of gender domains and identities 
were also interacting with the new parameters to shape the forms and boundaries of 
individuals' activities and of the market itself. 
One way of reading the ethnographic material would be to say that that state and local 
discourse and practice were combining to create a gendered division between market and 
subsistence domains. We saw that the local ideas about men's 'outs ide/provider' roles and 
women's 'inside/nourishing' roles shaped under socialism were being transposed to the new 
economic structures. In the folk 'inside/outside' metaphor, the state farm had been 
familiarised as a bounded space where people knew each other or were related. Now, some 
forms of work, such as market trading, were bringing individuals further into 'outside' or 
unbounded space. Within new family farms, such as Kairat's, men took responsibility for 
'outside' trade with 'unknown' actors, whilst women were responsible for 'inside' or informal 
trade via 'known' actors, including friends, colleagues and kin. The market could also be seen 
as another opportunity for men to consolidate their position as 'providers' or main 
'breadwinners'. On Druzhba, women and men were increasingly coming to occupy different 
niches in the market economy, with men moving into off-farm waged work, particularly 
local processing industries, often joint ventures with foreign companies, and women 
remaining in farming, juggling subsistence and trade in surplus produce. Similarly, on 
Lenin, those men who were able to find work elsewhere were migrating out of the village, 
either individually or with their immediate family, leaving either their wives or the older 
generation to maintain the domestic smallholding. 
However, the preceding discussion of these ethnographic examples has cautioned against 
making a straightforward equation between men/market and women/subsistence. The 
examples highlighted three other factors: first that the flexibility within the rural gender 
contract during the Soviet period was being carried forward into the new environment, 
second, that both the macro level and micro level discourses tended to obscure women's 
actual contribution to economic activity and households' economic well-being and third, that 
reform was also destabilising men's as well as women's relationship to the public domain. 
Just as native metaphors had stretched to accommodate women's labour in the state farm 
sector, the idioms of the rural gender contract now allowed areas of market activity to be 
defined by both sexes as part of women's family-based economic, caring and nourishing 
responsibilities. We saw how women respondents who worked as private farmers, traders or 
entrepreneurs used metaphors uch as'feeding the family'to make their activity both morally 
acceptable and congruent with ideas about women's 'propee conduct and 'inside' space. At 
the same time, just as women had expressed other meanings and feelings about work in 
socialist enterprises, many now expressed different feelings about trading or working for 
private farms and firms. Although, in the presence of husbands and kin, women tended to use 
the 'feeding the family' idiom, amongst hemselves, they told stories of 'initiation' and the 
acquisition of experience that highlighted dangerous but exciting encounters with freedom 
and the unexpected and their own daring, strength and skill. Other women also wove a 
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narrative of admiration around women traders, stressing their skills, courage and boldness. 
In this sense, like the socialist work collective, the market also gave some woi-ncn an 
alternative 'private' space where they could escape family obligations and explore other 
identitieS227. 
Second, women's management of household farming and social networks were a useful 
resource in the new market environment. In Chapter 6, we saw how women were able to 
convert surplus food from the household farm into tradable and exchangeable goods and also 
how they used their existing social and kin networks to conduct trade and organise labour 
and marketing for the new private enterprises. In this way, women were able to'humanise'or 
Opersonalise'the market, and the trust and reliable personal connections they maintained were 
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an integral part of successful farming and tradin 
Women's position in the fluid field of the domestic economy and social networks therefore 
gave them a strong base for participation in the market, both in terms of morally validating 
their activity and equipping them with important resources. In turn, through activities such as 
trade, women brought back gains to the household in the form of network connections and 
money, which put them in a strong negotiating position as resource persons in their own 
right. For some, notably the long-distance shuttle traders (chelnoki), who travelled abroad to 
Pakistan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, there was a perception that tile personal 
style and security they gained in the market place could be brought into other social 
situations, giving them increased confidence and strength. As one shuttle trader's daughter 
described: 'Being a shuttle trader is not something you are, but something you become. They 
are people you wouldn't want to mess with. They have more self-confidence and power than 
most women. They are even forming an interest group. Recently a group of women traders 
held a demonstration (never reported) to protest about how a colleague was treated by the 
police' (Fieldnotes, Almaty, May 1997). Some of the women who operated in the new 
private sector of the economy were therefore able to expand and consolidate their position. 
Using the flexibility of local idioms around gender domains, they were able to define the 
new 'outside' space in ways that enabled them to use their resources and initiative to shape 
new identities and activities. 
The situation can usefully be compared to that described by Ingrid Rudie (1994) in rural 
Malaysia, where, as in Kazakstan, indigenous systems contained both 'impulses towards 
mate hegemony and strong impulses towards a more even juxtaposition of women with men'. 
Here too, women traditionally had a part to play in the public sphere of the village and had 
ritual and networking functions of major 
importance to the viability of household and 
community. Although the new discourses around 'modem' 
development tended to reinforce 
the tendency towards male hegemony, women's ability to elicit resources from ceremonial 
and market trading enabled them to maintain a position as resource persons within 
households. However, Rudie's analysis also highlighted that women's assets were dependent 
117 See also the chapters by Astuti, on Madagascar, Pine, on Poland and Stewart, on Roma and the 
general discussion in the Introduction to Lilies ofthe 
Field. Afarginal People Who Livefor the 
Afoment S. Day, E. Papataxiarchis and M. Stewart (eds. ) for a useful parallel. 
228 See also Bruno (1996b), Kaneff, (1999) and Rudie (1994) for an exploration of comparable skills 
and processes in urban Russia, rural Bulgaria and rural 
Malaysia, respectively. 
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on a particular division of work and a particular kind of female solidarity, that were not 
easily carried over as local subsystems were more firmly integrated into large-scale 
economic and political systems. She found that, whilst women's identity as resource persons 
was tenacious, it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, as community networks 
were eroded and as the 'housewife' role overtook women's role as economic contributor. 
From this perspective, the ethnographic material also situated the limits or boundaries of 
women's market resources and involvemen t229. 
First, although women's informal social networks were a key resource in both their market 
and survival strategies, their stability was coming into question as a result of economic 
differentiation. This process had gone furthest on Druzhba. As in rural Uzbekistan 
(Kandiyoti, 1998), under socialism, many women had been involved in gender-specific 
informal networks. On the one hand, there were the work-collective-based women's credit 
groups (chernaya kassa), where each member contributed part of their salary and took it in 
turns to draw the lump sum. On the other, this work-based credit system was intertwined 
with a system of regular but informal get-togethers, where women took it in turns to invite 
colleagues, kin and neighbours to their homes. Each member would contribute an agreed 
amount. The hostess would use the money collected to provide refreshments, and keep the 
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remaining lump sum, which she usually put towards the next fease . In Kandiyoti's case 
study, the functions of these forms of credit had changed, as the money was increasingly 
needed to provide cash resources for households. However, the system of communal sharing 
and support itself had not (yet) been undermined by inequalities introduced by the 
encroachment of the market economy. A conscious effort was being made not to exclude less 
well-off neighbours or kin by letting them share the food and the recreation even if they were 
not able to pay. 
On Druzhba, although similar efforts were being made towards inclusion, the strains and 
tensions were far more evident. Here the chernaya kassa system appeared to have 
disappeared altogether along with the former socialist work collectives and divisions 
between women with land or employment and those without were putting solidarity relations 
in jeopardy. In 1997, women formerly linked through these networks continued to gather in 
each other's homes, but the introduction of private farming was changing their relationships. 
Women farmers, such as Bota, drew on their networks of former colleagues and neighbours 
to do fieldwork, particularly at harvest time. Both sides described the relationship as one of 
'help' and 'friendship' and linked this with socialist and indigenous values of mutual support 
and reciprocity. In 1998, relations were tense and described differently by the two sides. 
Bota now said that the other women were 'working foe her and complained that they did not 
work well or efficiently; the other women maintained that they were 'helping' out of 
friendship. The two parties now had a different investment in the relationship, which was 
becoming increasingly assymetric. The landless women were reliant on the connections of 
229 Another comparison here would be with Cole's Women of the Praia which looks at changes in 
women's labour in Portugal with the end of Fascism and beginning of socialist development. 
230 On Lenin, it appeared that no direct money transactions were involved. Each hostess would lay on 
a feast at her own expense and using her own domestic resources (baking baursaki etc. ). The rule was 
that enough should be provided so that the members could share the food, but also take food home to 
their households and the hostess received recognition for her generosity. 
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solidarity for subsistence and were resistant to moving to the language of 
employer/employee, which signalled a change in relations and highlighted inequality. 
Working for somebody from the community as an employee was widely perceived to be 
shameful or immoral231. Only unemployed men from the city and in-migrants from the 
Kazak diaspora, derogatorily labelled as kalpaki and seen as the lowest and most culturally 
backward sector of the population, explicitly worked as hired labour. Conversely, the 
landowner needed to ensure that her land gave the best possible returns and now highlighted 
the contractual aspects of the relationship. However, small farmers such as Bota, who did 
not have sufficient resources to employ outside labour, were still reliant on their social 
networks. On the other hand, those who were better off could afford to use the new 
possibilities of market and money transactions to hire workers. For them, the 'language of 
help' was becoming a moral rather than an economic one. In a moral atmosphere where 
community and solidarity were important values, entrepreneurs ran the risk of reprisals, 
ranging from being labelled as profiteers, being socially cold-shouldered or asked to pay 
higher prices to finding that their fields had been set alight. As Dina's example illustrated, 
women entrepreneurs, in particular, risked crossing a specific gendered boundary out of the 
moral economy. Women's existing social networks were therefore being maintained but 
destabilised by the nascent economic inequalities. 
It was difficult to speculate how the situation would evolve. One possibility was that there 
would be increasing differentiation between types of network, as successful women traders 
and farmers formed alternative but more exclusive networks of their own, excluding the less 
wealthy. On Druzhba, wealthy farmers such as Dina were beginning to unite in associations, 
which gave access to other forrns of labour-sharing and credit. On the other hand, the 
complex relationships between Dina and the people working for her illustrated that patterns 
of differentiation were difficult to predict. Although male workers from the city were hired 
on a contractual basis and paid set wages, the relationship with migrant labourers was 
structured by a complex hybrid of market relations and ideas about moral community. An 
entire family would be lodged in one of her outbuildings in return for their labour. The men 
often ate in the kitchen with Dina and her family whilst the women, who she referred to as 
moi zhenshchiny (my women) would spend time in 'inner' space in the home, discussing 
children and intimate emotional matters. At the same time, these families lived in poor and 
unsanitary conditions, were expected to be available for work whenever needed, were 
berated for their 'lazinessý and, in some cases, summarily dismissed. The relationship 
therefore bore hallmarks of inclusiveness and inequality, reciprocity and exploitation. 
Beyond the in-migrant labourers, longstanding members of the community were also 
involved in a variety of share-cropping and other arrangements. It was striking how these 
231 In this context people used a particular term for working, 'batrachif, which comes from the word 
'batrak'- a particular category of peasants constituted during the post-revolution and early civil war 
years. As Werth (1984 : 71-77) describes, these were peasants on the margins of the rural community, 
who had often lost everything during the Revolution or civil war, 
did not have sufficient means to 
farm their land and were obliged to become agricultural wage workers. After the dissolution of the big 
estates, this generally meant working for rich peasants, often erratic work 
by day or week under poor 
conditions. The batrak 'was extremely isolated 
in a rural society which tended to consider him (or her) 
as a vagabond, or at best as an inveterate layabout. 
' As well as using this ten-n, people also claimed 
that only 'alkashi' (inveterate alcoholics) and BICHi (byvshii 
intelligentyi chelovek - lit. 'formerly 
cultured/educated people', ie. people who have 
dropped out) worked as hired labour. 
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working and social relationships on Druzhba, the most 'market-oriented' and 'privatised' 
former sovkhoz could be paralleled with the forms of patron/dependent labour emerging on 
Sarybulak. An alternative trajectory would therefore be for particular networks of solidarity 
to be maintained, whilst becoming more assymetric. 
Another possibility was that the different life experiences of the various cohorts of women 
would become increasingly important. Women in the middle cohort, such as Dina and Bota, 
were able to draw on the social capital they had developed uring the socialist period, when 
the combination of work for the state and social networks gave them important resources. In 
the case of these women, their position in the life cycle, as mother and khozyaika in their 
own right, had combined with their previous positions in state employment to give them the 
proper age, experience and resources to launch into market activity. With the disappearance 
of state employment and the breakdown of trust and strains on neighbourhood and other 
networks, it was not at all certain that younger generations of women would be able to create 
and maintain the same kind of social capital. This also points to the possible disruption of 
local expectations about age, life cycle and activity brought about by market reform. 
Second, we saw that women's freedom of action and initiative did not necessarily translate 
into formal entitlement or power. In the example of private family farms, women's 
contribution was not always reflected in the new property regime, which was becoming 
increasingly important in determining the future trajectory of the new enterprises and the 
position of their members in the formal economy. Similarly, women's dominance in trade 
can be seen both as a result of their resources and as a result of their lack of resources. 
Although some forms of trade potentially provided a path towards economic prosperity, from 
the perspective of the wider formal economy, even shuttle-trade was an economically 
marginal activity or niche. Locally too, trade in particular was often perceived as'shameful' 
or as a last resort for the economically marginal, rather than part of the concretisation of new 
opportunities. 
Third, the material raises the complex issue of the relationship between discourse and 
practice. The use of the'family' idiom to define women's involvement in market activity can 
interpreted as both a resource and a constraint. The metaphor operated in a number of 
different ways. On the one hand, it enabled the market (like the sovkhoz) to be classified A 
'safe' or'family' space where women could operate without transgressing gender boundaries 
and enabled women to maintain a 'flexible' identity that gave them entry into particular 
niches. On the other hand, it signalled that it was less acceptable for women to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity and maintained the status quo by defining their work in ways that did 
not challenge men's breadwinner/provider role. Within households, the idiom of 
women/family and men/market was therefore both assymetrical, in that it confirmed men's 
authority, and complementary, in that it preserved the rural gender contract, whilst enabling 
household members to reach into, shape and use all the new niches available to them. The 
question of how local definitions of men's and women's activities would affect their future 
development is one that requires further investigation. The material suggested that, in terms 
of access to the market, local discourses around men's activities coincided better with the 
categories and values prevalent at macro level. For example, although the boundary between 
'private' and 'subsistence' farms was actually blurred, local discourses that defined male- 
221 
headed farms and men's farming activities as 'commercial' and women's as 'feeding the 
family'were inter-relating with the categories used by development agents to exclude women 
from further assistance and support. Although the use of the family idiom may help women 
to build market-based activities, it may also make it difficult for them to consolidate and 
expand them. 
However, here, it is also important to bring men into the picture. Far from experiencing 
market reform as the herald of new entrepreneurial labour opportunities, many rural men 
experienced it as a kind of emasculation and overturning of their role and status. In tile 
countryside, men as well as women were being marginalised from the new market dornain, 
as private farming and trading became located in a shaky position between market and 
subsistence. For men in particular, this experience was complicated by the new discourses 
surrounding national identity, work and success in the market sphere. As Gilmore (1990: 
187) points out, 'often manhood as an ideology becomes caught up in nationalist or other 
political movements that temporarily magnify its emotive power. 232 For most rural men, the 
reinvented models of manliness, of hero-entrepreneurs conquering the market and making 
good were unattainable dreams. Instead, rural reform was making it difficult for rural men to 
maintain the performance of masculinity, whose 'threshold is in the eye of the beholder, a 
fuzzy demarcation always in need of testing! (Gilmore, 1990: 66). This critical threshold, 
which must be seen to be crossed, is 'the point at which the boy produces more than lie 
consumes and gives more than he takes' (ibid.: 266). In the Kazak rural gender contract, it 
was important for'real men'to be both productive and generous, and waged employment was 
central to their ability to provide for the family and consolidate their status and authority as 
head of household through feasts and giving. 
In this sense, economic reform was creating painful divisions between men who were able to 
provide, and others, labelled in both local and state discourse as'mis-adapted' or'lazy', who 
could not do so. As we saw in Chapter 5, the category of beneficiaries of decollectivisation 
varied from farm to farm, but the language in which they explained their own success and 
others' failure to benefit from reform centred on ideas about work and morality. Those who 
did not take up early opportunities were 'lazy' and 'unwilling to work. Those who had since 
failed at private farming had done so because they preferred to barter, feast, gift or eat their 
stock rather than investing in production. The trope of 'hard work! and 'ability to pay from 
one's own pocket' served as a rationale and justification for the winners' own relative success 
within the community. On the other hand, like the head of the Sarybulak association, success 
was also reflected in the ability to'give'through feasting and generosity, without being'eaten 
away' by it. Particularly on Sarybulak and the surrounding farms, this moral discourse was 
also entwined with religion. Here, the mosques had re-opened and young as well as old men 
had begun to attend regularly. I found that the new market discourse about work and 
productivity was mirrored in constructions of Islam: as one man put it, 'Some people just 
don't want to work. If you work, you live; if there's work, there's hay. In the Koran, there's a 
232 An interesting comparison can be made between Kazakstan and Gilmore's example of nationalist 
movement of guru Vivekananda in India, 'for the young men who represented the guru's constituency, 
this call to manliness was (as it still is for many) an irresistible appeal, because it imbued the search 
for national identity with the glories of the past and with the justifying imprimatur of sacredness. 
Here the desire for independence has both a national and psychological relevance'. 
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passage that says, 'he who works lives better'. The prophet said about Esak, 'let him look 
after his own flock. I am tired of doing everything for him. 
In the macro-level discourse, it was suggested that men's principle breadwinner role could be 
translated fairly straightforwardly into their role as head of a family enterprise or 
entrepreneur. However, for most rural men, private farming and trade could not be a 
straightforward replacement of work for the state farm, either in economic or moral terms. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, most enterprises had a combined commercial and subsistence 
status, which made this new identity an ambiguous and unsteady one. The extent of this 
ambiguity depended not only on how much income the new activities brought in, but also 
how they were valued. On Lenin, where men were particularly invested in their position as 
specialist state employees, many men felt that - even if successful - private farming and 
trading were 'not real work'. Trade, in particular, was perceived as a female-dominated area, 
and was seen as 'unmanly', or by Russian respondents as only fit for'marginal' men such as 
Uzbeks or Koreans. Women respondents concurred that men 'could not trade'. However, 
again, discourse masked actual practice. Just as the rural gender contract obscured women's 
involvement in entrepreneurial or income-generating activities, it also enabled men to engage 
in 'unmanly' work without compromising their masculinity. For instance, although Kairat's 
Russian brother-in-law, Victor was explicit that it was shameful for'strong, grown men' to be 
seen to be 'selling pies like women, ' he did actually trade with his wife. Both prepared the 
meat for sale, he drove to market and set up the stall, whilst his wife took care of the actual 
dealing. The fact that he could present marketing as his wife's responsibility and his own 
contribution as 'help' gave him the space to participate without compromising his 
masculinity. In contrast, on Druzhba and in the surrounding area, where greater numbers of 
men had been involved in second economy activity, many men initially embraced both trade 
and private farming as productive activities which socially re-established them as providers. 
Here it was often the husband who took responsibility for trade. However, as private 
farming veered towards subsistence, it was less able to meet men's need either for money or 
for status. In contrast, on Sarybulak, where subsistence farming was perceived more 
positively, it also appeared to be more congruent with men's roles and identity. 
This discussion has illustrated that processes very similar to those described in Chapter 2 
were coming into play as market relations expanded: first, opposition, as the new 'outside' 
domain of the market was counterpointed to the 'state' and 'inside' domains; second, 
transposition, as ideas about providing for and feeding the family were extended into the new 
market domain; third, juxtaposition or bilingualism, as people used the different metaphors 
of enterpreneurship/self development and family/social responsibility in different 
circumstances. Just as in the adaptation of indigenous society to socialist development, 
familiar metaphors of the rural gender contract were being extended into the new 
environment and shaping the way that communities and individual men and women within 
them organised their work, perceived their skills and saw their space for opportunity. At the 
same time, the consensus about gender roles and identities was being constantly stretched 
and re-aligned in response to rapid change, not least, the actual experience of reform. 
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111. Gender and the turn to subsistence 
As described in Chapter 6, reform was leading not so much to the emergence of a private 
sector of the economy as the relocation of rural communities as a whole to a new marginal, 
subsistence economy. As I described in the previous chapter, one marked aspect of this 
process was the erosion or disappearance of one of the main underpinnings of tile household 
and the rural gender contract - waged labour. The hypothesis set out in feminist critiques of 
transition was that women were suffering disproportionately from tile unemployment caused 
by restructuring of the state sector, were obliged to assume a growing burden of reproductive 
labour previously performed by the state and were therefore becoming increasingly' invisible' 
in the public sphere. 
Initially, in 1996, this analysis seemed to be an accurate reflection of what I was seeing. 
Market ideology and the local rural gender contract which prioritised the male wage 
appeared to be combining to impact primarily on the women in my research communities. 
Layoffs and redundancies had been fastest and strongest in the female-dominated branches 
of agriculture, processing and social services and talk on both Lenin and Druzhba focused on 
the fact that women were losing their jobs and that there was no work available for women 
any more. The closure of kindergartens and the need to boost home food production were 
also complicating women's work, leading many to focus on these activities. However, two 
sites of complexity entered into this picture. Firstly, in talking to different women in my 
research communities, it became obvious that their experiences and feelings about the loss of 
waged labour varied considerably. Secondly, in bringing men's experiences of and feelings 
about the loss of employment into the framework of observation and analysis, it became 
clear that the thesis of women's marginalisation and inequality was much less clear cut. 
One vector of differentiation was generation. For the eldest cohort, now retired, the 
disappearance of state employment was primarily experienced in terms of the erosion of the 
services they had expected the state farm to provide during their old age. Whilst those 
without family were often experiencing considerable practical difficulties, others found 
themselves at the centre of their families' economic strategies, as their experience in 
subsidiary farming was called upon and their pensions and other benefits became 
increasingly important resources. Although this generation of women was sometimes 
nostalgic about the past, their nostalgia was balanced by often harrowing accounts of what 
they had endured during the hard years of famine, forced deportation and war and they 
tended to stress their own strength, skills and self-reliance outside state structures. 
In contrast, the middle cohort tended to be more nostalgic about work under socialism, often 
going into great detail in interviews about their previous jobs and expressing asense of shock 
and loss. Only some social sector workers, particularly teachers, had been relatively 
unaffected by the changing employment patterns. Most had seen dramatic changes in their 
work lives, as their branches of the social services, administration or agriculture were cut 
back and their burden of work in the domestic economy increased. Many of those who had 
been made redundant wished to re-enter waged employment, but felt that their labour 
experience had suddenly become a useless currency and that they were excluded from a 
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market that now called for young women 'without complexes'. At the same time, this 
generation represented a majority of those who were turning their previous experience and 
support networks into a springboard for other income-generating activities such as private 
farming and trading. Their perceptions of this shift depended on their community, ethnicity 
and occupation and will be explored in more detail below. 
One of the clearest divergences in patterns and perceptions of work was between mothers 
and their daughters. For the youngest cohort, reform had brought radical changes in 
expectations about study and employment, as paths that were open to their mothers were 
filled with new obstacles. Rising living costs, together with the uncertainty about finding 
work after graduation, meant that study and work were no longer an obvious step towards 
personal development and autonomy. In all three communities, it appeared that early 
marriage was becoming more common. Girls who did go on to further study were far more 
reliant on their families than their mothers, who had benefited from state grants, had been. 
Several respondents had started but then abandoned their studies, as a result of the difficult 
environment within colleges and universities as wealthy students 'bought' their success in 
entrance and exams, and living conditions in student accommodation worsened. Kazak girls 
often expressed this sense of insecurity in fear about being 'stolen' into marriage against their 
will. Those who had graduated often found that there was no work in their field or, if they 
were returning to work after having a child, that their previous jobs had been axed and cut- 
backs in childcare made it difficult to find alternatives. Many described their situation with 
the pithy and pejorative phrase 'sitting under a cow', describing how reform had shrunk their 
horizons and led to a sense of hopelessness or even despair. However, at the same time as 
highlighting the problems they faced (the shortage of jobs, the fact that many older and more 
qualified women were seeking work, the closure of childcare facilities, elderly parents 
needing them at home or husbands 'not giving permission to work! ) they often also talked of 
their aspirations to study, work or contribute to building the new society. 
These aspirations often diverged or conflicted with the views of their parents, parents-in-law 
and husbands. Many parents felt that, in a world where doctors and other highly qualified 
people now traded on the bazaar, socialist models of education and work simply no longer 
applied to the younger generation. Instead, their expectations were that their daughters would 
help at home, then get married in their turn. One common pattern was for the mother to 
become active in farming or trade, whilst her daughter or daughter-in-law assumed 
responsibility for domestic work. On Druzhba, for example, Gulnara! s daughter had trained 
as a 'commodity researchee (tovaroved), but since there was no work in her field, she had 
taken on the 'homemakee role whilst her mother worked as a doctor and private farmer. 
Similarly, through a combination of economic necessity and moral perceptions about kinship 
and trust, households involved in private farming or trade often relied on the labour of the 
younger generation. In this atmosphere, it was difficult, particularly for daughters-in-law, to 
pursue their own aspirations. Their ability to do so was also influenced by the outlook of 
their husbands. Although some were supportive, between 1996 and 1998 there was a 
growing tendency for young men to adopt a form of the rhetoric employed at macro level. 
Young Kazak men, in particular, invoked 'tradition', explaining that Kazak girls always got 
married young, Kazak women always 'sat at home', did the cooking and looked after the 
children and that there was no need for a wife to work if the man could provide. The 
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example of Fatima's daughter-in-law, set out in the life history appendix, illustrates well how 
the combination of family labour requirements, 'old' and 'reinvented' custom were combining 
to limit the opportunities of many young women. However, this was not the only pattern. 
On Druzhba, the daughters of the wealthier rural producers, who did not rely on family 
labour, were often able to go to Almaty to study the newly prestigious disciplines of 
economics or business. One of Dina's daughters was studying business whilst also working 
as a fashion model. On Lenin, the pattern of younger marriage and curtailment of studies 
was countered by another pattern of young women finding work in private enterprises in the 
nearby towns. 
Cutting across generational differences was a spatial/ethnic and socio-occupational element, 
which was expressed in the metaphors for talking about the loss of state employment. Just 
as waged work had played different roles in women's identities, its disappearance now meant 
different things to different women. For the women who were previously most invested in 
the Soviet model of labour, who drew a sense of competence and independence from their 
jobs, unemployment came as a dramatic and negative change in their personal circumstances. 
These informants often entered into long and impassioned narratives about their past 
employment experience, emphasising the challenges they had faced and what they had 
gained from their jobs. In contrast, they spoke about losing employment in terms of 
becoming marginal or invisible, losing the security of state protection and their position in 
society. The term they generally used to talk about their current circumstances was 'sidet' 
domd - literally, that they were 'sitting at home. In actual fact, this local term, with its 
connotations of idleness and laziness, was a mis- or non-recognition of the actual tenor of 
their days, filled with never-ending chores relating to feeding and caring for their 
households. 
Table 7.1: Activities relating to 'sitting at home' 
Cooking: now also including baking bread 
Caring for children and elderly relatives 
Cleaning 
Making clothes 
Cultivating the vegetable plot 
Looking after the animals and yard: including feeding, milking, 
separating the milk and making butter and cheese. 
Preparing food for winter 
Informal trade 
Work on the private farm 
These informal or domestic activities could clearly also be considered as work. However, 
although many explicitly used the word 'rabotd (work) when talking about these activities, 
and expressed pride that they were crucial to their families' survival, their value was at best 
ambivalent and reflected the denigration of the private over the public sphere in the Soviet 
and capitalist model of labour. In contrast to waged labour, this was not seen as 'real work'. 
In contrast, the loss of waged labour was perceived rather differently by many women on 
Sarybulak and in the outlying villages on Lenin. Instead of referring to their circumstances as 
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'sitting at home' they would use the much more active and positive term 'zanimalsya 
khozyaistvom' or 'taking care of the domestic economy'. Here, where the folk model of labour 
and value continued to have greater currency, work in the domestic sphere was perceived as 
a valid and valuable activity. This is not to say that individual women necessarily accepted 
their situation with open arms or that they would have chosen to leave waged work of their 
own accord. It was rather that local model of work allowed them to validate their activities 
as real and significant work in a way that the Soviet and capitalist model of labour and value 
did not. 
Table 7.2: Women's perceptions of the loss ofwaged work 
Druzhba Lenin Sarybulak 
'Sitting at Central village and Central village Central village 
home' Otdeleniye and oldeleniye 
Cross nationality Cross nationality Kazak: no slav 
population 
Factory workers Administration 
Technicians Social sector Administration 
Administration Agriculture Social sector 
Social sector 
Agriculture 
'Taking care of Otdeleniy Otdeleniye Central village, 
the domestic Otdeleniye, Otara 
economy, 
Turkish minority, Kazak women Administration 
Seasonal agricultural formerly working in Social sector 
workers who formerly agriculture Agriculture 
marketed their own New private 
produce farmers 
Local models of labour therefore gave some women ways of finding value that were not 
available to others. On the other hand, it was only on Sarybulak that men used the positive 
term 'zaniniatsya khozyaistvom' to talk about women's work, showing a divergence between 
women's and men's understandings of 'reproductive' labour. Even on Sarybulak, men who 
were unemployed did not use the term to refer to their own activities. 
In the second year of fieldwork (1997) 1 noted a puzzling change of discourse on Lenin as 
people began to say that'only women work now'. This change in emphasis went to the heart 
of the changing forms and meanings of work in the countryside and the disruption of the 
rural gender contract. At first sight, it seemed to fly in the face of the evidence. No new 
employment opportunities for women had been created; if anything female redundancies and 
unemployment seemed to have been stepped up with the closure of the hospital and cutbacks 
in the farm administration. However, considered in relation to changing work structure 
described in Chapter 6, the new language took on a clearer meaning. One factor was that 
money wages were now only being paid in the traditionally female service sector. Although 
many women in these branches had lost their jobs, those who remained were becoming 
increasingly important as income-earners. Another clue lay in the way people had talked 
about female redundancies the previous year. As one woman put it, 'soon there won't even be 
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any work for men any more'. In other words, it was not that female unemployment trends had 
suddenly been reversed, but that men's traditional areas of employment were now also 
threatened and with them the'male wage'. As I have described, by 1997, state enterprise had 
entirely disappeared on Druzhba and was losing its meaning on Lenin. Here, although many 
men were still nominally employed by the former state farm, money wages were not being 
paid and short-time work and redundancy had begun to affect them too. Tile work of tile 
rural population as a whole was being made 'invisible' and 'reproductive' rather than 'visible' 
and 'productive' and many rural men, as much as rural women, were being 'relocated' against 
their will to the domestic domain. 
Although both sexes reacted with consternation to the disappearance of the wage and of 
labour in the public sector, it was the erosion of men's work and wages that was perceived by 
both sexes to be a fundamental threat to the normal order of things, both in terms of 
household strategies and individual identities. At a household level, the loss of the husband's 
wage was seen as a much more threatening than that of the wife. For men, whose work and 
home identity had centred around their ability to provide for their families, tile erosion of 
waged employment in the public sector came as a body blow. The collapse of the state farm, 
together with the new discourse around opportunities for success complicated their 
breadwinner role, raising expectations of them being able to provide at a time when it was 
becoming increasingly difficult for them to do so. As one respondent explained: 
'It may not look it to you, but things are very difficult. I don't know how it is where 
you come from, but here from the dawn of time it has been the man who has 
provided for the family, his wife and children, fed the family. Before you brought 
home your salary. Now, everything is a headache: where to get hay, where to get 
coal, where to get firewood, where to get the money to pay for it, how to get it all 
back home. All that is on your shoulders now. ' (Conversation. Lenin, 22.8.98) 
Many male respondents were suffering acute anxiety about being able to 'provide'. A recent 
statistical study (Buckley, C. 1997) identified a rising suicide rate among Kazakstani men 
and put forward the hypothesis that they were experiencing a particular identity cri SiS233: 
'The age and sex patterns found in Kazakstan suggest that women are less 
susceptible to the identity challenges associated with tile transition period and that 
men in their 20s and 60s are most susceptible. ( ... ) In Kazakstan where males hold 
more responsibility for the public and economic spheres, their identities are tied 
more closely to external dichotomous factors such as career success, income and 
public recognition. Kazak women, who are held more responsible for reproduction 
and holding families together, find internal procedural relations more central to their 
individual identity. The lack of any substantial increase in female suicide rates may 
reflect the greater emphasis placed on the family as an informal support network 
(and hence the role of women) during the transition or the small role labour outside 
the home plays in women's self concepts. 
Whilst I would disagree that work outside the home played a small role in women's self 
concept, it was clear that women's roles in household and public sphere were less consonant. 
233 Buckley gives the figure of a 36.6% rise in male suicide rates and 2.2% rise in female suicide rates 
between 1990 and 1994. To my knowledge, three young men committed suicide during my 
fieldwork, two on Lenin and one on Druzhba. 
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Unlike men, their identity was spread over different roles, duties and responsibilities. In the 
new environment, their greater responsibility for general household well-being was 
translated into myriad survival strategies, as they brought all the resources at their disposal, 
including domestic food production, social networks and trading, into play. As discussed 
above, with the exception of shepherds on Sarybulak, similar 'survival' activities were not 
considered a'proper' replacement for men's position in waged labour. 
Tile change in men's status was making the home a highly contested environment and 
leading to disputes over gender roles. On Lenin, discourse analysis of conversations about 
reactions to the changes produced a series of gendered qualities: women were said to be 
gibkie (flexible), shustrie (quick on the uptake), pobystree prisposablivayutsya (more 
adaptable), whereas men were said to be lazy, jealous and drunk or to be pskhuyut (psyching 
out) and skandalyat doma (making scenes at home). The perception was that women were 
now taking on the male role of family provider, 'doing what had to be done', whereas men 
were opting out in various ways, such as resorting to alcohol. As one woman put it: 
'Everywhere, women are carrying the load (rabotyagi). They're the ones supporting 
the family. Men, especially Kazak men, don't understand the changes. They were 
used to working eight hours a day, getting paid. Now they've just gone to pieces, 
turned to drink (seichas slomalis, spilis). Turkish men will go and trade with their 
women, Korean men will go and work in the fields. But our men just give up. 
Wives are carrying their husbands on their shoulders. You must have seen how many 
women are on the bazaars, trading. Someone has to feed and clothe the children. v234 
Within households, I began to see kinds of open conflict and disputes between Kazak 
husbands and wives that I did not observe during my first period of fieldwork. The 
following extract from my 1998 Lenin fieldnotes provides a graphic example. This was a 
household where the husband, the former sovkhoz economist, was now unemployed and 
where his wife was attempting to persuade him to find anotherjob: 
Gulsum: "No women want to have children now. And anyway, why should I have a 
child for my husband when he is not working? What has he done to deserve another 
child? I'm on sexual strike as well. I don't have a huge sex drive and neither does 
he, for whatever reason - but he is a man and does want sex once a month. I can't 
even be thinking about it - how can you think about sex when you have to think 
about survival, worry about the children, where to get food, how to get the money for 
school. So I goad him. Hejust sits there, day in, day out, and doesn't even seem to 
be thinking about how he is going to provide for his family. So, no sex until he gets 
moving and finds work. He gets angry. But at least he doesn't hit me. I've heard 
235 about cases like that, when a man is refused and beats up his wife .I call him my 'little souvenie because he sits at home all day... " 
While Gulsum was preparing lunch, her husband, came home. He looked awful, his 
black hair standing up in unkempt tufts, very scruffy, probably a vodka glaze in his 
eyes, a little unsteady on his feet. Over lunch there was a good deal of tension. She 
said she wanted to find a new husband, a rich one with a car. Her sister said, half 
joking and half serious, 'you say that in front of your husbandT He laughed 
234 Conversation with Aigul, Rodnikovsky, Fieldnotes September 1997. 
235 Domestic violence was common, as I saw from shadowing the village healer for several days. The 
majority of the women who came to see her wanted 'cures' for alcoholic husbands who had beaten 
them 
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uncomfortably. Gulsurn said that she told people that lie is her'little souvenir' or her 
'oldest son'. 'What's the use of him when he sits at home all the time?, lie got up and 
went out. A little later a man came in to buy vodka. lie wanted to take it on credit. 
Gulsurn consulted with her sister - she knew tile man, who was a neighbour, his 
mother was waiting for her pension, but would have money soon. lie needed tile 
bottle to pay the man who was helping to unload hay for him. Gulsum said that her 
sister's instincts were usually right and gave him the bottle. Her husband stormed 
back in and started shouting, saying she shouldn't have done so. 'I've had it up to 
here with you, ' she says. Then generally to the room, 'lie sits here, useless and then 
tries to put on airs as though he was the khozyain. It's a good tiling my daughters are 
quick on the uptake (shustrie). My son's the only one who's like him. ' 
Economic change therefore appeared to be fundamentally restructuring gender relations in 
unexpected ways. As waged labour was eroded and people were pushed into survival 
strategies based on the domestic sphere, women were perceived to be coping and men 
failing. This realignment of gender roles was expressed in two stories that were circulating in 
the research communities, usually recounted second-hand as something that had happened to 
someone else. The first tells of a child who has begun to address his mother as mapa 
(mother and father) since she is the one who 'works, brings home the money and does 
everything for us'. The second tells of a man who runs into an acquaintance fie has not seen 
for some time. The man asks him what he is doing now. '011, you know, Zh. K. 0', lie replies. 
Puzzled, the man asks whether this is some kind of new organisation. '011 no, comes the 
answer, 'zhena kormit, odevaet'(my wife feeds and clothes me). 
Interpreting these stories - and the reality behind them - is not as straightforward as it might 
appear. Rather than expressing a radical change in tile rural gender contract, they need to be 
looked at more subtly in terms of both continuity and change. First, although these stories 
pointed to the new prominence of women's activities, they also referred implicitly to tile rural 
gender contract and the two sexes' expectations of it. Women would often go on to talk about 
how they were keeping things together while men were failing apart, whereas it was 'men's 
role' to provide for the family. Conversely, men would often go on to make 'joking' asides 
about women now being 'behind the wheel' and, for Kazak men, about their women 
becoming 'Russif led' and no longer respecting their authority as'khozyain'. Implicitly, men's 
'propee roles as provider and authority were highlighted at the same time that anxiety and 
uncertainty were being expressed about them. As discussed in the example of Kairat's private 
farm, most women did not welcome this shift in roles. In that instance, Kairat's wife was 
happy to use private farming as a means of 'shoring up' her husband's role and identity. 
Similarly, even where wives berated their husbands for their failure to fulfil their 
breadwinner role, or used it as grounds for separation or divorce, this did not call the role 
itself into question. In these circumstances, it was rather that women were goading men into 
fulfilling their part of the gender contract or seeking another man who would be able to fulfil 
it. The perception was that this change in gender roles was a temporary departure from tile 
236 'natural' balance, which would soon be righted 
236 As in this example, it was common for women to refer to omens or clairvoyance: 'Wives are 
carrying their husbands... A psychic from Dzhambul said that these difficulties would last for 7 years 
from the election of the President. Five have already gone by. Already things are getting better - 
pensioners are being paid. Soon maybe the men that have been sitting at home will be able to get 
work from the pensioners. ' 
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Second, to cite Ingrid Rudie (1994: 159) once again, stories of lazy husbands and industrious 
wives are a 'mythlike theme that surfaces to demonstrate the economic potential of women'. 
From this perspective, we can see them both as a reflection of men's anxieties about being an 
adequate provider and of women's insistence on the value of their work and economic 
potential at a time when this role was actually being undermined in the market sector. 
Third, at a 'deep structural level' the stories did not reflect a departure from social and 
cultural norms. Just as the radical changes brought by socialist development led to a focus 
on women as the lynchpin of the household and/or ethnos, women were again being figured 




Perhaps the story of development is more thanjust 'one damn thing after anotherý- it 
is a story of unfolding, of one thing leading to another in a process which can be 
given some meaning. But the trouble seems to be one of time lags... [T]he 
development thinkers seem to base their action and thought on experiences of the 
last-but-one decade or a last-but-one phase, only to be overwhelmed by the 
inappropriateness of such action and thought in the face of new events and new 
problems. Is it perhaps a case of a problemfor every solution, rather than a solution 
for every problem? This seems to come close to the truth. It can be presented 
pessimistically as always reacting too late and to an obsolete situation; or more 
optimistically as a learning process. " (Singer, 1989, p. 3 Lessons of Post-Mar 
Development Experience: 1945-1988, Discussion Paper 260, April, Institute of 
Development Studies, Brighton) 
This thesis has been about the relationship between two very different conceptions of what 
development is and how it takes place: 1) development as consisting of deliberate efforts 
aimed at'progress' on the part of various agencies, including governments, various kinds of 
organisations and social movements; and 2) development as a historical process of social 
change in which societies are transformed over long periods (Thomas, 1992: 7). Focusing 
specifically on gender issues in rural areas, the research set out to use field-based, qualitative 
methodologies to explore the deliberate efforts of the Kazakstani government and 
international community to change a socialist society into a market capitalist one and the 
ways these efforts were mediated by local forms of economy and culture and understandings 
of value, seen in a long-term perspective of historical change from through pre-socialist to 
Soviet and post-socialist society. 
The analysis presented here has operated on two levels: firstly, it has explored tile ways in 
which gender issues have been incorporated (or otherwise) into the policies of different 
development agencies and, secondly, it has examined how actual processes of enterprise- 
level privatisation. and restructuring have been played out, and tile manner in which they are 
gendered. This concluding chapter draws these two levels together, by spelling out tile 
implications of the ethnography for macro-level policies and further research. 
Complexity and development practice 
Between 1996 and 1998, there was increasing recognition on the part of the Kazakstani 
government and donor agencies that the emerging rural economy did not resemble tile 
planned blueprint for the agricultural sector. In jargon of tile 'transition', two issues not 
foreseen at the outset of reform were theapparent stability of partial reform equilibriums' (in 
other words, the persistence of large cooperative enterprises) and the 'perverse relationship 
between privatisation and quality of governance' (i. e. insider privatisation and the 
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accompanying increase in inequality and breakdown of trust)(World Bank, 2002: xxvi). 
Rising rural unemployment and poverty and declining services and quality of life were also 
acknowledged, although generally addressed separately from the restructuring of state and 
collective farms. However, despite this acknowledgement, donor and government 
explanations of these outcomes and proposals for further action were not informed by close 
analysis of local patterns of transformation. In particular, the ways in which gendered 
models of work and family operated in local contexts and how these might impact on 
people's responses to the new opportunities and obstacles presented by reform, fell outside 
the mainstream development framework. 
One of the key arguments of this thesis has been that, without a better understanding of local 
processes, development cannot work, either in its own terms, or in terms of responding to 
what people want and need. The research contributes to the call for 'detailed ethnographies 
that reveal both the intended and unintended effects of (development) policies, as well as the 
responses of those who are at the receiving end'(Kandiyoti, 2002: 252). More specifically, it 
is situated within an approach which has attempted to formulate 'less misleading models of 
social processes than those proposed in macro-level models' (Stirling, 1993: 15) by 
investigating the links between place-based conceptions of the economy and social and 
cultural life. As Stirling puts it, 'the fund of cosmologies, myths, religious ideas, historical 
narratives, political models, private moralities, customs, rites, technologies and scientific 
ideas, which exists in any society at any given point in time must profoundly affect the way 
that the economy functions and the way it changes; and economic growth must in tum have 
profound and multifarious consequences for that fund' (ibid.: 4). In this way, the 
ethnography adds a building block to a new area of research in Central Asia, which 
investigates how 'everyday practices of ordinary people participating in the economy 
according to their own priorities, social pressures and values' impacts on the trajectory of 
market reform, and vice versa (Mandel and Humphrey, 2002: 12). 
The particular strength of the anthropological perspective of the research was to illustrate 
how macro-level policies were masking and disguising the local processes that were playing 
an important role in shaping rural economies and how the meeting of macro and local 
processes were often having negative effects. 
By mapping the different kinds of enterprises resulting from the decollectivisation reform in 
connection with local farming systems, perceptions of privatisation and models of work and 
family, tile research suggested that development was being planned with a model of civil 
society in mind that had only limited sense at local level. The vision of 'liberating! 
individuals to create profit-oriented businesses was often in tension with strongly-rooted 
local models of work, entitlement and community that influenced individual, household and 
community strategies and were generating their own economic patterns. On former sovkhoz 
Lenin, 'resistance' to reform could be partially explained by conventional ly-c ited factors, 
such as lack of information and the attitudes of local authorities and the farm management. 
However, the villagers' decision to 'stay togethee was also motivated by their perception that 
large, cooperative enterprises were not only the most effective way of conducting 
agricultural production in a risky environment but also the most 'moral' or 'civilised' way of 
organising work and community life. On Druzhba and Sarybulak, various factors, including 
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the pro-reform attitude of local authorities, farming system and different relationships to the 
state and second economy, had contributed to the larger number of private farms. I lowcver, 
here too, the model envisaged at macro-level failed to capture the range of activities, 
interests and strategies in these enterprises. It was only if the complex relationships between 
private farms and wider household and kinship survival strategies were ignored that the new 
farms 'fit' the planned model of profit-oriented farm businesses run by single entrepreneurs. 
By failing to address the complex interactions between economic, social and cultural forces, 
well-intentioned macro-level policy was therefore not only failing to create what it intended, 
but also mis-recognising what it encountered and forcing local realities into ill-adapted 
moulds. 
In addition, the meeting of macro models and local practices was having negative effects that 
called into question the whole notion of privatisation bringing a new form of modernity and 
progress. In a process of cumulative advantage and disadvantage, reform was heightening 
inequality, dividing the rural sector from the rest of the economy and one former state farm 
from another and separating the trajectories of their individual members. In comparison to 
the efforts deployed to reform 'key' sectors such as the oil and gas industries, the agricultural 
sector as a whole came a poor second or third. Within it, some communities, such as 
Druzhba, which enjoyed advantages such as a propitious geographical position and external 
assistance, were playing the new development game, whilst others, such as Lenin, were 
increasingly marginalised from it and risked bankruptcy and disintegration. Within rural 
communities, rather than opening new opportunities, the new forms of land tenure and 
ownership were reproducing and intensifying inequality. Rights over land and assets were 
being concentrated in the hands of a minority, often those who fon-nerly held powerful 
positions in the state farm hierarchy, whilst tile majority of villagers were experiencing rural 
reform as an erosion of their former economic and social entitlements. In other words, rather 
than creating a new model of democratic civil society and market economy, tile direct impact 
of reform was to produce rural communities that were essentially maintaining basic 
subsistence activities. At the same time, as further support went to 'efficient' forms of 
farming enterprise or civil society organisation which appeared to fit the planned model, 
rather than to subsistence or alternative local forms, reform threatened to deepen tile 
emerging division between market and subsistence domains. The example of tile Lenin 
otdeleniye and the Sarybulak shepherds demonstrated that, for certain groups or 
communities, being 'outside' or 'marginal' to the new public market domain was not 
perceived as a threat, or that the combination of the new possibilities of trade and marketing 
of livestock and tile domestic economy could be 'the good life'. For others, this was 
perceived as a painful, unstable and untenable situation. 
Development, gender and 'collateral damage' 
By exploring how gender entered into the processes described above, tile fieldwork 
challenged the assumption that decollectivisation was a gender neutral process. Looking 
through and for a model of an efficient agricultural sector based on private, profit-making 
enterprises, planners failed to understand women's particular position and concerns: how 
women had benefited from the balance of productive and welfare services embodied in the 
state farms and what the moves towards private fan-ning, based on family enterprises, meant 
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to them and their view of themselves. For many men, as well as women, becoming farmers 
was seen as going 'backwards' from 'modem' work on the sovkhoz with its clear structure of 
skills and specialisation. Other men identified with the concept of becoming a private farmer, 
which dovetailed well with male roles in the family division of labour and authority, 
although in practice, many found the new status an impossible mirage or more difficult to 
negotiate than the planners or they themselves envisaged. However, for women, in 
particular, going into private farming meant going back into the household and losing the 
particular social space that work in the public sector provided and that made them feel 'like 
human beingS, 237 . For them, agricultural work in the new family 
farms was domestic space, 
often under direct male authority, where their farming activities merged into other domestic 
tasks and were invisible or unrecognised. This was a particularly painful prospect for 
women who had lost theirjobs, in specialised occupations, which provided far more than an 
income. It was perhaps less so for women, such as the shepherds on Sarybulak, whose roles 
in public and domestic production had always been more consonant. But here too, for a 
younger generation of women, the move to private farming was often seen as painful limiting 
of horizons. More broadly, the sexual division of labour meant that the shift to subsistence 
was putting increasing burdens on women, who not only took on the main share of caring for 
children, the elderly and the sick, but also much of the responsibility for providing food and 
'foraging' for the family through trade and other informal strategies. The resilience, strength 
and creativity of women were therefore crucial to maintaining families' well-being and a 
relative sense of security and stability. For some, these activities brought a sense of 
achievement and a strengthening of their position within the family. For many, tile price was 
a feeling of marginality, powerlessness and sometimes despair, that lay underneath the 
veneer of the coping persona. 
The research demonstrated that gender was not the only factor in exclusion and inequality. 
However, aspects of Boserup's (1970) argument around the ferninisation of subsistence and 
Rogers' (1980) critique of the 'domestication of women', presented in Chapter 1, are 
depressingly pertinent to the current situation in rural Kazakstan. There are lessons to be 
learned here both for the Kazakstani government and for the donor agencies and 
organisations working in the country's rural areas. Gender issues have been largely invisible 
in macro-level policy-making and programmes. The reasons for this are connected with the 
development framework being applied in the country, the power relationship between 
government and donor agencies and the legacy of how gender issues were approached under 
the Soviet regime. Firstly, the 'transition' paradigm has prioritised economic and technical 
development over social concerns, including gender. As such, it is not qualitatively 
different, for example, from structural adjustment policies being applied elsewhere, but the 
way in which development practitioners have conceived of 'transition' in relation to 
'development' has added a further layer of gender blindness. In Kazakstan, the government 
and international agencies (with tile notable exception of the UNDP) explicitly prioritised 
macro-economic objectives and initially excluded a range of 'development' issues, including 
redistributive measures of social well-being, such as life-expectancy, literacy, school- 
enrolment, equality of income distribution and the liberation of women, which are 
I- 
237 In'Retreat to the household', Pine (2002: 100-103 ) describes a very similar pattern in postsocialist 
Poland. 
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considered relevant in other settings. Secondly, Kazakstan's high income from oil and gas 
reserves has given it a relatively large space to manoeuvre and resist pressures from donor 
agencies in areas such as democratisation and poverty reduction, where most of their gender 
programmes have been focused. Thirdly, the way in which gender issues were bound up with 
socialist ideology and are now being incorporated into nationalist and statc-building 
discourses has also mitigated against detailed analysis of the ways in which reforin is 
actually impacting differently on women and men. However, although analysis of gender 
issues has been largely lacking in rural refon-n policy, it has nevertheless carried a strong 
gender bias. As in the colonial policies critiqued by Boscrup, an assumption that women 
were not involved in agricultural production has been carried through into tile rural 
development approach of the major donor organisations in Kazakstan. Women's work in tile 
spheres of subsistence agriculture and domestic labour has gone largely unrecognised and 
women 'subsistence' farmers have been bypassed in favour of male 'commercial' farmers. 
Rural reform policy is therefore playing a role in creating a feminiscd dichotomy between 
market and subsistence agriculture. Whilst rural women themselves are struggling to define 
new possibilities and opportunities within national and local discourses, these discourses are 
excluding women from new opportunities and pushing them into invisibility in tile home. 
From this perspective, the stability and status of women's 'informal' or 'domestic' work is 
threatened by the new development discourse and practice itself. 
To situate the research in the context of the arguments around women as 'winners' or 'losers' 
of reform, the findings echo those of Pine, who concludes that there are two senses in which 
'the new democracy is a masculinist democracy': 
Many of the structures and mechanisms associated with building the privatized, 
market economy favour what are established male practices and prerogatives and 
limit those of women. Second, the division between public and private, which pre- 
dates socialism as an ideological construct but was exacerbated under socialism, is 
being reformulated in ways which exaggerate the established tendency to associate 
women with domestic and household activities and production, and which 
conversely make it easier for men than for women to move horizontally within the 
public domain'(2002: 102-3). 
In order to challenge this situation, government and development agencies working in rural 
areas of Kazakstan would need to look beyond their own gendered assumptions about tile 
roles of women and men in rural production to see their contribution for what it really is. 
What are the prospects, if any of this taking place? 
One factor that may encourage consideration of gender issues is the ongoing shift in 
development paradigms. Current questions with considerable resonance for development 
practice as well as academic debate concern the relationship between economic and social or 
'human' visions of development and the connection between development management and 
questions of power and strategy (Dichter, 2000; Kabeer, 1994; Thomas, 2000). At global 
level, the past decade has seen an apparent softening of the neo-liberal agenda of the 1980s 
towards a new international consensus on 'social development' reached at the Copenhagen 
Summit in 1995 and a growing focus on poverty alleviation. The 'transition' paradigm of 
development I have described in relation to Kazakstan cannot be seen in isolation from this 
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shift. The neo-liberal agenda (structural reform, economic liberalization, rapid privatisation), 
which began to soften elsewhere in the 1990s (Flewitt, 2000), continued to apply longer and 
in more undiluted form in 'transition' countries, including Kazakstan. Nevertheless, here too, 
as we have observed, between 1995 and 1998, there was a move towards a more 'social' 
development perspective on the part of the development agencies and government. Since 
1998, this has become more marked, as the negative impact of reform on many sectors of the 
population has become increasingly clear. Taking a broad regional approach, the World 
Bank's report, Transition, The First Ten Years: Analysis and Lessonsfor Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union, published in 2002, observes that in the CIS region as a whole, one 
in five people are now living below the poverty line (compared to I in 25 a decade before) 
and that inequality has increased so much that these states have 'come to rival the most 
unequal countries in the world' (p. xi). It notes that a new panoply of social policies have 
been introduced 'to protect the most vulnerable groups until growth takes hold' (ibid, p. ix). 
Likewise, in Kazakstan itself, the widespread poverty in rural areas has been acknowledged. 
In 2004, a six-year rural revival program was launched. This initiative has been promoted by 
President Nazarbaev as the largest infusion ever made in the country's agricultural sector and 
includes large investments in the construction of hospitals, roads and schools. 
Is this paradigm shift likely to lead to gender issues being addressed in a more substantive 
way in government and agencies' rural development policy and programmes? My own 
research and the lessons learned elsewhere suggest that no such direct equation can be 
assumed. I have flagged that, by 1998, the greater emphasis on social aspects of reform and 
the increasing recognition of gender issues by at least some organisations had not in fact led 
to gender issues being included in any more systematic way in rural development projects on 
the ground. The analysis of the Druzhba farmer support project also highlighted that, even 
where projects appeared to follow a more 'people-oriented' approach, in the absence of in- 
depth social and gender analysis or monitoring, even 'participatory' projects failed to address 
existing gender inequalities or the gender impacts of projects themselves. These outcomes 
could be imputed to the time-lag between the ideological shift to a more socially-oriented 
model of development and its implementation in practice. If this were so, an optimistic 
prognosis would be that, as lessons were learned from the painful processes of rural 
restructuring and as the social and 'human' aspects of development were given more weight, 
the different impacts of rural reform on women and men would be acknowledged and 
addressed in government and agency policy and programmes. 
However, gender 'blind spots' may persist despite sometimes major shifts in development 
paradigms. Studies on the link between the new focus on poverty and the inclusion of gender 
issues in poverty reduction strategy papers, which are now commonly drawn up between 
national governments and development agencies, have demonstrated that improvements in 
mainstreaming ender have been patchy (Zuckerman and Garrett, 2003). More broadly, 
analysts have pointed to a continued 'failure to reconcile new social policy, education and 
health objectives with 'structural adjustment' requirements' (Kalb, 2002: 330). The more 
radical proponents of an ethical, human-centred globalisation are scathing about any such 
tinkering with the dominant neo-liberal model. Vandana Shiva, for instance calls for a radical 
review of the 'neoliberal relationship between private/public domains and the assumption 
that everything can be privatised - land, water, electricity - which profits a minority and 
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extemalises costs on populations, particularly the rural poor, making them pay for what was 
once theirs and depriving them of what they need to meet their basic needs. ' Making the 
connection between this process and gender, she also argues that 'the market as the driving 
force shaping culture is pushing patriarchy to unimaginable levels' (2003). Instead, her vision 
is of an 'earth democracy, an ethical rather than a purely economic globalisation, one that 
will not only benefit the minority able to control and access capital, goods and resources but 
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The prospect of such an 'earth democracy' being introduced in Kazakstall seems remote. 
Although oil revenues continue to pour into the country, capital, goods and resources seem 
likely to remain concentrated in the hands of a minority (Nazpary, 2002). For rural areas in 
particular, although the state is making major investments in the six year rural revival 
program launched in 2004, initial reports suggest that it may primarily benefit those who arc 
already in a strong position. In pursuit of the key objective to 'put farmers on a competitive 
footing' and 'enhance the country's investment image' support is to be concentrated in areas 
with the strongest farm industry and there are plans to move agricultural workers from the 
more economically depressed regions (Nurskenova, 2004). In fact, despite tile dramatic 
decline in well-being which is one of the most visible outcomes of transition policy, both 
government and the major donor agencies (again with the exception of UNDP) continue to 
define development primarily as a question of spurring economic growth through more 
sustained and intensive market reform. The World Bank report on the lessons to be learned 
from ten years of reform, cited above is instructive. It states clearly that 'policy-makcrs 
cannot postpone the pain of liquidating and restructuring the old sector until the cushion 
provided by the new enterprises is in place'(2002: p. xxviii). In this context, the introduction 
of new social policies may not represent a serious change in direction, merely an add-on, 
designed to palliate the 'collateral damage' caused by economic restructuring. Indeed, tile 
very structure of the World Bank's report embodies tile continued split between economic 
and social policy, which is mentioned only briefly in the main body of the text. Nor have past 
limitations on the way gender is addressed been challenged. Gender issues get no mention at 
all in the main report, only in a separate, accompanying report, on poverty. And here, gender 
policy takes the form of defining specific measures for women, who are seen as 'one of tile 
most vulnerable groups. ' As KandiYoti fears, in this context, women-directed policies may 
come to represent the 'welfare' arm of monetarist policies and serve as part of a series of 
stop-gap measures to buffer some of the most visible negative outcomes of transition policies 
(Kandiyoti, 1990: 12). 
Understanding Complexity 
The opening citation for this final chapter notes that the intmentions of development 
agencies can be seen either pessimistically, as always reacting too late and to all obsolete 
situation, or more optimistically, as a learning process. Their efforts at engineered change 
also need to be seen against the background of more long-term social transformation. 
238 Vandana Shiva, speech to the Global Progressive Forum, European Parliament, Brussels, 
November 27-9,2003. 
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How does change happen? What happens when individuals shape their lives within 
discourses shaped by competing agencies, such as the state, workplace and family? How are 
gender divisions reproduced or altered? A concern with the interrelations between individual 
experience, structuring forces and local practice has run throughout this thesis. One of the 
key challenges in understanding and trying to model this process in rural Kazakstan has been 
the particular combination of what Hann terms 'revolutions and cyclical repetitive change' 
(1994c: 9). The relationship between life-cycle changes, long-term change over generations 
and sudden, very rapid transformation is difficult to untangle in communities which have 
experienced both intervals of relative stability and two radical transformations of political 
and economic system over the past eighty years. 
Through the exploration of the 'rural gender contract' and how it was accommodating to 
change I aimed both to look at how power relations between men and women were shifting 
and to provide a window on wider processes of cultural change and continuity. I argued that 
the Soviet state attempted to impose a particular division between public and domestic 
spheres, which interrelated with indigenous ideas about the appropriate organisation of 
family and work lives and male and female domains. In a dual process, new situations 
stretched existing categories, whilst existing categories were also carried across to new 
situations. Distinctions between public and domestic or outside and inside domains were 
more flexible in practice than they appeared to be, either in local or official discourse. They 
were also to do with power. Within the household, the value and power of the different 
domains was negotiated between their members: husbands and wives, mothers and 
daughters-in-law. Outside the household, the power of different household members to act 
was constrained in different ways. Under the socialist gender regime, the state implicitly 
repaid production with care and protection, especially of women and children. Conversely, 
women's opportunities and desire to respond to state exhortations to work and participate in 
public life were constrained by their domestic and caring responsibilities. For Kazak women, 
in particular, the 'outside' domain represented a domain under male authority to which 
entrance had to be negotiated. 
The current reforrn threw the pieces of this evolving power jigsaw into the air. The 'big 
pieces'- the state, the economic system and the sovkhozy and other institutions representing 
them - were suddenly displaced. With them went the'little pieces' - people'sjobs, incomes, 
childcare, housing, pensions - along with the accustomed balance of power within 
households and the sense of identity and security that accompanied them. Nevertheless, I 
ended Chapter 7 by evoking the 'deep structural' level at which women were once again 
being figured as the source of stability and the lynchpin of household strategies and the 
imagined new national community. 
The ethnography of changing gender domains presented in this thesis contributes to the 
ongoing debate amongst social anthropologists (in particular) about the relationship between 
'local social organisation and Soviet institutions, and its impact on current trajectories of 
change (Hann, Humphrey and Verdery, 2002). The debate has been particularly acute in the 
context of Central Asia, where there is a polarisation between three approaches. The first 
argues that Central Asian societies remained marginal to state socialism, meaning that 
'traditional' society was maintained and there is consequently no need to address the 
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relationship between the actual workings of the Soviet system and postsocialism. Tile second 
recognises that 'traditional' society was recomposed under the Soviet system, but argues that 
its collapse has led to a quasi-reversion to pre-Soviet forms of solidarity that ultimately 
transcend time and context. The third argues that 'reform is producing novel forms, that 
cannot be fully grasped through an analysis of pre-Soviet forms or their recomposition under 
the Soviet system' (Kand iyoti, 2002: 24 8)239. 
This ethnography has supported the third approach. The research pointed to the continued 
importance of the past, in this case both a Soviet and a pre-Soviet past, in tile way that 
individuals and communities are adapting to the present. It has illustrated that the ways in 
which local forms of social organisation, in this case, gender domains, interacted with Soviet 
institutions is having an impact on current trajectories of change. However, it was not simply 
a question of a'reversion' to indigenous gender domains left somehow untouched by Soviet 
modernisation. Inside and outside domains had accommodated to the socialist model of 
public and domestic spheres and both were being renegotiated in the new context of tile 
emerging private enterprises and market economy. As Pine cautions, 'in the post-socialist 
world, particularly, any discussion of continuity and change is complicated by the fact that 
many social and economic processes, which appear to be quite new, demonstrate under 
closer scrutiny a marked similarity to older relations and practices, whilst others which 
appear to be continuities are taking place in contexts which are drastically different from any 
that previously existed' (2002: 98). Speaking as the mother of a small child, the image which 
my research brings to mind is that of building blocks: some from home, others added or 
taken away by a capricious state, all used in ways not necessarily envisaged by their makers. 
As different geopolitical situations, systems of governance and locations in the global 
economy cause the development paths of the various post-socialist states to diverge, the 
question of how long it will be appropriate to speak of, write of and think of a category 
called 'postsocialism' is now being raised (Hann, Humphrey and Verdery, 2002). Like 
various other ethnographic studies of postsocialist rural communities, this research suggests 
that socialism continues to be an important point of reference for many people and is likely 
to remain so for a number of years, even if generational change lessens its direct relevance 
(Hivon, 1995; Kaneff, 1996; Konstantinov and Vladimirova, 2002)240. What is clear is that 
these complex processes of long-term transformation are still relevant, not only to the 
individuals and communities concerned, or to anthropologists, but also to the development 
community. 
239 Kandiyoti's analysis of these three approaches or models contains detailed illustrations of particular 
case-studies, including Roy's work on collective farms in Central Asia, in relation to the second 
approach, and Humphrey's study of a collective farrn in Buryatiya and her own ethnography of a state 
farm in Uzbekistan, in relation to the third. 
240 See also the contributions in Anderson and Pine, 1995; Bridger and Pine, 1998; Kandiyoti and 
Mandel, 1998; Burawoy and Verdery, 1999; Mandel and Humphrey, 2002 and Hann, et al, 2002. The 
latter gives a detailed overview of the key areas of anthropological research of postsocialism. 
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APPENDIXI 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILES OF THE RESEARCH COMMUNITIES 
Former Sovkhoz Lenin 
1994 1996 1997 
Total 1,954 1,653 1,509 






Sovkhoz employees 583 





























1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
No. of people 106 102 123 168 116 93 60 
N. B. Detailed records with breakdown by age, gender and ethnicity were not kept. In 
addition, the records only listed those who officially "deregistered" (Vypisyvalis) and were 
therefore only indicative since many people left "temporarily" and continued to be registered 
in the community. Some further details were garnered from an interview with the 
administrator esponsible. According to her information, largely from personal memory, in 
1991,56 men and 50 women left the community. These included the Director, who was 
transferred to the local town to work as deputy Akim and left taking his wife and family, two 
families who left for Germany and three who left for Russia. Of the others, many were 
young people (aged 17 to 18) :6 people (2 boys and 4 girls) left to go into higher education; 
44 people (23 boys and 21 girls) left to find other work. Of the male adults, most left to take 
up other work, mostly in the local town, either in the militsia or in the mines. Some 
pensioners left to live with children elsewhere. Of the female adults, 8 left to get married 
(traditionally high mobility of women, exodus on marriage); 6 followed their husbands who 
had found work elsewhere; II left to work or study; 2 left to stay with relatives and I went to 
Germany. In 1997 23 women left, 10 were pensioners who went to family elsewhere; 5 
followed their husbands; 6 left to work; I left to stay with relatives and I left to study. That 
year, 25 men left: 3 were pensioners; 7 went to relatives; 15 left to work. In total : 27% of 
those who left were pensioners; 44% left to find work; 2% left to study and 27% left to live 
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with relatives. Of these : those who left to work, 12.5% women and 31.25% men; 
pensioners 20.8% women and 6.25% men. With relatives women=12.5% and men=14.5%. 
Former Sovkhoz Druzhba: 
In 1991, the former state farm itself had an active population of 1,130 people, divided 
between the central village and four otdeleniye. 
Situation as of 1.1.1998 Total Alen Women 
Total population (of the rural district as a whole): 14,141 6921 7220 
Of which: 
1) Population under working age 4666 2371 2295 
2) Population of 'pre-pension age' (50+) 370 178 192 
3) Pensioners (60+ men)(55+ women) 1564 556 1013 
4) Population of working age and capable of work 7906 3994 3312 
Of which: 
Employment figures: 
People of working age and capable of work currently 1612 863 749 
unemployed: (1685 as of 
1.1.1997) 
Officially registered as unemployed: 351 
(190 as of 
aso 1.1.1997) 
People of working age and capable of work engaged in 2586 893 1693 
subsistence 
agriculture 
People of working age and capable of work engaged in 3593 2360 1233 
the formal economy 
Of which: I 
State sector 1122 986 136 
Private farms 1100 800 300 
Small businesses 130 60 70 
Self-employed 872 301 57 
Religious cults 22 14 8 




Of which those of working age: 14 
Mothers of large families 217 
Single mothers 76 
Women on maternity leave 419 
Invalids 1 346 1 1 
N. B. These official figures from the local Akimiat represent the situation as of 1.1.1998 
and cover the whole of the wider'rural community' of which tile former Druzhba state farm 
was a part. There appear to be a number of inconsistencies and discrepancies in tile figures, 
which should be taken as indicative of certain trends rather than totally accurate statistics. 
From discussions with the administrators responsible for compiling tile figures, these 
inconsistencies seemed to be connected with a number of factors. First, people themselves 
listed their situations according to different criteria. For example, whereas some people 
described themselves as 'unemployed' many preferred to describe their situation as being 
'self-employed' or as 'working in subsistence agriculture'. In some instances, people 
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appeared to have been counted in several different categories. Second, as discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5, figures on the number of people employed in the different branches of the 
economy, notably the numbers of men and women employed on private farms, were often 
based on 'ideal' patterns rather than actual practices. 
In- and Out-Mijuation 
From 1.1.1996-31.12.1996 From 1.1.1996-1.07.1996 
In-migrants Out-migrants 
Number of families 165 
Number of family members 
of which 686 
men 
women 
From 1.1.1997-31.07.1997 From 1.1.1997-31.07.1997 
In-migrants Out-migrants 
Number of families 66 1 46 
Number of family members 
of which 284 212 
men 
women 141 112 
143 too 
From 1.1.1997- From 1.1.1997- 
31.07.1997 31.07.1997 
In-migrants Out-migrants 
Number of families 66 46 
Number of family members 
of which 284 212 
men 
women 141 112 
143 1 100 
People of active working age 
of which 168 142 
men 
women 92 80 
76 162 
Nationality 
Kazak 234 121 
Russian 37 55 
Ukrainian - 3 
Belorussian 3 
Tatar I - 
German 1 16 
Uzbek I - 
Uighur 8 13 







Fronz, lto where From To 
Russia 6 31 
Ukraine - - 
Belorussia - 14 
Karakalpakistan 60 3 
Tadjikistan - - 
Turkmenistan II 
Uzbekistan 10 
Kyrgyzstan I - 
Azerbaijan - - 
Tatarstan - - 
Mongolia - - 
Turkey - - 
Germany - 121 
From/to other oblasts in 112 (Shymkent, 39 
Kazakstan Semipalatinsk, KyzI- 
Orda) 
Within Almaty oblast 183 04 
From 1.1.1998- From 1.1.1998- 
25.09.1998 25.09.1998 
In-migrants Out-migrants 
Including internal Excluding Including internal Excluding 
migrants internal migrants internal 
migrants migrants 
Number of families 103 55 85 54 
Number of family 
members 395 144 316 142 
of which 
men 190 69 160 73 
women 205 75 156 69 
People of active 248 89 205 94 
working age 
of which 
men 131 50 105 49 
women 117 39 100 45 
Nationality 
Kazak 353 130 128 28 
Russian 21 10 143 87 
Ukrainian - - 8 8 
Belorussian - - 
Tatar - - - 
German 7 4 16 18 
Uzbek - - 5 - 
Uighur 2 8 
Dungan I I 
Turkish 3 - 
Azeri 4 5 





FromIto where From TO 
Russia 9 9 92 92 
Ukraine - - I 
I 
Belorussia - - - - 
Karakalpakistan 110 110 21 21 
Tadjikistan - - - - 
Turkmenistan 10 10 - - 
Uzbekistan 7 7 4 4 
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 2 2 
Azerbaijan - - - - 
Tatarstan - - - - 
Mongolia - - - - 
Turkey - - - - 
Germany 7 7 22 22 
From/to other 133 43 
oblasts in Kazakstan 
Within Almaty 118 131 
oblast I I I II 
N. B. Figures ftom the local Akimiat. It was onlyfrom 1997 that more detailed breakdowns 
of the figures were available. According to the administrators responsible, the peak of in- 





EXTRACTS FROM WORK AND LIFE HISTORIES 
The extracts are from work and life histories recorded on the Lenin, Sarybulak, Druzhba and 
Zhenis state farms between November 1996 and August 1998. My main aim in including 
them is to highlight and illustrate some of the issues raised in the main body of the text by 
using people's own words to convey their stories and feelings about their experience. The 
extracts include both 'synchronic' information on daily life 'as it was' and 'dynamic' 
information on 'how it happened' (Pahl and Thompson, 1994: 131). Sometimes I asked 
people explicitly to'tell me their story'. Sometimes, reminiscences of the past were sparked 
by my questions about current experience and often people themselves moved between past 
and present experience. These extracts were therefore often embedded in longer 
conversations or interviews. On Sarybulak and Zhenis, the stories were told to me either on 
one occasion or over the space of a few days. On Lenin and Druzhba, I spoke to some 
people on only one occasion, but to others at different times over the course of several field 
trips. The style of writing reflects whether the histories were recorded on tape (in which case 
they are structured as first person narratives) or written up from detailed fieldnotes (in which 
case they are structured in a combination of first and third person narratives). In all cases, I 
have chosen to produce a narrative here, rather than reproduce the kind of extremely detailed 
text that would be used for primary discourse analysis. Some of the conversations were held 
in Kazak with interpretation in Russian; most were held directly by me in Russian. The 
translation into English is my own. Where it seemed useful, details about the circumstances 
in which the story was told and my relationship with the person concerned, have been 
included. 
Oldest Cohort (born between 1915 and 1945) 
Ded Petya, Slav, Pensioner, Central Village, Lenin Sovkhoz 
He is 73. He worked on the sovkhoz as a driver, then as a guard. He and his wife are now 
retired and live from his pension of 4,000 tenge and hers of 2,000 tenge. War veterans get 
telephone and light free. And he tells me there is a banquet for war veterans in the nearby 
town on 9 May, when they are all given 3,000 tenge. Now there are only 9 veterans left in 
the district - at 73, he is the youngest. 
'My parents came here from the Ukraine, as volunteers, in 1909. They were giving land 
then. We lived over there (points towards the steppe). We had our own farmstead (khutor). 
Maybe I hectare, 10 cows and 50 sheep. It was a small village, we were nearly all relatives. 
There were lots of villages then: 10 km further on, 8 kin further, dotted about. Here where 
the central village is now, there were only 5 or 6 earth houses (zentlyanki), over there where 
the broken down house is. The Kazaks lived in small groups - in winter in sanianki - 
primitive earth houses - in summer in yurts. 
There were no cars then - that was under Soviet power. We travelled by horse or by 
ox. There were seven of us in the family. My father died of typhus when I was little. I 
started work when I was 8- herding the sheep. Yes there was a school, but we had no 
money for clothes or shoes. My mother was bringing us all up herself. 
Then came the difficult time, when they went after the kulaks (rich peasants). My 
father was dead, so my elder brother served 5 years in prison, near Akmola. It was like a 
concentration camp. When 1,000 people died, they would carry them away on camels and 
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bury them in a common grave. But my brother was strong. He was still there - another 
1,000 and he was still there. Later he fought, all the way through Austria. 
I remember well. I was six years old. We had two wooden buckets of potatoes. The 
Chekisti, the NKVD came, and they took everything, even the old carthorse. My brother and 
I were on the floor. We knew we were going to go hungry, and tried to take some potatoes, 
but the man saw us, kicked us so hard up the behind... They even took our last potatoes. 
Five or six chekisti would come - they took everything. Thats what they called 
'collectivisation'. My mother came here, to the sovkhoz, to bake bread for the workers. They 
shot people too. They would come at night in the black van (chernyy voron) and take people 
away. All were afraid to talk then. That's was Stalin's law - but it was all Beria's fault. He 
wanted power, but Stalin trusted him. After Stalin's death things got better. 
I, went to fight when I was 17, in Ukraine and Manchuria. We Russians fought like 
beasts; we didn't even ask for food. The Germans were armed to the teeth; we only had 
pitchforks, but we broke their backs. It was terrible. 
My wife had to escape with her parents and sister from the Ukraine - they were 
bombed out. She was the only one to survive. She was sent here, first to 'Kazakstan' 
sovkhoz and then here. We've been married for 50 years. We don't have any children of our 
own, but we brought up one of my brother's sons. 
Last time I was in town was two months ago. We used to live well, under 
communism. Petrol was cheap. You could get everything you wanted. If s all Gorbachev's 
fault. If he were here, I would string him up by his feet from that lamp-post. 
It is better to work collectively. I couldn't farm now, I'm too old and the fields are too 
far away. Ask the young people there how they are doing. Maybe it is working well for 
them. But I can honestly say to you, we lived better then, that's how we lived (gesture of 
satisfaction). 
Tetya Anya, Russian, Pensioner, born 1936, Central Village, Lenin Sovkhoz. 
Tetya Anya lives with her husband and two of her grown up, unmarried, sons and one 
grandson. Her other son, recently divorced, lives nearby. The unmarried sons have set up a 
private farm, together with a friend. Her husband was present at the beginning of the 
interview. 
She was born in Pavlodar oblast. That was her homeland (zemlya). Her father was taken 
away to serve during the war and was killed and her mother died soon afterwards. 
[Addressing her husband, she says that they had a very different war. In Kazakstan, the men 
were all under suspicion of being spies and weren't taken away to fight. In Pavlodar, they 
only had women left. Her father was taken, then the neighbour. They were all taken one by 
one. ] 
She was 7 and went to live with her eldest sister, who was 19 and married to a man 
much older than herself. His first wife had left him and their two children were living with 
him. Did her sister love him? What did she know? She never talked about it. The marriage 
had been arranged by her godmother, a relative of his. She was Poor. What else was she to 
do? 
Very soon, her sister had had her first baby and she, aged 8, was his nanny, carrying 
him around although he was almost as big as she was. By age 9, she was chopping wood 
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together with her sister's stepdaughter, Yanka. And by 11, she was baking bread and 
cooking for the family. 
Her sister's husband was a difficult man, but he didn't drink. Then it got difficult to 
feed her - her sister had her own children - and she was sent to an orphanage run by a 
relative. There it was better. At least they had enough to eat. 
From the orphanage, she went to study at an agricultural college and graduated as a 
zootechnician. The day she graduated, the Director of the orphanage (her relative) bought all 
the graduees a present and he gave her a beautiful dark blue dress - which she only gave 
away last year because she couldn't fit into it any more - and a soft blue shawl and a pair of 
shoes. She had sewed herself a coat with the money she earned on work experience and 
froze in it when she was sent to Kazakstan, until she got a furjacket the second Winter. 
Everybody did work experience at the college. There was a real farm with livestock and 
grain. They all learned to milk cows. In principle they all learned to operate machinery too, 
though that never really sunk in. How a pump worked, for instance. How to ride a horse and 
saddle it up yourself 
She was sent to Kazakstan with her brother for her firstjob, 42 years ago, to work on 
one of the otdeleniye (2 nd ferma) as a zootechnician. What was it like here then? There was 
practically nothing here, just some of the houses you see in the central village now. They 
built up just about everything themselves, by their own efforts. There were just some earth 
houses (samanki) and some barrack type buildings. This house, she and her husband (ded) 
had built themselves. 
That first winter, she and her brother lived in a house with an earthen floor - not a 
wooden one like now. In the North, in Pavlodar, the floors were of wood, but here there was 
none, so they mixed clay and straw and laid it down. The Kazaks used to cover it with felt 
from wall to wall, but theirs was just earth. They didn't know they could ask for an advance 
and nobody told them, so for the whole Winter, they went without. They'd get some food 
from the storehouse. Later her brother was able to travel to one of the other villages and buy 
some provisions. 
It was mainly a sheep farm then, with some cattle and some fowls. Thefernly were 
over by the river (later diverted when they built the Irtysh-Karaganda canal). In the Summer, 
practically everyone was out on the zhaylau and she would be there too, checking the herd 
numbers with the shepherds. She didn't speak Kazak and they didn't speak Russian - so each 
did a count in their own language. The outlying villages were nearly all Kazak and tile central 
village nearly all Russian. But Kazaks her age spoke Russian too. 
All transport was by horse or ox and she rode everywhere herself, even over to the 
herds near Plodorovsky. It was scary. Plodorovsky was part of the zona (network of labour 
camps) then. The prisoners were building up the sovkhoz. There was barbed wire and 
watchtowers over by the hills. 
In winter, she would go and check the hazy (animal stalls) to check how much feed 
the animals got. Did people think it wasn't women's work? What does that mean, women's 
work or men's work? The zootechnician before me was a woman too. There were lots of 
women in agricultural work then. Perhaps we were simpler then, not as 'clever' as people 
today... What were the Kazak women doing? Quite a lot went to train at tile local 
agricultural college. A lot were'listed'as assistant shepherds, but what kind of work can you 
do when you have 10 or 12 children? Just some help maybe at shearing time. They were 
listed as working, but they were really at home, bringing up the children. 
248 
Things were difficult at first, but then year by year it began to get better. They could 
see the results. A new hospital. The school. Shops selling everything you could wish for. 
Transport to the town. 
Woman pensioner, Kazak, Lenin Otdeleniye, born in 1937 
I finished Kazak school. I have six children, five sons and one daughter. The eldest son 
lives in Karaganda. He's married with two children. The next eldest lives in the sovkhoz 
centre. He lives well. One of the next sons also lives in the centre - he's married to the head 
of the post office. And another lives in the rayon centre. The two other boys live with us - 
the youngest has just moved here, a few months ago. All five served in the army, they did 
good service, the eldest in Czechoslovakia. (Long silence, broken when I prompted her 
about her own life. ) I studied in Akmola oblast, in the rayon centre. Then I worked for 
fifteen years ..... Did I work all the time? Yes, yes... I got my pension at 55. (1 asked her if 
she worked when the children were small). I had four children, then I worked. (I asked her 
why she decided to work then). Because you needed to work to get a pension. (I asked her 
how her hushandfell about her workingfor the sovkhoz). He allowed it, so long as I could 
manage to do everything, do all the housework, then that was alright. We always had 
chickens, cows, sowed tomatoes, potatoes; 60 sacks last year. Now we give the children 
food, help them out. With cream and butter too. If you don't have a khozyaistvo, how would 
you live? The children living in the city, they need help. The problem now is that there is no 
khozyain on the sovkhoz. If you have a khozyain, you have everything. If you have no 
khozyain, then everything is a problem. Now you keep chickens, you sell the eggs, the milk, 
the butter and that's how you live. The traders come, and we get what we need in exchange, 
sugar, tea, for barter, they come on Saturdays, every Saturday. 
Middle Cohort (born 1945-1965) 
'Kirghizkal, woman shepherd, aged 45, Zhenis sovkhoz, jailoo, 19/7/98 
I am an assistant shepherd - I'm always busy. [My husband] is out with the stock all day. I 
take care of the household work (zanimayus khozyaistvom), milk the 
* animals, 
look after the 
young ones. My youngest son helps with the cooking; he cooks for his Dad if ever I'm not 
here. Left to his own devices, my husband would eat only bread. Some men are good - they 
help to get the water and to light the stove. Others just go out to the steppe and come back 
and do nothing. 
In April or May we go to a place called Sakhman for 45 days, for lambing. Then we 
come here to Ortyzken, the jailoo, and in October we go to the zimovka, where there are 
three families. In the Summer it is horrible there - near the main road. There are two 
quarries nearby, they're private enterprises now, which have electricity. People work there 
for 15 day shifts. Of course, it's much better out on the zhaylau. What on earth would I do 
with myself in the aul? No, we don't have electric light, or a fridge... But we keep food in 
the well. Or, for example, we bury products in a bucket inside the yurt. (They have a yurt 
and a wagon. - Her kitchen is outside. There is a stove for making bread and a second 
cooker, fired by dung, with two 'rings'and a samovar). 
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In winter I'm very busy. I'll have to go soon to whitewash the zimovka and get things 
ready; get the dung (kizyak) in for the Winter. Before, we used to get coal from tile sovkho. -, 
but we don't any more. Over the winter, I knit socks too and make felt (koshma). Out on tile 
steppe, I get headaches that can last 2 or 3 days, because of the sun and tile wind. 
My husband takes the stock out in the morning, comes back at 2, then goes to the 
river so that the sheep can have a rest and be washed. He comes home at about 5. There are 
1,200 sheep on the sovkhoz this year, and 600 new lambs. 
I was 'stolen' [into marriage] by her husband from Frunze [now Bishkek, 
Kyrgyzstan]. All my family are there. I'd never met him before... (Her husband's brothers 
and otherfamily members all live on the sovkhoz). 
What happened with privatisation? There was a meeting. All the men went, the 
shepherds too, but not the women - they had to look after the khozyaistvo. People were told 
that they could split up and take their own share - but nobody wanted to. In other places, 
everybody's out for themselves. People are selfish and mean. Here, say, if our neighbour 
needs a tractor, we will help him out. There, on the neighbouring farms, they wouldn't any 
more. The sovkhoz stills sends a truck to help us move; and we get paid still, but not money. 
We get vermicelli, macaroni, flour, sugar and tea. We have 50 of our own sheep and 3 cows. 
Last year we had more, but we sold them because the children needed clothes and books for 
school. When we need to buy something - vegetables, for instance - we sell meat or kumiss. 
Either me or [my eldest son] - he's in I Ith grade - go ourselves to sell on the market, or sell 
to the traders who come here. 
So long as we have sheep, everything will be OK. My sons will be shepherds too -a 
father and a son are like the front and back wheels of a car. ' 
Sandugash, Kazak, aged 39, Lenin Sovkhoz 
When we first got married, I was working in M. earning good money and the kollektiv was 
good, the work was interesting. He was working as a teacher on Lenin. I said, wily not 
move to the town? But he said, no, I have a good job here too. And you know how it is, 
here anyway, what the man says, goes, and I came here. But his parents interfered all the 
time. When I first came here, I didn't know Kazak. I could understand it, but not speak, and 
they were hostile to me because of that. And we were brought up amongst Russians and I'm 
used to speaking my mind. They hated that too. They said I was badly brought up. flow 
was I supposed to be? Modest Not speak. Defer to them. But that's not me, I can't live like 
that. 
My husband used to be a teacher of biology, drawing and computers (infornialika). 
He was quite senior, but he doesn't want to work. lie just sits at home and helps his parents. 
We don't even have a khozyaistvo. People are amazed. But he just can't be bothered. And I 
can't do everything on my own. He will not do housework. For example, one day, I said, 
'why don't you wash the floor while I'm at work? ' But he said, 'that's women's work% But he 
doesn't even do his 'man's work'. It's proper that when a man gets married, he provides for, 
feeds and clothes his family. He deals with getting hay, coal and firewood. It's true my 
husband does chop wood, but he is all mouth. This time last year he kept saying, 'We've got 
no coal, how are we going to heat the houseT But he didn't actually do anything about it. In 
the end it was me who had to find transport and go to the mine and get the coal. It's much 
easier for a man to do deals with other men, isn't it? They can sit down over vodka and 
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discuss things. It's easier. And it was the same story with the hay. You run, run, look for a 
car. And the men here, they say, 'why are you running about like a man (muzhik)? Don't you 
have a husband at home'. (Qu. Don't the other men mock him? ) He doesn't have any friends. 
He's with his parents all the time. He has no goal in life, he's not striving for anything. My 
father always told us it was important to set yourself a goal - to study, because you need 
education to get a good job; a goal, you know, it could be to get a wall-unit (stenka) for the 
home, a new suite of furniture, a car. I said to him, 'Let's save up for a car so we don't have 
to rely on anybody'. But every time, he'd see something, a pair of boots, whatever, and the 
money would go. My husband always in the end says, 'Why should 1, what do I need it for? '. 
It's in his blood -he's aTatar. His parents lived with just abed and a table'. 
Galya, Russian, aged 42, Druzhba 
She grew up in the North of Kazakstan and came to the Almaty area after finishing school to 
work in a cotton factory. Then there was slump in Uzbek cotton production and they put the 
factory on slow. At this point, she went on maternity leave, then worked at the kindergarten 
her daughter attended while simultaneously training to be a nurse. After that, she did 
evening classes and trained as a switchboard operator and got a job for the geological survey, 
based in a state farm community. Then she worked for the post office, before being made 
redundant. She worked for a while for a private cafe, but had left. She was eager to talk 
about her previous jobs, but very cagey about her current situation, except to say that whilst 
she tried to sell her flat in the city and buy a house in Druzhba, she was living there with her 
cousin and 'helping. She also 'helped' one of the women farmers to pick and sort potatoes 
and this conversation took place as she was 'helping' her to make preserves and pickles for 
the Winter. 
'There were thousands of jobs for women in Almaty then. Now look at the situation. I sold 
pies in a new private cafe for a while, but then I broke my leg and had to stop work. The 
owner tried to cheat me at first. He was an old man, a Turk, and I thought he'd be OK, 
respectable. But he tried to claim that 20 pies had gone missing and that it was my fault. I 
said to him, 'look at my work book - I've been responsible for budgets of thousands of 
roubles, and you think I'm going to steal 20 pies? You can try that on with a girl of 15, but 
don't try that kind of stuff with me. Well, he apologised, said he must have made a mistake 
himself.. And I carried on working for him. When I left, he complained that his takings and 
his customers were down... 
When I worked for the geologists, we'd be away for several months of the year, on 
expedition. We did aerial photos, all over Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, and I was responsible for 
communications and for the cooking. It was a 'men's collective. They were all solid guys, 
but they respected me. I still have the scar on my leg from where I was bitten by a snake in 
the desert and the team leader cut it open... I've seen poisonous snakes, tarantulas - their 
colour is different depending which soil they live in, reddish brown, rich black or striped. 
At the kindergarten, I used to take one of the little boys home with me every night, 
when the creche was closed. It was always me who stayed behind late. I was trained as a 
nurse. Anything could happen. He (the little boy) lived with his grandmother and she 
worked nights as a watchwoman so he came home with me, slept on my couch. I got into 
trouble with my boss over it. She wanted me to take the child of one of her own relatives. 
But I stood firm. I saw her recently, and remembered. 
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At the post office, it was always busy, there were always customers. I knew 
everyone, I have a memory like a telephone book. A man would walk in, and I would have 
dialled the number he wanted before he even said a word. 'Go on, you're through, tile time's 
ticking away already'. The other woman was always doing her nails, having tea. She 
complained that everyone always came to me, because I was young and lively and did things 
fast... I worked spells - my parcels always got through, never got lost, were always on time. 
I'm not afraid of living alone. I have done for the past 17 years. I came home one 
day and found my husband in bed with another woman. He didn't expect me back, but they 
were poisoning cockroaches in the off ice and sent everyone home... I told him straight off to 
get out, not come back. And I didn't take him back either. 
I'm happy so long as I'm busy, so long as I'm doing something. But what work is 
there now for us women over 40? The ads all ask for knowledge of computers - or for slim 
women with long legs... ' 
The Youngest Cohort (born after 1965) 
Fatima's daughter-in-law, Sarybulak 
One of Fatima's daughters had been 'stolen' the night before and this story was told to me 
during a feast held to mark this occasion. She began by telling me that she had also been 
'stolen' with her agreement. Then something seemed to boil over in her, she took me to one 
side and began to tell me another story. 
Her husband had 'stolen' her from the city in the middle of Winter and taken her on a lorry 
to the sands (peski), where the family was pasturing the stock, many kilometres away. She 
had protested, she had begged him, pleaded with him to take her back, to let her out. Later, 
many hours from the city, in the middle of the steppe, he had stopped the lorry and said 'So 
you want to get out do you? Go on then! '. He had mocked her. 
She had been studying to be a vet, in Dzhezkazgan. She had had only two terms to 
go before her final exams. She had wanted to work hard, to qualify. She and her (now) 
husband had been seeing each other for some time. It had been serious. But she had not 
been ready to get married. 
When they arrived at the zimovka of her parents-in-law, what could she do? She was 
angry, but it would have been shameful (stydno) to show anger in front of her father-in-law 
and mother-in-law. (By tradition she could not even address them by name). She was stony 
cold to her husband for as long as she could, but he hadjust laughed and said, 'Areyou going 
to stay angry with me all the time? How long do you think you can keep it up? Forever? '. 
And he was right, there was no escape. Where would she have gone? 
She had plucked up the courage to ask her father-in-law if she could go back to tile 
city to finish her studies. But he had refused - she might not come back, she might gulyat' 
(see other men) and shame the family name, his son had to stay and work on the zimovka so 
she had to stay too. His word was final. She got pregnant in the first week. By the time her 
parents had come, she was unmistakeably pregnant. 
She is still angry with her husband. She cannot make peace with him, it is her 
temperament. She is like that (she says this with a mixture of defiance and culpability). She 
wants to divorce him. She still has a flat in the city from her student days. Her mother-in- 
law does not want her to go. She says they need her, they will miss her, that she is the only 
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worthwhile snokha (daughter-in-law). She does not want to go to the zhaylau. It is dull and 
boring. There is no electricity. There nearest neighbours are five kilometres away. She has 
already had 5 years of this kind of life and it is enough... She doesn't know what she will 
do. 
Asel', Kazak, Lenin sovkhoz, 3 rd otdelenive 
She would like to go on and do further study - but the financial situation is difficult now. 
'Before, if your grades were good, you could be sure you would get a place. But now, it 
depends on having the money or connections. You even need to pay to pass exams'. 
Her sister had stayed at home for a year after school to help with the khozyaistvo. 
There's only one brother, and he is older and married with children. Both her parents are 
retired and can't cope on their own. They have 4 cows and 4 calves and 2 small ones, 26 
sheep (it was 28 but theyjust slaughtered one to give to relatives) plus hens and ducks. They 
used to have a lot of geese too, but for some reason this year they weren't fattening properly 
so they slaughtered them. Winter is the time when there's most work. In Summer, the 
animals are just put out to pasture, but in winter they have to be given hay and the sarai has 
to be mucked out... there's so much muck. 
She prefers the aul to the sovkhoz. Ifs much more beautiful - there are the hills 
really close and the river too. There's been less and less water over the past few years, 
although there are still some deep places where you can swim. There's more to do. People 
come visiting. But in the town, it's probably better. Her sister wanted to study too, but if s 
just not possible. She's working in a private bakery in town now - but it's really tough. She 
actually does the baking and it's hot and stuffy. Another sister sells bread - that's much 
easier. 'The girls who get married when they're still at school? No they're not my friends, 
they're a couple of classes ahead of me. If s stupid. They're stuck here now. They won't see 
anything of life. ' 
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APPENDIX 3 
Selective List of Legislation on Agrarian Reform and Farm Restructuring 
Source, Final Reportfor ADB TA. Project No. 2356, Strengthening the Implementation of 
Agricultural Sector Reforms, Volume 1, Main Report, September 1996: 23. Danagro, 
Adviser als in association with Landell Mills Ltd. for the Asian Development Bank 
1. Resolution 402 of the Government, April 1996, About Procedures for Providing 
Land Plots to Citizens and Legal Entities 
2. Resolution 402 of the Government, April 1996, About Distribution of Certificates on 
the Right of Land Plot Ownership and the Right of Permanent Land Use Among 
Citizens and Legal Entities; 
3. Resolution 403 of the Government, April 1996, About Establishing of the Regulation 
on Procedures of Application and Redemption of Land Plots for State Needs 
4. Edict of the President, December 22 1995, Concerning Land 
S. Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakstan, December 1994 
6. Resolution 625 of the Cabinet of Ministers, June 14 1994, Concerning the Approval 
of the Procedure for the Purchase and Sale by the Citizens and Legal Entities of the 
Republic of Kazakstan of the Right to Life Hereditary Tenure, the Right to Use or 
the Right to Lease Land Plots. 
7. Edict of the President, April 5 1994, Concerning Further Improvement of Land 
Relations 
8. Edict of the President, January 24 1994, Concerning Certain Issues of Regulating 
Land Relations 
9. Law of the Republic of Kazakstan, 1992, Concerning the Introduction of 
Amendments and Additions to the Land Code of the Kazakh SSR, the laws of the 
Kazakh SSR'Conceming Land Reforrn in the Kazakh SSR!, 'Conceming Peasant 
Farms in the Kazakh SSW and the Law of the Republic of Kazakstan'Conceming 
Privatisation of Assets of State-Owned Agricultural Enterprises' 
10. Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh S SR, June 199 1, Regarding the 
Procedure for the Implementation of the Law of the Kazakh SSR'Concerning the 
Land Reform in the Kazakh SSW 
11. Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, February 13 199 1, Concerning the 
Implementation of the Land Code of the Kazakh SSR. 
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APPENDIX 4 
STATISTICS ON FARM PRIVATISATION 
1) NATIONAL LEVEL 
I. l. Transformation of Sovkhozes into New Farming Enterprises: 1992-1995 
Years Total of New Collective Joint Farming Co- Small Peasant 
privatised enterprises Enterprises Stock Partnerships operatives Enterprises Farms 
sovkhozes formed Companies 
Total 
1992 972 1938 794 99 358 762 
1993 130 159 64 30 7 15 12 31 
1994 761 3207 53 220 52 344 1950 588 
11995 1 469 1 746 1229 72 1134 1 86 15 1 210 
1 Total 1 16050 11140 1367 1193 1544 12335 1159 
Source: Goskomstat 
Cited in Final Reportfor ADB TA. Project No. 2356, Strengthening the Implementation of 
Agricultural Sector Reforms, Volume 1, Main Report, September 1996: 30. Danagro 
Adviser als in association with Landell Mills Ltd. for the Asian Development Bank. 
Notes: 
1) In 1996, the ratio of peasant farms to privatised sovkhozes fell well below the 
average for the total period 1992-1995. 
2) The category of small agricultural enterprises largely represents enterprises formed 
around structural units of former state farms and are, in fact, another form of 
collective enterprise. 
3) At this time, most kolkhozes had not yet changed status. 
1.2. Number and Area of Peasant Farms, 1990-1995 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Number ofpeasantfarms al 324 3,333 9,262 16,283 22,325 31,055 
Total area offarms (000) ha - 1,083 4,936 6,471 7,828 13,317 
Average size offarm, ha 
- --- 
325 533 397 350 428_ 
Source: Final Reportfor ADB TA. Project No. 2356, September 1996: 28 
Notes: 
1) The average size of peasant farms varies widely. In steppe areas they may average 
400 hectares but almost all the land will be permanent pasture. In irrigated areas, the 
average size is nearer 40 hectares and close to cities farms may be as small as 4 
hectares. 
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1.3. Size Structure of Peasant Farms 




Percentage of total area ofpeasant 
PrIns 
<5 20 neg 
5-10 10 neg 
10-35 15 1 
35-100 18 3 
100-200 11 4 
200-500 11 8 




FT-otal 1 100 - 100 
Source: Goskornstat, cited Final Report for ADB T. A. Project No. 2356, September 1996: 29 
Neg. = negligible 
2) FIELDWORK COMMUNITIES 
2.1. Karaizanda Oblast': State farms largely opted to remain as large entities; 
relatively few 
private farms. 
(Situation in August 1997: based on interview and statistical material from the oblast' 
agricultural administration) 
Karaganda Oblast: 3,757 private (peasant) farms, 1,020 with Gos At na Zemlyu and 
956withPatent. Data not disaggregated by gender and exact figures 
for number of farms headed by women unavailable. My informant, a 
civil servant from the province's agricultural administration, knew of 
only one farm where a woman was registered as the head. 
Lenin Rayon: II former state farms, re-organised into cooperatives andjoint stock 
companies 
173 private farms registered, of which 125 had a GosAkI and II had 
gone through the full ownership registration and certification process 
In the rayon as a whole, no women had been registered as heads of 
private farms. 
Lenin Sovkhoz: Farm reorganised as ajoint stock company (A. 0. ) 
5 private farms created 
No female-headed farms 
2.2. Zhezkazizan Oblast': Selected at Ministerial level in 1992 as a pilot region for 
farm privatisation; the majority of state farms restructured 
completely into smaller enterprises. 
(Situation in August 1998, based on interviews with rayon agricultural administration and 
village Akimiat) 
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Sarybulak Rayon: All but one state farm totally reorganised (the exception was a 
special breed centre, which first remained as state property, then 
became a joint stock company in which half the shares were held by 
the state). 
Sarybulak Sovkhoz: The sovkhoz split into 52 private farms and small enterprises. No 
farms officially headed by women, but de facto at least three women 
were running farms. 
2.3. Almaty Oblast': Privatisation produced a relatively large number of small private 
farms, but there was wide variation between the different rayons. 
Mast: (Nov. 1995): 90 of the original 123 state farms had been 
restructured, leading to the creation of 39 joint stock companies, 64 






(1998) over half of the state farms radically restructured. 
Most farms restructured into cooperatives and joint stock companies. 
1989- First'private farmers' (arendatory) leased land from the 
sovkhoz; 
1990- They and others entitled to take land and set up private 
(peasant) farms (kresjýyanskie khozyaistvo); by 1994, there 
were 41 such farms. 
1994- One of the first of the riýyon's state farms to opt for radical 
restructuring: 
sovkhoz divides into 7 producer co-operatives based on the 
former otdeleniye and 27 krestyan'skie khozyaistva. 
The land distribution model gives all shareholders 
demarcated land plots rather than merely paper shares. 
1996 -All but one of the cooperatives split into associations of 
private farms and family farms. 
1998 - 434 private farms registered, of which 40 officially 
headed by women. 
1998 -Two contrasting tendencies: 
1) further splitting of family farms into smaller units (i. e. 
farms based on the extended family into farms run by 
individual households; 
2) agglomeration of family farms into larger units, such as 
associations. 
Figures from TACIS project "Support to Private Farmers and Cooperatives". 
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FIELD RESEARCH 
1. Formal Interviews 
1.1. Pilot Trip : October-December 1996 
Chief Accountant of Lenin Collective Farm, Dzambulskii raion 
Country Director of Mercy Corps International 
Head of the Regional Board of Agriculture of Almaty 
Head of Dzuldiz Independent Fanners' Association 
Project Director, Food Systems Restructuring Project, Agricultural Co-operative 
Development International 
Regional Director of the Winrock International Farmer-to-Farmer Program 
Representative from TACIS Project DKA 9203, 'Support to Private Farmers and Co. 
operatives in the Almaty and Taldykurgan regions, (Attendance of end of project seminar, 
6/2/96). 
Representative from TACIS Project Tilot Projects in Agricultural Enterprises in Animal 
Production and Fresh Produce Sector' 
Representative of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) in 
Kazakhstan 
UNDP WID Programme Officer 
1.2 Second Field Research Visit : October - December 1996. 
Interview with Professor Bektorganova and Kudrat Dzhamalov, Association of Sociologists 
and Political Scientists of Kazakstan. 
Interview with Meral Akkent, Turldsh sociologist. 
Interview With Craig VanDevelde, Regional Director, Winrock International Farmer-to 
Fanner Program. 
Interview with Daulat Chunkanov, Project Officer, Winrock International Farmer-to-Farmer 
Program. 
Interview with Robert Kossman and J. D. Von Pischke, Enterprise Development and 
Financial Services Group, D. A. 1 (Development Alternatives International), contractor for 
Asian Development Bank (working on rural credit project). 
Interview with Mike St Martin, consultant, D. A. I. 
Interview with Ben Steinberg, Regional Director VOCA. 
Interview with Raushan Kryldakova, local representative of HIVOS organisation. 
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Interview with outgoing WID development officer, UNDP. 
Interview with incoming WID development officer, UNDP. 
Interview with Chris Osakwe, advisor to the President on legal reform. 
Interview with representative of CASDIN (NGO support organisation). 
Interview with Leonard Klein, Regional Director of Counterpart Consortium, USAID 
Contractor working on NGO development. 
Interview with Mansiya Kainazarova, NGO development officer, Counterpart Consortium. 
Interviews with members of 'Shiragin' Women's Association. 
Interview with Head of Women and Law Association. 
Participant observation, meeting of 'Delovye Zhenshchiny' (women's NGO) 
Participant observation, International AIDS Day Meeting. 
Participant observation, UNDP, meeting of women's NGOs. 
Participant observation, meeting of Shiragin Women's Association and USAID 
representatives. 
Interviews with farm women on 'Luch Vostoka' former sovkhoz, Almatinskii oblast, (visit 
with representatives from TACIS 'Pilot Projects in Agricultural Enterprises in Animal 
Production and Fresh Produce Sector). 
interviews with farm workers on 'Dzhetiginsldi' former sovkhoz, (visit with representatives 
from TACIS Tilot Projects in Agricultural Enterprises in Animal Production and Fresh 
Produce Sector). 
Interviews with women workers at milk processing plant, near Dzhetiginskii former 
Sovkhoz. 
Participant observation of meeting of association of farmers and representatives of TACIS 
Farmer Support Program, Chemolgan, Kaskelen Raion. 
Interviews with women farmers, Chemolgan, Kaskelen Raion. 
Interview with rural women from Semipalatinsk Oblast, taking part in HIVOS project. 
1.3 Third Field Research Visit : May - December 1997 
Interviews and participant observation with representatives of TACIS projects Tilot 
Projects in Agricultural Enterprises in Animal Production and Fresh Produce Sector' and 
'Fanner Support Program! projects. 
Interviews with UNDP gender and development representative. 
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Interview with consultant with World Bank Poverty Alleviation Programme, Bishkek. 
Interview with representative of Swiss-Kyrgyz Forestry Project, Bishkek. 
Initial and follow-up interview with director of UNDP Women and Development National 
Bureau, Bishkek. Participant observation in the Bureau. 
Interview with representative of Counterpart Consortium, Bishkek. 
Interview with representative of TACIS Co-Ordination Unit, Bishkelc 
In terview with representatives of HIVOS office, Bishkek. 
Participant observation, herding families, Song Kul Lake. 
Interview and participant observation with members of the "Shoola" women's NGO, 
Bokonbaevo village, Tonskii Rayon, Issk-kul oblast. 
Interview with head of women's NGO 'Soyuz Sel'skikh Zhenshchin, Ion Bulak village, Issk 
Kul oblast. 
Talk with women in the fields, Ion Bulak village. 
Participation in seminar 'Institutsional'noe razvitie zhenslcikh nepravitel'stvennykh 
organizatsii' organised by Forum zhenskikh nepravitel'svtvennykh organisatsii Kyrgystana, 
II July 1997. 
U., VV. E. L. LEARNING RESOURCES 
